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ABSTRACT 
Linguistic Contexts and Verbal Learning in Primary School Children. 
Research on the deciphering of nonsense words within the context of text, a story, or tale 
was conducted at various schools and day-care centres in the Stirling area of Scotland in 
1985-1988. Three experiments were conducted, in which large samples of primary school 
children aged 4-12 were tested. The experiments resembled Werner and Kaplan's (1950) 
"Word-Context Task, " in which isolated sentences in a series with one nonsense word in 
each sentence were presented to school children. The children were asked to answer 
questions about the meanings of these words. The results were not in line with the rapid 
word learning that experience suggests happens in young children, it was not until after age 
9 that the children started to give approximately correct answers, and prior to age II the 
answers did not meet up with proper adult definitions. It has been pointed out, however 
(Donaldson, 1978), that because these sentences were not supported by any relation to 
immediate context and behaviour, and because the children were required to process 
utterances as pure isolated language--an unnatural situation for language acquisition, the 
"Word-Context Task" may have given an unrealistic picture of the child's ability to acquire 
language naturally. 
In the three word-leaming studies at Stirling University in 1985-1988, in order to 
account for a more natural presentation, the sentences with the nonsense word were 
embodied in the context of a story. Children were thought to fare better (than the children 
in the Wemer & Kaplan study) when listening to such a story, especially if the basic theme 
was of interest. 
A methodological tool, refined in the work of Dockrell (198 1), in which the full 
meaning of a term involves having worked out the sense, reference, and denotation of the 
term. was applied in each of the test batteries that followed the presentation of the story. In 
these tests, the children were tested on both their comprehension and production of the new 
ion of the term in question. Drawings were used in order to try to tap the children's denotati 
new tenn, and to facilitate young children's approach to the demands of the study. 
I 
As regards word meaning in general. Martin Joos (1972) had argued that the 
common blunder was that an odd word must have an odd sense--the odder, the better. He 
argued that one should define words in such a fashion as to make them contribute least to 
the total message derivable from its passage where it is housed, rather than, e. g.. defining it 
according to some presumed etymology of semantic history. He called this concept 11 a tacit 
principle, " and argued that word learners and word users would sense the intuitive 
familiarity of the conveyed meaning of words and text. Words are. according to this 
principle, "mysterious" in their environment, their meanings are not worked out 
deliberately, intentionally; rather, one should make the mysterious item maximally 
supportive and supported in its situation, in order that redundancy would result in proper 
connotation of the distributed meaning. Context and knowledge of contexts reveal 
meaning; the text is processed holistically, and so are the instantaneous meanings of the 
words of which it is composed. 
Thus, Joos maintained that in deciphering an unknown word, the wisest course is to 
assume the "least meaning" consistent with the context. Tasks such as Werner and Kaplan's 
"Word-Context Task" (1950), force subjects to infer aspects of meaning that go well 
beyond this "least" meaning and, as Joos pointed out, this leads notably to errors from 
which recovery is difficult. 
In the studies at Stirling University, attempts were made to determine if different 
types of learning would result in different types of responses. The dichotomy, 
intentional/incidental or analytic/holistic was worked out into experimental and control 
conditions, as based on Aveling's pioneering experiment (1911,1912) into the general and 
particular aspects of encoded stimuli. Later, Lee Brooks (1978) worked with the 
dichotomies intentional/incidental in his Lepton experiments and argued that the more 
complex a behaviour is (speaking or writing, for example), the more likely it is to be 
learned implicitly. He pointed out, however. that the dichotomies explicit/implicit, 
analytic/non analytic, and deliberate vs. intuitive processes need to be elaborated and not 
taken as a strict division. 
In the three experiments at Stirling, children of primary school age (ages 4 to 12) 
were presented with a "word-context" task and their understanding of the unknown word 
was probed under different conditions. In the control condition a control word was probed. 
but in the experimental condition the child's understanding of the target word was fully 
tested. All the children listened to a short story displayed by a video or read from a tape in 
which the unknown word occurred in several different contexts, the unknown word in each 
story denoted an unfamiliar natural kind. During the story's display, children in the control 
condition were, at certain intervals, asked questions about the story's theme. Children in the 
experimental group were, at these same intervals, shown a sample of objects, to one of 
which the unknown word referred, and they were asked to hand these objects to the 
experimenter as she requested the objects, or they were asked direct questions about the 
meaning of the target word and about other words in the story. After hearing the story, all 
subjects were tested on their comprehension and production of the unknown word, together 
with other words, and a scoring procedure based on a technique developed by Dockrell 
(198 1) was applied. This procedure necessitated the full meaning of the term covering 
aspects of the sense, reference., and denotation of the new term (cf. Lyons, 1977a). 
The results indicate that children younger than those tested in the Wemer and 
Kaplan's "Word-Context Task" (ages 8.6 to 13.6) could decipher the full meaning of the 
new term. But individual differences within age groups showed greater differences than 
existed between age groups. All in all, the results indicate that working out the full 
meaning of a new term is a lengthy process indeed (Campbell & Dockrell, 1986), even 
though a sense of the given semantic domain may often be established quite early in the 
learning process. Performance styles also differ from younger children to older ones. 
The results indicate that there were significant age differences between the children 
in the first and second experiments, but that such differences were lacking in the third 
experiment, and that control subjects in the three studies seldom gave poorer responses 
than did experimental subjects and often did better. However, the results must be 
interpreted in the light of learning and recovery from error occurring, within the 
experimental subjects in the course of deciphering. If the initial scores of the experimental 
subjects on the target word as obtained during encoding are compared with the first scores 
obtained from the control subjects after they had heard the whole story, there is a 
significant difference in scores between the conditions in favour of the control subjects in 
III 
all age groups. This is consistent with Joos's assumption that an interference concerninLy the 
meaning of a word that occurs too early in the learning task and not enough information of' 
contextual cues will lead the children in the experimental groups astray in their guesses 
when asked too early for answers on the new word's meaning. But implied in Joos's Axiom 
is the likelihood for recoveries from errors, and the strategies children use in order to work 
them out need to be explored further. 
Much individual variation was found among the children's responses in the age 
groups. These differences were indeed more significant than were the differences between 
age groups. Overall, the children did very well at these tasks and that result may be related 
to the population from which they were selected, Stirling UniversIty Playgroup, 
Psychology Department, Dunblane Primary Schools Nursery and Killin playgroup and 
primary Schools in Central Scotland. 
In general, the study provided support for Joos's idea (1958,1967,1972) that early 
interference with the meaning of a new word when deciphering from a verbal context 
results in errors. However, recovery is possible, if not guaranteed. The study also indicated 
that children much younger than Werner and Kaplan's subjects (1950) could work out the 
full meaning of the unknown word. Earlier studies on context such as theirs may have been 
biased in using experimental setups with bits of isolated language and thus not tapping the 
real capability of the young word-learner who may come to learn words and their meanings 
through contexts, through the procedures that the word is linked to, through the verbal 
and/or nonverbal circumstance it is used in, and accompanied by actions, and exercised; 
what John Dewey had termed "context of use" (1910). 
Also, it is clear from the study that at a young age children are able to establish a 
sense of the given semantic domain a new word belongs to and a stable denotata, as their 
drawings indicate, but in order to decipher the full meaning of a new term is a lengthy 
process indeed for most children (Carey, 1978a, Campbell & Dockrell, 1986; Miller & 
Gildea, 1987). 
In all age groups and in all conditions there were differences between the children's 
comprehension and production of the new term in favour of comprehension. However, that 
result may be related to the nature of the experimental setup (the children gained more 
IV 
experience in working with comprehension than with production), and does not necessarily 
give support to the claim that comprehension precedes production. 
There were differences in the age groups between comprehension and production: 
children in all conditions gave more correct answers in the comprehension tasks and is in 
accord with earlier experimental evidence. There were children in all age groups who 
clearly had acquired the full meaning of the new word. its sense, reference, and denotation. 
whereas the average picture of the children's performance on all these three aspects was 
quite scattered. This is in accord with earlier work of Dockrell (198 1), which suggests that 
to work out the full meaning of a new term is a lengthy process, even though a sense of the 
give semantic domain may often be established quite early. In a posttest, two to three 
weeks later , in which all the children were tested again on the unknown word, it was clear 
that learning had indeed taken place and that in most cases children who had mapped the 
new word's meaning in the first experimental set-up, now felt surer about the unknown 
word's meaning. 
In general, the study provided support for the view that too early interferences and 
constraints in the learning task lead the young word learner astray, but that children may 
nevertheless recover from their errors when provided with more inforination and time. The 
study also demonstrated that the children were motivated to work at the tasks set before 
them and that their drawings are a valuable experimental and educational tool for tapping 
young children's representations. 
The results indicated that the control group subjects in all age groups fared better 
than did the experimental subjects, and age group differences here were, in most cases. 
significant. That the control group subjects fared better is consistent with Joos's assumption 
that too early an interference on a word's meaning will lead the children astray in their 
process of deciphering. However, bombarding the children in the experimental groups with 
questions on the meaning of the unknown word while they are in the process of encoding 
hampers the needed reorganisation of the tacit semantic representation underlying their 
meaning of words. 
The different tests that were designed for the three experiments reveal interesting 
individual variations in the sample and different testing profiles. The tests show much 
V 
correlation among them, such that tests that were designed in order to test forverbal 
coding, comprehension, and general knowledge correlate highly and tests that "ý-ere 
designed to test for imaginal coding (depicting) show positive correlation to these verbal 
comprehension tests--high scores on the verbal tests usually relate to good performance in 
the depicting tests--and tests that were designed for the production of the new word also 
show positive correlation with tests that only test for comprehension. and. finally. tests of 
categorisation that were designed to test for linguistic definitions--for conceptual 
understanding and declarative skill based on the understanding of logical relationships 
between words in a taxonomy--show some positive correlation to the other tests (such as 
the ones of production) but less to others. The test results may indicate that the tests of 
production and the tests of linguistic definitions better reflect semantic content and true 
linguistic ability than tests of comprehension, general knowledge, and imaginal coding that 
may be broader and cover more functions and thus reflect general, cognitive knowledge. 
These results from the different tests confirm the idea that the meaning of a word 
has many phases, each of which takes time to grow and to be mastered by the child, the 
results also show that within the same child and between children there are differences as 
to their fluency in dealing with these different phases of word meaning and mastering 
them. Thus, the results confirm the basic notion of this thesis, namely, that different phases 
are involved in both the composition of a word within text, and in the deciphering of that 





This thesis addresses the process of semantic development in children of 4 to 12 years. In 
particular, there are two emphases: a) the observation of developmental differences in 
children's acquisition of the meanings of unfamiliar words from linguistic contexts and b) 
the examination of the effects of experimental interventions on the lexical entries for these 
new words during continuous assessment. 
The development of word meaning is not a simple one-trial affair, rather the 
process of learning the meanings of words is done slowly by repeated encounters with a 
word in a number of specific contexts. For children, acquiring the meaning of a new word 
can be a lengthy process. They may progress through various "wrong theories" of a word's 
meaning, but they are adaptive and have various linguistic and non-linguistic strategies to 
map the proper meaning (cf Campbell & Dockrell, 1986). 
The three developmental studies that are described in this thesis are based on the 
work of Julie Dockrell and Robin N. Campbell at Stirling University. On basis of their data 
(198 1), they have argued that the process of co-ordinating information from various 
sentences about the meaning of a new word would be accomplished without a child's 
awareness; thus the precise meaning of a new term would be acquired through a process of 
semantic reorganisation and with further experience with the word. This process may be 
hampered, they have argued, if the child is required too early to make a precise guess as to 
the meaning of the new term. 
Martin Joos (1972) has argued that, when deciphering an unknown word, the safest 
course is to assume the least meaning consistent with the context. This least meaning, 
though inevitably wrong, includes the correct meaning and converges on it through 
intersection with least meanings inferred from future encounters with the word. He calls 
this tacit understanding of words in the context of sentences, Semantic Axiom Number 
One. Hill (1970) states the same idea in the following: "Meaning is never given by an item 
which is totally unpredictable. It only occurs when an item is one set of possibilities 
already defined by the context. In fact, this characterisation of meaning has led me on 
occasion to define meaning as partial predictability" (p. 252). Similarly, the inferences and 
predictions in the deciphering of words are based on incidental rather than intentional 
processing and learning. 
The basic aim of the developmental studies outlined in this thesis is to demonstrate 
a corollary of Joos's Axiom: that children in the process of acquiring a new word should be 
given time to co-ordinate their meanings and to learn about the subject matter. As can be 
implied from Joos's Axiom, when the child is required to infer the full meaning of an 
unfamiliar word, such inferences are inevitably erroneous and recovery from these errors is 
problematic. 
1.2. Joos and Meaning. 
In the following, I discuss the main theoretical and empirical notions that the research 
presented in this thesis is based on. 
As the thesis tackles the issue of context, I start with definitions that have been 
given of that concept. Context can be seen as the interconnected whole that gives meaning 
to its parts--the sum being different from the parts. Similarly, language can be thought of as 
a Gestalt, a holistic phenomena of many levels of organisation that are not to be equated 
with their entering components. Context can be divided into verbal and nonverbal context. 
Verbal context has suggested itself as an important factor in the process of word-meaning 
acquisition. The knowledge actually relied upon by children when deciphering new words 
may be extremely fragmenta1y and therefore easy for either the child or the observer to 
miss when the child's explicit knowledge of a new word is assessed. In deciphering the 
meanings of new words from contextual to acontextual meaning, a process of 
decontextualization must occur. Light and Butterworth (1992) have pointed out that 
decontextualization, generally, may arise through the child's construction of mental 
models. They describe this construction in the following: 
A need for greater understanding is initially aroused by perception of 
incongruous events, it is developed and supported by dialogue and peer 
group approval, and it flourishes if mental modelling is unhindered by the 
immediate need for a definite solution to the problem (1992, p. 10- 11). 
Thus, when children are in the mental process of modelling their new concepts or creating 
the meanings of new words out of fragmentary knowledge, explicit questioning could act 
as an interference effect on their perception and on their progress. The nature of word 
meaning may be such that it does not lend itself to componential associative specification, 
therefore, explicit questioning may go against the child's natural sensitivity for the integrity 
of the perceived lang ..,, age. 
In sum, with the nature of word meaning and the relation between language and 
thought, the question is whether productive insight-thinking and creative representational 
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processes are needed or atomistic, reductive representational processes. or. whether all 
these processes interact somehow. 
Johnson-Laird has suggested (1985) that everyday reasoning is based on types of 
culturally specific knowledge; that the appropriatcý context evokes its representation, and 
that perception presupposes context in deriving meaning from experience. Reasoning has 
been defined as the ability to call upon, in regularly occurring settings, an appropriate 
scheme, or context- sensitive rule that has been derived from experience (Light & 
Butterworth, 1992). Light and Butterworth further argue that the ecological framework for 
cognition and the role of perception may have been underestimated in the cognitive 
functioning underlying children's language acquisition, and that when perception is 
construed as an aspect of cognition, this position will contribute towards a new 
understanding of thinking as "situated in the world. " Hence, if language perception is 
blurred erroneous cognition may result by which the child's function and adaptation in the 
world can become affected. 
In order to learn a word, the child must be able to associate its sound with its 
meaning. There are separate learning processes underlying this association: the child must 
master the mechanics of uttering the word and recognise the word and s/he must master the 
concept that the word expresses. Even if the child knows that an object has a peculiar 
name, s/he may need many repetitions before the sound of the new word becomes familiar. 
Miller (1978) has argued that when a word appears in a sentence, subjects have access to 
definitional (meaning) information about the word and to contextual (selectional- 
restriction) information associated with the word. Two stages have been detected in the 
child's appreciation of the meaning of a word: a rapid stage and a slower, lengthier one. 
Children are quick to notice new words and to assign them to broad semantic categories--to 
the proper semantic field. They can keep such fields separate even prior to knowing what 
the individual words mean but for them to work out the logical discriminations for the 
word within a taxonomic framework takes much longer (Miller & Gildea, 1987) (see Fig. 
P. 9). 
The Canadian linguist, Martin Joos, has advanced the idea (1972) that words are 
understood tacitly as they appear in sentences, thus every hearer assumes that sentences are 
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to be interpreted in accord with maximum rather than minimum congruence with their 
environment. This idea implies that in situations where the meaning of the context is 
known, that meaning is best which contributes least or changes least the total context. Joos 
has called this tacit understanding of words in sentences Semantic AxIom Number One and 
states it as follows: "It is the rule that the best guess is that one which maximises the 
redundancy of word and environment together" (p. 257). 
Joos terms the relationship between verbal and nonverbal contexts, or between 
linguistic patterning and extralinguistic patterning, correspondence meaning. He maintains 
that correspondence meaning can be deciphered from "other" meanings only conceptually. 
and then only briefly, for as soon as one tries to employ the distinction it vanishes (cf. Hill. 
1970). He says that he did not invent correspondence meaning himself but deciphered it 
from successful work published during several centuries and from the work of pioneers in 
child psychology, such as the Stems. Joos maintains that the common blunder is that an 
odd word must have an odd sense--the odder, the better. Instead, he argues, one should 
define words in such a fashion as to make them contribute least to the total message 
derivable from the passage where it is inserted so that the mysterious item is made 
maximally supportive and supported in its situation. Then, he maintains, redundancy would 
bring forth the proper result. 
Joos's main impetus for the formulation of the Axiom came as he worked as a 
lexicographer and a teacher composing text footnotes and glossaries for readers of Middle 
High German poetry. The main text that he was translating came from the Arthurian 
Romance, " Parzival, " by Wolfram von Eschenbach. In this long poem, there were 19 lines 
(verses 46 to 49) and one word, especially, the meaning of which Joos and his co-worker, 
Whitesell were constantly trying, in vain, to decipher. Many lexicographers before them 
also had been unsuccessful. The lines were as follows: 
11... all red at the hero's desire 
was his sword reddened 
towards the edge/sharpness 
however gelaetet" 
(Joos, 19722, p. 258). 
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It was their long-term confusion over the word gelaetet that Joos has described. After 
some years of struggle with the word and the context of the poem. a solution as to the 
word's meaning suddenly emerged: 
'fall red at the hero's desire 
was his sword reddened, 
towards the edge however leadened" 
(Joos, 1972, p. 262) 
"Leadened" for "Gelaete ;" that is, just barely showing a border of bluish grey bare metal 
or hardened (Hatto, 1980). Joos (1972) pointed out that personal experience and 
background knowledge were important factors in deciphering. A person must profit from 
other personal experiences sufficiently to guess the meanings of unfamiliar words 
correctly, to see that the least meaning of a new word is identical with the meaning of 
another word in a similar context or environment. 
Joos argues that the audience of the poem, in the age when it was written and 
recited, knew and were more familiar with the situational context to which the fictitious 
poem referred. According to him, this familiarity was bound to have helped them to 
decipher the appropriate meaning of the word by using their subconscious, tacit knowledge 
as they listened to the text. This process would have been so swift that it could only have 
happened subconsciously. Joos states that in their search for the word's meaning, he and his 
co-worker underwent the same discovery procedure of learning new materials as do 
children--namely that of testing the theory to find the best fit, a process that takes place 
without awareness. He further maintains that there develops in that process a matrix of 
both conscious and unaware knowledge and that very often, out of the unconscious moiety 
of that matrix, the answer, solution, or meaning, emerges unpredictably and unscheduled. 
To this Joos adds: 
Now let me muster the useful matrix elements that I can retrieve and 
consciously display, presumably not all of them: we never know how much 
we know after all (p. 260). 
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In his work. "The Five Clocks, " Joos describes his ideas about the different styles 
of English. His general idea about a reader's processing of linguistic information is that 
very often the process is automatic and based on some unaware familiarity. Readers %vill 
subconsciously feel what a given text means and their intuition will guide them in the 
deciphering (Joos, 1967, p. 72-75). Joos argued that English is a code and that trying to 
work the code consciously and logically instead of "listening to what clearly responsible 
people actually say" is bound to result in error. He spoke of linguistic adjustments as basic 
complex ways in which speakers adjust their language to the various contexts in which 
they employ their language. He further maintained that the perceived acoustic input was 
interpreted by hearers unconsciously and very rapidly with reference not only to the 
phonological structure but to more abstract levels of grammatical categorisation. 
The American linguist, J. P. Denny (1978), later echoed similar views when 
speaking of "economy of effort. " He distinguishes between what he calls "our thought 
capabilities, " (the concepts we are able to form if necessary) and "our thinking habits. " The 
linguistic channelling of thought arises like this: 
To understand the importance of economy of effort we must remember that 
people use language as an automatic, unconscious tool to facilitate 
information-processing in the course of other tasks which are subject of their 
conscious attention and effort. They will resist the need to think about how 
to express an idea in their language and will settle for those ideas which are 
easily included in the semantic representation of that language (p. 77). 
Joos (195 8,1967,1972) has argued that in deciphering an unknown word, the 
wisest course is to assume the "least meaning" consistent with the context. Tasks such as 
Werner and Kaplan's "Word-Context Task" (1950) (see Ch. 1, p. 10- 11) force subjects to 
infer aspects of meaning that go well beyond this least meaning, leading, as Joos has 
indicated, to errors from which recovery is difficult. The needed tacit processes of 
understanding are suppressed by the demands for explicit strategies for understanding in 
their task. It is implied in Joos's assumption that an interference occurring too early or a 
lack of information about contextual clues will lead a child's guesses astray, particularly if 
the child is asked too soon for definitions of the new word. The strategies children use in 
order to eliminate errors need to be explored further. Recovery is possible, if not 
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guaranteed. Joos's thesis also seems to imply that implicit knowledge of a word's meaning 
is acquired in the absence of conscious reflective strategies and that this process. v,, hich 
does not usually take place via deliberate efforts. must be taken into account. To 
summarise, then, two main implications of Joos's Axiom can be stated: a) the processing of 
linguistic information takes place implicitly and b) in normal circumstances, we do not 
most of the time make a deliberate effort to consciously reflect on the processing in such a 
way as to learn by intent. The main theoretical tenet suggests that deciphering involves a 
change in the mental representation of the word meaning problem, a change that lives on 
with the person. Thus, the solving of meaning depends upon both perception and 
restructuring involving insight thinking as the word meaning problem is suddenly solved in 
the absence of outward changes, and in the absence of overt trial- and-error approaches. 
Out of the unconscious moiety of the matrix of conscious and unaware knowledge the 
meaning emerges unpredictably and unscheduled, i. e. incidentally. 
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Figure 1.1. 















1.3. Experimental Evidence. 
In the following section, I have given an overview of the literature on the deciphering of 
unfamiliar words from linguistic contexts, with or without a non-linguistic support. By 
doing so, I consider experimental evidence that has a bearing to my experimental work to 
be described in this thesis. 
1.3.1. Studies of the Deciphering of Unfamiliar Words from Linguistic Contexts. 
I now review the work of the first known researchers on children learning 
unfamiliar words from sentential contexts: Werner and Kaplan's (1950) work with children. 
The Study of Werner and Kaplan (1950). 
In their Word-Context Test (1950), Wemer and Kaplan tried to detennine the ways 
in which 112 children aged 8.6 to 13.6 could grasp the meaning of an artificial word in a 
verbal context that replaced an English noun or verb in 12 six-sentence series (such as: "A 
corplurn may be used for support; " "A wet corplum does not bum"). The task was 
presented, one sentence at a time in written form and with a question about an unfamiliar 
word within the sentence being answered by the child before a new sentence was given. 
Each sentence provided further infonnation about the new word. They presented children 
with six exposures to each new word (all nominals) in a wholly verbal sentential context of 
six different sentences. The task itself dealt in synonyms. Thus, children were required to 
find a new word within the sentences to denote a known concept and a known word. The 
task was so constructed that Werner and Kaplan took English words like the noun "stick" 
and replaced it by the nonsense word "corplum" to create several sentences using the word 
"stick" ("corplum") in each sentence. The task was designed so as to observe changes of 
meaning that took place when a word was to be applied successively to a number of 
contexts. Each concept was required to be of sufficient flexibility to be applied to a variety 
of contexts. 
Werner and Kaplan were not concerned with correctness of meaning . in the 
responses they received from the children. However. correctness was found to increase 
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significantly from one age level to the next. Their main aim was to observe the processes 
of signification in the word meanings given by their subjects. Many responses of the 
younger children indicated a lack of differentiation between the meaning of the word and 
the given verbal context. Instead of conceiving of the word as referring to a circumscribed 
meaning, many of the younger children regarded the artificial word as carrying the 
meaning of the whole or part of the context in which it appeared. There were two groups of 
immature signification found: in one group, the sentence-contextual group the word carried 
with it the whole or parts of the sentence context (sentence-wordfusion), in a second 
group, the non-sentence contextual group, the word was clearly differentiated from the 
sentence context, but still possessed a broad contextual meaning (holophrastic 
conceptualisation). Thus, there was a lack of differentiation between word and sentence in 
the responses of the young subjects. 
The children did not respond correctly prior to age eleven. Before eleven, they 
could not isolate or integrate the word successfully. Signification based on sentence-word 
fusion decreased most sharply between age levels 9 1/2 to 10 1/2 and 10 1/2 to 11 1/2 
whereas signification based on holophrastic conceptualisation showed a different 
developmental trend--it gradually decreased and even at the oldest age level, the 13-year 
level there were subjects who still showed such solutions. 
Recently Miller and Gildea (1987) have modified Wemer and Kaplan's study by 
examining the abilities of elementary school children to acquire new words. 
Earlier, several 
other researchers had adapted the Werner and Kaplan technique 
for children in order to 
investigate their abilities to decipher word meanings from verbal contexts (cf. 
Braun- 
Lamesch, 1972,1973; Campbell & Bowe, 1978; Dockrell, 1981, and van Daalen & 
Elshout,, 1981 with adults). I will refer to these studies later in this thesis as 
I describe my 
own studies. 
1.3.2. Studies of the Deciphering of Unfamiliar Words from Linguistic 
Contexts With 
Non-Linguistic Supports. 
in the following section, I give a description of four studies that 
have been 
conducted into children's abilities to 
decipher unfamiliar words from linguistic contexts 
with non-linguistic supports. These are the studies of Roger Brown (195 7), of Wykes and 
Johnson-Laird (1977), of Carey and Bartlett (I 978a), and of Dockrell and Campbell 
(1981). 
The Study of Roger Brown (1957) and the Studies of Wykes and Johnson-Laird 
(1977). 
D- 
ch young children F. -oger Brown (1957) conducted a research on the extent to wh, 
appreciate the syntactic and semantic rules governing language, in order to learn how 
children determine semantic properties on the basis of syntactic cues to parts-of-speech 
membership, and to discover if they use the structural syntactic cues for guessing the 
semantic referent of form classes. In this context "part of speech" means the grammatical 
practice of allocating words to one or another sentential category which we think of in 
semantic terms,, such as nouns being conceptualised as naming substances, verbs as naming 
actions. Brown argued that the children in his study were using structural syntactic cues for 
guessing the semantic referent of form classes and that the four-year-olds easily identified 
the object by means of the form-class cue. 
Brown maintained that the semantic distinction between parts of speech is much 
clearer for the child than for adults. Children in this study were able to use such syntactic 
information and with both the prototypical examples of noun denotata (concrete objects) 
and verb denotata (actions) were very successful. The children could clearly differentiate 
among nonsense words (nonsense verbs) referring to movement, particular objects and 
extended substance (mass noun). Brown's stimuli were pictures of strange shapes, each 
containing an action, object, and extended surface, so that there was no greater salience of 
one stimulus than another. 
Presenting pictorial test stimuli and pictorial response stimuli allowed the children 
in Brown's study to establish a "universe of discourse" by creating a 
framework for the 
referential act, which is appropriate. His study also showed that such a method could 
be 
used successfully with children of three to five years of age. 
Wykes and Johnson-Laird (1977) tested 3 to 4 year old children's acquisition of 
verbs using a story format with a supporting non-linguistic context. 
The experimenter told 
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a story (four different stories) to one child at a time (fifteen children participated) and acted 
the story out with puppets (examples from one such story are: "John stepped out of the boat 
and the water mibbed his trousers so he went home to change into some dry clothes. The 
water had rnibbed his trousers right through so Simon made him some hot tea. But John 
dropped his cup and the tea mibbed over the floor,, " (p. 326). The child heard each story 
four times, on two occasions the experimenter read it and acted it out, and on two 
occasions the child then attempted to do the same. And, with somewhat older children the 
experimenters first allowed them to hear the story a few times, and, then, only tested the 
children on the novel terms metalinguistically; in this case there was no acting out earlier 
in the procedure. 
Wykes and Johnson-Laird argued that "the subjects and objects occurring with a 
verb might help the child to infer its meaning, " (1977, p. 326). In their studies, however, 
the child may only have associated the occurrence of the object used with the presentation 
of the novel verb and learnt nothing more about the nature of the verb. Although focusing 
on the objects occurring with the verb is informative and may have led the child to make a 
correct response, Dockrell's design (198 1), in which the subjects and objects occurring with 
the verbs were not highly constrained and the children were presented with a choice of 
responses, may tap their knowledge better, as children can easily be misled by the context 
in which the verb occurs (see Ch. 1, p. 33-34). This situation will force the child to lean 
more on available semantic categories than on learning simple associations. 
However, the important point to learn from the Wykes and Johnson-Laird's study is 
the fact that they did read each story twice and acted it out to the children and gave them 
second trials in the testing session following the story-reading, if the children were 
hesitant. This procedure may have created a pattern of interaction between child and adult 
and strengthened confidence in the child that was needed for the restructuring of his/her 
acquisition in the situation. Wykes and Johnson-Laird's results should be estimated in this 
light. 
In summary. one can state that the verbal context and its nature is important even if 
there is no evidence from earlier studies that the child can pick up the meanings of words 
more readily in a story format than in a sentence-series context. The child may pay 
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attention to different aspects of discourse in two situations: a) in a storY presentation the 
child may be deterred from focusing on the individual lexical items by attending more to 
the theme running through the story, b) or. being more familiar with a storv forinat may 
help the child respond appropriately. The sentence presentation, on the other hand. is not as 
natural to the child and may lead to local identification of the involved linguistic elements 
without proper consideration of the total context. In Wykes and Johnson Laird's study. the 
child was provided with non-linguistic information in the form of acting out. which mav 
have accounted for differences in their result sets and those of Werner and Kaplan (1950). 
The Study of Carey and Bartlett (1978a). 
Carey and Bartlett (I 978a) provided a novel experimental technique that combined 
both longitudinal and cross-sectional methods in their examination of the acquisition of 
unfamiliar terms by pre-school children. They studied the course of development of a 
single colour term in the lexicon of 14 three-to-four-year-olds, by using the unfamiliar 
word "chromium" to denote "olive green. " They plotted the development of the new term 
over a period of six months. First, they established that a group of three-year-olds did not 
know the colour olive. Most of the children called it green; some called it brown. They 
took two cafeteria trays and painted one tray olive and the other blue. Each child was then 
told casually: "Hand me the chromium tray. Not the blue one, the chromium one. " The 
child would pause and perhaps point to the olive tray: "This one? " "Yes, that one. Thank 
you. " 
A week later, with no further guidance, the children were asked again to name the colours. 
When olive was presented, they paused. They did not remember chromium, but now they 
knew that this colour was not called green or brown. A single exposure was enough to 
begin a reorganisation of their colour lexicon. Carey argued that children are quick to 
notice new words and to assign them to broad semantic categories. After hearing chromium 
just onoe, the three-year-olds assigned it to the semantic field of colour names. A single 
exposure was enough to cause them to reorganise their semantic 
field of colour tenns 
(Carey. 1978a). However. only one child had established ftill mapping. by the end of six 
months. 
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Before the introductory event took place, the child was presented with a colour 
identification task and the child's preferred term for olive green was establ 1 shed-- usual Iy 
either as green or brown. In the first encounter with the term, the possibility for the child to 
gain the full meaning of the new term was allowed, but Carey did not specify what "full 
meaning" entailed. Here the child was asked to: "Bring me the chromium tray not the blue 
one, " there being only two trays available. In this first encounter the child was clearly not 
required to pay specific attention to the new word, per se. After the introducing event, 
Carey plotted the development of the new colour term over a period of six months, both in 
a natural playgroup situation and in a number of production and comprehension tasks. Over 
the six-month testing period, two distinct forms of responses emerged: one group of 
children interpreted "chromium" to be a synonym of green, whereas the other group of 
children seemed to realise that olive was an odd colour requiring an odd name but did not 
necessarily produce this name. 
Carey (1982) has argued that the way forward in the building of a theory of 
semantic development is: a) to examine the role of the linguistic context in which a child 
first meets a word and to assess the child's use of this information; b) to isolate, if possible, 
any short-lived hypotheses that the child might entertain; c) to consider whether differences 
exist between the types of words that children learn, d) to examine whether constraints on 
human concepts rule out meanings -that children might entertain; and e) to assess whether 
any differences in children's concepts, and hence, meanings, constrain a theory of semantic 
development (cf. Levine & Carey, 1982). 
The Studies of Dockrell and Campbell (1981). 
Dockrell and Campbell (198 1) were interested in knowing the ways in which 
children map the meanings of novel lexical items. They argued that the child's 
data bases, 
the time and type of exposure, and the word class must be clearly delineated in order for a 
coherent picture to emerge. They were concerned with the ways in which children manage 
to map the meanings of novel lexical items and to outline some aspects of the child's 
contribution to the word learning task and the potential source of problem-solving 
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information available to the child. They argued that short-lived. incorrect hypotheses might 
give a significant insight into the word-learning process. 
Dockrell (1981) adapted from Brown (1957) the technique of using nonsense words 
in order to reduce the semantic information available to the child and thus to force the child 
to focus on other sources of information in order to infer the meaning of the unknown item. 
Based on six experiments in her doctoral work, she drew distinctions among sense, 
reference, and denotation as criteria against which to assess a child's full meaning of a term 
and to test the acquisition of unfamiliar terms in the vocabularies of three- and four-year- 
old children. 
In one of her experiments, Dockrell chose an animal term rather than a colour term 
to present to her subjects. (She thereby avoided the complexity of the nature of colour 
vocabulary, the fact that colours lying on a perceptual continuum may make the isolating 
of the appropriate range of denotation difficult for children). Thus by using an animal term 
she was able to present her subjects with a distinct perceptual entity. Furthermore, 
children's knowledge of animals seems to be fairly well -differentiated even at young age. 
She argued that there were data bases that the children may use if the inference "Y is an 
animal" was established. The question she asked was: "How does the child learn a new 
word that fits into a firmly established conceptual framework? " She designed the 
experiment so as to give children a series of quasi-natural contexts in which to develop the 
meaning of the new word. The goals of the experiment were: 
I) to explore the child's ability to acquire a new animal term; 
2) to explore the child's ability to produce and comprehend this term in natural 
conditions with peers; 
3) to investigate whether the child does associate the new word with a particular type 
of animal: 
4) to examine if the child associates the new word with a particular type of animal, 
how the new term relates to the general concept of animal. For example, is it 
ascribed with animate characteristics? 
Working with the artificial word "patas. " which stood, in her study, for a tapir (a South 
American animal), Dockrell received 100% correct answers from her young control 
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subjects. Her subjects seemed to know that "patas" could not refer to a cow, a sheep. or a 
pig--other animals that were used in the test sample--since their names were already 
known. 
In the patas example, the child's mental model of the world assigns the three 
familiar animals to known categories associated with known words (cf Johnson-Laird, 
1977). The fourth animal, the unknown tapir, is assigned to an unknown category. When 
the child hears the instruction "Give me the patas, " the form "patas" is assigned to a 
phonological structure and a syntactic structure. But its semantic structure is unknown. The 
child's understanding of the frame "Give me the !" and the child's mental models 
determine the response. Because the pig, the cow, and the sheep are preempted by their 
known category labels "pig", "cowl" and "sheep., " the child gives the tapir to the adult. The 
child may derive from the experience: a) that a patas is an animal name just like a pig, a 
cow, and a sheep, b) information about word sense, c) the information that its denotation 
includes animals like the tapir. Since the child in the study saw four animals--a pig, a 
sheep, a cow, and a tapir--and was asked "Pass me the patas, not the pig, the sheep, or the 
cow, but the patas, " there was little choice in deciding to what the new term might r 
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information available to the child. They argued that short-lived. incorrect hypotheses might 
give a significant insight into the word-leaming process. 
Dockrell (1981) adapted from Brown (1957) the technique of using nonsense words 
in order to reduce the semantic information available to the child and thus to force the child 
to focus on other sources of information in order to infer the meaning of the unknown item. 
Based on six experiments in her doctoral work, she drew distinctions among sense. 
reference, and denotation as criteria against which to assess a child's full meaning of a term 
and to test the acquisition of unfamiliar terms in the vocabularies of three- and four-year- 
old children. 
In one of her experiments, Dockrell chose an animal term rather than a colour term 
to present to her subjects. (She thereby avoided the complexity of the nature of colour 
vocabulary, the fact that colours lying on a perceptual continuum may make the isolating 
of the appropriate range of denotation difficult for children). Thus by using an animal term 
she was able to present her subjects with a distinct perceptual entity. Furthermore, 
children's knowledge of animals seems to be fairly well-differentiated even at young age. 
She argued that there were data bases that the children may use if the inference "Y is an 
animal" was established. The question she asked was: "How does the child learn a new 
word that fits into a firmly established conceptual framework? " She designed the 
experiment so as to give children a series of quasi-natural contexts in which to develop the 
meaning of the new word. The goals of the experiment were: 
I) to explore the child's ability to acquire a new animal term; 
2) to explore the child's ability to produce and comprehend this term in natural 
conditions with peers; 
3) to investigate whether the child does associate the new word with a particular type 
of animal; 
4) to examine if the child associates the new word with a particular type of animal, 
how the new term relates to the general concept of animal. For example, is it 
ascribed with animate characteristics? 
Working with the artificial word "patas. " which stood, in her study, for a tapir (a South 
American animal), Dockrell received 100% correct answers from her young control 
16 
subjects. Her subjects seemed to know that "patas" could not refer to a cow, a sheep. or a 
pig--other animals that were used in the test sample--since their names were alreadv 
known. 
In the patas example, the child's mental model of the world assigns the three 
familiar animals to known categories associated with known words (cf. Johnson-Laird. 
1977). The fourth animal, the unknown tapir, is assigned to an unknown category. When 
the child hears the instruction "Give me the patas, " the form "patas" is assigned to a 
phonological structure and a syntactic structure. But its semantic structure is unknown. The 
child's understanding of the frame "Give me the !" and the child's mental models 
determine the response. Because the pig, the cow, and the sheep are preempted by their 
known category labels "pig", "COW)" and "sheep, " the child gives the tapir to the adult. The 
child may derive from the experience: a) that a patas is an animal name just like a pig, a 
cow,, and a sheep, b) information about word sense, c) the information that its denotation 
includes animals like the tapir. Since the child in the study saw four animals--a pig, a 
sheep, a cow., and a tapir--and was asked "Pass me the patas, not the pig, the sheep, or the 
cow, but the patas, " there was little choice in deciding to what the new term might refer. 
Thus the new term was treated as being in contrast to the other animals with familiar 
names. 
A vital point here is if the lexical entry for patas contributes something to the child's 
response (Campbell & Dockrell, 1986), since there is doubt if there is a lexical entry; 
rather, comprehension and proper use of the word in the given context; and three-year-olds 
performing with 100% efficiency on the task. Dockrell has argued that this observation 
calls for certain methodological principles in research on semantic 
development. These 
principles must be such that one can disentangle from the child's use or comprehension of a 
word the contribution that the lexical entry makes to the response. 
As regards the data bases that children have regarding an object or an attribute, it 
seems clear that they influence the word-learning process. A semantic 
framework into 
which the new word can enter appears to be more important 
for representation of the sense 
of a term than for representation of its denotation (Dockrell, 
198 1). Dockrell has argued 
that the initial contrast determines the semantic frame. Such a 
frame shows that children 
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know that relations exist between words and it allows the new term to enter into these 
word-word relationships. This semantic frame may not be a necessary prerequisite for the 
development of sense relationships. 
The conclusion is that lexical and strong perceptual contrast in one particular 
semantic domain allows the child to be extremely adept at picking up certain aspects of a 
word's meaning. This is an extremely useful strategy for the early word learner, Dockrell 
concluded. The children's results might have been very different, as she points out, if a) 
more unknown animals, for example, had been present. b) if the contrast had been purely 
linguistic, for example, I like cabbage, not aubergines, " or c) if the new word had been 
preempted. 
Campbell and Dockrell (1986) argue that using the threefold distinction of a word's 
meaning "forces quite specific guidelines for a child or adult with knowledge of a word's 
meaning and allows an analysis of the criteria which form the basis of a particular 
meaning" (p. 124). Besides, from this perspective, different words are possibly learned in 
different ways by the same child or the same word could be learned in different ways by 
different children. 
"Meaning" is not seen here as simply "full" or "partial. " It is either "full" or one of 
various types of partial meanings. One important conclusion from Dockrell's studies is that 
the analyses of partial meanings are extremely informative about the processes underlying 
the child's acquisition of novel words. She has also argued, on basis of her data, that 
children have difficulties in stating what they know about a particular lexical item, 
particularly when they have knowledge of a given term. Thus, the knowledge underlying 
word meanings is tacit; the child is not aware of the knowledge s/he has of it. Not only is 
the child not aware of her or his knowledge about a word's meaning, but frequently the 
tacit understanding of the term, as viewed in spontaneous production and comprehension, 
does not necessarily reflect what the child says about the term. Acquiring a word's meaning 
according to these data, strongly indicates that the child is quick at mapping new words to 
proper semantic fields but that working out the proper denotata takes much longer (cf 
Miller & Gildea, 1987). 
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1.3.3. Studies of Intentional Versus Incidental Learning. 
Finally, I review a pi II oneering study on intentional versus incidental learning. The 
arguments on which this study was based have direct bearings on the experiments to be 
described in this thesis--namely, that mechanisms underlying the acquisition of complex 
materials such as the processing of language are sometimes analytic mechanisms and 
sometimes holistic mechanisms. This is the study of Aveling (1911), which has served as 
groundwork for later studies, such as the studies of Brooks (1978) with adult subjects, and 
the studies of Kemler-Nelson (1984) with children, both of which explore intentional 
versus unintentional acquisition mechanisms. 
The Study of Aveling (1911). 
Aveling (1911,1912) conducted research into the relationship of thought process 
and percept in perception. He argued that a close connection existed between the thought 
processes involved in perception, and the sensorial contents of the percept. He wanted: "to 
determine the manner in which a given stimulus would be perceived -by an ideational 
preparation of the observer, corresponding to different kinds of perception, and secured by 
the giving and acceptance of the instruction" (1911, p. 213). Aveling maintained that the 
group of sensorial contents entering into the complex of the image is perceived as a type of 
this or that class, or as an individual of this or that kind. 
Aveling presented his adult subjects with pictures of objects perceived in three 
different backgrounds. The subjects were divided into two groups. One group was 
instructed to try to perceive the pictures of the objects as individuals; the other group was 
instructed to perceive them as types, or generals (1911, p. 214). 
Aveling reported that these types of instruction had a pronounced effect upon the 
If subsequent perception of the subjects. The result was a striking dif erence 
between the two 
groups in the structure of the percept and in the related phenomena of consciousness, 
he 
argued. Constant differences were found in the sensorial contents of the percepts that 
corresponded to the differences in the thought processes. Thus, the group who 
had been 
instructed to perceive the pictures as types of classes of similar objects was seen as notably 
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less exact and faithful to the originals than was the group that had been instructed to 
perceive the pictures as individuals. It seems that analytic rule fori-nation (intentional 
learning) guided the responses of the former group but memory for individual instances 
(incidental learning) the nonanalytic responses of the latter group. 
In sum, quantitative differences in responding were not substantial between the two 
groups but the type of encoding, however, had a clear qualitative bearing for the results. 
This result is in line with the arguments I stressed in the opening pages for this thesis: that 
perception and cognition are intertwined and have clear bearings for the function and 
adaptation of the person in the world (see p. 3-4). Later experiments have resulted in 
similar findings, such as the Lepton experiment of Lee Brooks with adult subjects (1978), 
and Kemler-Nelson's experiments with children (1984). 
In his Lepton experiment, Lee Brooks (1978) employed the dichotomies 
intentional/incidental or analytic/holistic by working them out in a few different encoding 
conditions with adult subjects. On basis of his data, he argued that the more complex a 
behaviour is (speaking or writing, for example), the more likely it is to be learned 
implicitly. He pointed out, however, that the dichotomies explicit/implicit, 
analytic/nonanalytic, and deliberate vs. intuitive processes need to be elaborated and not 
taken as a strict division. 
Kemler-Nelson (1984) in a series of intentional vs. incidental learning experiments 
with children argued on basis of her data that the holistic relation of overall similarity in 
natural, human acquisition plays a much greater role than hitherto acknowledged and that 
young children, for example of 3 to 6 years, would be more likely to use family- 
resemblance concepts and holistic processing than concepts based on selected attributes 
and analytic processing, as older children and adults would be likely to employ. 
In the following pages I shall describe the tenet of experimentation in this thesis 
and how I hypothesise different types of instruction or encoding (my intentional and 
incidental conditions) to result in subsequent but different perception, cognition and 
function of the participating subjects. 
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1.4. The Tenet and Aim of Experimentation. 
In the following, I describe the tenet of experimentation and the general aim of the research 
presented in this thesis and discuss the main theoretical notions underlying the research 
together with the methodology and the basic experimental design that was employed. 
As stated earlier, (see Ch. 1, p. 1-8), Joos (1972) has argued that the safest course in 
deciphering an unknown word is to assume the least meaning consistent with the context: a 
word should be defined in such a manner as "to make it contribute least to the total 
message derivable from the passage where it is at home" (p. 257). This least meaning, 
though inevitably wrong, includes the correct meaning and converges on it through 
intersection with least meanings inferred from future encounters with the word. 
The basic aim of the developmental studies outlined in this thesis is to demonstrate 
a corollary of Joos' Axiom, viz. that a child in the process of acquiring a new word should 
be given time to decipher its meaning. Werner and Kaplan's (1950) "Word-Context" task 
forces subjects to infer the full meaning of an unknown word. As can be implied from 
Joos's Axiom, such inferences are inevitably erroneous and recovery from them is 
problematic. 
Joos has argued that the process of deriving a complete meaning occurs without the 
individual being aware of the process and that the final understanding would manifest itself 
apparently spontaneously. How would this principle of semantic discovery work for the 
young word learner? The process of co-ordinating information from various sentences 
about the meaning of a new word would occur, according to Joos, without the subject's 
awareness. This idea of lack of awareness fits well with the processes of semantic 
reorganisation that Dockrell's (198 1) data suggests are spontaneously occurring in the 
child. The precise meaning of the new term would be acquired through a process of 
semantic reorganisation and with further experience with the word. This dual process 
might be hampered if the child is required to make a precise guess as to the meaning of the 
new term. The child's representation of new lexical items change slowly over time when no 
information is encountered. 
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Thus, semantic reorganisation may be a holistic process governed by rules of 
gestaltist, organisational principles leading the child to privately creative and insightful 
word meaning solutions, the distinction between self and other such selves, and the 
environment being constantly in a state of flux, his/her Idea of self and other/others ever 
unfolding depending upon the perception of qualitative differences between outside and 
inside stimuli (cf Notterman & Drewry, 1993, p. 103-113). 
The Processes of Semantic Reorganisation. 
Dockrell (198 1) uses the following example to illustrate how Joos's Axiom would 
possibly work with the young word learner. 
Let us imagine that the child encounters the following sentence: "The 
children are playing with the lud. " Now if the child is required to or 
naturally makes a precise guess as to the meaning of lud, he might well say 
"ball. " However he will find himself in considerable difficulties if he later 
encounters the sentence "Daddy is taking the lud for a walk. " The initial 
specific guess "ball" is inconsistent with this second encounter. If on the 
other hand the children follow Joos' maxim, all that is required is a very 
general guess, viz. "something children play with, " and on the second 
encounter this initial guess would need to be co-ordinated with the second 
context, viz. "something that is taken for walks" (p. 271). 
The literature (Bowerman, 1978,198 1! ý 
1982; Braine, 198 1; Gleitman & Wanner, 
1982; Karmi loff- Smith, 1986) suggests that conceptual representations may be actively 
changed while the child is in the process of learning words. Children often seem to 
be 
unaware of this knowledge. It is tacit; they are not only unaware of what they 
know about a 
word's meaning, their tacit understanding of a term, as viewed in spontaneous production 
and comprehension, does not necessarily reflect what they say about the term 
(Karmiloff- 
Smith, 1979). Experimental evidence shows that children have a great deal of difficulty 
stating what they know about a particular item (Litowitz, 
1977; Dockrell, 198 1). 
Dockrell argued that there was a need to create research situations in which the 
child could encounter an unknown word at more than one 
instance of encoding. where the 
child's hypothesis is suggested in the 
first instance and a different meaning Is predominant 
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in the next instance. Thus the child must assimilate the information from both encounters 
with the term to work out the correct denotation and sense. It is important to create 
research conditions in which the child is not required to give the precise meaning of a ý. ", 'ord 
immediately after hearing the word. The child could thus hold specific criteria with respect 
to the meaning of the new word until further instances were encountered. The child has no 
way of knowing whether the initial guess is correct until the term is met again, since. if 
Joos's Axiom is correct, the child initially endows a novel lexical item with the least 
amount of meaning given the initial context. 
In the studies undertaken for this thesis, there will be an examination of the nature 
of fast mapping and the type of information the child uses in such a mapping. The nature of 
these mappings may vary between word classes but in these studies only the child's 
acquisition of nominals is examined. There is evidence from Dockrell (198 1) that in the 
case of fast mappings for relational terms in contrast to nominals, certain contextual 
elements may be more salient than others. For nominals, the degree of similarity to the 
prototypical exemplar of that category may feature strongly in the fast mapping. The 
relative importance of syntactic, lexical, and conceptual elements in the fast mapping may 
be specified. 
Campbell (1979) speaks of the distinction between phenic and cryptic 
representations in order to account for disjunct representations of a term. It is Possible that 
the child's production and comprehension of a given term are processes employing cryptic 
representation occurring without the child making inferences about the meaning of the 
term. When we ask the child to make a conscious rational decision about the meaning of a 
term, the process may involve a phenic representation that is not yet available for use. It is 
at the same time clear that children's representations of the new lexical 
item change slowly 
over time when no information is encountered, indicating that cryptic processes may 
be 
involved in word learning. 
A disjunction between the child's two representations of a new term is 
noticed in Dockrell's experiments. She cites the following example of such a 
disjunction: So, for example, Andrew (pattern group, specific pattern 
strategy) behaves as if gombe denotes tigrine, and clearly distinguishes 
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between shape and colour tenns, but cannot explicitly distinguish between 
shape, pattern or colour with reference to 'gombe'. On the other hand, Anna 
never responds as if gombe denotes colour, does respond as if gombe can 
denote shape, yet on occasion denies it is a shape and says it is a colour. 
There appears to be a disjunction between the children's two representations 
of the term (Dockrell, 1981, p. 272). 
Reference, Denotation, and Sense. 
A useful way of analysing the process by which the child acquires words is to use 
Lyons' (1977a) distinction between the "reference, " "denotation. " and "sense" of a word, 
which helps to clear the relationship between words, concepts, and the world. Reference is 
the relationship between an expression and the entity in the world the expression is 
supposed to identify. Thus a speaker who says: "That's a cat, " is making reference to some 
entity in the world, or, as sometimes is the case, to different entities. Reference is thus a 
way of using words. Denotation is the relationship between a word and the world and is 
independent of particular utterances. A word used to refer to one entity of a class can also 
be used to refer to any entity of the class. This class of entities to which a word can refer 
constitutes the word's denotation. The denotation of a word is taken to be the concept to 
which the word is mapped, as in the studies by Dockrell (198 1). Her studies were aimed at 
learning about the mapping process when the child maps a word onto a concept. Thus, she 
studied the process of establishing the denotation of a word. 
Intension is the idea of properties, definition of concepts like "blue, " and is often 
linked with a word's connotation. Extension is a category, i. e., the extension of blue is a set 
of blue things in the world. The property or properties of blue, for example, is a matter of 
context. Blue has a different meaning according to context. Denotations are different in 
different contexts and are often linked to extensions. Some words have very well defined 
categories; others such as size adjectives examples "long, " "thick, " "large, " do not. The 
adjective "blue" denotes a set of things such as blue car, the adjective "brown" denotes a 
set of animals such as brown dog; as soon as a noun is stuck to the adjective, the noun 
determines the set. Adjectives are syncategorematic: they have meaning only when 
attached to other words. 
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There are two aspects of meaning that should be distinguished. According to 
Bierwisch's paradigm (198 1) these aspects are organ'sed according to Independent but 
interacting principles: semantic structure determined by the rules of language and thus 
pertaining to the realm of tacit linguistic knowledge and conceptual structure that is based 
on rules in terms of which mental representations of the world are constructed (see also 
Bierwisch 1970,1980). 
Lyons (I 977a) calls the various relations of a term with other words, sense. 
Examples of sense are relations of synonymy, contrast, opposition, hyponymy, and 
superordination. 
Dockrell (198 1) introduced the "Concept of Full Meaning, " of sense, reference and 
denotation (SRD), a distinction that clarifies the understanding of the notion of meaning, 
and, by doing so, provides a framework for assessing the child's competence by analý, sing 
full meaning in terms of the components of sense, reference, and denotation, it was 
possible to pinpoint the difficulty with any particular component of the word-learning 
process, i. e., which component of meaning caused the difficulty in the word-leaming 
process. What components of meaning are present in a partial representation of a term can 
now be stated: either sense, reference, or denotation. She suggested that "the SRD 
distinction clarifies our conception of the word-learning process, adds precision with 
respect to the variables involved in the mapping process and allows us to define meaning in 
such a way as to be able to make predictions about the processes involved in acquiring the 
meaning of an unfamiliar word" (p. 287). 
The aim of the research presented in the thesis is to study the formation and 
subsequent representation of semantic categories of 4- to 12-year-old children. 
The child is 
studied as a word learner and characterised with the use of a particular methodology and a 
three-fold distinction of word meanings. The research is based on the argument that 
knowing the semantic domain of a term that is the word to which the term is closely bound 
by sense relationships helps to create the boundary conditions 
for application of that term. 
An attempt is made to determine the sources of information that children 
have available, in 
an attempt to arrive at an initial reference and a stable 
denotation of the new term. The 
child's ability to acquire a new term will 
be influenced both by the nature of the term and 
25 
the type of experience leading to its acquisition. The type of encoding that the child 
employs in the experimental situation is predicted to influence his or her decoding (cf. 
Aveling 1911,1912, Brooks, 1978, Kemler-Nelson, 1984). 
Campbell and Dockrell (1986) argue that contextual constraints provided by 
situations in the real world may assist the child in creating meanings for a word and that 
the child's early experience of such terms is likely to be in context, which, in turn. may 
guide his or her initial hypotheses about possible meanings of a word. It still must be 
explained, they argue, how the child proceeds from performance in canonical situations to 
an acontextual meaning. 
What the child in an experimental setting learns about a novel lexical term may 
depend upon the nature of the term. Learning verbs, for example, may be different from 
learning nominals, as has been suggested by both Bowerman (1978) and Dockrell (198 1). 
The studies being undertaken here and described in this thesis are concerned with 
the child's acquisition of nominals, but in the case of new terms denoting objects, the child 
seems to acquire information pertaining to the object per se. When the child can isolate a 
correct object in a situation, the child is indicating that she or he is sensitive to the cues that 
the researcher presents--cues that indicate the intended level of specificity (Brown, 1957. 
1958). Children who do not isolate the intended level of specificity will not be able to infer 
that a new word denoted some previously unnamed natural kind. In the studies, the child's 
acquisition of natural kind terms is probed. It has been shown that young children do well 
with sorting tasks when they have to group members of a natural kind, a complex cluster of 
attributes (Nelson, 1974,1978,1985). Use of a single attribute as a basis for sorting or 
matching, on the other hand, is a much later acquisition (Vygotsky, 1962). Despite the 
dense and related nature of the components of many nominal categories underlying natural 
kind terms, children at three or four years of age have been found to have an organised 
semantic domain for animal terms and even for other natural kinds like plants and fruit 
(Dockfell, 198 1). Age level and effect of intervention are used as the main variables to 
estimate children's semantic knowledge and to examine how children determine semantic 
properties on the basis of syntactic cues to part-of-speech membership--the grammatical 
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practice of allocating words to one or another part of speech. Nonsense words are used in 
order to replace the semantic information available to the child. 
Comprehension and Production. 
The language acquisition of young children is an extremely complex process and 
the acquisition rate is very rapid. By age 6, the average child is estimated to understand 
14,000 words. If these words are learned between the ages of 18 months and 6 years, this 
works out to be nine new words a day, or as Carey (I 978a) has pointed out, almost one 
word per waking hour. The average 6-year-old is also able to analyse language into its 
minimal, separable units of sounds and meaning; to use rules for combining sounds into 
words and words into meaningful sentences; and to participate actively in coherent 
conversation. 
While comprehension entails only identification of the item referred to, production 
for the item is a cognitively more complex one, in which the child must select a word 
appropriate to the initial identification. 
In production, a concept is used to generate a label and thus to reflect existing 
conceptual representations. Only existing instances of the concept can be appropriately 
labelled. In comprehension, a label is used to access a concept and then the prototypical 
representations can be used to predict new instances that should possibly be included along 
one of the relevant dimensions of the concept (McShane, 1991). Fewer underextensions but 
more overextensions in comprehension would be expected in this account. McShane 
(199 1) suggests that false extensions will presumably be weeded out by various processes 
such as the later provision of alternative, more suitable words, which suggest another 
concept of the instance in question; or by the setting of boundaries on the concept 
by other 
means that lead to the exclusion of the instance from that concept. 
Huttenlocher (1974) has suggested that it is easier for the child to recognise a word 
and recall its referent (i. e. to comprehend a word) than it is to recognise an object or event 
and recall its label (i. e. to produce the word) thus, comprehension 
involves a mapping from 
form to concept, whereas production involves a mapping from concept to form. But 
production is not simply the opposite of comprehension 
(Campbell et al. 1982; KuczaJ, 
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1982; McShane & Dockrell, 1983). Often the lack of correspondence between children's 
use of a term in production and comprehension has been thought to reflect task difficulty 
(Thompson & Chapman 1977). These methodological difficulties need to be elaborated 
further. 
There may be great difference in the speed at which a given linguistic feature is 
acquired within the spectrum of "normal children. " Various factors are involved, such as 
socio-economic background, sex, intelligence, opportunity, and motivation, and these 
affect the quantity as well as the quality of a child's comprehension or production. Within 
the range of "normal" development, a variation in rate of anything up to plus or minus six 
months is to be expected (Greene, 1975,1986). 
Whether an initial relationship between production and comprehension can be 
assumed is still questionable. At the same time it is clear that one must take both sources of 
data into consideration in an attempt to give a characterisation of the young word learner. 
These two systems must be evaluated in various contexts and with different classes of 
words in order to evaluate the relationship between production and comprehension. The 
more general finding is of overextensions in production rather than overextensions in 
comprehension. In these studies mentioned above, one must be aware of certain 
methodological questions such as whether the noticed lack of connection between 
comprehension and production is applicable to all lexical domains or only to especially 
complex areas such as colour vocabulary, and if the relation does vary with the linguistic 
competence of the child or with the nature of the child's initial introduction to a new term. 
Certain processing limitations may be used to account for some of these results (Dockrell, 
198 1). Also, one must be aware of the postulated differences between the learning of 
concepts and the learning of names (Macnamara 1972,1982-, Rosch 
1973.1976,1978; 
Rosch & Mervis 1975, Rice 1980). The content of the children's speech is likely related, at 
every age, to their stage of general cognitive developmental 
(Clark, 1975). 
Developmental differences. 
Individual differences are expected to be quite substantial in the studies described in 
this thesis. Differences are expected both in rate of development and in characteristic 
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patterns of use and probably also in learning. These differences have been well supported 
in recent work by Gordon Wells (I 986b) on his research into the literature on variation in 
child language. The following studies will investigate a) the development of the child's 
denotational boundafies for comprehension and, if possible, production. b) the semantic 
representation of the new term in relation to other words in the same semantic field-, and c) 
the importance of the linguistic input in determining the appropriate semantic domain. All 
these issues require that the child's knowledge of words is tested over time rather than in a 
single presentation situation. 
There seems to be a clear indication that very young children, (two and a half to 
three years of age, at least) have a predisposition to form natural kind categories- 
categories such as those for animals, plants, and living things (Dockrell, 198 1; Golinkoff, 
1982; Gelman & Markman, 1987; Markman, 1989). The linguistic context in which the 
child first meets a novel lexical item is a source of hypotheses about the terms denotation 
and sense. 
In the studies to follow, variables such as age and conditions will be examined. Age 
is known to be an important factor in such studies as those of Werner and Kaplan (1950), 
in which there is a strong developmental trend towards the full meaning and a great shift in 
performance at the ten-to-eleven-year level. Werner and Kaplan have suggested that this 
trend is the result of the increasing ability of older children to state their knowledge about a 
new word's meaning in a declarative form and that it further reflects their growing 
sensitivity for relation between grammar and meaning. 
Children may have more knowledge available than they can access without proper 
retrieval cues. Like adults, they do not always have access to 
different aspects of their 
knowledge base (Winograd, 1975). The kinds of knowledge that are most difficult to 
access are those called procedures (or ways of doing things); 
knowledge that is generallN. 
accessible has been stored in declarative form. As Mandler (1983) says: 
"To the extent that 
a bit of information is embedded within a given procedure it may not 
be easily found and 
used when relevant to another situation" 
(p. 424). 
In the case of practical anticipations, the context in which activities are carried out 
tends to be given heavy weight in the child's interpretation. 
There is thought to be a 
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procedural basis of early knowledge organisation, said to be contextually embedded. ManN, 
early concepts seem to be tied to the contexts in which they were first formed. leading to 
such phenomena as underextension of word-meanings. The early organisation of 
knowledge around scriptlike activities may play a profound role in the child's developing 
conceptual life. Younger subjects may be more dependent on the representation of familiar 
sequences to guide their encoding and memory. A major developmental change is the 
gradually increasing accessibility of knowledge. The word needs to become 
decontextualised from the routine within which it had originally been embedded (cf, John 
Dewey, 1910). It needs to become productive and context-free. An important aspect of 
development is the gradual formation of a declarative knowledge system from the 
continued applications of procedures. 
Bruner (1964) has suggested that a change in the child's representational system is 
thought to occur around age six to eight when this system becomes more symbolically and 
linguistically based. Having gradually mastered the linguistic rules involving 
categorisation and hierarchical structure, the child learns to apply them to conceptual 
categories as well. During restructuring, differentiation and elaboration of acquired 
knowledge is thought to take place. 
In the studies to follow, the lack of attention exhibited by the younger children is 
expected to produce a less detailed representation, but does not imply that their 
representations of the new words are fundamentally different in kind from those of older 
children and adults. It is clear that many factors other than the underlying nature of 
representation itself can account for performance as well. Besides, as Fodor (1975) has 
pointed out in this regard, children, rather than progressing from level to level (as Bruner 
suggests) may have an uneven development, thus reaching high levels of sophistication in 
some phases and fields while remaining naive in others. Nevertheless, performance 
is 
expected to be influenced by the effect of schooling experience that has shaped and 
restructured earlier concepts of the child and furnished him/her with new methods of 
thinking. Thus, a developmental sequence towards a more accurate understanding of the 
meaning of the new ten-n is predicted. 
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The extent of the age change is expected to be affected by experience In the 
knowledge domains and new events are expected to be comprehended through a bottom-up 
or data-driven processing, which gets blurred with less likelihood of recovery in 
intervention conditions: the hypothesis being that the blurred perception of language 
influences cognition and the subsequent adaptive functioning of the child. 
To surnmarise, then, in the studies undertaken for this thesis, transition from 
context-bound to more context-free knowledge is expected to take place in the process of 
semantic reorganisation. Children gradually become able to access knowledge beyond the 
demands of the immediate (procedural) context with growing age. Their increased 
accessibility is manifested in the ability to recall absent things, to locate an item in memory 
without any current perceptual support, and to give logical definitions of the meanings of 
words. 
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1.5. The Experimental Design. 
A study (1984) that I conducted into the comprehension of the words "more" or "less" 
(with one unfamiliar control word "tiv") in the vocabularies of 48 children (4- and-5-year- 
old), was the forerunner to my doctoral studies presented in this thesis. The results 
conflicted somewhat with predictions from earlier studies (cf Donaldson & Balfour, 1968-, 
Carey, 1978a); the prediction from these studies being: a) that the order of development 
goes from more being represented positively as (+) quantity before less but a noted 
inability to relate text to context correctly in ambiguous situations, or b) more being 
correctly represented as (+) quantity, (+) pole and the child being able to pick out the 
relevant features in the context; less being recognised as the polar opposite of more and 
requiring similar strategies in picking out the correct features. 
My results did not give a base to postulate either that quantity was worked out 
before polarity for both terms, or that polarity was worked out before quantity for both 
terms. The percentage of correct answers to more in the older age group (mean age 4.6) 
was 83.3% as compared to 59.6% in the younger age group (mean age 3.11); the 
percentage of correct responses to less was 62.5% in the older age group as compared to 
55.9% in the younger age group, the percentage of correct answers to the control word tiv 
in the older age group was 55.6% as compared to 36.8% in the younger age group--as can 
be seen, there is small difference between the correct answers to more and less in the 
younger age group. 
The experiment encouraged the need for further interpretation of quantitative terms. 
However, the experiment shed light on the development of more or less by taking into 
account a wider range of factors relevant (the target words were 
incorporated in a story 
format with accompanying non-linguistic contexts--pictures of different objects and of 
different colours that related to the theme of the story; a few. famillar colour terms were 
asked about; the colour "orange" proved most difficult 
for the younger children, this result 
perhaps evidence for pre-emption: the young children confusing the noun 
"orange" and the 
adjective "orange, " thus failing to relate text to the non-linguistic context--the colour 
term 
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lexically captured by the noun ten-n). (See the story employed and photos of the stimuli 
pictures in Appendix A, p. AI -A3, Fig. A. I., A. 2., p. A4-A- 
The experiment gave a clue as to the validity of asking children what they thought 
about their reasons for their answers. a technique that I have adopted In my later studies. 
Older subjects, for example, when asked directly to state why they thought less was not of 
as great quantity as more, said: "It is not as much as that, " and pointed to the relevant 
objects in the pictures (suggesting that they used simple comparisons). 
In one of her experiments, Dockrell (198 1) modified Brown's technique (see p. 12- 
13) and presented a pictorial task to the child. She used four choice pictorial stimuli, one 
item depicting the correct referent, another depicting a similar but incorrect referent, a third 
depicting the original context excluding the correct referent, and a final one that was totally 
irrelevant to the original picture. 
In my own experimental designs, whether using pictures or objects, I have adapted 
Dockrell's modifications of Brown's method. A group of test stimuli was designed for my 
studies which focused on different elements shared with the target referent. In the sample, 
one object, picture, or material would stand for the correct referent; a second would stand 
for a similar but incorrect referent; a third would have some similarities but would not 
share as many characteristics as the target referent. 
What criteria does the child use for restricting and extending the denotation of a 
new term and what kind of relationship eventually holds between the various denotata such 
that they form a coherent whole--a concept? The studies undertaken for this thesis are 
designed to assess the denotational boundaries of the new terms and the ways in which 
these boundaries change over time. As has been stated by Anglin (1977) and by Bowerman 
(1978), the future development of a word's meaning begins from the first referent for which 
a word is used. The learning process is completed slowly after this 
first mapping by 
repeated encounters with a word in a number of specific contexts (Campbell, 
1979-, Carev, 
1978b; Clark, 1973a, 1973b, 1975; Dockrell, 1981). Since acquiring the meaning of 1978a., 111 
a newword is arguably a lengthy process, these studies will attempt to trace its progression 
from the child's initial encounter with the term to a later stage of posttesting, when a case 
for the existence of full meaning can be made. 
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In these studies, "word-context" tasks were presented to children aged 4 to II years. 
Subjects encountered an unknown word four to six times in a story format. An important 
difference between these tasks and those of Wemer and Kaplan is that care was taken to 
make sure that the target meaning was not already "captured" by a known word. A range of 
conditions explored the effects of asking subjects to guess the meaning of the unknown 
word after each encounter. In the control conditions, subjects were asked questions about 
events in the story; in the experimental conditions, subjects' knowledge of the unknown 
word was assessed by direct or indirect methods. At the conclusion, all subject groups were 
fully tested for knowledge of the unknown word, using methods developed by Dockrell 
(198 1) to test for full meaning, including the sense and denotation of the new term. 
One control condition and several experimental conditions, which differed among 
the three studies, were employed in this research. In the experimental conditions, the 
experimenter intervened at predetermined points in the story in a more-or-less direct 
fashion,, in order to test the child's knowledge of the new term. Thus, the child was obliged 
to think about the new word on a number of occasions. In at least some of these occasions, 
so little information was available to the child that his or her guesses about meaning were 
often incorrect. On the other hand, these interventions necessarily employ the novel term 
and so provide learning opportunities. In the control condition, intervention took place as 
well, but only to check on the child's general understanding of the narrative. No questions, 
direct or indirect, were asked about the target word or other unfamiliar words. In the case 
of the control subjects, the learning conditions were more incidental and holistic, as the 
child's information processing regarding the novel lexical item was not disrupted. 
Under the incidental conditions used in the studies (the control conditions), the 
subjects were given scope to co-ordinate in a holistic manner the various aspects of the 
new word's meaning in several verbal contexts. Under the intentional conditions (the 
experimental conditions), subjects were required to test their guesses about the meaning of 
the new word at predetermined points in the story. Asking the "Intentional" learners to 
define the new term's meaning directly or indirectly, whilst in the process of encoding, was 
expected to foster more analytic learning; whereas allowing the 
"incidental learners" to 
encode inforination about the new term without interfering was expected to 
foster holistic 
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learning. This design bears resemblance to those of Aveling (1911,1912), of Brooks 
(1978) and Kemler-Nelson (1984) conditions. 
It was predicted that "full mappings" would be more likely to occur, reflected in the 
lexical entries of subjects' performance patterns, under the control condition. Subjects In 
the control condition were thought to have gathered enough information about the meaning 
of the novel items through their implicit and indirect encounter of it, and did not have to 
guess about its meaning too early. "Fast mappings" or incomplete lexical entries, as 
reflected in subjects' response errors, were predicted under the experimental conditions. 
which provided the subjects with somewhat ambiguous and unstructured alternatives. Age 
was thought to be a very important factor. Older children are capable of more sophisticated 
reasoning and so older children were expected to reap greater benefit from the additional 
exposure to the novel word that intervention provided than were the younger subjects. 
It was expected that the control conditions would not be inferior to experimental 
conditions, despite the much greater exposure to the unknown word enjoyed by subjects in 
these latter conditions. With younger subjects, the control groups were expected to perform 
even better, with great individual differences. The subjects in the experimental groups, 
although making the errors predicted by Joos, were to an extent predicted by the hypothesis 
to solve the problem of recovery. 
The story topics were selected with a child's interest in mind. An account of the 
developmental progression of word meanings with age was expected, and this effect was 
examined against performance in tests under various conditions. These studies were 
designed to yield information about the processes that operate as children extract 
information about an unknown term from the sources of textual context available during 
encoding. 
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The Technique of Using Drawings in the Studies. 
The development of the technique of using drawings in the language studies 
described in the thesis has been suggested by works of many authors. Avellng 0 911. 
1912), whose research I cited earlier (see Ch. 1, p. 19-20). used drawings to estimate the 
encodings of his subjects together with their verbal responses of introspection. He 
investigated in his adult subjects the effects of different types of encodings of pictured 
objects and how they resulted in different types of decodings of the pictured objects. He 
found that instructions to his subjects influenced their responses; he discriminated between 
two types of responses--analytic responses that were based on the general rule or class of 
the pictured objects and nonanalytic responses that were based on instantiated memories of 
the pictured objects. Aveling is one of the earliest researchers reported to use drawings in 
this regard, an activity that I decided to adopt from him and to use in my experimental 
designs together with his ideas of the influence of instruction and of different encodings 
resulting in different decodings. 
Recently Mandler (1983) has argued that it is not good to equate verbal production 
with conceptual understanding and that nonverbal measures can often tell more about the 
child's classificatory systems than can verbal ones. Using drawings as an assessment tool 
of the nature of the young child's imagery was a much-employed method in the studies of 
Piaget and Inhelder (197 1), in which children's symbolic representation was used to study 
their representation of knowledge. Their drawings were seen to yield information about 
their knowledge (Goodnow, 1977). However, even if drawings are influenced by what a 
child knows, Freeman has recently suggested that, as all drawings involve the labour of 
production, they require complex rules of their own (Freeman, 1972,1976,1987). 
Bearing 
in mind that there is a difficulty in separating a child's knowledge of pictorial conventions 
from the content of a child's internal representation, the technique was adopted in the 
present study; drawings are thought to appeal more to younger children as a means of 
expressing themselves about the meaning of a new word 
(Lowenfeld & Brittain, 1975). It 
is possible that young children rely more upon 
imagery in their thinking than they do on 
verbal mechanisms (Arnheim. 1969; 
Paivio, 1971, Paivio & Csapo, 1973). However, as 
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Fodor (1975) holds. even if children are quite attentive to the visual and open towards it 
(thinking about the visual aspect of things) that In itself is no proof that they are thinking in 
images (thinking with visual representations). Bearing this sceptical argument in mind. 1. 
however, cautiously adhere to the pioneering procedure and empirical approach of Aý'eling. 
and those who followed. 
Thomas and Silk (1990) have reviewed the literature into children's drawing 
development. They discriminate between three main theoretical approaches to the problem: 
a) constructivist theories that stress the ways in which pictures must be constructed b,,,, 
using graphic devices to achieve pictorial means; b) ecological invariant theories that point 
out the extent to which natural perception and pictures are often concerned with the general 
appearance and structure of scenes; and c) gestalt theory that provides an analysis 
suggesting that one's responses to certain forms and patterns may be innately determined 
by the operation of Gestalt laws of perceptual organisation, of the organisation that is 
brought to sensations; the Gestaltists postulating that reality was based on perception that 
again depended on the bringing of coherence or organisation to the sensations and the 
stimuli that evoked them. 
However, each of these approaches is partial, as each one explains only some 
features of pictures. 
Freeman (1987) has proposed that a child's drawing development is largely the 
developing mastery of graphic skills. Any piece of graphic work can be seen as a set of 
parts or units combined into a whole or pattern. Goodenough (1926) suggested that 
children's graphic work illustrates their thinking and probl em- solving. Graphic work is 
seen for children as truly "visible thinking" and this is seen as true for adults also. Such 
graphic work displays were the main features of thrift, conservatism, principles of 
organisation, and sequence. 
How does the child develop the means of representation and expression? In the 
literature it has long been thought that a child's drawing directly reflects mental images or 
concepts (Barrett & Light, 1976). Recent research, however, has demonstrated the 
complexities of the drawing process and how this process shapes the final drawing product 
(Freeman. 1987). The task demands of the drawing process are thought to interact with 
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representational intentions in the way that the child uses graphic devices for a variety of 
representational purposes. 
Lowenfeld and Brittain (1975) stress the actual act of creating, the process of 
making a drawing as an indivisible part of the overall mental and developmental progress 
of the child. They further argue that the child's first attempts at drawing symbolic pictures 
may not stem from visual stimuli or from concepts or ideas. Other channels of perception. 
such as the sense of touch that is awakened when the child holds an object. may be of as 
much importance as seeing the object and understanding its role. They stress the 
importance of aesthetic growth in the child, as did Kellogg (1969). 
Generally, the use of drawings in the studies is based on the assumptions that early 
drawings, though not easily recognisable to observation may have been intended as 
representations by the child who produced them, (cf. Campbell & Harrison, 1990), and, 
that drawings are not only "internal models" or figurative schemes of objects, --as Piaget 
would have postulated--but that, children's drawings are influenced by the pictures that are 
available to their experience in their environment. Thus, children may "invent graphic 
symbols" comparable to their invention of the rules of language that gradually come to 
represent the rules of their language community, and, they may also, co-ordinate various 
cognitive units to invent a novel solution (Lange-KUttner & Thomas, 1995, p. 105). 
Vygotsky (1962) stressed the functional role of drawings in the overall 
development of the child in the cognitive, emotional and communicative domains. His 
cultural -historical approach to human development and his view on the 
instrumental mind 
and the need of the child to relate thought to concrete action/experience focused: "on the 
meaning of the child's achievements in the domain of drawing for his or her life in a real 
world, in a given socio-cultural context, as a member of a human society" (cf. Lange- 
Uttrier & Thomas, 1995, p. 147). This Vygotskian perspective is the theoretical base for 
the application of a drawing test in the experimental designs presented in the thesis. 
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Experimental Proceedings. 
A problem in much of the modem research on language development is the small 
size of the samples used. Such samples may be justified as a means of developing 
hypotheses, but are hardly sufficient to develop causal relationships (Wells, 1986b). 
It is not until a fairly detailed account is available of the common trends in 
development that one can, indeed, make systematic assessment of the extent to which there 
are significant individual differences. Now there is good evidence for substantial variation 
in rate of development. Why do these differences exist, how do they correlate with 
subsequent developmental indices and to what extent are they open to modification? In 
order to investigate these questions, patterns of covariation between linguistic indices and 
other attributes of children and their experience, which vary across the population, must be 
evaluated (Wells, 1986b). 
Larger samples are needed if one is to take systematic account of even one or two 
of the multiple sources of variation, whilst at the same time obtaining data amenable to 
detailed linguistic analysis. The study of variation is necessarily quantitative and such 
analysis involves counting in one form or the other. On the basis of this rationale, it was 
decided to use large samples in the developmental studies. 
The pilot testing of materials for Experiments I and 2 were run with a group of 
eight children in Balquhidder Primary School in the Glen of Balquhidder, to ensure that the 
requirements were not too complicated for the children and that the intended nonsense 
words could be decoded by primary school children of normal intelligence. The 
Experiment 3 pilot was run with eight children from Balquhidder Primary and the 
Psychology Department's Playgroup at Stirling University. 
The scoring procedure for the three experiments was two-fold. On the one hand, it 
involved the reading of all the protocols, in order to classify definitions and responses 
given in the Encoding Phase. On the other hand, it involved scoring responses from the 
Test Phase and Posttest Phase for each of the tests used there. Responses were given a 
score of I when correct and 0 when incorrect. Various statistical tests were run on these 
responses, such as t-tests, Chi-squares, Anovas, and the Duncan Multiple Ranges 
Test in 
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order to give a clarification of the main trends in development as a function of the three 
main variables: Age, Sex, and Condition. Analyses based on these will be further explained 
in each of the following experimental chapters. 
To surnmarise, then, in the studies described in the thesis, an attempt is made: a) to 
trace the development of word meaning over time and to discover the development of the 
child's denotational boundaries and b) to examine both the child's comprehension and 
production of the new lexical item and the relation of this term to other terms in the same 
semantic domain. 
The three following chapters describe, in detail, the three experiments that were 
undertaken for the thesis and analyse the results and discuss the main findings. Followed 
by these chapters there is a summary chapter in which I discuss the three experiments and 
their results and the consequences of the probing techniques. Furthermore, there is 
discussion of what the results tell about word use as compared to word meaning, of the 
applications of the results and the implications of the observations of the functioning child 
in the experimental settings, and, finally, some concluding remarks are given. 
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1.6. The Structure of the Thesis. 
The present thesis is based on three developmental studies, all of which aim at examining 
implicit and explicit processes in the progression of the meaning of unf amiliar natural kind 
terms in the vocabularies of 4- to 12-year-old children over a period of 4 to 6 weeks. An 
attempt is made to demonstrate a corollary of Joos's Axiom: if a child is in the process of 
acquiring a new word she or he should not be asked too early in the acquisition process 
what the word means. 
Since acquiring the meaning of a new word is arguably a lengthy process. one must 
attempt to trace its progression from the child's initial encounter with the term to a later 
stage when a case for the existence of full meaning can be made. In the three studies 
described in this thesis "word-context" tasks are presented to 4- to 12-year-old children in 
which subjects encounter an unknown word four to six times in a story forinat. Care is 
taken to make sure that the target meaning is not already "captured" by a known word. 
Two to three experimental conditions are involved and one control condition. 
Under the control condition--the incidental (implicit) condition, subjects are given scope to 
co-ordinate in a holistic manner the various aspects of the new word's meaning in several 
verbal contexts within a story. Under the intentional conditions (the experimental 
conditions), subjects are expected to test their guesses based on the new word's meaning 
when intervened with at predetermined points in the story. Asking the "Intentional" 
learners directly or indirectly to define the new term's meaning whilst in the process of 
encoding is supposed to foster more analytic learning, whereas allowing the "Incidental 
learners" to encode information on the new term without interfering is supposed to foster 
holistic learning. Thus, the notions of explicit and implicit learning are tested in the thesis 




A NOVEL MINERAL TERM 
Introduction. 
This chapter presents the first experiment conducted for the thesis. I start with a few 
introductory remarks: Shannon (1948) has argued that human language, far from 
conveying maximum information, is highly redundant, is highly predictable. Hill (1970) 
has called this principle of maximal redundancy "correspondence meaning, " the 
correspondence between the occurrence of a linguistic item and a non-linguistic object, 
action, event, or the like. Hill maintains that meaning is never given by an item that is 
totally unpredictable. It only occurs when an item is one of a set of possibilities already 
defined by the contexts. 
In the present study (Experiment 1), children were presented with a story in which 
the meaning of a new word had been sharpened with each section, but the precise meaning 
had been withheld through several steps. The learning of the meaning of the new word was 
the main object of study. 
Joos (1972) has argued that the new item should be made maximally supportive and 
supported in its situation, a situation in which redundancy allows the subjects to predict 
that the task will require a great deal of deciphering. He argues for subconscious processing 
in the deciphering of word meaning. One must receive the message in order to define the 
new word in such a fashion as to make it contribute least to the total message. 
Resemblance or analogy is important, as the new term must be a symbol of a real world 
item that is familiar enough to the reader that s/he can connect the information with 
previous knowledge and experiences. Joos (1967,1972) has argued that the tacit 
knowledge of situational context and experience are important factors in the "intuitive 
behaviour" of hearers when they are interpreting the meaning of an unknown word in a 
given text. Hill speaks of this tacit knowledge as Joos's law or as correspondence meaning 
and maintains that: 
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If we then recognise that there is a difference between context within 
sentences and contexts reaching beyond sentences, many of our problems 
are resolved. In believing that the search for larger contexts to deten-nine 
identity is justified, my reason is the truism that context does indeed give 
meaning, and that no hearer can understand the meaning of a sentence 
unless he knows the context in which it occurred (Hill, 1970, p. 254). 
A child must be equipped with good general knowledge in a given domain and 
must be flexible in intuitive behaviour when deciphering the meaning of a new term from 
text. The flexibility in the attachment of meanings to words must be tremendous, but on the 
other hand, the complexity and ambiguity of the information must be somehow reduced 
(cf van Daalen & Elshout, 198 1). 
Joos's thesis holds that a given word is redundant in a given text, i. e., that it carries 
little information. Johnson-Laird (1977) maintains that people cannot understand language 
without knowing something about the context in which an utterance occurs. People use 
general knowledge about the meanings that a speaker or writer is intending to convey. 
Thus, this behaviour involves high-level knowledge about the world (schemas), events that 
are likely to occur (scripts), and social conventions for different types of communication 
(story schemas and speech acts). 
I would argue, however, that it is important to realise that language understanding 
cannot be completely explained in the light of general knowledge; linguistic skills come 
into play, as well as the child's perceptual sensitivity for the given situational context and 
how well these abilities handle interferences of linguistic materials. 
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Object of Study. 
A developmental study was designed to trace the acquisition of a single mineral term--a 
two-syllable nonsense word that represented a mineral--in the lexicon of 160 children 
ranging in age from five to twelve years. The study tests the following hypothesis: 
Supplying proper information about a novel lexical item through an indirect and implicit 
linguistic encounter is a sufficient basis for the mapping of its meaning. 
Tacit knowledge of semantic structures not only enables us to interpret the sense of 
a word within a given linguistic context by attaching the least meaning possible to it, but 
also to eliminate certain candidates for election as referent (Joos, 1958,1972). 
The ability to categorise, and thereby to fonn concepts, is a prerequisite to 
acquiring a lexicon. There is a clear indication that young children have a predisposition to 
form natural kind categories, also the type of concept most readily acquired depends on the 
characteristics of the task conditions and the leamer. 
Although no common consensus exists at present about what constitutes linguistic 
meaning, I thought it was necessary to have some sort of paradigm or yardstick to use in 
analysing the accumulated data. Therefore, it was decided, a "full meaning" paradigrn 
would be employed in this study, with "full meaning" entailing knowledge about both the 
sense and denotation of the tenn in question. The child's "sense" of the novel lexical item 
was supposed to- be exhibited by an understanding of the word's relation to other words in 
the child's lexicon. Knowing to which set of objects in the world the novel term referred 
meant that the child had acquired that component of the new word's meaning which is 
called denotation. With this in mind, and in order to avoid the problem of pre-emption, an 
unknown mineral term, "Mikas", a nonsense word that denoted an unfamillar metal, was 
created for use in the study. 
Metal, or mineral terms, being words that represent mass, take neither an indefinite 
article nor a plural. Therefore, in this study, I hoped to observe whether the child's 
sensitivity towards these distinctive grammatical features is developed in close 
interdependency with the mapping of the word's meaning. I also hoped to observe at which 
I N, children of different ages first learn the novel natural kind term. and level of generalit, I 
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whether their application of it reflects a basic-level categorisation or a high-level one. 
Knowing the semantic domain of a term, the words to which the term is closely bound by 
sense relationships, helps to create the boundary conditions for application of that term. 
But to what extent do the types of categories that children form influence the type of 
meanings they entertain? 
In Experiment 1, the development of the novel lexical item was plotted over a 
period of two months with children of four different age levels. Thus, the experimental 
approach combined both cross-sectional and mini -longitudinal methods. 
The intention of the study was not to establish norms or a scale, however, but rather 
to seek a trend in semantic change and the acquisition of lexical strategies as reflected in 
the lexical entries of four different age groups, each of which underwent four different 
encoding processes for the novel item. 
The Experimental Design. 
The main experimental variables under consideration in the study were Age, Type 
of intervention, and Sex. The two main objects of the study were to observe developmental 
differences in children's acquisition of a new lexical item as a function of age and to see 
how three different types of experimental interventions affected the lexical entry for the 
unfamiliar word, with one control condition being run. 
Subjects at each age level were randomly assigned to one of the four intervention 
conditions involved. The design called for 10 subjects in each cell of the 4 (age level) times 
4 (methods) design. Thus the total sample of 160 subjects was split into 4 age groups of 40 
subjects each and within each age level 4 subgroups of 10 subjects each, these 
10 subjects 
comprising 5 boys and 5 girls. 
Method. 
In Experiment 1, the experimenter did not provide the subject with any specific 
learning instruction. Rather, the subjects' referential inferences were observed after the 
child was exposed, indirectly and 
implicitly, to the novel lexical item through the context 
of a story. This interference with the encoding process 
by indirect or direct questions about 
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the meaning of the new term disrupted the information processing. Thus the subject lacked 
adequate information about the distinctive syntactic and semantic features of the novel 
item, and was, at the same time, confronted with a somewhat ambiguous stimuli material in 
the case of the indirect condition. Thus, it was predicted that this procedure would result in 
subjects' response errors, which would be temporary in some cases but more permanent in 
others, as a function of such variables as age and previous linguistic knowledge. Another 
important variable is the nature of the experiment itself and the conscious strain and 
linguistic labour of the subjects in the experimental conditions. At the same time it should 
be clear, however, that being manipulated indirectly and directly on the novel item, as 
experimental subjects were, gives subjects other contexts in which to decipher the meaning 
of the word. 
The subjects were not given feedback on the correctness of their responses. In each 
of the six interval sessions of the story, the experimental subjects were not only asked 
direct or indirect questions about the novel lexical item they were in the process of 
learning, but were also asked direct and indirect questions about other words in the storN'. 
In general, then, the linguistic and non-linguistic contexts and manipulations in the 
three experimental conditions might compensate for the lack of information about the 
semantic features of the novel term brought about by disrupting the encoding process. 
These manipulations might, on the other hand, force the subject to make a wrong guess. 
Experiment I pitted these notions. The subjects' responses were both written and tape 
recorded and observational notes were taken about the children's general performance and 
approach to the experiment, errors in responding, recovery from errors as a 
function of age 
and/or condition, and pattern of recovery were the main emphases of the observation. 
The 
particulars of experiment did not vary according to age, except that questions were slightly 
simplified for the youngest subjects. 
In all conditions,, the story context of the study was thought to be somewhat too 
complicated for the youngest subjects. Thus, their performance under 
these special 
conditions might not give a very accurate picture of their 
true capabilities in mapping the 
meaning of a novel lexical 
item. 
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Testing and Scoring. 
Each child was tested twice: in a Testing Phase and in a Posttest. which was 
developed in order to estimate if the child still entertained the meaning that s/he had given 
to the novel term in the Test Phase and the way in which this particular lexical entry was 
reflected in the comprehension and production of the term. 
The tests were designed to be used as an assessment tool for the child's 
understanding of the new word encountered in the story. These tests were concerned with a 
range of functions, so that the total testing profile would include the child's linguistic 
abilities (both comprehension and expression), verbal and imaginal coding, the child's 
general knowledge, and IQ. The tests in Experiment I were arranged in a certain order that 
was identical for all the children. 
Standard testing, such as the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC), and 
the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WPPSI) (Wechsler, 1949, 
1967), show that a child often demonstrates great diversity in types of intelligence. A given 
child may score at age level in nonverbal measures such as, for example, sight 
discrimination, drawing and concept comprehension, but score 1.6 years younger or older 
on a language developmental scale like the Reynell tests. These qualitative variations in the 
tests in the experiment are part of their diagnostic value. The variation may, for example. 
identify highly restless children who might find Test 5, the drawing test, in which they are 
doing something -with their hands, easier than Test 3, the category test in which they are 
required to sit still and give a verbal definition. 
The scoring in the study was twofold; it entailed the scoring of the protocols gained 
during Encoding and the scoring of five different tests. Experiment I was based on similar 
work of other researchers such as Brown (1957). Werner and Kaplan (1950,1952). Wykes 
and Johnson-Laird (1977). It is characteristic of all these studies that the scoring procedure 
is not described in detail and , in some cases, is not 
described at all. Several assumptions are 
therefore being made: a) that most experienced experimenters in the developmental field 
are farniliar with the procedures of standard scoring as used in 
both standard language 
development tests such as Reynell (1977.1983) and standard IQ tests such as the WISC 
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and the WPPSI (Wechsler 1949.1967) and the Stanford-Binet (Terman & Merrill 1960). b) 
that the scoring in their studies, instead of being subjective, is based on the standard 
I important, in order to avoid errors that are procedure; c) that the order of presentation s not 
concerned with the aim of the tests, d) that all responses must be demonstrated in order to 
be scored; e) that I point is given for a correct answer and 0 points for wrong or no answer. 
and f) that suggestive questions should be avoided. Thus with the same stanclardised 
design, differences in scores could result from two main sources: the skill of the 
experimenter and/or the subject sample that is being investigated. 
It is important to realise that all scoring is based on the experience and skill of the 
experimenter. Thus, the standard scoring is very strict and in the Encoding and the tests in 
Experiment 1, correct answers for each question are scored with I point and, in order for a 
correct answer to be scored, the instructions must be carried out by the child exactly as 
requested and without omissions. An attempt is made at finding a trend in the 
developmental data but not to calculate the scores in terms of a quotient. 
As in any psychological test, scores alone have limited value. Thus, observational 
notes were made on the ways in which the individual child accomplishes individual tasks 
and what sort of mistakes s/he makes. I have based the scoring procedure for these tests, to 
a large extent, on Reynell's language developmental scales (1978). (See more about the 
scoring procedure for each test on p. 64-65). 
Taken together, the quantitative scores and the qualitative data generated by the 
observational notes give a useful indication of the assets and difficulties 
in linguistic 
functioning, concept formation, and drawing abilities. These data are of value when the 
child's overall performance is being estimated, but they are also useful 
for specific 
information such as screening tests of linguistic abilities, which can 
be used to develop 
individualised educational programs for specific children. 
The aim is to gain a 
comprehensive testing picture. 
A drawing test has been added to the end of the last test battery. Many studies have 
shown that drawings of children are 
influenced by general intellectual development, which 
include age and emotional development. Drawings of houses 
have, for example, been used 
to estimate or diagnose mental development 
(Krampen. 1991). It is known from these 
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studies that the house drawings of 5-year-olds differ fundamentally from those of older 
children. Because the child's cognitive development assessments are not necessarily based 
on language, it is possible in Experiment I to better tap the understanding that young 
children or children of low linguistic abilities have for new words. The child's drawings 
should constitute an access to the mental images on which they have been based so that if 
these images are undifferentiated the drawing should be the same; if the images are clearly 
articulated, however, the drawing should be clear. It has been argued that in the earlier 
phases of graphic activity, drawing and writing are not yet separated; both are based on 
graphernes, the smallest graphic elements, which develop between the ages of 4 and 6 
years. These graphernes are thought to constitute a sort of visual script that children use to 
note down their "internal models" on paper. Drawings of metal things in the test would 
originate from the child's mental image of metal things in the sample, or from experiences 
of things made of metal (Krampen, 1991). 
Subjects. 
In Experiment 1, the subjects ranged from 5 to 12 years of age and were all pupils 
of the Bridgend Primary School in Callander in Mid-Scotland. The experimental sample 
consisted of 160 children from Bridgend. Most of these children come from the town of 
Callander or from the nearby farms, and were relatively homogenous in their socio- 
economic background, coming from predominantly middle-class homes. All the children 
were native speakers of English. No systematic attempt was made beforehand at gaining 
information about the subjects' intellectual levels. The school's records showed that the 
school enjoyed an above-average performance on a standard Vocabulary Test of English, 
which has been demonstrated yearly with the oldest children, those in Primary 7. 
The experimental sample was divided into four age groups, consisting of children 
from Primary 1,3 3,5, and 7 with equal number of boys and girls. The mean age for the 
groups were 4.9,6.9,9.1 and 11.2, referred to below as the 5-, 7-ý 9-, and II -year-old 
groups. 
49 
Materials and Procedure. 
A story (See Table 2.1. p. 5 -3 3) was read in six sections, each 
follov, 'ed by an interval 
of a few minutes, dunng which time subjects were questioned about the preceding section. 
An unfamiliar mineral term, Mikas, appeared in six different verbal contexts or sentences 
within the story (See Table 2.2, p. 54, and Appendix A, p. A6-A9). 
The story was presented to the subject in an ordinary schoolroom set aside for the 
purpose. A few days before this presentation the experimenter first visited each age group 
and told the children that she had written a science fiction story that she was going to invite 
them to watch on video and asked them if they were willing to help her by answering some 
questions about it. Teachers were given instructions not to allow the children to discuss the 
story and the experiment in the classroom after they had been tested, but the teachers knew 
little more than the children did about what was involved. The experimenter later met the 
children individually and again invited them to listen to a story and to help to answer some 
questions. They were then shown the video recording of a young woman reading the story 
that was written for the experiment. The unfamiliar term was deliberately made less than 
salient in the theme of the story, in order to test the verity of the assumption that selective, 
conscious attention need not necessarily be involved in the acquisition of a word and its 
meaning. 
In summary, then, this recorded story presents the subjects with auditory and visual 
stimulation, the last one mentioned being a part of the non-linguistic context of the study. 
The story, per se, provided subjects with an indirect and implicit encounter with the natural 
kind term they were supposed to plot. 
The experiment was designed so as to give children a series of quasi-natural 




One of three different methods were used to probe word knowledge during the 
Encoding Phase: 
I) Indirect questioning: Experimental Condition I (E 1 ). 
2) Metalinguistic questioning: Experimental Condition 2 (E2). 
3) Metalinguistic plus indirect questioning: Experimental Condition 3 (E3). 
Each test session consisted of two phases: an Encoding Phase and a Test Phase. In all three 
conditions the subject's understanding of the stimulus word was probed by means of 
question instructions. 
In three experimental conditions and one control condition subjects listened to the 
videotaped story for 5 minutes; then the tape was stopped and the subjects were asked 
questions, which varied according to experimental condition. After answering these 
questions, they listened to the next part of the story, then were interrupted and asked to 
watch the video again. Thus, each child completed: 
a) an Encoding Phase, which took about 25 to 30 minutes to present and was broken 
into intervals giving scope for some manipulation on the novel lexical item; and 
b) a Testing phase, which involved presenting the child with five tasks that had been 
designed to plot the subject's lexical entry for the novel word. This phase took place 
immediately after the Encoding Phase and lasted from 20 to 30 minutes. 
Thus Experiment- I took 45 to 60 minutes, the time varying a bit, mainly as a function of 
the subject's age. 
A period of 6 to 8 weeks was allowed to pass until the child was presented with a 
Posttest involving two separate Test Phases aimed at estimating the child's comprehension 
and production of the newly acquired term and estimating the verity of the main 
hypothetical notion to which the experimental data had given rise. 
This Posttest involved two Test Phases administered separately: 
a) a Comprehension test, and 
a Production test. 
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Each Test Phase took 5 to 10 minutes, and an interval of two days separated the 
comprehension and production portions. 
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Table 2.1. 
An Example of Text from the Story. 
Section 2 
Skyfax. is now out of our known galaxy and is soon entering a galaxy in the 
Milky Way no one from planet Earth has been to before. Soon Captain Cook gets 
planet Oc on the radar screen and starts to prepare for the landing. Everything 
seems to work out well. They land at the entrance to a big valley. As they leave the 
starship they take their helpful robot C- IB with them. When they start to look 
around, they see in the middle of the valley the ruins of what seems to have been an 
old city. The only building which is still in a reasonable state is a huge temple near 
some rocky hills above. Everything is deathly quiet. No animals, plants or life 
forms of any kind can be seen anywhere. Huge layers of sand lie all around. There 
is something glittering in the sand; it is Mikas which does not wear off easily. 
Suddenly their robot C- IB gets very excited and unfortunately stumbles over some 
ruins and falls forwards. He lies like this for a while complaining, but then gathers 
himself together and hurries towards the temple. What is his excitement all about? 
(See the story in full length in Appendix A, p. A6-A9) 
53 
Table 2.2. 
The Six Sentence Exposures of the Unknown Word Mikas in Experiment I. 
1) A good supply of Mikas supported the Oc's culture. 
2) There is something glittering in the sand; it is Mikas which does not wear off easily. 
3) Their voices echoed strangely in there because of all the Mikas in the hall. 
4) Once out of the ruined city, they came to a countryside of many farm ruins circled by 
fences made of Mikas. 
5) When out of the water, Cook's clothes were soaking whereas the Mikas he had kept 
in them from the temple was wet, but of course not soaking as it does not get soaked by 
water. 
6) Captain Cook's hand brushed against something in the city ruins made of Mikas 
which the sun's rays had made terribly hot and burnt himself 
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Experimental Condition 1. 
In the Indirect condition, the subject was asked to select from a set of objects made 
of six different materials the one that the experimenter had named. In each interval the 
objects were spread on a desk in front of the subject and their position was haphazardly 
determined. 
One of the six materials was supposed to represent the unfamiliar metal substance 
called as Mikas in the story. The other five substances were: leather, wood, felt, plastic, 
polystyrene. The unfamiliar metal referred to in the story as Mikas was represented by steel 
that had been painted a silverish metallic blue colour. When these steel objects had been 
painted, tiny brass flakes were sprinkled on them to make them look even less familiar. 
The stimuli objects differed in shape, colour, and substance, and included objects 
like small buns (felt), spoons (Mikas), keys (Mikas), buttons (plastic, wood) as well as 
geometric shapes of circles (coins), crosses, stars, and cubes. There were six different 
colours used: red, green, yellow, blue, silver, pink. Three of the substances (leather, felt 
and polystyrene), were soft with smooth edges, and the other three, (plastic, wood and 
Mikas) were all hard with sharp edges. Only one of the substances was heavy and that was 
Mikas. There were felt squares, 60 x 60 mm, felt crosses, 100 x 100 mm, felt buns, 100 x 
30 mm; Mikas crosses, 45 x 45 mm; Mikas stars, 55 x 55 mm; Mikas coins, 20 x 20 mm, 
Mikas coins, 15 x 15; Mikas spoons, 160 x 35 mm; leather crosses, 55 x 50 mm; leather 
stars, 60 x 60 mm: wooden stars, 60 x 60 mm; wooden crosses, 48 x 48 mm; wooden 
cubes, 30 x 20 mm; wooden buttons, 30 x 10 mm; plastic stars, 60 x 60 mm; plastic cubes, 
30 x 20 mm; plastic crosses, 48 x 48 mm; plastic buttons, 15 x 15 mm; polystyrene crosses, 
50 x 50 mm; polystyrene stars, 55 x 55 mm, and polystyrene coins, 20 x 20mm (See 
Photos 2.1,2Z 2.3', 2.49 2.59 2.6, p. 57-59). 
Objects were requested in a randomised order with questions such as: "Will you 
hand me over the Mikas ones, please? " or "Will you hand me over the leather ones? " 
Subjects were allowed time to touch and observe the materials if they wanted to 
before being questioned about them. Because pilot testing had shown that a multiplicity of 
the objects tended to confuse the five-year-olds, only two items of each material were 
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included in their presentation. All other subjects were shown three to four objects of the 
same material in a sample set at each presentation. 
In the test sample the child was presented with somewhat unstructured alterriatives. 
By varying the similarity of other materials in the sample to the target material 
(polystyrene, leather, felt, wood, and plastic), I hoped to be able to discover something 
about the range of similarity over which the child's inductions occurred. None of the 
materials was of the same category, and all were different in appearance. However some 
were more similar to Mikas than were others. The target material was the unfamiliar- 
looking metal, Mikas; the polystyrene and plastic materials both looked shiny; the 
polystyrene looked soft and light; the plastic was hard and not as light as the polystyrene. 
The leather, felt, and wood had a different, nonmetallic appearance. 
The aim was to acquaint the subject with the materials and to see the inductions the 
subject made in the process of grouping. Also, by presenting subjects with this test sample 
and giving them the task of sorting the materials into piles ("the ones that go together") I 
was able to have the subject choose the criteria--a free-sorting technique that was adopted 
from Vygotsky's grouping study (1962) with blocks and unfamiliar names, and Miller's 
sorting study with words (1978). It was predicted that subjects would choose the criterion 
material,, rather than shape or colour, for example, and they would not make many mistakes 
in their groupings. Thus, they would adhere to the criterion provided by the context and 
their own sensitivity. Miller had found that when presenting his subjects with a sample of 
words drawn from a dictionary and printed on small cards, the subjects sorted these words 
according to their own criteria; subjects clustered words of similar meaning, such as words 
for humans or living things instead of adhering to a trial-error sorting. The groups were 
created by normal intuitive standards that are in line with the standards of dictionaries. 
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Photo 2.1. Sample Set of Mikas Objects 
Photo 2.2. Sample Set of Polystyrene Objects 
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Photo 2.3. Sample Set of Leather Objects 
Photo 2.4. Sample Set of Plastic Objects 
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I 
Photo 2.5. Sample Set of Felt Objects 
: 
Photo 2.6. Sample Set of Wood Objects 
41ý 
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Experimental Condition 2. 
Subjects were asked to define six words in the story. each of which occurred once. 
These words were nouns, verbs, and adjectives. 
In Section 1, the following questions were asked: "Do you know what the word 
'destiny' means? " "Do you know what the word 'ancient' means? "' In Section 2: "Do You 
know what the word 'galaxy' means? " "Do you know what the words 'to stumble over' 
mean? " In Section 3: "Do you know what the words'to bang together' mean? "' "Do you 
know what the words'to contemplate on'mean? " In Section 4: "Do you know what the 
word 'decipherment' means? "' "Do you know what the word 'hieroglyphics' means? " In 
Section 5: "Do you know what the word 'satellite' means? " "Do you know what the word 
'brainracking' means? " In Section 6: "Do you know what the word 'alien' means? " "Do you 
know what the words 'electric current' mean? " 
In the Metalinguistic Condition, one of the words in each section was always 
"Mikas. " Subjects in this condition were therefore asked six times about Mikas, but only 
once about each of the other words. 
The subjects were asked if they knew what the word "Mikas" meant, if they had 
heard it in the story, and, if so, what they had heard or what they could remember about it. 
When subjects gave their definition of the novel term, "Mikas, " they were asked to state 
the reasons for their definitions. They were also asked to compare their definitions of 
Mikas with the one or ones they had given at the earlier intervals of the story when asked 
about Mikas, and to state how well that definition would fit with their present definition. 
Altogether, 80 children of the 160 subjects employed in the Encoding Phase of the 
experiment were presented with the Metalinguistic intervention procedure described above; 
these were the subjects in the two experimental groups named Metalinguistic and 
Metalinguistic Plus Indirect. 
Experimental Condition 3. 
In the Metalinguistic Plus Indirect condition, the subject was presented with a 
learning encounter that was a mixture of the procedures used in the Indirect condition and 
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the Metalinguistic condition. In each story interval, the subject was first asked the 
metalinguistic questions and then presented with the test sample of objects. Subjects in 
Condition 3 had therefore had 18 encounters with the new term before the Test Phase 
started. This means that during the Encoding Phase they heard the new word six times in 
the linguistic context of the story; they were six times asked direct questions about the 
meaning and they were required to select a proper referent for it from a set of objects six 
times. When the Test Phase began after the story had ended, these subjects were familiar 
with the two types of task involved in it--namely Test I and Test 2. They had seen the test 
sample of objects six times before and were quite familiar with the six different materials 
used. Also they were familiar with direct questions about the novel lexical item. 
Subjects in both Condition I and Condition 2 had had 12 encounters with the new 
term during the Encoding Phase--six times in the story encounter and six times in the 
interval encounter of experimental manipulation, including the sixth after the story ended 
with the last section. 
The Control Condition 
There were 40 subjects in the Control condition--ten subjects at each of the four age 
levels. After listening to each part of the story, these children were asked what was 
happening, who were the main characters in the story, and what was their role. In each 
interval, the children received five to six questions about the part to which they had just 
been listening and about the story's general theme. 
The questions used in Section I were presented in the following manner: What was 
the purpose of the Skyfax team? Did you notice if others had attempted going to Oc? Did 
you notice if they knew something about the Ocs? In Section 2 they were asked: 
What was 
so special about planet Oc when they came? Did you notice that they 
had their robot with 
them? Where did they go next? In Section 3: Where did they come to when they followed 
their robot" What did they find there? How did they manage to enter the temple? 
In Section 
4: Can you tell me what they found in the altar manuscripts? Have you 
heard about picture 
signs before? Could their robot translate these signs all 
by himself.? In Section 5: How do 
you think captain Cook and his men 
felt on planet Oc? What d1d they find in the loch? So 
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they got the satellite out of the water, how did they feel then? In Section 6: Can you no". 
tell me just briefly what had happened to the Ocs? Why did the Ocs want to hide their 
secret knowledge? What did captain Cook think about the Ocs? 
Pilot testing had shown the need to make the questions somewhat simpler for the 
younger subjects. By doing so the experimenter tried to encourage these young subjects to 
speak about the story at their level of understanding, hoping to get a picture of whether 
they had gained some global sense of the story. This precaution was taken because it had 
been predicted that the story text might be too complex for the youngest age group and the 
story too long, given the complexity added by the interval interfering procedure. Finally, 
children in the Control condition had no experience of the multiple choice set of objects or 
of questions aimed at estimating the child's mapping of the novel term; therefore children 
in this condition were unfamiliar with all the tasks in the Test Phase taking place after they 
had listened to the story. 
The Test Phase. 
The Test Phase was conducted shortly after the subject had listened to the entire 
story and been through the six stages of the story. 
The subjects' performance in the Test Phase after the story was to be used as a 
criterion for their particular lexical entry for the novel term. It was predicted that the 
analytical or intentional learning procedure set up in the three different experimental 
conditions and the ambiguity inherent in the structure of these conditions would result in 
the subjects' "fast mappings, " which again could lead to a more incomplete lexical entry for 
the new term. Age was thought to be a very important variable, however. The older 
subjects might benefit from this type of learning, their mental apparatus being ready for 
and used to sorting the criterial attributes of a given stimuli. Furthermore, their recall and 
recognition skills were better developed, along with their reasoning and general knowledge 
of the world, reflecting better developed communicative skills. In short, the older the 
children, the more likely they were expected to make use of the experimental setting in 
which they participated. 
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The five tasks were constructed around the mapping of the three components of 
meaning, which the "full meaning" paradigm to be used as a yardstick in analysing the 
acquired data involved. The definition of "full meaning" entailed that the child would kno\, N- 
the sense and denotation of the novel lexical item and be able to make use of lexical 
knowledge in making an inductive reference about a proper referent within the range of 
possibilities given in the Test Phase situation. It was not thought to be the case, however, 
that once two components of the new word's meaning were known to the child, the third 
could be deduced in some calculative manner. 
The Test Phase was conducted identically for all subjects and involved the 
presentation of five tasks, each presented singly to the child. The test sample that has been 
described earlier was used not only in the Encoding Phase of the experiment, but also in 
the real Test Phase that took place after the story had been listened to. The Test Phase 
involved five different tasks, and in two of them, Test I and Test 4, the same stimulus 
material had been employed in another context during the Encoding Phase with two of the 
experimental groups: Indirect and Metalinguistic Plus Indirect. 
Test I in the Test Phase was actually the same sort of a multiple-choice task 
procedure with which these two groups were confronted in the Encoding Phase. This meant 
that half of the subjects in the total sample of 160 children, or 80 of them (40 x 2), were 
already familiar with the test materials and the nature of the first task in the Test Phase 
when they came to complete the Test Phase. 
Test 1 (Tl) : Object Comprehension. 
In this first task the subject was presented with the same multiple choice set of 
objects made of the six materials that were used with subjects in Experimental Condition I 
and Experimental Condition 3 in the Encoding Phase of the study. (See p. 55 for a more 
detailed description of the set). 
The perceptual and lexical contrasts that the child encountered in the task, although 
somewhat ambiguous, were thought to give the child scope to use the lexical knowledge 
already gained on the novel term in the Encoding Phase and to form the needed referential 
relationship between the different materials. However, none of the materials except 
Mikas 
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was mentioned in the story. In order to establish the referential relationship. the subject had 
to comprehend which set of objects from all possible objects in the world the novel ten-n 
denoted. 
Subjects were asked questions such as: "Can you hand me the Mikas ones. please"" 
"Can you hand me the felt ones, please? " The order of the questions was randomised for all 
subj ects. 
Before the testing started, three or four objects of each material in the test sample 
were spread randomly on a desk and the children were allowed to handle and examine 
these objects. Thus, the children were able to familiarise themselves with the objects and to 
identify them perceptually before the test questions were asked. The experiment was not 
focused on how children sort things. Rather, by asking the child to sort the objects into 
piles without experimenter interference, it was hoped that the experimental situation was 
not too rigid and that it allowed the child's own interest in the objects to emerge. The 
objects were thought to be attractive to the child. By creating a short play situation as a 
prologue or introductory phase, and at the same time taking care that this play situation did 
not overwhelm the test situation so that the child failed to attend to the test instructions, or 
that it held up the test unduly, the experimenter could pinpoint the rules on the relation of 
the experimenter and the child that then went on all through the tests. 
This procedure is based on Reynell (1977,1983). Looking at the objects in response 
to the questions usually creates a selective response. The objects are requested randomly. 
For example, the experimenter would ask: "Can you now hand me over the Mikas ones? " 
"The plastic ones? " The child scored I point for each correct response. If a mixed response 
was given--let's say of both Mikas and polystyrene--the child was asked to point to or to 
show the Mikas by lifting it, a technique that is widely used in diagnostic tools of language 
development. In no case did the experimenter use a prompt such as "Are you sure? " or 
"Could it be something else? " The child was allowed to correct errors if s/he did it without 
prompting, as per standard testing practice. For example, the child might realise that s/he 
had not handed the Mikas objects as requested and could respond: "I realise I made a 
mistake earlier when I gave you the plastic ones; these are the Mikas. " Such a response 
would be scored I point. 
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Test 2 (T2) : Category Definition. 
Here the subject was presented with four cards, one at the time. and with one for 
each word. The words were all natural kind terms, animal term, plant term and the mineral 
term of the study. These words were used: rose, cow, Mikas, robin. 
The subject was asked direct questions about the meanings of these words, "What 
does the word 'rose' mean? " "What does the word 'Mikas' mean? " or in the following 
manner: "What kind of a thing is a rose? " "What kind of a thing is Mikas? " Thus an 
attempt was made in a direct manner to determine if the child had established criteria to 
define the semantic domain of the novel term and its sense relations to other words. 
In such metalinguistic questioning, the word is unaccompanied by objects made of 
the Mikas material and this requires a new orientation for the child. For the young children 
who were not expected to realise what was wanted of them, a prompt was allowed on the 
first word "rose, " such as "What does the word rose mean? " and, if the child paused, s/he 
was asked "What is a rose? " If the child hesitated, the experimenter would ask, "What do 
you do with it? " "What do you use it for? " Children in both the Indirect and the Control 
conditions were not used to this type of questioning; whereas children in the two other 
conditions were. The language level needed for this type of questioning was thought to be 
higher than for the comprehension level of handing over objects as requested by their 
names, as in Test 1, so it can be argued that there is some contamination between Test I 
and Test 2. 
It was expected that many young children would know what the new term, Mikas, 
meant, but would find this type of metalinguistic questioning difficult to answer and would 
find it difficult to explain their understanding. In this situation, the child has no perceptual 
cue, such as an object of a strange-looking material. The child had to describe an 
internalised concept from the internalised object/material/concept "Mikas" to the more 
abstract structure of relations. This test gives scope to assess knowledge of the word and 
ability to use expressive language to describe it. The test was so 
designed that the new 
word must be understood to be metal if the response was to 
be carried out correctly. For 
this reason, the scoring was very strict. If for example, the child could only say 
"It's hard 
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and shiny, " or "It has got metallic bits on it. " Mikas was scored as undergeneralisation. 
Similarly, by defining the rose, not as a plant, but as: "shaggy and has got leaves, " the child 
would not gain a point. Even if the child said: "It looks like silver or gold, " there could be 
no point scored without the demonstration that silver and gold are metals, as is the nexNr 
material. Thus, the child had to demonstrate knowledge of the superordinate metal or 
mineral as Mikas in order to score a point. 
Test 3 (T3) : Word-Sentence. 
For this task, the subject was presented with a card with four artificial words, one of 
which was Mikas, the mineral term under the study. The other unfamiliar words were: 
Gombe, Patas, and Tapas. On the card there were also four sentences, two of which 
included a natural kind term. ) and two of which included an 
individual kind tem-i, which, in 
both instances, were words that denoted objects made of metal. The four sentences were as 
follows: 
1) You use it to sew with. 
2) It can be used to make coins and pots. 
You use it to drive in. 
It can be used to make clothes. 
When the subject was shown the card s/he was asked whether s/he had heard any of 
the words before. Then the child was asked to find a sentence to match the word chosen. 
Here an attempt was made to discover if the subject had developed proper referential 
understanding of the underlying conceptual category, and, on that basis, had developed the 
sense relations of the term, which helped restrict its denotational boundaries. Also, the 
subject was provided with an opportunity to recognise the new word within a productive 
frame of three other unfamiliar words, to which, to the experimenter's knowledge, the child 
had not been previously exposed. 
In this case, the subject was requested to discriminate the word "Mikas" from a set 
of three unfamiliar-sounding words ("Gombe, " "Patas, " and "Tapas") and show clear 
understanding of the things, that the word "Mikas" denotes. Two of the things referred to in 
the sentences are actually objects made of metal: in Sentence 1, a needle (Gombe) and in 
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Sentence 3, a car (Patas). Two of them are materials: in Sentence 2, (Mikas) and in 
Sentence 4, wool or felt (Tapas). This test therefore taps the conceptual development of the 
child, the grasping of the constructional and functional aspects of the word in question. and 
its underlying conceptual structure. Being able to discriminate between a piece of metal 
and objects made of that metal requires the identification of categories of individual and 
kind concepts and appearances. Being able to discriminate between metal and wool, for 
example, requires the identification of both as kind concepts but of different categories 
within the hierarchy of material concepts. 
Test 4 (T4) : Production. 
Here the subject was presented with the same multiple-choice set of objects as in 
the first task and was asked to match objects made of the same material and to name the 
material. By comparing performance on this task with performance on Task 1, the 
experimenter could estimate the child's production of the novel term and whether there was 
a dissociation between comprehension and production. On this basis, it would be 
determined if the child knew the sense of the term and was in the process of delineating or 
had already delineated denotation. 
As with all standardised tests, it was hoped that the experimenter would quickly 
become familiar with the usual range of productive responses, which would make it easy to 
understand what the child was saying even if the articulation was not 100% correct. Any 
sound recognisable as a true verbal label was acceptable. If the child always used the same 
sound sequence to refer to "Mikas" (like saying "majes" for Mikas), that was considered to 
be correct. Similarly, if the child left one item of the Mikas sample, like one coin, on the 
desk, and, having recognised this, and having said, for example, "And here is one more 
majes coin, " that response would be scored as correct. It was felt that heavy demands on 
errorless speech were inappropriate, following the practice of Reynell (1977,1983), who 
allows certain inexactness in articulation in her expressive tests. By adopting this less 
arbitrary method of scoring, I was attempting not to underscore the deserving child. 
67 
Test 5 (T5) : Depiction. 
In order to map the child's understanding better and to appeal to the younger 
children's level of communicative understanding. I decided to include in the Test Phase a 
task in which the children were asked to draw something made of Mikas. Along with this 
task came a short interview, in which the child was asked where Mikas could be found and 
if s/he had heard about it before. The child was also asked to draw something made of 
wood and asked similar questions about. Then the child was asked how s/he liked the story 
and what it had been about. 
The main rationale for using drawings in this test was to tap the child's 
understanding of the new term better. This strategy was particularly important for the 
younger children. An intermediary stage might exist between nonverbal and verbal 
understanding and at early stages a child's understanding is postulated, still. to be 
dependent upon circumstances and to be procedurally based. These tests such as Test 2, 
Category, that make more requirements for a declarative skill, are not suited to tap 
understanding at this young level. Generally speaking, the drawings were thought to give 
the children scope to represent to themselves and to the experimenter features present in 
the test sample or to draw on the source of earlier experiences of metallic things and 
imitations where graphic forms are used to represent internal models. Internal models or 
mental images have been stabilised by frequent internal imitation of perceptual activity (cf. 
Krampen, 199 1). 
I would argue that the child's drawings depend in their form largely on the 
maturation of inborn muscular and perceptual abilities. The youngest children in the 
experiment were 5 years of age. It is known that the forms produced by children of this age 
are often miniaturised or present the usual geometric shapes--circles, squares, or triangles-- 
and that subdivision of these geometric shapes is further spontaneously exercised. By 
selecting geometrically shaped objects made of various materials, like the ones used in the 
testing sample, I hoped to ensure that children of all ages would be able to draw them. 
Also, as children are thought to build images gradually when allowed to explore an object, 
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the touching and sorting of the objects in Test I and Test 4 was bound to influence the 
child's image or "motor copy. " 
Scoring in this case was based both on the drawings and the way in which theý- 
defined their drawings when asked about them. They were first asked what they had dra,,, v, n 
and then asked questions such as "What is Mikas"" "Where can you find it"" "'ýVhat can 
you use it for? " 
If a cross or a circle was drawn, the child was asked what they were, if they were 
hard or soft, where the material could be found for these, and so on. These questions were 
designed to explore the conceptual mapping and to probe the child's answers in order to 
score the drawing properly. There were crosses and circles in the test sample of all the 
materials used. 
Let's assume, for example, that the child has drawn something like a tin. The 
experimenter asks the child what s/he has drawri and s/he answers: "A tin. " The 
experimenter asks the child what it is made of, and if the child answers "Mikas, " or 
"metal, " the drawing is scored as correct. 
The Posttest. 
In the Posttest the same setting was utilised as in the Encoding and Test Phase. The 
subjects were asked if they wanted to come again to the schoolroom to help the 
experimenter with some questions. Each subject was tested singly, but the Posttest was 
conducted identically for all subjects. 
The Posttest took place six to eight weeks after the Word-Context Test and 
involved two Test P`iases: a Comprehension Test and a Production Test. The intention of 
the Posttest construction was to estimate how well the subjects entertained the mapping of 
the novel lexical item that they had been supposed to plot in the experiment, and to see if 
there were any observed disassociations between comprehension and production. Also. I 
hoped to get some idea of the range of the subjects' vocabulary for mineral terms and the 
generalised hierarchical structure of that vocabulary. 
The Posttest was presented by the linguistic context of a story which was 
apprommately the same length as one sectIon of the story used 
in the experlment. (See 
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story in Appendix A, p. A6-A9). The story's theme was somewhat similar too. In the story 
there were six words about which the subjects were asked directlY after hearing the story. 
One of these words was the unfamiliar mineral term, "Mikas, " of the former story. This 
tenn occurred twice in the Posttest story, but in the story the subjects were also exposed to 
a new term of the same semantic domain. This new mineral term was "Cobalt, " which the 
subjects encountered twice in the new story. 
The story and the metalinguistic questioning constitute the Comprehension Test. 
After answering questions about each word, subjects were asked to check how well they 
thought their definitions would fit into the sentence frame. In the case of the younger 
subjects, the sentences were read once again, if they gave no answer after one reading. 
Subjects were not presented with a multiple-choice set of objects while the story 
was read aloud, except in the case of the very youngest age group. For this group the 
objects used in the experiment were spread on the desk before them and they were asked if 
they remembered having seen them before. Then the story was read aloud for them. If these 
youngest subjects could not give any answer on the meaning of the unfamiliar term 
"Mikas" in the Comprehension Test, they were again presented with the object sample and 
asked if they could point to the Mikas things. 
In the Production Test, which was conducted separately two days later, subjects 
were asked to make a list of all the mineral terms they knew or could remember. Both these 
Test Phases took about five to ten minutes for each subject. 
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Results. 
The following section describes the analysis of the experimental data. Quantitative analysis 
is described first, followed by qualitative/descriptive analysis. 
A Quantitative Analysis of the Data. 
The quantitative analysis of the data is based on calculations of the raw scores of 
point I for correct answers and point 0 for wrong, or no answers. Various statistical tests 
were run in order to arrive at the final analysis of the two main variables, Age and 
Intervention. These analyses were Chi Squares, t-tests (with means tables), Anovas, and the 
Duncan Multiple Ranges Test. 
The analysis reveals that in Experiment 1, Age reaches significance levels for 
performance in all Tests, TI to T5. It is clear that many subjects in all groups and 
conditions reach full mapping of the new term. The tests were designed to test for the 
sense, denotation, and reference of the new term. Age had largest effect on sense in the test 
Category ("Vvlhat is Mikas? "), followed by Tests 3 (Word Sentence), Test 4 (Production), 
Test I (Object Comprehension), and lastly Test 5 (Depiction). 
It is clear that after the subjects had been through the first four tests, the test of 
depicting yielded the highest score across all Ages and conditions. Tests 2 and 3 were 
similar tests; they both tested for sense and they did not give scores as high as Tests I and 
5, both of which tested for denotata. The test of Production, in which the subjects were 
asked to name the referent, proved to be the one yielding the lowest score. This score was 
intercorrelated with the test for Production in the Posttest. There were, however, a few 
more subjects in the Production posttest that could not name the referent but could do so in 
the initial test. There was almost a one-to-one correlation between the first test and the first 
posttest, in which the test sample of objects made of different materials was used. Children 
in the experiment did better on tests of denotation than on sense, but in the latter instance 
they still scored above chance levels as a group. 
Males did slightly better in most tests in Experiment I than did females. The whole 
experimental setup may have appealed more to the boys than to the girls. because the boys 
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may have been more interested in the story of a space adventure and in objects made of 
metal. 
The result section starts with tables showing characteristics of responses during the 
Encoding Phase, then patterns of within-children/between-children responses in the Test 
Phase are shown, followed by individual between-groups comparisons for the different 
tests together with a correlation matrix for the tests, and, finally, effects of age and 
condition on performance are presented. 
Characteristics of Responses during Encoding. 
The correct responses to the new term during Encoding are presented in the 
following tables (Tables 2.3,2.4, and 2.5, p. 73) It should be stressed, however, that many 
subjects in all age groups did not attempt at giving a definition for the word. Here Category 
A means definitions of Mikas as metal without relating to something else outside the story 
by description or to some linguistic or nonlinguistic context within the story and the 
experimental setting; Category B means definitions of Mikas related to the story context by 
mentioning the word in relation to some part/parts of the sentential contexts or to part/parts 
of the story or to events in the story or to the experimental setting and Category C means 
definitions of Mikas related to something linguistic and/or nonlinguistic outside the story. 
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Table 2.3 














Metalinguistic and Indirect - Correct Responses during Encoding 
Section I 





Age A B C Test 1 
51 6 
75 3 2 9 
91 6 3 10 
11 6 3 10 
Age SI S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 Test 1 
5 4 5 4 5 6 6 
76 8 10 10 10 10 10 
93 6 8 10 10 10 10 
11 2 8 9 10 10 10 10 
N=40 
Table 2.5. 
Indirects - Correct Responses during Encoding. 
Age SI S2 SIN S4 S5 S6 Test 1 
50 4 1 2 3 
74 6 56 6 5 7 
9 8 9 10 10 10 10 
11 6 10 10 9 10 10 10 
N=40 
(In all these tables, Test I means Test I from the Test Phase that takes place after the 
Encoding Phase). 
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Patterns of Within -C h ild ren/Between -Children Responses. 
In order that the patterns of within-children/between-children responses can be 
estimated, their raw scores have been presented and have been calculated as the 
percentages of the possible total scores for each group, in which N= 10. Results from TI 
(Object Comprehension, T4 (Production) and T5 (Depiction) have been presented in the 
following bar graphs (see p. 75-77). Results from each of the other tests In the Test Phase 
can be seen in Table A. I., p. A 12, in Appendix A accompanied by bar graphs (Appendix 
A, Fig. A. 3., Fig. AA., p. A13-AI4). 
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Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.3. 







Age 5 Age 7 Age j kNge II 
Individual Between-Groups Comparisons for the Tests in the Test Phase. 
The different tests reveal interesting age-related developmental variations in the 
sample, and the effects of different encoding procedures; by using individual between- 
groups comparisons, employing the Duncan Multiple Ranges Test, the signIficance in 
performance is confirmed between the conditions and between the ages for the various tests 
in the Test Phase. 
Test 1- Object Comprehension 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms significant difference between the 
Metalinguistic plus Indirect condition (M .8 8) and the Metalinguistic condition (M . 60), 
(the Control condition, M . 75) at the . 050 level, and a significant difference between age II 
(M 
. 92), age 9 (M . 88), age 7 (M . 78) as compared to age 5 (M . 38) at the . 050 level. 
Test 2- Category Definition 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confin-ns no significant difference between the 
Metalinguistic plus Indirect condition (M . 68), the Control condition (M . 67), the Indirect 
condition (M .5 8), and the Metalinguistic condition (M . 56) at the . 050 level, but a 
significant difference between age II (M . 90), age 9 (M . 80), age 7 (M .7 1), as compared 
to age 5 (M . 10) at the . 050 level. 
Test 3- Word Sentence 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confinns significant difference between the 
Metalinguistic plus Indirect condition (M . 80) and the Metalinguistic condition (M .5 5) 
(the Control condition M . 72, the Indirect condition M . 60), at the . 050 level, and a 
significant difference between age II (M . 
90), age 9 (M . 88) and age 7 (M . 
68) as 
compared to age 5 (M . 23) at the . 
050 level. 
Test 4- Production 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms significant difference betWeen the 
Metalinguistic plus Indirect condition (M . 68) and the Control condition (M . 44) (the 
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Indirect condition M . 
65. the Metalinguistic condition M . 48) at the . 050 level. and a 
significant difference between age II (M . 85), age 9 (M . 73), age 7 (M . 59) as compared to 
age 5 (M A 0) at the . 050 level. 
Test 5- Depiction 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms no significant difference between the 
Metalinguistic plus Indirect condition (M . 88), the Control condition (M . 88), the 
Metalinguistic condition (M . 80) and the Indirect condition (M . 78) at the . 050 level, but a 
significant difference between age II (M . 97), age 9 (M . 93), age 7 (M .8 8) as compared to 
age 5 (M . 55), at the . 
050 level. 
(See Appendix A, Table A. 2., p. A 15 for subsets for condition and age for TI -T5 
with the Duncan Multiple Range Test). 
The following correlation matrix (Table 2.6, p. 89) shows strong correlation 
among some of the tests: the strongest correlation of Test 2 (Category Definition) and Test 
4 (Production) (. 64**); then, among Test 2 (Category Definition) and Test 3 (Word 
Sentence) (. 63**); among Test 3 (Word Sentence) and Test 4 (Production) (. 58**), among 
Test 1 (Object Comprehension) and Test 4 (Production) (. 56**); among Test 5 (Depiction) 
and Test 2 (Category Definiton) (. 55**), and, finally, among Test 5 (Depiction) and of Test 
I (Object Comprehension) (. 53**). (See more in Discussion on the revelations of the tests 
on p. 119-120). 
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Table 2.6 
Correlation Matrix for the Tests in the Test Phase. 
cumiiatiaas: amcm wosm am EEPM 
aBxm 1.0000 
. 5942** . 4553** -5619** . 5277** CKMEF 
. 5942** 1.0000 . 6343** . 6441** . 5472** WZEEN 
. 4553** . 6343** 1.00()0 -5839** . 4629** PBM 
. 5619** . 6441** . 5839** 1.0()00 . 4773** 
IIWM 
. 5277** . 5472** . 4629** . 4773** 1.0000 
N cf cages: 16D 2-tailed S ig=Lf: *- . 01 ** - . ()0, 
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Effects of Age and Condition on Performance. 
The following are Two-way Analysis of Variance (Two-way Anova) showing 
effects of Age and Condition on performance in the different tests in the Test Phase. Anova 
tables and mean tables for these tests are presented in Appendix A, Table A. 4. and Table 
A. 5., p. A21 -A29. 
Test 1: Object Comprehension. 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition F(3,144) = 3.55,12 
<. 005 and of Age F(3,144) = 16.79, p- <. 001. Age group 11.5 performed best overall, and 
all age groups performed best in the Metalinguistic and Indirect condition. 
Test 2: Category Definition. 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F 3,144) = 35.59, p <. 001. 
Age group 11.5 performed best overall, with the younger age groups performing best in the 
Metalinguistic and Indirect condition and the older age groups performing best in the 
Indirect condition but the younger ones having the poorest perfonnance in the Indirect 
condition. 
Test 3: Word Sentence. 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition F(3,144) = 3.74, p 
<. 05 and of Age F(3,144) = 26.75, p <. 001. Age group 11.5 performed best overall, with 
all age groups except age group 5.5 performing best in the Metalinguistic and Indirect 
condition. Age group 5.5 performed best in the Control condition. Age group 9.5 
performed better in the Indirect condition than did age group 11.5. 
Test 4: Production. 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition F(3,144) = 3.65, 
<. O I and of Age E(-), 144) = 26.3 8, p <-00 1. Age group 11.5 performed best overall, with 3 
the younger age groups performing best in the Metalinguistic and Indirect condition and 
the older age groups performing best in the Indirect condition. 
81 
Test 5: Depiction. 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F(3 3.144) = 12.99. p <. 00 1. 
Age group 11.5 performed best overall, and all age groups performed best in the 
Metalinguistic and Indirect condition, except age group 5.5, which performed best in the 
Control condition. 
Combined Tests. 
The following are combined tests, the results of which have been calculated from 
the means of each of a given subtest (TI: Object Comprehension, T2: Category Definition, 
T3: Word Sentence, T4: Production, and T5: Depiction) in the Test Phase (see p. 63-69 for 
a full description of the tests). The results of two such combined tests are presented here. 
These tests have been named Full Meaning and Comprehension. It should be noted that the 
names of these combined tests indicate that in Full Meaning, a child who has all the 
subtests correct has worked out the full meaning of the new term as s/he has mastered both 
the comprehension and production of the new term; whereas a child who has one or more 
of the subtests wrong has only a partial meaning for the new term. In Comprehension, the 
test of Production (T4) has been omitted, and as the remaining four tests are testing for 
comprehension and a blend of linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge, a child who has all 
four of them correct can be granted with a general understanding of the new term and with 
some linguistic understanding--but not a full meaning yet--as s/he has difficulties in 
recalling it, a procedure that may be of a more semantic content than the one of 
Comprehension. 
Full Meaning: All Subtests in Test Phase (Tl+T2+T3+T4+T5). 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition F(3,144) = 3.43, p 
<. 05 and of Age F(3,144) = 48.06, p <. 001. Age group 11.5 performed best overall. Age 
group 9.5, performed best in the Indirect condition, whereas all other groups exhibited the 
best performance under the Metalinguistic and Indirect condition. 
82 
Comprehension: All Subtests except T3 for Production (TI+T2+T4+T5). 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition F(3,144) = 3.68. p 
<-05 and of Age F(3,144) = 44.70, V <. 00 1. Age group 11 .5 performed 
best overall. Age 
group 9.5, performed best in the Indirect condition, whereas all other groups exhibited the 
best performance under the Metalinguistic and Indirect condition. 
The following graphs (Fig. 2.4., 2.5., 2.6., p. 84-86) present effects of age and 
condition on performance in T2 (Category), Full Meaning (T I +T2+T3+T4+T5) and 
Comprehension (T I +T2+T4+T5). 
Results from the posttests can be seen in Appendix A together with Anovas and 
mean tables for all tests in Test Phase and Posttesting. 
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Figure 2.4. Effects of Age and Condition on performance in T2, Category. 
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Figure 2.5. Effects of Age and Condition on performance in Full Meaning 
a. -ý va Irrv f 
-. 0A*tO 109013t 19 
ml ndi rpvt 
dAw tai(r. 





=p i. n 
- cz C) 
L5 




Figure 2.6. Effects of Age and Condition on performance in Comprehension 
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A Qualitative Analysis of the Data. 
The qualitative analysis is based on the two main variables under consideration in 
the study: Age and Intervention. This analysis Is descriptive as to the ways In which 
different types of encoding have emerged in the decodings for the new term both in 
Encoding and Test Phase. The analysis is based upon tape recordings and observational 
notes that were written down incidentally during the course of the study. The pragmatic 
factor in the study is established in the different types of encoding that each group 
underwent. This communicative context gave the background for which the new term was 
encoded and decoded and this was predicted to play a decisive role in the effect of 
ambiguity for the deciphering of the new term's meaning in the structure of the given 
situation. 
The child's vocabulary and understanding of syntax are not sufficient to account for 
successful encoding or decoding of the new term; the child also needs to understand the 
communication situation itself As stated in Krampen, (199 1), Von UexkUll argued in the 
twenties for the totality of the child's perception, thinking, and action. He maintains that 
one should not concentrate exclusively on the question of perception or storing incoming 
information on the one hand or on problems of action and production on the other. Rather, 
all these processes must be seen together in a "function circle" (Krampen, 1991, p. 28). 
If Joos's thesis holds, then, children with strong contextual abilities would decipher 
possible meanings for an unknown word in situations in which they know the meaning of 
the context--that meaning that would contribute least to or change least the total context. 
Joos contends that there are often discrepancies between one's reading of language and 
sense impressions from the real world, but he states that these discrepancies often seem, in 
the long run, to form a pattern themselves and that, when realising that, one corrects one's 
language. He calls this phenomenon intuitive behaviour that is not logical; one has to argue 
here by means of analogy. His ideas of intuitive behaviour and use of analogy or heuristics 
are similar to those of Werner (1952). 
Werrier (1948,1950,1952) had argued that there is a primordial form of 
classification of objects and experiences that is a primitive form of concept formation and 
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involves a process of, linked to the emotions and sensations of the i isa II perceiver. Th's * 
perceptual process that he has tenned physiognomic perception and is itself non-specific 
and does not differentiate among the many phenomena it subsumes. He has stated that the 
primitive concept is not specific and stable but relative and shifting and that the object- 
subject relation is less sharply articulated. the physiognomic and dynamic qualities of 
things would stand out clearly, whereas abstract concepts would tend to a high stability and 
specificity. 
It appears from the present study that children in all conditions have the strength of 
their own linguistic skill, past knowledge, and perceptual sensitivity to overcome the 
ambiguities in the input, and via their natural heuristics, are able to map the meaning of the 
new term. I hope the following descriptions will strengthen this assumption to a greater 
extent. 
The Indirect Condition. 
Two children in the 5-year-old group chose Mikas correctly in the sections, 
although some did get the hang of it, but slipped back. Children of the youngest age group 
showed a rather passive attitude towards the objects in the test sample. As a rule, they did 
not start to play with the objects, touch them, or examine them, except when encouraged to 
do so. 
The six materials used were: wood, leather, felt, plastic, polystyrene, and Mikas. A 
few of the youngest subjects were not sure whether they were supposed to discriminate 
among the objects on the basis of shapes, colour, or material. ) 
but most of them seemed to 
entertain some notion of the conceptual domain covered by these exemplars and that the 
six terms denoted, in all cases, some sort of a substance. Many of them could not 
discriminate among polystyrene, Mikas, and felt, and experienced a good deal of confusion 
and trial-and-error sorting in the 6 Encoding Test Phases. They quite often gave the 
response of "polystyrene" for "Mikas" and vice verse. 
Children of the 7-year age group behaved radically different from the 5-year-olds in 
their approach in the test sample to the objects with which they were presented. They 
seemed to be more active and more spontaneous, played with the objects, and examined 
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them without encouragement. The following is an example of Indirect testing ývith John 
(6.9): 
Section 1. 
Takes rather a quick look at the things. 
"Wood. " Gives "Mikas. " 
"Plastic. " Gives it correctly 
"Mikas. " Gives "Leather. " 
"Polystyrene. " Gives it correctly 
"Felt. " Gives it correctly 
"Leather. " Gives wood 
Section 2. 






































Felt. Mikas. Plastic. Wood. Polystyrene. Leather 
Test 2. 
It's a flower and it's red. 
It's in the field and it has got four legs and it gives milk. 
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Mettile. 
It's a little bird with a red breast. 
Test 3. 








E: Do you know the name of this mettile? 
S: Mikas. 
Test 5. 
E: Can you maybe draw me something made of Mikas? 
S: Draws a key. 
E: Where can you expect to find Mikas? 
S: In a cutlery drawer. 
E: Did you notice it in the story? 
S: Yes. 
E: Did they have Mikas on planet Oc? 
S: Yes. 
E: Do you remember what you heard about Mikas in the story? 
S: Pause. "Did they find it in the loch? " he then asks. 
E: What did you find most interesting in the story? 
S: When they found it in the loch. 
E: Can you maybe draw me something made of wood? 
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S: Draws a desk. 
E: Where would you find the wood for the desk? 
S: In a factory. 
Posttests. 
Test 1. Comprehension. 
Mikas: Metal 
Cobalt: A galaxy 
A geologist: Scientist 
Wee: Very small 
Distant: Far away 
To improve: To do better 







Generally characteristic of the 7-year-olds' behaviour, was their dynamism and 
eagerness to participate in the task. They often thought aloud and used much facial 
expression and body language when answering. Usually, they knew most of the materials, 
but still some of them became confused over felt, polystyrene, and Mikas. When thinking 
aloud they gave remarks like, "This is polystyrene; then this must be Mikas. " 
They tried to check the experimenter on their responding and looked at her for 
approval, disapproval, or reassurance. Thus, their attempt at making a reasonable inference 
about the objects were more systematic and sophisticated. The children in this group 
seemed to be more relaxed, in that sense their type of task seemed to be easier than the one 
in the Metalinguistic Condition. 
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Nine-year-old subjects seemed to be confident and relaxed when presented with the 
test sample. Some of them examined the objects carefully at first--the edges, their weight 
and texture--while others just took a quick look at them before handing them over. The task 
seemed rather easy for them to solve and they made few errors, except perhaps in the first 
two intervals. They seemed to be able to correct themselves. The errors in responding 
centred mainly on polystyrene and Mikas and felt. These subjects did not think aloud as 
much as the 7-year-olds did, nor did they use as much body language or as many facial 
expressions when thinking and answering. 
The II -year-old children usually took only a quick look at the objects in the test 
sample before returning them and this they did with ease. Errors in responding were rare. 
They had greater knowledge of the materials and a considerably more sophisticated 
reasoning. It was common for them in the first section, when first asked to hand over 
Mikas, to say with surprise: "What? " Most of the I 1-year-olds made mistakes only in the 
first section, if they made any mistakes at all. Usually, if they made an error in the first 
section,, it was to say "plastic" or "polystyrene" instead of "Mikas. " The oldest subjects 
looked at the edges of the objects and weighed them with their hands, a gesture that the 
youngest age group rarely made. The children were aware of the task demands. The 
demand characteristics of the task were plain to many of the II -year-old children; they 
knew that the experimenter was interested in materials. 
In order to do the task required for this study, a child must learn that an object can 
be referred to in more than one way. A cat can, for example, be referred to as "cat, " 
"Rufus, " "animal; " a metal can, for example, be referred to as "metal, " "Mikas, " or 
"mineral. " If the child has more than one unknown material in the sample, s/he must 
choose between these for the unknown term. In the noun case, such as in Experiment 1, the 
expression always referred to a material; there was no doubt about it being some substance. 
Dockrell argues that: 
If an unknown phonemic sequence is heard, whose reference is made clear 
because of the linguistic elements which accompany it or because of non- 
verbal information, the child will look for an unknown object; if no such 
object exists the child will have to adopt an alternative strategy (198 1, p. 
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124-125). 
If they failed to identify the unknown referent by use of the linguistic information 
available, the younger children opted for a close alternative like polystyrene, which is 
unknown; knowing the name of the intended referent interferes with choosing an unknown 
but potentially appropriate alternative. The Mikas materials may have been more familiar- 
looking to them than were the polystyrene ones. Children of the age of those in this 
experiment, even the youngest ones, have fairly well-developed lexicons and the size of 
their lexicons are increasing rapidly (cf. Carey, 1978a). A strategy of pre-emption would 
therefore have been a useful way for them to limit alternatives. The situation with the 
Indirect subjects was, to some extent, structured by the question "Can you hand me the XT' 
This type of question helped them to set up a semantic frame. The presence of objects 
made of different materials helped the older children in establishing reference and hence in 
developing subsequent meaning. For the younger subjects, more unknown materials or 
material names were clearly more of a confusion to them. 
Subjects in this experiment had two good reasons not to expect the new word to 
refer to a material that they knew by name: the child's own strategies for word learning and 
the lack of any linguistic information that would indicate that a change in level of analysis 
was required. Interpretation of this known/unknown dichotomy was expected to vary 
among children and situations as well as the child's degree of certainty about the real word. 
Katz, Baker, and- Macnarnara (1974) illustrated that the nature of the object is of 
significance in such situations. The supporting objects for the different materials used in 
the experiment indicated some definite referents and the level of specificity was in some 
sense determined; thus, the type of the referents were not specified any further. The 
children most likely assumed that there was a level of specificity used and that the context 
would support or question their initial assumption about this. I tried to assess the subjects 
inferences concerning the referent of a new term and postulated that the context and 
intended level of specificity would be in harmony, conforming to the normal requirements 
of conversation, so that the level of specificity indicated by the universe of discourse and 
the intended referent would be the same. The intended referent was explicit, but the 
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children were asked about it indirectly. It was physically present. This procedure presents 
the Indirects with information adequate to identify more than one intended denotatum if 
other referents in the sample are unknown. 
The children isolated and incorporated features of the object or substance that theY 
regarded as being critical in their representation of the term, saying, for example, "It is 
hard,, " or "It cannot get soaked. " Children clearly used this information when asked whý, 
they thought that Mikas is metal. Children can clearly use contrastive information in a 
restricted referential situation in order to grasp the denotation of a new term when the other 
referents are known as often is the case with the older subjects in this condition. 
There are also cases in which the child knows the intended referent exactly, even 
after giving an initial wrong response, makes a note of this, and spontaneously corrects 
him- or herself Unless the initial referential relationship is established, no subsequent 
representation of the new term can be developed (Anglin, 1977). 
The Metalinguistic Condition. 
The youngest subjects, the 5-year-olds often seemed puzzled at the metalinguistic 
questioning with which they were bombarded during the intervals of the Encoding Phase. 
Often they seemed to want to say something but remained silent. They were very sincere 
and made a great deal of effort in trying to do their best. When they were presented with 
the test sample of objects in the Test Phase after the story, they seemed relieved. As 
regards the novel lexical item, Mikas, they made few guesses and shifts. They remembered 
hearing it, but could not state what they had heard. There were great individual differences 
in their definitions of words. They were very pragmatic in their answers and in their 
definitions of words and often related their definitions to descriptions of events that they 
had heard about in the story, or knew from experience. Some showed a great deal of 
interest in the story. It was common for these youngest subjects not to attempt any 
definitions of Mikas. or of any other words, whether they thought they had heard the word 
or not. The children who showed the greatest recall of the story also had the largest 
vocabularies. It is clear that they made greater effort when asked how their definitions of 
Mikas connected to each other. 
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The 7-year-old subjects clearly had more advanced memory skills (recognition and 
recall abilities) than did the 5-year-olds, and could remember more about Mikas from the 
story. They also tried their best to answer questions about all the words they were asked 
about in the Intervals, and gave them definitions for them, however incomplete. These 
definitions were strongly related to actions. These subjects became a bit tense and nervous 
when they were bombarded with questions about words and confronted to make a 
conscious effort to define their meanings. They had often heard the word "Mikas" in the 
story, but there were gross individual differences in recall. Some of them were able to 
make gradual shifts on the meaning of the new words, and most of them understood that 
the word denoted some sort of substance. 
One child thought that Mikas was a Mecano after hearing in the story of Mikas in 
the hall, but after last section said "sun got it hot, " and after fifth section, "bit of wall" and 
then corrected the information in the end by saying "It's metal, it sounds like it. " 
There was much better recall from story in the 7-year age group, but it is doubtftil if 
they connected information from each section into a whole. 
A general characteristic of the 9-year-old group was that these subjects seemed to 
make conscious demands on themselves and were not as spontaneous as the 7-year-olds. 
They seemed to be more cautious and greater metacognition was seemingly involved. The 
shifts in meaning that they made concerning the novel lexical item in question were not 
common, but those who did make shifts did not necessarily stick to their first meaning. 
Those who did stick to their first meaning tended to repeat their error in the Test Phase 
also. The following is an example of Metalinguistic testing with Jane (8.8): 
Section 1. 
E: Do you know what the word "destiny" means? 
S: No, don't know. 
E: Do you know what the word "ancient" means? 
S: It's from long ago. 
E: Do you know what the word "lifestyle" means? 




Do you Icnow what the word "Mikas" means? 
No, don't know. 
Section 2. 
E: Do you know what the word "galaxy" means? 
S: Another planet. 
E: Do you know what the word "robot" means? 
S: A sort like human, but it is metal and it does what its master commands. 
E: Did you hear the word "Mikas" now? 
S: Yes, I heard it. 
E: What do you think that word means? 
S: Was it a human? 
E: Why do you think so? 
S: Just thought so. 
E: Do you know what the words "to stumble over" mean? 
S: To destroy it. 
E: Do you know what the word "radar" means? 
S. Pause. 
E: A radar screen. Do you know where you can find radar screens? 
S: In other planets. 
E: What can they be used for? 
S: Something that shows other people what is happening. 
Section 3. 
E: Do you know what the words "to bang together" mean'? 
S: A sort of hitting them together. 
E: Do you know what the words "to contemplate on something" mean? 
S: No don't know. 
E: Do you know what the word "manuscript" means? 
S: A piece of paper with an old writing on it. Heard the word in the story. 
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E: Do you know what the word "Mikas" means" 
S: Yes. I heard it in the story now. 
E: What do you think it means? 
S: A sort of a place. 
E: Why do you think so? 
S: Pause. 
E. Now you think it is a place and before you thought it was a human, can you tell me 
more what you are thinking? 
S: No. (Looks a bit puzzled. ) 
E: Do you know what the word "fate" means? 
S: You can rely on someone. 
E: Faith, you mean? 
S: Yes. 
E: But fate, like "the fate of the Ocs? " 
S: No. (Shakes her head). 
Section 4. 
E: Do you know what the word "decipherment" means? 
S: No, don't know. 
E: Did you hear that word in the story? 
S: Yes. 
E: Do you know what the word "hieroglyphics" means? 
S: No, don't know, don't think I heard it. 
E: Do you know what the word "Mikas" means? 
S: Heard it now in the story. 
E: What do you think Mikas means? 
S: Stone, she says quickly. 
E: Why do you think so? 
S: Because they said the building was made of Mikas. 
E: You said before that it could be a human or a place, didn't you? 
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S: Yes. 
E: What do you think it was then' 
S: A stone also. Is it a ruin? she then asks. 
Section 5. 
E: Did you hear the word "Mikas" in the story now? 
S: Heard it in the story, she says and smiles. 
E: What did you hear? 
S: It said that Mikas didn't get wet in water. 
E: So what do you think it is? 
S: Plastic. 
E: Why do you think so? 
S: Because plastic doesn't get wet very often. 
E: Do you think that the building could have been made of plastic? 
S: It could have because greenhouses are made of plastic. 
E: But this human you were thinking about first, what about plastic then? 
S: No. 
E: Can you find a definition that fits in with all the others, human, place, building, 
stone, plastic? 
S: God, (makes a funny face). 
E: But what about a "sort of a place"? 
S: Heaven. 
E: Do you know what the word "satellite" means? 
S: A planet from orbit. 
E: Do you know what the word "soaking" means? 
S: Wet. 
E: Do you know what the word "brainracking" means? 
S: Thinking. 
E: Do you know what the word "to nod" means? 
S: You don't do it. You are supposed not to. 
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E: You mean in the classroom? 
S: Yes. 
Section 6. 
E: Do you know what the word "electric" means? 
No. 
E: But "electricity? " 
S: Things that you can use by plug to watch or for heating. You have to pay bills for 
them. 
E: Do you know what the word "alien" means? 
S: It's a sort of a baby robot, something like that. Comes from out of space. 
E: Did you hear the word "Mikas" now? 
S: No, never heard it in this section. 
E: What do you think "Mikas" means? 
S: Material, she says and looks at E. 
E: Remember what you thought earlier that Mikas meant: "a human, " "a sort of a 
place, " "stone, " "plastic. " Can you tell me more about what you are thinking? 
S: Don't think these first definitions were right. 
E: Why do you think so? 
S: God is not made of stone. Heaven is not made of plastic. A human can get wet 
easily. 
E: Now you think Mikas is some sort of a material. Do you think you could find one 
definition that goes for all the other definitions? 
No. 
Test 1. 
Picks up the objects to have a quick look at them before asked to hand them over. 
Wood 
Leather, (gives it with the wood). 








Metal (Looked at the experimenter as she said the word. She sounded as if she was 
first going to say plastic). 
A bird 
Test 3. 
Reads the words. Then picks up Mikas and matches correctly. 
Test 4. 
Understands straight away what to do. 
Plastic. 
Felt. 
Wood, (was going to group leather with the wooden objects, then stops, leaves the 
leather out and feels these objects for a while). 
Leather 
Polystyrene 
Mikas, (said this confidently). 
Test 5. 
E: Can you now draw me something made of Mikas? 
S: Draws a pot. 
E: Where can you expect to find Mikas? 
S: In the kitchen. 
E: You mean like pots? 
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S: Yeah. 
E: But where does it first come from? 
S: From a factory. 
E: Do you think this is a man-made material or can it be found in nature? 
S: In nature. 
E: Whereabouts? 
S: In mines. 
E: Can you also draw me something made of wood? 
S: Draws a tree. 
E: What did you like best in the story? 
S: When they landed on the planet. 
Posttests. 
Test 1. Comprehension. 
Mikas: Metal. 
Cobalt: Plastic. 
A geologist: People who study. 
Wee: Little. 
Distant: Far away. 
To improve: Do better. 






The 9-year-olds still tended to define words in terms of the use of the objects to 
which the words refer and the function of the word in the linguistic commun ity. Their 
definitions were also rare in terms of synonyms. When asked to state their reasons for 
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giving a special definition for Mikas, they often answered: "I just think so. " Their word 
definitions still showed that they had, in general, greater knowledge than the 7- and 5-year- 
olds, and a better developed vocabulary. 
Subjects in the II -year-old group answered almost all questions about the words 
correctly and did so with relative ease. They made many shifts on the meaning of Mikas 
and these shifts showed greater flexibility of thinking and a more sophisticated reasoning 
than did the shifts made by any of the younger subjects. They were more willing to state 
their reasons for giving a particular meaning to the new term, they remembered more of the 
linguistic context that interfered with the lexical entry of the new word; and often, after 
hearing the first two or three sections of the story in the Encoding Phase, they came up 
with proper mapping for the novel term. Their definitions showed a trend towards a more 
sophisticated, declarative understanding. 
They did not spontaneously connect earlier information with later information, but 
made many individual guesses. It is clear that subjects in this group with generally good 
recall of the story were also equipped with good vocabularies and had enough confidence 
in their linguistic intuition to overcome the ambiguity of the experimental setting. These 
oldest subjects clearly had improved auditory skills for processing language. 
Following are examples of correct entries in the II -year-old age group: "Mikas in 
hall made sound; " "Their voices echoed because of it; " "A type of dust, walls made of it, 
stone or rock; " "Does not get soaking wet; " "Sun got it hot and burnt him; must be rock or 
metal; " "Glittering, shiny in the hall and the sand, on the fences; must be metal; " "Got very 
hot, burnt him; it must be metal. " 
Subjects in this condition appeared to treat each sentence as a discrete entity. Or 
were the children unable to make the logical leaps? Did they not realise what was required? 
Or did the task itself inhibit the treatment of each sentence as an independent unit? Werner 
and Kaplan (1950,1954) speak of incomplete final solutions; they say that their results 
reflect a young child's lack of recognition of the necessity for integrating, with a single 
solution, the cues offered by all six sentences. There are cases in which the subject's 
response is congruent for the presented sentence but totally incongruent with the previous 
presentation. There are other cases in which the child gave a correct response 
for the 
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second sentence that would be correct and congruent for the third sentence, but then 
changed his or her response. 
Some responses were coloured and dominated by the child's own private 
experience. Such response patterns suggested that the child had a preferred response and 
was unable to use responses already given. There were cases in which the child initiallý, 
gave a correct response for the term, yet in following sentences responded "don't know" 
and then in the final sentence, was again correct. There were cases in which s/he responded 
with "don't know" for the first sentences and the last one and gave an incorrect in between. 
There were cases in which a series of correct congruent responses were tied directly to the 
sentence given, but the child did not integrate the individual solutions into one overall 
correct solution. Perhaps the amount of information given in that particular sentence was 
leading to a correct identification of the intended referent but not to a reflection of the 
child's ability to co-ordinate the information presented in a series of isolated sentences. 
Let us look., for example, at Ana, age 11.2. When her answers to Mikas were 
probed, she showed this pattern: Section 1: "1 don't know what that word means. " Section 
2: "Is it some sort of a chemical? " "There was something in the ground, hard to get off. " 
Section 3: "Is it a sort of metal? " Section 4: "Some sort of building material. " Section 5: It 
must be metal; it doesn't get soaking wet. " Section 6: "It must be metal because he burnt 
his hand. " 
The preceding is a systematic development, with each response being appropriate 
for the preceding sentence as well as the present one. It shows that the child progressively 
develops correct meaning of the word, taking into account the information presented in 
each section. Most subjects, however, treated each sentence as a separate entity. 
In reality, 
the child must associate a number of independent presentations in order to grasp the 
meaning of a term. There was great value to the information gained 
by examining the 
single responses given by the metalinguistics. 
In the Metalinguistic group during encoding the subjects often reported memories 
of instances of the new concept by saying, for example, 
"it's shiny and hard, " "looks like 
silver. " Here the particular aspects seemed to play an 
important role. The subjects did not 
consciously try to connect the 
information; they remembered particular things that served 
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as contextual determiners or pointers but working out the general rule for categorising the 
new term seems to take place unconsclousIN'. Joos (1967) argues that much language 
processing is automatic, and that the codes we use in language operate subconsciouslý -- 
that there is some "unaware familiarity" on the part of the hearer, and that the hearer is 
aware only of the product of the subconscious. 
Some of the information that the children in this experiment gave for single 
responses is similar to that given by much younger children. Contextual associations for 
the development of meanings for the subjects that are procedural in nature are difficult to 
co-ordinate. The children used information from their own cognitive framework and from 
the linguistic information presented in order to arrive at an initial reference and a stable 
denotation of the new term. 
In the Metalinguistic condition, a simple verbal definition left the option open for 
the child simply to say "don't know, " and this response occurred often. 
There were cases in which the children had problems accepting the fact that an 
object for which they already had a name could have another name. In these cases the new 
term was preempted; for example "Mikas" became "silver. " Some children correctly 
identified the intended referent but rather than accepting, for example, that Mikas is a metal 
substance, they replied that "it's like gold; it's silver. " It is possible that this was a refusal to 
accept that Mikas could be some metal other than the two metals known, or to accept that it 
is a mineral substance. 
There were cases in which there were spurious justifications like "Mikas cannot be 
metal 'cause it looks like plastic. " It is as if the child rejected the possibility of having two 
separate labels for the same entity. Clearly, this was also a time-saving strategy. 
Interpreting the natural kind, the new material, Mikas, as an inanimate thing was 
rare among the children's guesses. Also they had a strong sense for Mikas as a natural kind 
concept, even if they were not able to give the proper definition. Children were less likely 
to give multi-word responses to nouns. There was little evidence, when the nature of the 
metalinguistic responses is examined, that the child was treating the word as a functional 
entity in its own right; rather. the attempts were focused on the broad context, on the 
procedures in which the word had been used or linked to. The child's attempts were of a 
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global nature, undertaken in order to make sense of the situation. in order to provide the 
child with information. There was a lack on the child's part to treat the word in a 
declarative manner, as an independent. symbolic system, and to reflect on the logical 
relationships that hold between words within the lexicon. There were cases in which 
attempts were made to give information adequate to define the word. In such a response the 
child may have used information given in one sentence to define the word, or may have 
used the new term in a different sentence, suggesting that s/he had achieved some 
understanding of the intended denotation. The child may also have used the general sense 
of the sentence in order to derive a representation when repeating the word, after 
recognising that the information was relevant to an understanding of the new term. There 
were cases in which the child defined the term as an entity rather than as an association 
with other situations, such as saying that Mikas is a metal, without relating to the context 
of the story. Some words are more easily placed in novel contexts than are others. Some of 
the defining criteria presented in the target sentences are more appropriate than others, such 
as liglittering in the sand, " in Section 2 in the story used in this study. 
Despite these problems with the task, children did, in single responses, provide 
definitions (responses) that suggested that they were using sources of information, as a 
child in a natural situation would do. They were able to draw on their own experiences and 
upon the linguistic information presented in the sentences in order to gain some 
representation of the term. 
The Metalinguistic and Indirect Condition. 
Most subjects in the 5-year-old group realised that Mikas was a noun and many 
realised that it was a substance. A few realised that it was a metal substance. 
They often 
gave definitions of words with the contextual information of the story, or their experiential 
context such as defining "to discover. " Their answers were 
linked to the context in which 
they previously had heard the word "moon. " Even if they reallsed that 
Mikas is a 
substance, given all the information that they gleaned 
from the objects, they gave 
interpretations like "felt" or "plastic, " "fences made of plastic. " A few totally wrong 
answers were heard, like 
"a thing, " "a kangaroo, " "a shape. " 
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Subjects in the 7-year-old group often said that they had heard the word in the 
story, but often didn't remember in what context. Yet they often give a proper definition for 
the word, and sometimes remembered hearing it in the latter sections of the story. When 
asked why they thought that Mikas is a metal, they sometimes referred to the objects theý- 
had been given, and said that it was "like in the spoon. " Some of the subjects could not or 
did not give any reason for their conceptual i sation of Mikas as a metal. These subjects 
seemed immediately to pick up from the story that Mikas is a noun and some sort of a 
substance. They speak of "stuff under sand. " A few said that it is metal but could not state 
their reasons for thinking so. They tried to bend the Mikas objects and said "it's metal 
because it looks like it, " "it is quite strong, " and "you can make a spoon of mettile. " These 
subjects often corrected themselves by saying something like: "I know I've got some of 
them wrong the last time. " Many did not spontaneously connect information from the story 
about Mikas with information from the objects. 
In the 9-year-old group, answers employing correct vocabulary went hand-in-hand 
with good background knowledge. It was clear that their auditory skills were better 
developed than they were in the two younger groups. These subjects were willing to guess 
and could benefit from information about the Mikas objects, but very often they failed to 
co-ordinate information from story and objects. They said, for instance, that Mikas was 
metal because the key in the sample was made of metal or they might relate their answer to 
the story by saying, "It's a mineral; it doesn't wear off easily; and that's the same with 
minerals and stones. " The following is an example of Metalinguistic Plus Indirect testing 




Mineral; because it doesn't wear off easily and that's the same with minerals and 
stones; I don't think it was right (robber). 
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Section 3. 
Something hard iron; because it is hard. 
Section 4. 
Metal like iron; Metal; 'Cause it goes in the water, it doesn't get wet, it doesn't come 
out soaking. E: You said earlier that you thought it was some mineral because it 
doesn't wear off easily, and that there was some iron in the temple hall and now you 
say it doesn't get soaking? S: Yes, it is metal. 
Section 6. 
Metal. He had all objects correct in sections except section one. 














Mikas + sentence 2. 
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Test 4. 








E: Can you now maybe draw me something made of Mikas? 
S: Draws a spoon. 
E: Where can you find Mikas? 
S: In the ground. 
E: On our planet or only on planet Oc? 
S: Ours as well. 
E: What did you like best in the story? 
S: When they found the satellite. 
E: What was the Ocs secret knowledge about? 
S: The knowledge of making weapons. 
E: Why did they want to hide their secret knowledge? 
S: So the enemy wouldn't find out. 
E: Do you think the Ocs were peaceful or violent? 
S: Peaceful. 
Posttests. 
Test L. Comprehension. 
Mikas: A shiny rock. 
Cobalt: Living things: I am not sure. 
A geologist: Person who studies the Earth. 
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Distant: Far away. 
Wee: Small. 
To improve: Make it better. 








If the 9-year-old children gave a wrong material from the test sample for Mikas, 
some repeated their error and did not try to use information from story, but rather clung to 
the test materials. They said, for instance, that Mikas is a metal because "it looks like it. " 
They often used the expressions "it feels like, " "it sounds like": "It feels like metal when 
you look at the things; but I am not very sure, so I think it might be plastic and a tiny bit 
metal. " 
Recall of the story in the I I-year-old group was good. They made many guesses 
about Mikas, and, having often heard it in the story, did not spontaneously connect earlier 
information with later information. Thus, they might say "glittering shiny, it was in the 
sand and in the hall, on fences, got very hot and burnt him, " but still not be able to say 
what it was. Some said that it was in the sand glittering: "That's what the stuff is called on 
the spoon. " These subjects related to objects like: "you gave me the spoon and they look 
like mettile and feel like mettile, too. " However, other subjects related information from 
both the story and the test sample. A few made a mixture of a material and an object made 
of that material. 
It is clear that the Metalinguistic and Indirect type of intervention provided the 
subjects with many clues to the meaning of the new term. When asked directly about the 
meaning of a new term, subjects who were not able to glean information from the text 
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could use information from the test sample of objects to guide their guesses and to restrict 
their possible denotata. They also heard the new term more often than did other subjects. as 
reflected in their responses in the production tests later. However, as their drawings 
showed, they tended to be bound to the test sample of objects and not to be sure how to 
categorise the new referent. 
The Control Condition. 
Among the five-year-olds, the controls seemed to like the story and listened 
attentively; individual variation, however, was substantial. Only in a few instances did 
subjects show restlessness and start to talk about something else or start to move around. 
These young subjects seemed to gain some global sense of the story, but when asked about 
particulars or special events in the story, their memories often failed them. They often used 
their own imagination to compensate for their lack of understanding or memory. Usually 
their imaginative answers could fit with some broad global sense of the story and its central 
theme. There were gross individual differences within the age group as concerns 
willingness to report on the story; many subjects answered merely with "yes" or "no" and 
often the experimenter had to ask more specific questions in order to help them feel more 
confident. 
The 7-year-olds were able to give a relatively good report on the story, but some of 
them used their imagination when their memory and understanding failed them. The 7- 
year-olds were eager to co-operate and to try their best at answering, even though they did 
somewhat poorly at times. Their reports showed a better developed sense for the story's 
central theme than was seen in the 5-year-old group; they also remembered more events 
and more about the main characters. 
The 9-year-old subjects gave rather good reports, and if they didn't know the 
answers to some of the questions about the story's content they simply said that they didn't 
know and didn't try to make up answers, which was the tendency among the 5- and 7-year- 
olds. They clearly had better-developed memory skills and understanding. Some of them 
actually seemed to remember the story word-for-word. 
The II -year-old subjects answered almost all questions on the story's content 
correctly and did so with ease and clarity. Many of this group spoke spontaneously of 
Mikas after the first sections. They said: "This stuff all around, " "stuff all around in the 
hall. " "The glittering, the ground was a kind of glittering, " "voices echoed in these. " "some 
dust everywhere, " "this metal or mahogany in the hall was very special, " "something 
glittering in a big pile. " But there were also subjects who never mentioned Mikas 





Mikas S: Pardon? E: Can you give me please the things made of Mikas? Gives 
them over correctly. 
Test 2. 
It's a flower. 
It's an animal. 
It is -buh-, hesitates and thinks hard, a sort of metal, she then says questioningly. 
It's a bird. 
Test 3. 










E: Where can you expect to find Mikas? 
S: I don't think you can find it anywhere, I don't think it is real. 
E: But have you heard about it before? 
Yes. 
E: Can you draw me something made of Mikas? 
S: Money can be made of it, she says, some sort of metal. Then draws a coin. 
E: Can you draw me something else made of Mikas? 
S: Draws a robot. 
E: Do you remember something that was said about Mikas in the story? 
S: In the sunshine it got very hot and you could bum yourself on it. 
E: So you don't think this Mikas was real, but if you use your imagination, where then 
do you think one could find it? 
S: On the planet. 
E: And where then? 
Just in some planets in the galaxy. 
E: What did you like best in the story? 
S: I liked it because they didn't know what would happen next and what they would 
find. 
Posttests. 
Test 1. Comprehension. 
Mikas: A precious metal. 
Cobalt: An even more precious metal. 
A geologist is a person who studies geography. 
Wee: Small, little. 
Distant: Far away. 
To Improve: To make it better. more advanced. 
113 















It is clear that Section 2, with Mikas glittering in the sand, gave the strongest clue to 
the meaning of the new term. The control situation allowed continuity and a final global 
assessment after a unified presentation. In this situation, the child was presented with a 
general picture, allowing implicit connection of the word and its referent. 
The new-ten-n was embedded in a continuous text and the information pertaining to 
the denotation of the term was indirect. The verbal responses to the stories were not as 
informative, of course, as were the verbal responses of the Metal inguistic s, since controls 
were never asked direct questions about the target word. The children made use of 
information provided in the text in order to answer the questions. They may have retained 
some information that would have been useful when encountering the new term again and 
again in the sections. 
There were cases in which the responses were a mixture of the child's own 
experience and information from the story. The child's response reflected an encounter 
with similar natural kinds in the world. This may have helped the child to create a frame 
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that had something to do with metal substances or living things. A few children were able 
to use the new term spontaneously in a new but appropriate context. There were cases in 
which comments from the young child indicated that the child had a global understanding 
of the story, and among the older children, due to improved auditory skills, I presume, 
some were able to repeat the story almost word-for-word. In the Control condition, 
children had more time to learn about the subject matter, resulting in a grasp of the total 
meaning of the story. 
Nonverbal and verbal IQ and auditory skills and the children's former general 
knowledge of materials clearly played a part in the young controls' ability to decipher when 
they saw the test sample. With the older controls, who knew all the materials except Mikas, 
there was no need to rely on linguistic information. There is no guarantee, either, that they 
had relied solely on non-linguistic contrasts. The controls often found it difficult to co- 
ordinate their information about the new word from the story with the sample of referents 
with which they were presented in the Test Phase. Some of these subjects said that they 
thought that the Mikas looked somewhat different and had to be encouraged and asked 
again for the Mikas objects. Some controls spontaneously corrected themselves and noted 
their mapping mistakes, sometimes as early as Test 1. Their main difficulty seemed to be 
that they had grasped some global sense of the new term, yet they had difficulty 
articulating the elements of the story that matched the word and link that information to the 
stimulus material of the objects made of Mikas. They clearly lacked experience in working 
out the extension of the underlying concept. Furthermore, there were subjects of all ages in 
this condition who stuck to their error patterns throughout Test Phase and Posttests. Some 
subjects in other conditions tended to do the same. 
The controls did not get as much exercise as did the other groups in establishing 
reference. However, generally speaking, they did not fare worse, and even fared better, in 
some of the tests. They seem to have developed in their encoding intension or connotation 
of the term, a feeling, or inner sense for the meaning of the new term. 
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Discussion. 
Vygotsky (1962) has hypothesised that the development of speech and thought in the first 
two years are parallel but unrelated; only after age two do they begin to fuse. He has 
argued that higher forms of human intelligence and thought are achieved because language 
is developed and that language rules are more sophisticated and abstract than what was 
previously believed. When mastering the knowledge of the many phases of linguistic 
meaning, the child needs not only the experience of the words themselves but also an 
understanding of the features and relationships in the outer world. When children enter 
school age, their semantic knowledge grows, together with their cognitive development; 
they develop new linguistic abilities and insight into their own language behaviour, or what 
has been termed metalinguistic awareness. In the years 9 to 12 the child grows in the 
cognitive ability to answer questions more sensibly, to use words more correctly, to define 
abstract words more precisely, to make generalisations from verbal and mathematical 
relationships, to see significant details in a situation, to detect absurdities, and to exhibit a 
larger fund of general information. It is important at this stage that the child is better able 
to use information that has already been acquired, in order to make judgements or 
deductions in areas that are only indirectly related to the information (Miller & Gildea, 
1987). 
By the age of five, normal children can analyse language into its minimal separable 
units of sound and meaning, use rules that they have discovered independently for 
combining sounds into words and words into meaningful sentences, and take an active part 
in conversations. Donaldson maintains that: 
It is a common but naive assumption that the understanding of a word is an 
all-or-none affair: you either understand it or you don't. But this is not so. 
Knowledge of word-meaning grows, it undergoes development and change. 
Also, the process of understanding an utterance does not jj ust depend on the 
serial addition of one word meaning to another. It is an active process of 
structuring and making sense of the whole (1984, p. 73). 
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Age and Condition. 
Age, the developmental variable in the three experimental conditions and the 
control condition, played a significant role in the acquisition process. together with the 
natural kind term to be acquired and the type of linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge 
that the child brought to the task. I had hoped to tap some of the developmental differences 
in the acquisition process and the underlying semantic and conceptual processes by 
designing the five test types analysed in the Test Phase. 
It is clear that Age was a strong variable in the experiment. Performance increased 
as a function of age, older children performing generally better than the younger. However, 
much individual variation existed within each age group and many idiosyncrasies of 
response. It is interesting that the 9-year-old group often performed worse than did the two 
next younger groups. It seems that a shift was taking place, and, from the protocols, I 
assume that it was due to a rise in metalinguistic awareness that occurred at this age, plus 
the fact that, at the same time, the children were not flexible enough in these new 
strategies. They seemed to be easily led astray in their guesses, not yet having control of 
these newly mastered abilities of reflecting back on their language. Besides, the question 
still remains whether these new abilities are qualitatively different from the abilities of the 
younger children, or have been brought forth because of quantitative changes in 
knowledge, and in the restructurin g of knowledge, and because of schooling and exercise 
in the older children. 
In all conditions, the story context of the study appeared to be somewhat too 
complicated for the youngest subjects. Thus, their performance under these special 
conditions might not give a very accurate picture of their true capabilities in mapping the 
meaning of a novel lexical item. 
There is a noted lack of interaction between age and condition and one can wonder 
if this indicates a similarity of functioning at all ages. Are the changes that are taking place 
quantitative rather than qualitative ones (Mandler, 1983)? 
There was much individual variation in all the conditions- C ontro 1, Indirect, 
Metalinguistic, Metalinguistic and Indirect--and many idiosyncratIc responses. The control 
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subjects did very well in the experiment. In the depicting situation, youngest subjects did 
well, as did the youngest controls in the matching of word to sentence. The controls had 
their worst performance in the Production, in which they were required to name the 
referent. They heard the new term the fewest times during Encoding, which can account for 
some of the difficulties in their condition. The controls were thus not as familiar with the 
acoustic image as were the other groups. Also, not being too sure of the proper 
pronunciation, they may have chosen to stay silent. 
Many researchers have reported a wide individual variation in acquisition rate 
(Griffiths, 1986; Campbell et al., 1982, Campbell & Dockrell, 1986; Crystal, 1971,1987; 
Lyons, 1977). When the various developmental factors are assessed-- language, 
understanding of concepts, drawing development--it is clear that there were differences 
between children of the same age and condition. Even within a single child, there was a 
diversity in these developments, as demonstrated in test performance. A given child may 
score like his or her age group on the first test and the drawing test, but score as a younger 
child in the other tests of category and word-sentence which require clear conceptual 
understanding. There are reported differences in auditory skills and in short-term memory 
based on these factors. 
There were also differences in spontaneous corrections and in the use that the 
children made of that strategy. In standard IQ testing, children are allowed to correct errors 
if they do so without being prompted, while, for example, they are drawing from memory 
(J6nasson, 1967). 
Most of the children, both younger and older, showed great interest and 
participation in the study. The administration of the tests was strictly adhered to throughout 
the testing, although the experimenter used her discretion in obtaining co-operation from 
an individual child. Training, skill, and experience are very important for the researcher in 
this type of experimental setting, because the situation, having little encouragement and 
feedback, is restraining for the child. In ordinary life, the child is used to receiving 
prompts. When the child is defining a word or selecting from a sample of objects, an adult 
might prompt him or her by saying something like: "Are you sure? " "Could it be the other 
one? " "Is this one similar to silver? " or "What can you do with it? " As Light and 
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Butterworth (1992) have said, "the child in discourse with the adult enters into a 
relationship of unequal power, where the child takes the adult's behaviour in context as a 
means to understand what is required" (p. 5). 
What the child understood the experimenter to mean by her questions is clearly a 
very strong factor in the study. The dialogue between the experimenter and the child, as 
defined by each condition, establishes a framework for the sharing of social knowledge and 
cognitive growth in the child. How children in a given condition feel themselves to be, 
affects the extent to which the tasks that they are given in the situation harness their 
intentions (Light & Butterworth, 1992). It is clear that even if it were true that children in 
the study were doing their best in responding to the experimenter's questions in this type of 
setting, and focused on that interpersonal aspect of their situation, many still could map the 
new word properly. 
The Revelations of the Tests. 
The tests in the experiment were designed as assessment tools of the growth of 
word meaning in children. The tests were not intended to be "intelligence tests; " rather they 
were concerned with a range of functions. The total testing profile of the experiment 
included: a) language ability assessment, both comprehension and expression, b) verbal 
and imaginal coding, and c) general knowledge and IQ. The different tests reveal 
interesting individual variations in the sample and different testing profiles. The tests show 
much correlation among them, especially tests that were designed to test for verbal coding, 
comprehension, and general knowledge, and verbal tests correlate with tests of imaginal 
coding--high scores on verbal tests usually relate to good performance in the depicting 
tests--and tests that were designed for the production of the new term correlate with tests of 
comprehension and highly with tests that only test for categorisation, conceptual 
understanding and declarative skill based on the understanding of logical relationships 
between words in a taxonomy. These test results may indicate that the tests of production 
and of linguistic definitions better reflect true linguistic abilities than tests of 
comprehension, general knowledge, and imaginal coding which may be broader and cover 
a wider range of both linguistic and nonlinguistic functions. 
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In the experiment there were 76 children of the total sample of 160 children 'who 
had all the 5 tests of the Test Phase correct, and 123 children had all the remaining 4 tests 
correct when the Test of Production (Test 4) that proved the hardest had been omitted. 
Thus, the children showed very good performance in all age groups and conditions. 
Two-Way Anova showed significant main effects of Condition, F(3,144) =33,43 3,12 
<. 05 and of Age, F(3.144) = 48.06,12 <. 001 for the combined score Full Meaning from all 
subtests in the Test Phase. Age group 11.6 performed best overall, particularly in the 
Metalinguistic and Indirect Conditions. However, age group 9.6 in the Indirect Condition 
performed better than did subjects in any other age group or condition. 
A strong correlation exists among some of the tests: the strongest correlation of 
Test 2 (Category Definition) and Test 4 (Production) (. 64**); then, among Test 2 
(Category Definition) and Test 3 (Word Sentence) (. 63**); among Test 3 (Word Sentence) 
and Test 4 (Production) (. 58* *); among Test I (Obj ect Comprehension) and Test 4 
(Production) (. 56* *); among Test 5 (Depiction) and Test 2 (Category Definiton) (. 55* *), 
and, finally, among Test 5 (Depiction) and Test I (Object Comprehension) (. 53**). These 
tests clearly tap the interrelated functions of various psychological processes necessary for 
proper performance. Children who score highly overall score well in all these tests; on one 
hand, the tests of Object Comprehension, Category Definition, Word Sentence and 
Production may be highly related by their nature: the declaration and recall in Category 
Definition and in Production is based on recognition in similar domains and children who 
do well in all these tests have both the ability for recognition and for recall; on the other 
hand, little contamination may exist between some of the tests such as the tests of Category 
Definition and Depiction as they cover different domains, the correlation may indicate high 
scores for other tests and the requirement of a similar ability in discerning elements 
however in two different domains--the one of linguistic competence, the other of graphic 
competence- similar to having a good logical reasoning ability, that helps, for example, in 
tests of some mathematical ability (but not necessarily in other mathematical fields), and in 
tests of linguistic ability. 
The order of the tests in the study is important. If Test 2, Category, had come after 
Test 5, Depiction, when the child had drawn a picture of Mikas, the child might have 
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scored higher on Category, having gained learning experience from all the tests and having 
drawn a picture, and thereby learning from a productive action. But. then again as the tests 
tap different processes, this may not necessarily be so. 
The sample used in the study rated above average in standard vocabulary tests of 
English, as reflected in high scores of children in the oldest age group, Primary 7, who take 
these tests before entering high school. When the results of the present study are evaluated. 
this fact should be borne in mind. 
In the three types of experimental intervention, the subjects gained more practice in 
declaring something about the new referent, so that at least it was more familiar to them. 
As for the Controls, their knowledge was more procedurally based and there was a lack of 
practice in access to that knowledge. Their drawings were not as stimuli-bound as were the 
drawings of children in the other conditions. Once presented with the Mikas materials in 
the Test Phase, the Controls often said that they thought Mikas looked somewhat different 
from what they had thought when they had the test sample of objects in front of them. It is 
clear that the Controls drew pictures that often did not refer to the objects used in the 
testing session, and this happened more often with them than with any of the children in 
the other groups. 
Those subjects who did not recover from an error--for example, confusing 
polystyrene and Mikas in the Encoding Phase--tended to repeat that error in later tests. 
However, there were fewer cases than expected of children in all the conditions repeating 
errors through the whole Test Phase and Posttests. 
The Metalinguistic subjects found the questions about the meaning of the new word 
and other words to be very stressful. Their definitions were quite often based on the 
function of objects in their environment to which these terms referred. Even among the 
older children, subjects used descriptions more often than they used definitions based on 
the logical relationships between words in a conceptual taxonomy. 
These subjects did not consciously connect the information they had given about 
the new tenn in section after section; even the older ones did not find this to be a natural 
process. However, metalinguistic skills were better developed in the oldest group, and 
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those subjects had greater control over these skills: they could benefit from guessing, the'V 
guessed more freely, and they fluctuated between guesses. 
The children's worst performance was generally in the test of Production. In the 
structured testing situation the term was apparently understood better than it was used. 
However, in the interview afterwards, it was used by some subjects spontaneously. 
The same test sample of objects was used in the first test in the Test Phase (Object 
Comprehension) and in the Production Test, and thus familiarity with the stimuli referents 
was equal. However, as all other tests were testing for comprehension, it is difficult to 
compare them fairly. It is clear that performance was affected by having heard the word 
often during Encoding. Such was the case of the Metalinguistic Plus Indirect group as 
compared to the Control group in their performance in the Production test. 
Joos speaks of the connotations of words or the intensions of concepts. Instead of 
arguing that children do err and are not able to recover from that error, it can be stated on 
basis of the results in the experiment that such repetitions of error were fewer than 
expected. I would argue that in all conditions the children's linguistic skill and knowledge 
of context based on experience came into play and helped in their recovery; however, the 
main differences were in the decoded connotations of the new term, and the control 
condition best helps call forth this aspect. 
It would be appropriate at this point to rephrase the hypothesis put forth in Chapter 
2. Instead of repeating their errors, children tried options and were quite adaptive. Repeated 
tests will show if the child in a same test makes the same response later or whether 
restructuring occurs. 
The idea of the "function circle" (cf. Krampen, 1991) means that the entire context- 
what the child sees, hears and senses--is related to the words that are being said, and that it 
is this total picture that the child interprets as a certain message in an experimental 
situation like the one in this study. 
If the child in the Control condition knows very little or has grasped very little of 
the topic of the story that gives the context for the Mikas material, the child has difficulties 
in making the "bridging" inferences necessary in order to understand sentences that assume 
that knowledge. 
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The production lists for the metal names in the Posttest indicates that children with 
large vocabularies of metal names tend to include Mikas in their list and to exhibit greater 
general knowledge about metals in their overall performance in Encoding, Testing, and 
Posttesting. 
The communication situation itself created by the different manipulations in the 
study shows up very well in the effects of subjects' decodings in their drawings. The 
drawings produced in Test 5 are more stimuli-bound in the case of the experimental 
groups, and, in the case of the Controls, are based more upon earlier experiences of 
metallic objects. In both cases, the actively explored environment is a factor. This is 
reflected in how stimuli bound the drawings of the experimentals were and how much they 
were based on the presentation of stimuli materials. On the other hand, the influence of 
past experience of metals, knowledge, and memory of metallic objects is reflected in the 
drawings of many Controls. 
Krarnpen (199 1) argues that, "the context of children's drawings does not lie in the 
situation in which they are made. The more important context of children's drawings is 
mental (or cognitive) and, in addition, remotely environmental" (p. 221). Thus, says 
Krampen, experience is the main context in children's minds of stereotyped images such as 
those of a church or a house. With increasing age, children's drawings begin to 
approximate what Krampen calls "stereotypes" that are less a result of situational context 
than of experiences that the children have had when coping with, say, objects like 
buildings: walking around buildings, walking through buildings, hearing people talk about 
buildings, or seeing pictures of buildings in a book or on television. 
The drawings of the Experimentals were more situation-bound than were those of 
the Controls; in some cases they were clearly copies of the test sample of objects. The 
Controls many seem to have sought the image of metal things in their memories, based on 
their experiences of metal things. Memory also may be a reason for the boys In the study 
perforrTfing better than the girls, they may be more familiar with metal objects. Their toys 
are more often made of metals than are the toys of girls; boys more often than girls play or 
work with metallic tools. Certainly, within the experiment, their lists of metal names were 
often longer. 
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On the following pages, examples of the drawings of the children In all age groups 
and conditions are presented (Fig. 2-7., 2-8., p. 125-126). 
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Figure 2.8. Examples of Drawin 
Restructuring. 
Differences in exposure, as Iin the four different conditions employed In the study. 
may lead children to different initial hypotheses about word meanings. Depending on their 
initial hypothesis about the meanings of new forms, they may follow quite different routes 
in arriving at the adult analysis. Differences in the input clearly affect the initial "fast 
mapping, " following the child's first encounter with a new word. In case of the Indirects 
and the Metalinguistic Plus Indirects, their initial meanings of the new term seem to 
depend largely on the kind of objects or materials they manipulate in the test sample of 
materials to which they hear the term applied, together with their knowledge of the domain 
of materials they bring with them to the task. 
It is clear in the study that the meanings of the new term for many of the Indirects 
and Metalinguistic Plus Indirects were based on the concrete test sample of objects of the 
various materials; hence they are ostensively bound. However, high scorers in these groups 
seem to have had linguistic skills and contextual abilities to overcome in their deciphering 
the ostensive nature of their conditions in which they have encountered the new term. 
Among the high scorers In all the groups, many showed signs of general knowledge 
of mineral terms and situations where Mikas could be found and used. But they also seem 
to have good linguistic abilities, by which I mean knowledge of the lexical meanings of 
individual words, grammatical rules (syntax), semantic rules for interpreting sentences, 
discourse rules for interpreting texts, and pragmatic rules for interpreting speech acts as 
indicators of speaker's intensions for a proper mapping to be established and kept. 
It has been postulated (Merriman et al., 1991) that certain non-linguistic intellectual 
capacities are necessary before any word learning takes place. In order to identify the 
intended referent of a word from nonverbal cues and to construct retainable representation 
of it, the word, and the association between these phenomena, the child needs to have 
acquired a certain level of attention, memory, and social skill. From the children's 
performance in the study, I would also argue that auditory skills are very important here. 
Children who report a great deal of the story, even remember it almost word-for-word, 
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usually show correct mapping very early, and this does not change in the course of testing 
and posttesting. 
Like Rosch (1973), Mervis argues that names for perceptually salient or important 
aspects of the world are acquired more readily than are labels for less noticeable or less 
valuable aspects (cf Merriman et. al.. ) 1991, p. 289-291). 
Given that the children liked the target material, they should have learned its name 
more readily than the name of something they did not like as much, say, for example. the 
material "felt" in case of the young ones. In case of the concept of minerals, if a given child 
has a clear concept of these, the child may only have to map the new term onto his or her 
pre-existing non-linguistiC Concept. 
Many accounts have been put forth as to the relationship among the various 
denotata that the child ascribes to a word. Vygotsky (1962) spoke of the child's concepts as 
associative and diffuse, and Werner (1948) maintained that complexive associations, 
shifting from one feature to the next, was the basis for categorisation occurring before any 
featural analysis took place. An initial complexive stage in word meaning was thus 
expected prior to a featural stage. 
What has emerged from these speculations is that the young child may be relying 
on a variety of systems for categorising or a blend of acquisition strategies (Donaldson, 
1978). Which process is activated may rely on the isolatability and saliency of criteria, 
together with the context in which the child first meets the word and initially believes that 
it is being referred to (Dockrell, 198 1). There will be differences within a particular child 
and between children in the categorisation process. (It is also clear from Dockrell's (198 1 
data that different words may be represented in different ways. ) 
in the mapping process the child has been noted to make errors of overextension 
and underextension of the new term. When children overextend a word, they apply it to a 
denotaturn that lies outside the proper denotaturn of that term (according to an adult 
standard) such as when using the term "dog" to refer to "cat, " or different types of animals, 
or to use the term "silver. " over different metals including "Mikas. " In underextension, the 
children's denotata are only a subset of the denotata usually included in the denotation of 
the particular term being used, such as using the name of a particular dog, "Fido, " only for 
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that particular dog, but not for other dogs that also are called "Fido. " or. for example. 
including objects made of metal. such as legs of stools, gold bracelets, silver rings, as 
happened in the present study, in a list of metal names. 
There is thought to be a natural level of categorisation by which the person 
processing the information creates a balance between increased s1milarlty as obtalned from 
a superordinate category and increased contrast, as obtained from a subordinate category. 
These features presumably aid children in their categorisations, and for them to map words 
and concepts at this level would appear to be a natural process. It is through that process 
that children form categories like "chain complexes, " as suggested by Vygotsky (1962), 
rather than sorting superordinate categories properly into conventional taxonomies. 
However,, if the constraint of mapping names denoting concepts at the basic level of 
categorisation as part of a taxonomic hierarchy, the child would have difficulties in ever 
learning the names for concepts above and below this basic level. However, this is not 
what natural word learning shows; the child also learns names for superordinate and 
subordinate categories. It is more likely that the child develops a rich network of relations 
among concepts in the process of language acquisition and even if such relations are a late 
acquisition, this network would pave the way for taxonomic categorisation, and was shown 
in greater skill among the older subjects to define word meaning in terms of other words to 
which the words asked about were logically related. 
Features are perceptually salient aspects of the materials used and are very likely to 
be probed automatically. The child's knowledge about the features and the different 
properties of the materials is crucial in a mapping of these features: whether, for example, a 
given material is shiny and soft or shiny and hard, or whether or not it is breakable. 
The undifferentiated patterns of young children may be a factor in their 
underattribution of features and properties attributed to metals. Thus they may, for 
example, include leather, which is light and soft, in their groups with the Mikas objects, or 
hand leather to the experimenter when asked for Mikas. Or they may, together with some 
older children, overattribute features to Mikas, include the glittering polystyrene, and cling 
to polystyrene in the tests. 
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Thus some error responses may stem from inadequate knowledge of materials in 
general, but as the conceptual isation of materials becomes more differentiated "Vith gains in 
knowledge, there is the possibility of better- structured domains for each material and more 
declarative skill on the child's part. Material properties are not completely undifferentiated 
in some children; greater differentiation can be seen in this study as a function of both age 
and knowledge. 
It is clear from the data that some young children know too little of the particular 
features accompanying each material to see the relevance of the distinction between Mikas 
and the other materials. Commonly, this happens with some older children as well; they 
include two or more materials in a single category of all ages. Most children could sort the 
materials properly, bearing in mind that the youngest children had fewer items of each 
material than the older children did. This may be in line with Carey's argument (1985) that 
in a given domain such as the one of animals--a single set of features weighed for relative 
salience--may underlie the young child's representations of all objects. 
Polystyrene may be closer because of appearance to the prototype that children hold 
for metals if they do not have a strong enough grasp of the underlying features. But another 
factor could explain these mappings: namely, that the child finds polystyrene to be less 
familiar, perceives the Mikas to be some painted metal, like steel, and chooses the 
unfamiliar-looking material to map onto the new term. 
The context of the word's presentation must be given proper weight. If the child 
does not realise the syntactic class or relations, the ontogeny of word meaning is a long 
drawn-out procedure with many possibilities for errors. Barett (1978,1982) argues that 
lexical development depends on both the store of phonological units available for the child 
to use as words and the conceptual system available for mapping meaning onto these units. 
The children in this study were dealing with the acquisition of terms of concrete 
reference and could be trapped by compounding real-world knowledge with semantic 
knowledge. They appeared to be constructing a store of knowledge relevant to "Mikas. " 
They had explicitly and implicitly been told that the key items were substances of some 
sort and they seemed to be sensitive to these cues. 
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The children in this study were using the perceptual and linguistic contrasts in the 
experimental situation to form an initial referential relationship. The set of objects was not 
too sharply circumscribed-, however, most children who do respond realise that Mikas 
denotes a substance satisfying some set of perceptual criteria and have incorporated the 
new term into a particular semantic domain. However, it is not always clear in these data 
whether the children base their inductions about the new concept of the mineral term on 
category membership or on perceptual appearances. 
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Conclusions. 
The result from the Test Phase and Posttest suggest that there are strong grounds to argue 
that many subjects know the denotation of the term and have mastered the sense to some 
extent. For many children, full mapping of the new term is well on the way to completion: 
"Being able to identify distinctive features of an object is a clear advantage in isolating one 
particular referent from a group of possible referents" (Dockrell, 198 1, p. 178). 
Even the youngest children in this experiment had fairly firm criteria for substance 
concepts, and this knowledge had implications for their learning. Let us suppose that the 
child entering the experiment already knows what a substance is. When this child is 
exposed to a new tenn, which s/he takes to denote a type of substance, it is necessary only 
for her/him to add this new substance term to a previously established lexical/conceptual 
framework. It is clear that in this type of situation that the child sees the new word as 
referring to a substance. The alternative in the situation is to take the new word as an object 
made of a substance like metal, given that the child knows the other materials in the test 
sample. 
For subjects in the experimental conditions who have not become confused among 
more than two materials, it is possible that they can correct themselves within the sections. 
Also, subjects in this group start to attend more clearly to Mikas in the story and mention 
it: e. g. "Mikas in the hall. " They are more aware of having made a mistake. 
Success on tests in this study can be related to success on tests of corresponding 
concepts--e. g. the Category Test and the Word-Sentence Test. A child who 
fails Category 
very seldom maps properly in Word-Sentence. 
The children seem to make use of analogy mechanisms. Very often, when asked 
about Mikas, the subjects say, "It looks like silver or gold. " It seems, 
in this situation, that 
they are making use of resemblance rather than identity. 
Light and Butterworth (1992) have argued for the process of decontextualisation, 
and the extent to which the process occurs would enable 
"generalisation across various 
contexts'through reasoning 
by analogy with aspects of the situation where the problem was 
first encountered" (p. 1533). 
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It would have been interesting to include objects made of gold or silver in the 
sample: material of the same category but differing in appearance, in order to see what 
sorts of mappings the new term would generate. Also, our including spoons and screws and 
coins in the test sample of materials may account for some of the correct mappings in all 
groups. A child who knows all the other materials does not have to rely on any linguistic 
information from the story when asked what Mikas is; it must be the unknown quality. 
From the store of the subject's background knowledge, s/he may infer that the object must 
be metal, since spoons, screws, and coins are usually made of metal. 
When speaking of children's conceptual development, Carey (1985) argues that 
children restructure their conceptual development between the ages of 4 and 10. She speaks 
of a restructuring of knowledge as well as an accumulation of new facts--new production 
rules in different relations among concepts and in patterns among new relations that 
motivate the creation of new abstract concepts and schemata. These abstract concepts and 
schemata may not be represented by the young child, or they may be represented tacitly but 
not accessible to them. What is basic level for the young child in terms of metal substance 
may be subordinate level for the older children. For the youngest children, "mettile" seems 
to be the basic level, whereas, for older children, the name of metals is the basic level. For 
the little children, as reflected in their production lists in the Posttesting, the word "mettile" 
is more common and lists of objects made of metal than there are metal names. There were, 
however, young children with well-structured vocabulary who included names of metals in 
their lists. It should, however, be born in mind that among the young ones there are high 
scorers who contrast the metal names at the same basic level as the older ones, or as an 
adult would do. 
It is not often that a given child uses a single criterion in the justifications of 
mapping Mikas as metal. It is clear in these data that a given child produces many different 
kinds of justifications when asked for reasons to map Mikas as a metal substance. Some 
productive process (Carey, 1985) seems to underlie the child's judgements, even if they are 
based on decisions of category membership. 
When the child attributes certain features of the metal substance to plastic or 
polystyrene, this may reflect a semantic rather than a conceptual problem. There may exist 
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a difference in the development of the meaning of the word "Mikas" and the development 
of the concept of material. The meaning of the word "Mikas" does change with age but the 
development of the underlying concept of material/metal can be related to the acquisition 
and reorganisation of the child's knowledge of materials. Restructuring in this case would 
implicate a basic level: a subordinate shift. Restructuring in the course of encoding and 




A NOVEL VEGETATION TERM 
Introduction. 
In Experiment 1, many children, regardless of condition, overcame the ambiguity of the 
unstructured setup of the test materials with which they had been presented. I would argue 
that this happened because of the children's former knowledge of materials, but also, as 
was the case of the Control children, and of many high scorers in the experimental 
conditions, because of the linguistic abilities that the experimental setup brought forth and 
very excellent linguistic abilities of the children that overcame the ambiguities of the 
experimental setup. 
The children in Experiment I in all age groups may have based their knowledge of 
the materials on observation and experimentation in daily life that had adaptive and 
heuristic value. I learned from the teachers in the school in Callander that the oldest 
children had recently been working on a topic on minerals as part of a geology project; 
many of these oldest children gave very long lists of metal names in the Posttests when 
they were asked to make a list of minerals that they knew. During the experiment, the 
children may have reasoned, from their own basic experience of materials to the specific 
metal material in question (Mikas) through a rationale such as: "This material is metallic, 
and all these metallic objects look the same; therefore it is very likely that they are all of 
the same metal substance. " Thus, categorisation may have provided the base for the 
children's subsequent mapping of Mikas as a metal substance, situated their thinking within 
the given frame of the experimental situation, and structured their thinking. 
The children's performance can be regarded as being based on a competence that is 
a function of the context of each of the four conditions employed in the experiment, and a 
function of the content of the child's pre-existing knowledge structures and linguistic 
abilities. The child's sensitivity to the meaning of the new term 
is based on his or her 
perception of the linguistic input and of the test situation. 
In order for the children to derive 
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meaning from their experience in these circumstances, they must rely on contextual 
variables. Light and Butterworth (1992) argue that "perhaps competence is a function of 
contextual variables and this is why performance varies from context to context" (p. 14). 
They speak of the importance of "situated cognition" in the cognitive growth of children 
and of contextual factors in the "restructuring of knowledge. " Furthermore, they maintain 
that contextual factors operate at different hierarchical levels. The effects of these factors 
through language, perception, and attention situate the individual in a physical and social 
reality. It is the perceptual field that provides the public frame of reference within which 
socially shared acts of communication occur: 
Language, developmentally speaking, marks the attainment of another 
cognitive level, and refers to the objects which exist in the space held in 
common by speaker and listener. The perceptual field may have priority in 
development and for referential communication (Butterworth and Jarrett, 
1991), and it may be the first contextual determinant on which other 
contexts are founded (p. 8). 
Brown (195 7) suggests that part-of-speech membership of a new word can operate 
as a filter, selecting for attention relevant features of the non-linguistic world. Language is 
thought to be a relatively late invention on the evolutionary time table and much of its 
evolution may have to do with intuitive analogies, a characteristic of the speech of 
primitive people and of young children as noted by Werner (1948). Thinking in spatial 
analogs may have preceded verbal thinking, and language may have evolved after 
prehistoric peoples were using thought to solve problems and even after they were making 
cave drawings to represent what they believed to be of significance in their lives. Joos 
(195 8) contends that each language decides on the basis of its own categories, which will 
be different from one language to another, e. g. usage of past versus present tense, or 
singular versus plural number (cf. Whorf, 1956). Together with Chomsky, Whorf has 
argued against too much emphases on the ostensive definition of meaning. As cited in Hill 
(1970) Chomsky noted that: "the only kind of reliance on meaning which is certain to fail 
is the attempt to define meaning by pointing to objects and classes of objects in the outside 
world" (p. 254). Joos 
(195 8) stresses the connotative aspect of meaning, or the 
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intension of the underlying concept that the hearer or the reader decIphers very rapidly in 
the processing of linguistic messages from a given text. He argues for "the autonomous 
focusing of attention without listening. " In this distributional theory of meaning, Joos 
proposes that a linguistic item does not refer to items in the real world by fixating the 
listener's attention upon the real world referent; rather, the linguistic item "refers to" the 
referent in the real world because collocations that work within language have stripped the 
linguistic item of so many other meanings that only this one is left: "Now this wandering 
of limited attention at every moment obviously eliminates certain candidates for election as 
referen " (p. 67). The semantic content of a given word is determined by an entire series of 
subconscious associations that tie the word into consciousness. These associations are 
called the connotations of the word and can be different for every individual, but are likely 
to have much in common. A word is thought to receive its connotation through the past 
contexts in which it has been experienced, or its referent, or both together; whereas the 
denotation of a word is the so-called "actual" or "dictionary" meaning of a word. This 
definition suggests that a word has a fixed and ascertainable meaning common to all 
persons who use it, an assumption against which Joos has argued. Rather, Joos argues, the 
recognition or use of certain words does not always require an accurate knowledge of what 
these words really denote and since there is a certain ideational haziness of denotation of 
many words, such as abstract words, perfect understanding of linguistic information is rare. 
It is clear that the "intuitive behaviour" of the children in Experiment 1, regardless 
of which condition, was being misled by many factors within the children and situation in 
which they perceived themselves to be. Therefore, it was decided that a different 
experimental design would be needed in order to reveal whether or not there are real 
differences between different encodings of a new word when children are presented with a 
story context in which they encounter a new word a few times. 
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The Object of Study. 
In Experiment 2, the subject's task was to plot the meaning of an unfamiliar vegetation 
term, Kelaph, which denoted an unfamiliar desert plant, and with which the subject had 
had three different encounters in the story. The story itself was in three sections, each of 
which contained the new word once. 
As in the Mikas study, subjects were exposed to interference with their acquisition 
through direct and indirect manipulation of the target word in the intervals between the 
sections of the story. Two experimental conditions corresponded to these types of 
manipulation. A control condition avoided such interactions. 
The stimulus material used in the Kelaph experiment differed from the Mikas 
material in that the subject had two tasks: a) to indicate which symbols in a symbol sample 
of four symbol classes best represented the meaning of the new word, and b) to choose the 
possible referent for the new term from a test sample of objects drawn from the denotation 
of the same symbols. 
By using some symbolic presentation of the real world referent, I hoped to gain 
more control over the real contribution of the linguistic encounters that the children have 
with the new word versus the contribution of the non-linguistic context of the study, or the 
more concrete contexts that the presentation of stimulus material offer. 
Krampen (199 1) maintains that at 4-year-old children are at the symbolic stage in 
their drawing development and should be sensitive to caricatures (cf, Bruner, 1966). 
Therefore, I predicted that young children in the study would not be perplexed by the 
caricature-like appearances of the symbols. The context and the communicative nature of 
the task in Experiment 2 was given to the children when the experimenter first introduced 
them to the symbols used in the experiment. It was explained to the children that they 
would be told about things in the story that these symbols stand for and that they would 
later be asked about them and about some words that they would hear in the story. 
The symbols used in Experiment 2 originate from the native culture of the Pimas of 
Arizona. Being somewhat abstract, they can be regarded as figurative drawings. It is 
known from common experience that even young children are many extremely adept with 
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toy puzzles and good at figuring out cartoon figures and that they seem to develop sense 
for shape early. Other experimenters have used non-figurative drawings in conceptual 
learning studies; Fisher (1916), for example, used such stimuli with adult subjects. In these 
cases, the drawings are regarded only as drawings and the subject is, from the beginning. 
given the instruction that they do not represent real objects. 
One such example of figurative drawings is a grapheme, which Whorf (1956) 
defines as a word formed on the analogy of morpheme, semanteme, to denote any written 
symbol, especially a linguistic factor, in place of an "ideogram, " "pictograph, " or the 
ambiguous "character. " A sign can be a hieroglyphic element of wide and varied use. Each 
sign, for example, in the Mexican day-sign system, has a name and a special grapheme that 
may resemble living things. For example, the Mazatl day sign has a grapheme that is a 
deer's head. Whorf maintains that when discussing hieroglyphics it is desirable to have a 
term that does not presuppose anything about the nature of the denotative process 
employed. Whorf stresses the role of resemblance in the deciphering of graphics: 
Hence the fact that some individual signs look like pictures of the things or 
ideas denoted by the words of the utterance plays no real part in the reading. 
Those signs are just as much symbolic, learned, and at bottom arbitrary 
signs for fractions of utterance as any other characters or letters. On the 
other hand, resemblance to an object or picture may be really important in 
decipherment, as a clue to how the sign came to be invented, to the logic of 
its original use, and hence to the fraction of utterance, i. e., sound, which 
answers to it in reading a clue to be tested by how well that proposed 
fraction, or sound, fits into each proposed reading (p. 178). 
Method. 
In Experiment 2, the children are told that the drawings that they will be presented 
with resemble real objects spoken of in the story. Now, nonverbal skills that underlie 
factors such as visual discrimination play a much heavier role, than in Experiment 1. 
The point of using more figurative-looking material s-- graphemic caricatures in the 
form of simple Pima symbols in the Encoding Phase--is to eliminate bias due to the use of 
the same materials in Encoding and in Testing. It was clear in Experiment 
I that the results 
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of children of both the Indirect and the Metalinguistic Plus Indirect conditions were 
influenced by the familiarity that they had already gained with the test materials during 
Encoding; whereas subjects of the Metalinguistic and Control conditions did not see the 
test materials until Test 1. Therefore, I decided to use denotational material in Test 2 in the 
Test Phase in Experiment 2 that none of the children had seen before. These materials were 
clay models of the same referents as those represented in Encoding and Test I by graphic 
symbols. 
In the experiment children in all three conditions--Indirect, Metalinguistic and 
Control--saw these clay models for the first time in Test 2 and thus they had equal 
experience of them. This test should therefore provide a less biased comparison than Test 
I. 
If the specific nature of the acquisition phase at each of the three levels of exposure 
to the new word influences, at least to some extent, how the children encode the new word, 
their responses may reveal something about the inferences that they make. Again, these 
inferences possibly reflect some of the covert conceptual i sations that underlie lexical 
entries and play a crucial part in the development of symbolic skills in the growing child. 
The evidence from the Mikas study is that the control subjects, who underwent a 
holistic encoding procedure, seemed to gain greater sensitivity towards the intension of the 
new word. For example, their drawings were not so bound to the referent stimuli in the test 
sample as were the drawings of the other groups. However, it would be an overstatement to 
attribute such differences solely to the experimental manipulations, as there are multiple 
variables entering into all the conditions, and individual differences in intelligence and 
lexical knowledge that the children bring to the task are crucial determinants of 
performance. The general performance of subjects in the Mikas study suggests, regardless 
of condition, that children use many means to acquire language, and that they learn it in 
spite of themselves. However, some general trends in response patterns were present 
in 
Experiment 1, trends that the methodology helped to call forth. 
In Experiment 2,1 had hoped, in the interest of control, to simplify the former 
design and to use a different test material and one meaningless word, together with a new 
lexical item, the unfamiliar plant term. Children in this study encountered the new term 
in 
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fewer contexts. Both a target word and a control word were used. The Metalinguistic Plus 
Indirect condition was not incorporated as In Experiment 1, as it was thought to give too 
much information to the children. They could extract information from both the test sample 
of objects and from the linguistic context of the story. All this information blased their 
responses and clearly raised their scores in Experiment 1. The interview in the Test Phase 
at the end of Experiment I was therefore incorporated as a separate test and also the 
Production post list in the Posttest Phase of Experiment I is incorporated as a separate test. 
Thus, this experiment tests the ability of 4- to I 0-year-old children to decipher the 
meaning of an unfamiliar word denoting an unknown plant, "Kelaph, " from a story that 
was read to them. The new word appeared in three different sentential contexts within the 
story. The experiment consisted of two parts: a) an Encoding Phase, in which the children 
heard the story and received different forms of questioning between three chapters, 
depending on condition, and b) a Test Phase, consisting of six comprehension plus 
production tasks. 
My hypotheses are: a) that early meaning-oriented questioning in the two 
experimental conditions would suppress the natural heuristics of lexical acquisition, 
leading to erroneous entries for the new term, b) that age would be important in that regard, 
as there would be more correct answers to the meaning of the new word with growing age, 
and, c) that control subjects who were questioned about theme and plot should not be 
affected in this way. 
The children's responses were tape recorded and observational notes taken as the 
experiment was conducted with each child, in order to gain a comprehensive picture of 
each child's overall performance. The scoring procedure was the same as the one adhered 
to in Experiment 1: correct answers were scored "I " and wrong or no answers "0. 
" (See 
Experiment 1, p. 47-48 and p. 64-65 for a more detailed description of the scoring 
procedure). 
Subjects and Experimental Design. 
The sample of 192 children was divided into four age groups, consisting of children 
from Nursery, Primary 2, Primary 4 and Primary 6, with an equal number of boys and girls 
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from each age level. As before, the main experimental variables under consideration are 
age level, type of intervention, and sex. Two different experimental, and one control 
condition were employed. Subjects at each age level were randomly assigned to these 
conditions. The subjects ranged in age from 4.3 to 10.2 and were divided into four age 
groups with the mean ages of 4.6,6.6,8.6 and 10.6 referred to below as the 4-, 6-, 8- and 
10-year-old groups. The total sample of 192 subjects was drawn from two primary schools 
in Central Scotland. These schools are located in similar areas as regards living standards 
and social environment. There were therefore four age groups of 48 subjects each and 16 
subjects in each condition, with an equal number of boys and girls. Half of the total sample 
of 192 were children who had participated in Experiment Ia year earlier. They were thus 
already familiar with the experimental setup employed and knew the experimenter well. 
Materials and Procedure. 
A further series of tests was designed in the hope of qualifying and modifying the 
conclusions arising from the first experiment. The overall experimental setting was that of 
a story, presented in three sections, about the Pimas of Arizona, a Native American tribe. 
The children were invited to examine some symbols that the Pimas had used instead of 
letters and which represented objects from their surroundings and daily life. The children 
were also told that they would hear a story about the way the Pimas used to live and that 
listening to the story and being presented with the old symbols would help them to crack 
an old Pima code. The main story theme was the one of the Thunderbird and the sustaining 
of the old Pima culture. In the course of the story, subjects heard the new term, "Kelaph, " 
three times. Kelaph denoted an unfamiliar desert plant. In addition, they once heard a 
control word, "Bareg, " denoting an unfamiliar bird. Two objects used in the Test Phase 
were also mentioned in the story: a sandstone rock and a desert lizard, called a Gila 
monster. The rock and Bareg are mentioned only once, whereas the lizard appears in three 
contexts within the same section of the story. The lizard, I thought, looked like something 
that children might easily consider to be a monster. These objects share few properties with 
Kelaph besides being natural objects. According to Carey (1985), both the bird and the 
lizard should be closer to the concept of "alive" for 4-to- I 0-year-old children than should 
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Kelaph, which, even if alive, does not breathe, reproduce, or move itself. and is therefore 
farther from the prototype for living things than are the bird and the Gila monster. All of 
the test materials, including the rock. can be crushed, only one grows, not all are edible. 
and all can be used for something. 
The story used in Experiment 2 was shorter than the story used in Experiment 
and the children listened to it on audio tapes. The new term, "Kelaph, " since it denoted an 
unfamiliar desert plant, should have been defined at the same level of categorisation as was 
the control term "Bareg, " which denoted an unfamiliar bird. The lizard was referred to in 
the story as the Gila monster. When the children were asked for the symbols representing 
the Gila monster, they were only asked for "the monster symbols. " Similarly, the rocks 
were not named, and the children were asked to hand over "the rock symbols". Thus, 
"monster" and "rock" were defined at different level in the taxonomic hierarchy than are 
"Kelaph" and "Bareg" and the children had to shift between these levels in their mapping 
of the four groups of symbols when handing each group to the experimenter as requested. 
Rock was expected, on the basis of pilot testing, to be the symbol most correctly identified. 
(See Table 3.2, p. 146 for an example of text from the story). 
Encoding Phase. 
Two different methods were used to probe word knowledge during the Encoding 
Phase. In the experimental conditions, the subject's understanding of the stimulus word was 
probed by means of questions. In the Control condition, more general questions about the 
story were asked. The story was presented in three sections. In all three conditions, subjects 
listened to a tape-recorded story for six minutes at each time. The tape was then stopped 
and the subjects were asked different types of questions, according to their condition. After 
answering the questions, they listened to the next part of the story, were then 
interrupted, 
and questioned as before. The Encoding Phase took 15 to 20 minutes to present and the 
Test Phase took place immediately afterwards. During the Test Phase, the children were 
presented with six tasks that had been designed to map their 
lexical entry for the novel 
term. This phase took about 15 minutes, and thus the whole Experiment took 
30 to 45 
minutes, although time varied a 
bit, mainly as a function of the children's age. A period of 
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6 to 8 weeks was allowed to pass before the child was presented with a Posttest of five 
different tasks aimed at estimating his or her comprehension and production of the newly 




The Three Sentential Story Contexts for the new Vegetation Term, Kelaph. 
1) They collected the Kelaphs in the desert and used them to dye their soft deer skins 
red. 
2) The medical knowledge of the Pimas' ancestors had taught them how to heal their 
warrior wounds by using a bandage of some crushed Kelaphs. 
3) The Pimas had learned to use the acid juices of the tough skinned Kelaphs to 
engrave designs on the shells. 
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Table 3.2. 
An Example of Text from the Story. 
Section 2. 
The Pimas believed in the Great Spirit. Occasionally, or so they believed, the Great 
Spirit manifested itself in the disguise of a bird of an enormous size. They held the bird in 
great awe and called it the Thunderbird. By the work of the Thunderbird, the Earth was 
watered and vegetation grew. He carried a lake of fresh water on his back, which caused a 
great downpour when he flew through the air. Also, the Pimas believed that lightning 
flashed from his beak and that the beating of his wings was the rolling of thunder. The 
Pimas saw the Thunderbird as a guardian of their old clan. Incidents of warfare with other 
clans were few, and the Pimas never fought a war except to defend their terrItory. Their 
worst enemies were the Apaches. The medical knowledge of the Pimas' ancestors had 
taught them how to heal their warriors wounds by using a bandage of some crushed 
Kelaphs. Another dangerous enemy of the Pimas was Gila, the desert monster which they 
feared more than anything else. However, the question still remains whether the Gila was 
an actual monster or a tall dust monster that arose every noon because of the whirling 
winds that then swept the desert. 
(The whole story can be seen in Appendix B, p. BI -B3) 
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The Metalinguistic Condition. 
Following each story section, the children were asked directly about the meaning of' 
the new word,, "Kelaph. " and asked to justify their answers. They were also asked about 
two words from the preceding section. For Section 1. the words were "Kelaph, " "guardian. " 
"clan. " For Section 2, they were "Kelaph, " "to scatter, " and "crushed. " And for Section 33, 
"Kelaph, " "jingling, " and "disguise. " 
Children in this condition were asked three times about Kelaph, but once about 
each of the other words. The children were asked if they knew what the word "Kelaph" 
meant, if they had heard it in the story, and, if so, what they had heard or what they could 
remember about it. When they gave their definition for the novel word they were asked to 
state reasons for the definition. They were also asked to compare the definition with the 
one or the ones that they had given in former sections, and to state how well the definition 
would fit with the present definition. 
The Indirect Condition. 
Following each story section, children were given a test sample of 16 Pima 
symbols. The symbols differed in shape and colour and there were four in each of four 
classes. The four classes also differed in size and position. The children were asked to sort 
the symbols according to shape, not according to colour: "Can you put together all the 
symbols of the same shape? " There was a blue Kelaph symbol 57 x 37 mm.; an orange 
Kelaph, 118 x 95 mm. ,a violet one 85x 82 mm. , and a yellow one 71 x 
48 mm. There 
was a blue Bareg symbol 113 x 53 mm. ;a red Bareg 130 x 69 mm. ,a green one 112 x 99 
mm. , and a 
black one 72 x50 mm. There was an orange Monster symbol 116 x57 mm.; a 
violet Monster 107 x 56 mm. ,a 
black one 80 x 34 mm. , and a green one 
107 x 54 mm. 
Finally, there was a brown Rock symbol 82 x 52 mm.; a green Rock 91 x 45 mm. ;a pale 
blue one 79 x 58 mm. , and a blue one 53 x 44 mm. 
When the children had grouped the 
symbols, they were asked to give them over to the experimenter according to name: "Will 
you now hand me over the Kelaph symbols, " "the Monster symbols, " etc. (See Photo 3.1, 
3.2,3.3,3.4, p. 152-155). For the two youngest age groups, Pilot 
Testing had shown that to 3 
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work with all the symbols was too confusing for them and instead they were given one to 
two symbols of each class. 
The Control Condition. 
Following each story section, children were asked three to four questions about the 
theme of the section and its main events. The questions used in Section I were as follows: 
"Can you tell me in what sort of land the Pima Indians lived? " "Did they grow something 
in the desert? " "Were they an old or a young clan? " In Section 2: "Did you hear about the 
Thunderbird? " "What did the Thunderbird do for the Pimas? " "Did they have some 
enemies in the desert? " In Section 3: "What happened at the Thunderbird festivals"" "Was 
there something strange about the high priest's lodge? " "What about the spirits? " 
The questions were somewhat simplified for the younger children. The children in 
the Control condition had no experience of the multiple-choice set of symbols or of 
questions aimed at estimating their mapping of the new word. They were therefore 
unfamiliar with all the tasks in the Test Phase and had not heard the word as often as 
children in the two experimental conditions. 
Test Phase. 
Six tasks were designed to test comprehension and production of the new term, 
"Kelaph. " The rationale behind these tasks is the same as was used in designing the tasks 
for Experiment I (see p. 62-68). The same strict scoring procedure was employed as in 
Experiment I (see Experiment 1, p 47-48 and p. 64-65). 
After listening to all the sections of the story, children were presented with five 
tasks, designed so as to allow for the testing of their comprehension and production of the 
new word. 
The five tasks were as follows: 
Test I (TI): Symbol Comprehension. 
The child was presented with the same set of symbols as were used in the Indirect 
Condition in the Encoding Phase and was asked to sort them and to hand them over 
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according to name: "Will you now hand me the Kelaph symbols, please? " In the Test 
Phase, all children were asked for the symbols, and later for the objects, in the same order: 
Rock, Kelaph, Bareg, Monster. The total context of things of nature was given to the child 
and his or her sensitivity for the task demands brought forth and a universe of discourse 
established between the experimenter and the child when the child was asked for the rock. 
Pilot Testing had shown that it was too confusing to use randomisation of both symbols 
and objects for each child. Therefore, it was decided to ask always for symbols and for 
objects in the same order during Test Phase: Rock, Kelaph, Bareg, Monster. In this first 
test, children had to comprehend the denotation of actual objects, the plant Kelaph, "in the 
real world, " as denoted by symbols in the test. 
Test 2 (T2): Object Comprehension. 
The child was shown a test sample of objects made of grey clay, which were more 
concrete representations of the Kelaph, the Bareg, the Monster and the Rock or the 
referents that the symbols in Test I stand for or symbolise (see Photo 3.5. A., p. I 56a). The 
Kelaph clay model was size 24 mm. (h) x 62 mm. (w) x 74 mm. (1). The Bareg was size 41 
mm. (h) x 36 mm. (w) x 50 mm. (1). The Monster was size 28 mm. (h) x 41 mm. (w) x 80 
mm. (1). The Rock was size 36 mm. (h) x 37 mm. (w) x 62 mm. (1). The children had only 
one of each clay model representing the Kelaph, Bareg, Monster and Rock in their test 
sample. This was a test of knowledge of denotation, as the clay models were copies (to 
some degree of accuracy) of the denotata (see Photo 3.1,, 3.2,3.3, and 3.4, p. 152-155). 
Test 3 (T3): Production. 
In this section of the experiment, the children were asked to match one symbol of 
each symbol group and one clay model. Having done that, the child was asked to name 
these objects: ("Can you tell me the name of this one? ") as the experimenter pointed to the 
objects. This test gives scope to tap the children's declarative or expressive skill and 
to 
compare their performance with their comprehension 
in the two former tests. 
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Test 4 (T4): Categorisation. 
In the fourth task, the children were shown a four-field layout with four different 
symbols, one of which, the Kelaph symbol, they had seen before. The other three were the 
butterfly, deer, and spider symbols. On the layout, there was a red Kelaph symbol, size 80 
x 64 mm, a violet butterfly symbol, size 92 x 60 mm, a brown deer symbol, size 80 x 56 
mm., and a black spider symbol, size 78 x 75 mm (see Photo 3.6, p. 156b). The children 
were asked to show the experimenter the Kelaph symbol and were then asked what they 
thought the other symbols represented. The experimenter asked: "Can you show me the 
Kelaph symbol? " Then, about the other three: "What do you think this symbol stands for? " 
The children had to rely on guessing for these three, and it was only the Kelaph that was 
scored: I if the child showed it, or pointed to it correctly; otherwise 0. The guesses for the 
other three symbols were probed. This test gave scope to estimate if the child had worked 
out proper reference and denotata of the new term. 
Test 5 (T5): Depiction 
In the fifth task the children were asked to draw a Kelaph. This test gave access to 
the children's mental images, their internal models of the features present in the test 
samples or of their experiences of plants or other objects of nature used: Rock, Bareg and 
Monster. This test taps declarative skill and denotation in giving scope for procedural 
understanding to be manifested. 
Test 6 (T6): Interpretation. 
Finally, the children were asked questions about why they thought a Kelaph is what 
they claim it is. Also they were asked some brief questions about the story they had just 
listened to. They were then told that by helping the experimenter they had contributed 
towards the understanding of the old Pima picture symbol code and that when they come 
back for more work they would be shown photos of the real things that the symbols 
represent. In the two youngest age groups, children were given a choice of sentences if they 
paused and if they could not state directly what a Kelaph was. They were then asked: 
"Could it be a stone, an animal. a plant, or a bird? " This test provided the possibility to 
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determine if the child had worked out criteria for defining the semantic domain of the ne", 
term and its sense relations to other words. This test was expected to have a potential for 
providing higher scores, since it was the last test in the Test Phase and the children had 
become acquainted with the linguistic material. 
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Photo 3.1. Sample Set of Kelaph Symbols 
/ 
Photo 3.2. Sample Set of Bjt, 
153 
Photo 3.3. Sample Set of Rock Symbols 
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Photo 3.5. A. Sample Set of Clay Models 
- 
Photo 3.5. B. Sample Set of Photos - Posttest 
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Photo 3.6. Sample Set of Symbols in Test 4 
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The Posttest 
In the posttest, which took place six to eight weeks after the actual testing, the 
children were presented with five tasks. First, they were read a short text about the Pimas 
(see Appendix B, p. BI -B3), in which they heard each new plant name once: Kelaph, and 
another plant name, Asta, which they had never been exposed to before. The children were 
then tested with five tests: 
1) Symbol Comprehension Posttest. They were presented with the symbols that were 
used in the actual testing and asked to sort them and hand them to the experimenter as 
they were named in the order: Rock, Kelaph, Bareg, Monster. 
2) Object Comprehension Posttest. In this test, the children were presented with a 
layout of four photos, each of which, they were told, was a photo of one of the four 
objects that they encountered in the story in the actual acquisition task. The layout of 
four photographs showed a monster-like creature (a Gila monster), an unfamiliar 
flowering desert plant (a Kelaph), a bird (a Bareg), and rocky hills, and the children 
were asked to show,, in the following order: Kelaph, Bareg, Monster and Rocks (see 
Photo 3.5. B., p. 156a). 
3) Production Post List. In this test, the children were asked to name the referents by 
naming the photos used in Test 2 above. The experimenter pointed to each 
photograph in the same order as in Test 2 and asked: "Can you tell me the name of 
this one? " This is the first time during the whole experiment that the children see the 
photos of the real things. When they were asked earlier to name the referents, they 
had either been presented with symbols or clay models. 
4) Generalisation. In this test the children were asked about another new plant narne, 
Asta, that they had been exposed to once in the brief text that was read to them before 
the Posttest: "Can you tell me what the word "Asta" means? " 
5) Production List. Finally, the children were asked about the names of some plants 
that the Pimas used, and also if they could name some plants that grow in their area. 
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Results. 
I will now discuss the data analysis for the experiment, first quantitatively and then 
qualitatively/descriptively. 
A Quantitative Analysis of the Data. 
The tests were designed to test for sense, denotation, and reference of the new term, 
"Kelaph. " Quantitative analysis of the data was based on calculations of the raw 1/0 scores 
from the test performance of each child. Statistical tests, such as Chi-squares, t-tests, 
Anovas, Mean Tables, and Duncan Multiple Ranges Test were run. Analysis focuses on 
effects of Age, Sex, and Type of Intervention. 
The tests revealed Age only in Test I and Test 3, i. e. in the tests of Sign 
Comprehension and Production. There were children who reached a full mapping of the 
new tenn in all groups and in all conditions. Age had a greater effect in the test of 
Production, in which children were asked to name the referent. This was the test in all age 
groups that gave the lowest scores, and it was intercorrelated with the test for production in 
the Posttest in which the scores are similarly low. Age was near significance levels but did 
not attain significance in Test 2 (Object Comprehension), or in Test 5 (Depiction), or in 
Test 6 (Interpretation). 
The result section starts with tables showing characteristics of responses during the 
Encoding Phase, then patterns of within-children/between-children responses in the Test 
Phase are shown, followed by individual between-groups comparisons for the different 
tests together with a correlation matrix for the tests, and, finally, effects of age and 
condition are presented. 
Characteristics of Responses in Encoding. 
In the following tables the correct responses to the new term during the Encoding 
Phase are presented. It should be pointed out, however, that many children in all age 
groups did not try to give a definition for the word. Category A means definitions of 
Kelaph as a plant without the children relating it to something else outside the story bý' 
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description or to some linguistic or nonlinguistic context within the story and the 
experimental setting; Category B means definitions of Kelaph related to the story context 
by mentioning the word in relation to some part/parts of the sentential contexts or to 
part/parts of the story or to events in the story or to the experimental setting and Category 
C means definitions of Kelaph related to something linguistic and/or nonlinguistic outside 
the story. (See Table 3.3. and 3.4., p. 160). 
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Table 3.3 








S2 S3 Test 1 
7 7 8 
6 7 8 
12 9 8 
8 13 14 
Metalinguistic - Correct responses during Encoding 
Section I 






Age A BC Test 1 
4 0 6 
6 0 6 
8 2 17 
10 1 38 
N=64 
(Test I in all these tables is Test I ftom the test phase. ) 
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Patterns of With in-Child ren/Between -Children Responses. 
In order that the patterns of within-children/between-children responses can be 
estimated, I decided to show these responses in terms of the raw scores and then to 
calculate the percentages of the possible total scores for each condition at each age level. in 
which N= 16. Results from T2 (Object Comprehension), T3 (Production), and T5 
(Depiction) have been presented in the following bar graphs (Fig. 3.1., 3.2., 3.3., p. 162- 
164). Results from each of the other tests in the Test Phase can be seen in Appendix B in 
Table B. I., p. B5, accompanied by bar graphs, Fig. B. I., B. 2., B. 3., p. B6-B8. 
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Figure 3.1. 
Percentages of Correct Responses for Age and Condition. 
Test 2 
Object Comprehension 
0 im, 01 
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Age 4 Age 6 Age 8 Age 10 
Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.3. 
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Individual Between-Groups Comparisons for each Test in the Test Phase. 
The different tests reveal interesting age-related developmental variations in the 
sample and the effects of different encoding procedures, by using individual between- 
groups comparisons, employing the Duncan Multiple Ranges Test, the significance in 
performance is confirmed between the conditions and between the ages for the various tests 
in the Test Phase. 
Test 1- Sign Comprehension 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confinns no significant difference between the 
conditions, Metalinguistic condition (M . 42), Control condition (M .5 9), and Indirect 
condition (M . 59) at the . 050 level, but confirms significant difference between age 10 (M 
.7 3) as compared to the three other age groups, age 4 (M . 44), age 6 (M .5 0), age 8 (M .4 8) 
at the . 050 level. 
Test 2- Object Comprehension 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms significant difference between the 
Metalinguistic (M 
. 59) and control condition (M .8 1), (Indirect M . 66) at the . 050 level and 
a significant difference between age 10 (M .8 1) as compared to age 4 (M .5 8), (age 6M 
. 72) and age 8 (M . 65) at the . 050 level. 
Test 3- Production 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms no significant difference between the 
conditions, Metalinguistic (M . 34), Control (M . 27), and Indirect (M . 33) at the . 050 level, 
but confirms significant difference between age 10 (M . 54) as compared to the three other 
age groups, age 4 (M .2 1), age 6 (M . 23) and age 8 (M . 27) at the . 050 level. 
Test 4- Discrimination 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms significant difference between the 
Control condition (M . 75) as compared to the Metalinguistic (M .5 5) and Indirect condition 
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(M . 58) at the . 050 level, but no significant differences between the four age groups, age 10 
(M. 71), age 8 (M. 60), age 6 (M. 60), and age 4 (M . 58) at the. 050 level. 
Test 5- Depiction 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms no significant difference between the 
conditions, Indirect (M . 
59), Metalinguistic (M 
. 
63), and Control condition (M . 
75) at the 
.050 
level, but a significant difference between age 10 (M .7 
5) and age 4 (M .5 
2) (age 6M 
. 
65 and age 8M .7 1) at the . 
050 level. 
Test 6- Interpretation 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms significant difference between the 
Indirect (M . 42) and Control condition (M . 66) (Metalinguistic condition M . 48) at the . 
05 0 
level, and a significant difference between age 8 (M . 60) and age 4 (M .3 8) (age 
6M . 718, 
age 10 M . 75) at the . 05 0 
level. 
(See Appendix A, Table A. 2., p. A 15 for subsets for condition and age for TI -T5 
with the Duncan Multiple Ranges Test). 
The following correlation matrix (see Table 3.5., p. 167) shows strong 
correlation among some of the tests: the strongest correlation among Test 5 (Depiction) 
and Test 6 (Interpretation) (. 67**); among Test 4 (Discrimination) and Test 5 (Depiction) 
(. 55**); then, among Test I (Symbol Comprehension) and Test 2 (Object Comprehension) 
(. 43**); among Test 1 (Symbol Comprehension) and Test 3 (Production (. 40**), and, 
finally, among Test 5 (Depiction) and Test 2 (Object Comprehension) (. 39**). (See more 
in Discussion on the revelations of the tests, p. 197-198). 
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Table 3.5 
Correlation Matrix for the Tests in the Test Phase 
: Smmm CEIMM Pfm rmsc! 13am nmR 
S=M 1.0000 
. 4324** . 4014** . 3371** . 3388** . 2374** CEKXM 
-4324** 1.0000 . 2848** . 2437** . 3874** . 2306* am 
. 4014** . 2848** 1.0000 -2205* . 3223** . 2868** rwx 
. 3371** . 2437** . 2205* 1.0000 -5493** . 3338** IIEFM 
. 3388** . 3874** . 3223** -5493** 1.0000 . 6668** INIER 
-2374** . 2306* . 2868** -3338** -6668** 1. oc)()o 
N Ct ceam: 192 2-tajiad Sigr]if: *- . 01 ** - . 001 
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Effects of Age and Condition on Performance. 
The following is Two-Way Analysis of Variance (Two-Way Anova) showing the 
effects of Age and Condition on the different tests in the Test Phase. Anova tables and 
Mean tables for these tests are presented in Appendix B in Table B. 4., p. B 14-B 18 and 
Table B. 5., p. B19-B24. 
Test I (Symbol Comprehension) 
Two-way Analysis of Variance (Two-way Anova) shows significant main effects of 
Age, E (3,180) = 3.43,12 <. 05. Age group 10.5 performed best overall. Age groups 6.5 and 
8.5 performed best in the Control condition, and age groups 4.5 and 10.5 performed best in 
the Indirect condition. 
Test 2 (Object Comprehension) 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition, F (2,180) = 3.86, p 
<. 05. Age group 10.5 performed best overall. All age groups performed best in the Control 
condition. 
Test 3 (Production) 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Age, F (3,180) = 5.63, p= . 00 1. 
Age group 10.5 performed best overall. Age groups 4.5 and 8.5 performed best in the 
Metalinguistic condition and age groups 6.5 and 10.5 performed best in the Indirect 
condition. 
Test 4 (Discrimination) 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition, E (2,180) = 3.28, p 
<. 05. Age group 10.5 performed best overall. All age groups performed best in the Control 
condition. 
Test 5 (Depiction) 
Two-way Anova shows that neither Age nor Condition are significant for 
performance in Test 5. Age group 10.5 perfonned best overall. All age groups performed 
best in -the Control condition except age group 
10.5 performed best in the Metalinguistic 
condition. 
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Test 6 (Interpretation) 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition, F (2.180) = 3.96, V 
<. 05. Age group 8.5 performed best overall. All age groups performed best in the Control 
condition except age group 4.5 performed best in the Indirect condition. 
Combined Tests. 
The following are combined tests, the results of which have been calculated from 
the means of each of a given subtest: (TI: Symbol Comprehension, T2: Object 
Comprehension, T3: Production, T4: Discrimination, T5: Depiction, and T6: 
Interpretation) in the Test Phase (see p. 148-150 for full description of each of the tests). 
The results of three such combined tests are presented here. These tests have been named 
Full Meaning, Insight, and Comprehension. It should be noted that the names of these 
combined tests indicate that in Full Meaning, a child who has all the subtests correct has 
worked out the full meaning of the new term as s/he has mastered both the comprehension 
and production of the new term; whereas a child who has one or more of the subtests 
wrong has only a partial meaning for the new term. In Insight, only the tests of Depiction 
(T5) and Category (T6) are included and a child who has both of these correct can be 
granted with both linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge of the new term. In 
Comprehension the test of Production (T3) has been omitted, and as the remaining five 
tests are testing for comprehension and a blend of linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge, 
a child who has all five of them correct can be granted with a general understanding of the 
new term and with some linguistic understanding--but not a full meaning yet--as s/he has 
difficulties in recalling it, a procedure that may be of a more semantic content than the one 
of Comprehension. 
Full Meaning (All tests, TI - T6). 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Age, F (3,180) = 4.39,12 = . 
005 
and of Condition, E (2,180) = 3.25, p <. 05. Age group 10.5 performed best overall. All age 
groups performed best in the Control condition. 
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Insight (Test 5+ Test 6). 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition, F (2,180) = 3.47.12 
<. 05. Age groups 6.5.8.5 and 10.5 performed quite equally overall. All age groups 
performed best in the Control condition. 
Comprehension (Tests 1,2,3,5 and 6. All Tests except Test 4- Production) 
Two-way Anova shows significant main effects of Age, E (3,180) = 3.25, p <. 05 
and of Condition, E (2,180) = 5.11, p <. Ol. Age group 10.5 performed best overall. All age 
groups performed best in the Control condition. 
The following graphs (Fig. 3.4., 3-5., 3.6., p. 171-173) present effects of age and 
condition on performance in Full Meaning (T I -T6), Insight (T5+T6) and Comprehension 
(TI+T2+T3+T5+T6). 
Results from the posttests can be seen in Appendix B (p. B 13) together with 
Anovas and Mean Tables for all tests in Test Phase and Posttesting (Table BA, p. B 14- 
B 18 and Table B. 5., p. BI 9-B24). 
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Figure 3.4. Effects of Age and Condition on Performance in Full Meaning 
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Figure 3.5. Effects of Age and Condition on Performance in Insight 
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Figure 3.6. Effects of Age and Condition on Performance in Comprehension 
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A Qualitative Analysis of the Data. 
I now describe the data in the experiment qualitatively and take, as my starting 
point, the concept of resemblance and its connection to the issue of incidental learn' ing. 
Words not only have associations that users can articulate if they have the necessary 
memory and application, they also seem to form secret or hidden connections in the 
unconscious levels of the mind. Joos (1972) has stressed the use that hearers make of 
resemblance in their intuitive behaviour when they are deciphering the meanings of new 
words. The word as symbol stands for something such that, when it is noticed through 
sight or hearing, the thought of it comes to mind. Words as symbols for thoughts do not 
maintain a strict one-to-one relationship with the things symbolised. 
Intersubjectively demonstrable sensory experience provides the basis for much 
linguistic patterning. Resemblance, in this jargon, is thought of as a structural aspect of 
sense experience. William James (1890) argued for resemblance (similarity) as the 
cornerstone of logic in regard to both classification and inference. Von Slagle (1974) has 
described resemblance in the following manner: 
Resemblance, it seems reasonable to assert, constitutes the basis of all 
categorisation. Thus, for example, when we say silver is a metal or Fido is a 
dog, we are categorising on the basis of criterial modes of similarity which 
must be fulfilled in order to correctly label such phenomena according to the 
semantic code of the English speech community (p. 34). 
Roger Brown (1957) has pointed out that if a semantic map is to be oriented, it 
must be oriented in terms of intersubjectively demonstrable sensory experience. Brooks 
(1978) and later Kemler-Nelson (1984) have both argued for family resemblances as the 
basis for much incidental learning. Brooks has maintained that this mechanism is important 
when people process complex material such as the one of language in textual 
interpretation. Resemblance is given in immediate perceptual experience. Von Slagle 
(1974) further contends that we classify the three most important classes of denotata-- 
substances, attributes, and relation--on the same basis--in ten-ns of modes of resemblance. 
In his terminology, "substances" are things such as houses, trees, and ships, "attributes" are 
categories such as size. shape, colour, weight, and "relations" are experiential correlations 
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of concepts such as resemblance, causality, before, after, weak and strong. The immanent 
organisational factors of perception have been regarded as the immanent organisational 
factors of thought. Concepts are thought of as "rules" of perceptual organ, satIon and as the 
ultimate constituents of the constructs of the imagination are thought to be derived from 
sense experience. The function of similarity or resemblance is regarded as a principle of 
spontaneous grouping in sensory fields and can be related to the function of similarity as 
the basis of classification and recall. 
Werner (1948) spoke of "physiognomic perception" as a process of subsuming 
experiences which, he maintained, is a process that children adhere to in their early 
perceptual organisations. Joos (1972) has spoken of a resemblance process when people 
decipher the meanings of unknown words within a given text. Errors are always involved. 
Donald Schon (1963) pointed out the significance of errors in restructuring that happens in 
the understanding of metaphor, metaphor being based on resemblances, analogies: 
Error functions as a guide to discovery. Misapplication of a theory, based on 
a partial misapprehension of what is in the situation, guides us of the theory 
as a projective model for the situation. Children thrive on a similar process. 
They call a croquet mallet a bat; they proceed to discover, through a variety 
of experiences, how it is not a bat; but in the meantime their notion of a bat, 
and of games in which a bat is used, serves for them as a projective model 
for playing croquet. The transition from erroneous application of the old 
theory to its displacement is part of what gives continuity to their leaming. 
And, since their first identification of the situation is never wholly 
erroneous, the error assures them of some appropriateness in their choice of 
metaphor (p. 71). 
I will., in what follows, give a descriptive account of the observed processing that 
children in each condition in Experiment 2 underwent. A light will be cast on Joos's 
hypothesis that I have stated earlier in this thesis, that: a) children make use of certain 
contextual determinants without thinking logically or consciously about them when they 
are learning the meaning of a new term; b) interferences in this process lead the children 




Memory for instances for the children in the study is more natural than for them to 
work out consciously the general rules governing the meaning of the new term, " Kelaph. 
Often these memories are based on pieces of valuable information from the linguistic 
and/or non-linguistic context, and there are many children, even if making errors, who are 
not totally erroneous in their inferences and progress towards a proper mapping of the 
meaning of the new word. 
The Indirect Condition. 
The non-linguistic and linguistic context in which a child learns a word will make a 
difference in his or her first hypotheses about the word. Linguistic information in the input 
can thus lead the child either toward or away from contrasting a new and an old word. The 
fact that the child develops non-linguistic concepts separate from language can influence 
the course of linguistic development. If the child discovers, for example that items such as 
cats and cows belong to separate categories or that Kelaph and daffodil belong to separate 
categories, s/he may look for separate words to label those categories. The children brought 
to the experiment their own non-linguistic biases and predispositions. It has been found 
(Merriman, 1986), that children prefer to apply a novel term to an unfamiliar token of a 
type, for which they had a name, over applying it to a familiar token of a type, for which 
they had no name. This phenomenon is reflected in children when they ignore explicit 
contrast information in the input but respond on the basis of their preferences for attaching 
words to one type of meaning over another instead of relying on the information in the 
input to form their hypotheses about the meaning of the new word. 
The situation in which the Indirect children were placed was, to some extent, 
structured by the question: "Can you hand me the XT' This helped the children to set up a 
semantic frame. The presence of objects helped the older children to establish reference 
and hence to develop subsequent meaning. On the other hand, too many unknown symbols 
and too many unknown objects were a confusion for the younger children. This condition 
gave the most practice for the children to work out the extension of the new concept, 
Kelaph. It provided contact with the stimuli materials of symbols from the start of the 
experiment to Test 1, Sign Comprehension. 
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In a contrasting situation, children handed over the strange object emphasised by 
the lexical contrast. But a different picture emerged in the experiment when there was more 
than one unknown object employed, such as Kelaph and Bareg, and the children had to 
choose between them. As the new term was a noun, the children were aware that the 
denotaturn was likely to be an object that was not going to change to any significant degree 
in the course of the experiment. After a few subsequent requests in the Encoding Phase and 
the Test Phase, many children had developed a stable mapping of the meaning of the new 
term. 
The 4-year-olds made several mismatches and showed confusion. Many spoke 
aloud when they were grouping the symbols. Some spoke of counting the symbols and 
spoke aloud about what they were going to do with them. Some stuck to their error all 
through the sections. The most common mistake was to choose the Bareg for Kelaph. 
Quite a few of the children were even incorrect in all three sections in the Encoding Phase 
on all the symbols. But there were also confusions between Baregs and Monsters. Quite a 
few young children wanted affirmative answers from the experimenter and said: "That's 
like this, isn't it? ", "Isn't it? " was often asked. 
The 6-year-olds commonly had all four referents wrong in all sections in the 
Encoding Phase. Also, they mistook Bareg for Kelaph. Some had three out of four symbols 
incorrect, with Rock being the symbol most correctly identified. However, there were 
children who realised their error, and if they had made a recovery already in the sections, 
they did well in the Test Phase also. 
The 8-year-olds were often already correct on Kelaph after the first section. Still 
there were children who were not correct on Kelaph until in the last section; this was the 
case with a few children in the two younger age groups. The following 
is an example of 
Indirect testing with Mary (age 7.8): 
Section I. 
Is quick at grouping the signs and does so correctly. 
Gives Rocks correctly. 
Gives Monsters for Kelaphs. 
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Gives Kelaphs for Baregs. 
Gives Baregs for Monsters. 
Section 2. 
Gives Baregs for Monsters. 
Gives Kelaphs for Baregs. 
Gives Monsters for Kelaphs. 
Gives Rocks correctly. 
Section 3. 
Gives Monsters for Kelaphs. 
Gives Baregs for Monsters. 
Gives Rocks correctly. 
Gives Kelaphs for Baregs. 
Test 1. 
Gives Rocks correctly. 
Gives Monsters for Kelaphs. 
Gives Kelaphs for Baregs. 
Gives Baregs for Monsters. 
Test 2. 
Matches Monster models with Bareg symbols and Bareg models with Monster 
symbols. 
Points to the Rocks correctly. 
Points to the Bareg (models) for the Kelaphs. 
Points to the Kelaph (models) for the Baregs. 
Points to the Monster (models) correctly. 
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Test 3. 
These are the Rocks. 
These are the Bars for Kelaphs. 
These are the Monsters. 
These are the Kelophs for Baregs. 
Test 4. 
Points to the Butterfly symbol for Kelaph. 
Says "Something like a donkey or a cow" for the deer. 
"The Bar- one, " she says for the Kelaph. 
"A square, " for the spider. 
Test 5. 
E: Can you now draw me a Kelaph? 
S: Draws the monster symbol. 
E: Is this the Kelaph symbol? 
S: Yes. 
Test 6. 
E: What do you think a Kelaph is? 
S: I think it is an animal. 
E: Why do you think so? 
S: Because when you showed me the pictures of one, it sort of looked like that. 
Posttests. 
Test 1. 
Shows Bareg for Kelaph. 
Shows Kelaph for Bareg. 
Shows others correctly. 
Test 2. 
Shows Bareg for Kelaph. 
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Shows Kelaph for Bareg. 
Shows others correctly. 
Test 3. 
Says Bar for Kelaph. 
Says Keloph for Bareg. 
Others correct. 
Test 4. 
Don't know for Asta. 
Test 5. 
Cactus, snowdrop, thistle, daffodil. 
The 8-year-old children, when they were first asked to hand over Kelaph, often 
asked: "What is a Kelaph? "; whereas few of the younger children asked such a direct 
question. However, there were still children in this age group who repeated their 
mismatches, usually by confusing Kelaph and Bareg in both the Encoding and the Test 
Phases. 
The I 0-year-olds, after having mismatched Kelaph for one of the other referents 
after the first section, realised their mistake and corrected themselves. They showed 
surprise when they heard the words "Kelaph" and "Bareg" from the experimenter, after the 
first section, when they were asked to hand these over. They remarked: "What? " or "What 
does it mean? " There were children who were correct on the Kelaph symbols and on all the 
other symbols also in all the sections and could even say the word "Kelaph" properly. 
However, there were children who were wrong in two out of three sections on Kelaph. 
Handing over the Bareg for Kelaph was the most common error pattern. 
The Metalinguistic Condition. 
The rationale behind the Metalinguistic condition is that children's erroneous 
responses and their general comments about their tasks are often as informative as their 
correct responses. Cases here show that even if children were not performing properly, 
many of their responses attempted to draw on the linguistic information presented 
in the 
sentences in the story. They said, for example: "This red stuff to dye the skins of the 
little 
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deers" (Anton, age 6; 3). The important point is that few of these responses were 
semantically empty. When the children made incorrect responses. there was often an 
underlying pattern. They had difficulty in completing their tasks. even if they demonstrated 
semantic competence in other ways. They were required to reflect on the linguistic input in 
a metalinguistic manner--forced to pay attention to the word that implies an awareness that 
they may not have until a later age. They had to make an initial decision after a minimal 
presentation of specific linguistic information. They had to integrate a series of guesses 
about the meaning of the new word. The emphases was on conscious deduction and 
inference. The interpretation of several sentences required a more abstract approach to 
language and to words than lay within the capabilities young children can consciously 
employ. Besides, the interpretation may have taken place at tacit levels of understanding 
that were not accessible to young children. 
There were cases in which the children repeated a single response throughout the 
series of sentences. They may be said to have grasped the "nature" of the task--that the 
responses to the sentences were somehow related. There were attempts to integrate the 
repetition with the preceding sentence such as Robert's (age 8.3): "1 have never heard of a 
Kelaph before, but it must be some sort of plant they crushed for bandages. " After the last 
section, the same child recalled that the Pimas used the tough juices of Kelaph to engrave 
shells and said: "It's a desert plant tree. " When he was asked to connect his definitions, he 
said: "It must be some kind of a flower that they grow. " 
The appropriate interpretation was often governed by the new situation and by the 
old information. The incident was salient to the children and the next encounter with the 
new word could bring to mind two associations. Also, there were attempts by the children 
to make sense of the problem by using associations that had originated in their own 
experiences. Some of these attempts were more appropriate than others, such as saying, 
like Christine (age 9.7) did in Section 1: "They used Kelaphs like berries to dye things. " In 
Section 2, she said: "It could be Keila that they used. " In Section 3, she said: "The hard 
skins, the rough Kelaph skins. " When she was asked to piece together the 
information that 
she had given, she brought in her background 
knowledge, which led her astray and gave 
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this definition of Kelaph: "The blood of some buffalo. well, I know they used blood for 
medicine and berries to dye things. " 
Some of the children's guesses about Kelaph were more useful than others in their 
mapping of the meaning of the new word. Especially, if. a) the children remembered the 
initial presentation in which the word had occurred and b) if they saw the connection 
between the presentations of the word. However, many children were unable to see the 
connection etween the presentations of the word and to consciously determine the general 
rule. Instead, they talked about memories of instances, contexts in which they had heard 
something about the new referent but could not connect the information when asked to do 
so. This lack of co-ordination may, therefore, reflect the children's inferential abilities in 
this type of learning situation rather than the children's word-leaming abilities. Contextual 
abilities are the only factors other than perceptual features that Anglin (1977) has found to 
be important in concept formation. On basis of the children's performance in this condition, 
it can be argued that the children who had abilities to make use of the given situational 
context and to make use of the available linguistic context quickly adhered to a self- 
regulatory process in which they tried intuitively to decipher the meaning of the new word. 
A noted characteristic was how well they trusted their own contextual skill and ability. 
The main strategies that the children used in this condition were: a) a variety of 
strategies ranging from the primitive use of phonetic information in "slang" associations to 
correct responses that utilised all the information given in an individual sentence. (There 
were not many such responses. Saying, as did Martin (age 6.4) that: "Kelaph is ceiling, " is 
an example of phonetic origins and made no sense in relation to the story); b) responses 
that were solely situation-bound such as mentioning objects in the room where the 
experiment took place or in the outer environment while being tested. (For example, Loma 
(age 6.1) spoke about a picture on the wall in the test room when she was asked about 
Kelaph. If such responses occurred, they tended to reflect something salient in the testing 
environment. Type I and 2 strategies were of no constructive use to the children. 
They 
were not learning anything important about when to use the word or about its possible 
contextual determiumts), c) the issue of contextual determinants was 
brought forth in one 
strategy that the children used. Rather than making spurious connections 
drawn from the 
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physical situation of the testing, there were responses that reflected associations that were 
(or appeared to be) directly generated from some association with the linguistic elements 
presented. These associations integrated some aspect of the children's world knowledge 
and elements within the presented sentence. These responses apppeared to be bizarre if an 
attempt was made to replace the new term by the children's explanation of it, but the 
associations were clear. By using this strategy, the children were trying to make sense of 
the situation. For example, Keith (age 5-9) who could not state anything directly about 
Kelaph in both Section I and 2, said in Section 3: "1 heard the shell bit. " 
The 4-year-olds gave few definitions of words. When they were asked about the 
new word, they often responded: "A Kelaph is just a Kelaph. " Thus, they gave concrete 
definitions of the new word, more like holistic,, unanalysed labels that may have been 
understood by the children themselves from their point of view but did not pass for proper 
vocabulary definitions by adult standards. However, there were children who could give 
very good answers to the questions, as did Susan (age 4.1): (It took some time to get her to 
come out of her class and to the test room. She took her rag dog, Snoopy with her). 
Section 1. 
E: Do you know what the word "clan" means? 
S: No. 
E: Do you know what the word "to scatter" means? 
S: Nice, if there is a bit of salve, my mother put some posters up this is my bit and this 
is little sister's bit (shows the experimenter on the table) that comes first. 
E: Do you know what the word "Kelaph" means? 
S: Yes. 
E: What? 
S: Don't know. 
Section 2. 
Asks the experimenter: "Do you know a dog named Rhea? It's a Labrador. 
E. Do you know what the word "Kelaph" means? 
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S: Kelaphs, yes, don't know what it is. "Kela. " she says. 
E: Do you know what the word guardian means? 
S: (Hesitates). 
E: Do you know what it is "to guard someone? " 
Pause. 
E: Does your Labrador dog guard your family? Do you guard your Snoopy? 
S: Pause. 
E Do you know what it means if something is cirushed? 
S: I don't like it. 
S: I heard the Thunderbird (she remarks, as she hears about the flock of birds in the 
story accompanying it). 
Section 3. 
S: We will have some games, won't we? But you need to tidy the table (she says to the 
experimenter. Talks to Snoopy). He says he knows that this fast bit Kelaph will tell 
me, he will keep a guard of this one (the Bareg bird). 
Test 1. 
I don't know what any of them are anyway (she says as she sees the objects). I can 
only recognise a face and a face, that's all I can recognise (she says about the 
Bareg). 
Gives rock correctly. 
Gives Kelaph (this one, she says) correctly. 
Gives Bareg correctly 
Gives Monster correctly. 
("That one looks like a Monster, " she remarks) 
Gives all items quickly and correctly. 
Test 2. 
Points to Rock correctly. 
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Points to Kelaph correctly. 
Points to Bareg correctly. 
Points to Monster correctly. 
Test 3. 
The hills (for the rocks) 
A Monster (for the deer) 
A duck (for Bareg) 
A Keili (for Kelaph, this word came quite spontaneously) 
Test 4. 
Shows Kelaph correctly. 
Looks like hat. 
An arrow for the butterfly. 
The Monster for the deer. 
S: I think Snoopy is trying (to say). She talks to Snoopy: It has points one, two, three, 
four points and a one square and one little one in the middle (the spider). 
E: What do you say? 
S: Snoopy says he doesn't know either. 
Test 5. 
E: Can you now try to draw me a Kelaph? 
S: I am trying to. I show you, what I can make (starts to draw). Draws the sign. 
Test 6. 
E: What is a Kelaph? 
S: I don't know. It had a bang at the top there, that's how it looked like definitely. 
S: It must be a plant if I put it over and if I put another side of it. 
E: Did the Pima Indians use the Kelaph? 
S: Yes. 
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E: What for? 
Some hats. 
E: Did they use the Kelaphs for a bandage? 
S: Yeah. They might have. They were talking about the sea Monster, couldn't it" 
E: Did you like the story? 
S: He (Snoopy) quite liked it all the way. 
Posttests. 
Test 1. 
Shows all items correctly. 
Test 2. 
All correct except Kelaph. 
Test 3. 
Can say Kelaph straight away. All except Bareg. 
Test 4. 
Doesn't know for Asta. 
Test 5. 
Kerlagh, daicie, dandelion, jucca, spider plants, a leaf and a flower, a kind of wee 
flowers. 
Other 4-year-old children paused when asked and still others constantly said that 
they did not know; a few gave completely wrong answers such as: "A man" or "An 
animal. " 
The 6-year-olds picked up information from the story context on Kelaph. However, 
the most common situation was that the information that they had gleaned became 
coloured with other information that was more outstanding in the text. They said, for 
example, that Kelaph meant "animal" because of. - "This red stuff to dye the skins of the 
little deers, "(that was spoken of in Section 1). They even said that Kelaph meant "the 
enemy" or that it was "An Indian name, " because they had heard about a bandage in the 
story that had been made of crushed Kelaphs, and then they had heard about the enemies; 
therefore, Kelaph must be enemy or an Indian name. There was a relation between such 
responses and a poor performance later in the Test Phase. Nevertheless, there was a small 
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group of children who managed to get the meaning of Kelaph right even after an initial 
wrong guess. There were response such as saying after Section I that Kelaph meant 
"people, " but then already after Section 2 saying that it meant "a plant, like cactus, 
something living. " These children did well in the Test Phase. 
The 8-year-olds performed better than the 6-year-olds in proper vocabulary 
definitions. These children tended to repeat the words after the experimenter. They often 
used qualifying phrases like "sort of' and "kind of" Their definitions of words were longer 
and more to the point than were the definitions given by children in the two younger 
groups. However, their definitions were descriptive rather than real categorical definitions. 
There were responses for Kelaph showing that the children had picked information about it 
in the story but that the information then became coloured with the main theme and with 
the main events in the story. There were children, for example, who connected Kelaph with 
the enemy or with a person, by saying, for example, after having listened to Section 3: "An 
Indian dressed in deer or bear skin. " A few children said, as the young children also had, 
that: "Kelaph is an animal. " There were, however, many more children who remembered 
hearing the word "Kelaph" in the story even if they could not state what they had heard. A 
few children got the word "Kelaph" right almost from the beginning and as some younger 
children who also had got the word right early, these children did well in the Test Phase. 
An example of this type are the responses of Roger (age 8.9), who said that Kelaph was: 
"Some sort of plant 'cause the leaves had been used for bandage. " After he had heard 
Section 3, he said: "Could it be a tree because skin would be bark and it has got leaves? " 
And John (age 8.1) said after he had heard Section 1, that he did not know the 
pronunciation of "Kelaph. " But after Section 2, he said: "I have never heard of a Kelaph 
before, but it must be some sort of a plant that they crushed for bandages. " After Section 3, 
he recalled that the Pimas had used the tough juices of Kelaph to engrave shells and said: 
"It's a desert plant tree. " When he was asked to put together his definitions from all the 
sections, he said: "It must be some kind of a flower that they grew. " 
The I 0-year-olds gave definitions of words that were more accurate than were the 
definitions of the three younger age groups. They gave a word other than the word they had 
been asked to define, instead of giving descriptions such as younger children had done. It 
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was only in this age group that children could give definitions as requested for words such 
as "Clan. " There were more recalls of Kelaph from the story. The children also picked 
contextual information on the word from the story. However, there were cases in which the 
children could not properly piece together the information that they had gleaned. The most 
common definition of Kelaph was that it meant "men" or "enemies" or "warmen" or "men 
who danced and ladies who danced. " There were even children who said nothing about 
Kelaph. There were children who gave the reverse meanings of the words such as saying 
"enemy" was "friend. " There were children who got some information on Kelaph right and 
had picked some contextual clues--children such as Ina (age 10.3) who said "They used 
Kelaphs like berries to dye things" ( Section 1); "It could be Keila that they used"(Section 
2), and "The hard skins, the rough Kelaph skins"(Section 3). When she was asked to 
connect her definitions, she brought in background information that led her astray and said 
that Kelaph must be: "The blood of some buffalo, well, I know they used blood for 
medicine and berries to dye things. " 
The children tended to fit the information that they had grasped into a whole, but 
incorrectly. For example, Robert (age 9.7) replied that the man reading the story had said: 
"They picked up the animals. " Thus, his inference shows that he may have mixed 
information from two phrases: "Hunting animals" and "Collecting Kelaphs. " Since his 
attention may have been drawn to the unfamiliar word, "Kelaph, " the combined effort: 
"They picked up the animals" may have happened instantaneously. 
Joos (1967,1972) has spoken of heuristics. It is like the text that the children heard 
was "swallowed" or understood at an intuitive, heuristic level, which made it difficult 
for 
them to give direct definitions of the new term. Some of their answers to the words were 
quite imaginative, such as: "Spirits are like electric wool. " They used their imaginations 
in 
order to combine what they had heard and to create, in conjunction with their previous 
knowledge, an answer that was meaningful to them, an answer that made sense in the 
situation. 
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The Control Condition. 
The Control Condition reflected the children's abilities to comprehend text. 
Storytelling is a familiar activity for children. However. in this condition. the children did 
not need to pay attention to the individual words in the text in order to gain some 
understanding of the story. Therefore, pre-emption may have been a problem for the 
children. While they knew what was happening in the story, they did not have to make 
inferences about the new word. They could make sense of the situation without inferring 
what Kelaph meant. If the children in this condition tried to make sense of the new term, 
what they may have found was that all the objects and actions that occurred already could 
be given familiar names and that Kelaph was redundant. This would pose a problem. Thus, 
the nature of the story may not have required specific identification of a referent so that the 
problem of pre-emption did not arise. This was in contrast with a situation like the one the 
Indirect children had. They were asked: "Can you now hand me the X. " The Controls may 
not at all have objectified their thinking so as to consider word-object pairing. 
The types of responses that the Controls gave reflected the information that they 
had picked and regarded as being salient. A passage of time was allowed between the 
child's initial encounter with the new word and subsequent encounters. This lapse resulted 
in a considerable modification of the information retained, perhaps with the more 
idiosyncratic responses being eliminated. However, there were interferences in the 
children's processing. Even if they were not asked in the intervals between the sections, 
about the meanings of words and about Kelaph, they were asked questions about the theme 
of the story. These questions were, to some extent, interventions in their processing of 
linguistic information from the story. It needs to be established by the use of other future 
designs what would happen if the Controls had no such intervening questions about theme 
but instead listened to the story in one piece and then responded to questions. 
The children were sometimes not too sure about Kelaph when they had 
been 
presented with the test materials in Test 1. This 
lends support to Joos's ideas that when 
speaking of the intension of a new word, or 
its connotation, lingui5tic. nrocessir e. 
Even if the children had already mapped Kelaph as plant in the Encoding Phase, they said 
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that they thought Kelaph looked somewhat different than the Kelaph symbol and the 
Kelaph clay model. Therefore, spontaneous reconstructions were seen in Test I and Test 
when the children asked for second trials and recorrected themselves by piecing together 
information from the story and from the test materials. 
The 4-year-olds could not deal with many of the questions about the story's theme. 
Therefore, the questions were simplified and the children, being requested to recall the 
Thunderbird, the Indian's festival and dancing, were asked questions such as: "Did the 
Pimas live in a forest, in a desert, or in a fertile land? " or "Was it a real monster or a dust 
monster? " The third section of the story was the hardest for children of all the age groups 
to recall. It was common for the young children to think that the Monster was just a man 
dressed up as a monster. There were not so many recalls reported on events in the story. 
Few children mentioned "Kelaph" spontaneously and those who did so were not questioned 
about it further. These young children were quite talkative. They were also attentive to the 
questions asked even if they were not able to answer properly. There was a relationship 
between good recalls from the story and performance in the Test Phase. It was quite 
common for the children to slip back into familiarity. They had often grasped some of the 
events and objects that were talked about in the story but could not express these except 
with their familiar words, such as the word "horsie" for "deer. " The children tended to 
connect differing information from various sentences within a given section into one piece 
of information. For example, when the experimenter asked if the Pimas grew anything in 
the desert, the child answered: "Just one horsie grow" (Eve, age 4.1). Another example of a 
similar strategy was when Loma (age 4.2), who had picked up something about a plant in 
the story, was asked if the Indians hunted animals, and answered: "Swarfs, little creatures 
that grow in the ground. " In the Test Phase when she was asked: "What is a Kelaph? ", she 
answered: "A weaver. " When she was asked again, she said: "It's a Kela. " 
The 6-year-olds had greater recall of the story. However. ) they, 
like the 4-year-olds. 
needed a br'. -fing of the questions. Few showed spontaneous recalls of Kelaph. The 
children were interested in the story and could answer the questions in their own style. An 
example is Peter (age 5.8), who said: "I think they grow the crop. " when he was asked if 
the Pimas grew anything. 
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The 8-year-olds often spoke spontaneously about the story and went on and on 
about it. There were various recalls of Kelaph in connection with something else. such as 
noticing that "the Pimas used skin for clothes" (Katherine, age 8.2). Generallý-. the recall 
from the story was good and no briefing of the questions was needed, or choices such as 
the experimenter asking if the Pimas lived in a forest or in a desert. The children could be 
asked plainly: "In what sort of land did the Pimas live? " The children noticed aspects of the 
story such as the other bird, Bareg, and the magpies that accompanied the Thunderbird and 
said, for example: "It flew by, other birds joined it, all the birds saw it and joined in" 
(Shivan, age 8.5). The children now spoke of the monster, Gila, in Section 2, as a dust 
monster, not as a real one. They brought in their knowledge, as did Lesley (age 8.9), who 
said that: "The Pimas lived on buffalo meat and used to eat the insides of them and use the 
skins for jackets and clothes. " There were children who recalled that the Pimas wore 
clothes that were decorated with engraved shells. However, few of them in the Encoding 
Phase had recollections that bore directly on Kelaph. Often this did not happen until the 
end of the Test Phase. Then there were children who could recall information from the 
story about Kelaph. 
The I 0-year-olds gave good and detailed recalls of the main events in the story. 
There were children who had quite good recall of all the main events and also of other 
information that was not as outstanding. These children gave accurate descriptions. The 
following is an example of Control testing with Neil (age 10.3): 
Section I. 
E: Can you tell me in what sort of land the Pima Indians lived? 
S: It was all desert, it was sandy. 
E: What food did they have there? 
S: Wild deer and all the animals they could hunt. 
E: Did they grow something in the desert? 
S: No, didn't hear that. 
E: Were they an old or a young clan? 
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S: Old, they went back, I think 900 years, they were as natural as the mountains in the 
land. 
Section 2. 
E: Did you hear about the Thunderbird? 
S: Well 
, it was supposed to carry a lake, the lightning flashed from his beak and there 
was rolling of thunder. 
E: What did the Thunderbird do for the Pimas? 
S: It was supposed to have protected their clan, and it goes back in the years. 
E: Did they have some enemies in the desert? 
S: Yes, they thought there was a big some sort of sand monster that arose every noon 
which they feared more than anything. And they only fought when they had to 
defend thernselves. 
Section 3. 
E: What happened at the Thunderbird festivals? 
S: Well, they all came to honour the Thunderbird, a sort of All the ladies came and 
they al I wore copper bells that jingled when they danced. 
E: Was there something strange about the high priest's lodge? 
S: It was said to be enveloped in white winds and white mist, or something, that's what 
was special about it; but then it was just ordinary like the other houses. 
E: What about the spirits? 
S: I don't know. 
Test 1. 
"Okay", he says when asked to group the signs, takes good care here and looks 
through his groups. 
Gives Rocks correctly. 
Gives Kelaphs correctly. 
When asked about the Baregs he says "Pardon? " and looks at E. 
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Gives Monsters correctly. 
Test 2. 
When asked to match, he says: "Oh, yeah, right. " 
Points to the Rocks correctly. 
Points to the Kelaphs correctly 
Points to the Baregs correctly. 
Points to the Monsters correctly. 
Test 3. 
These are the Kelaphs. 
These are the Rocks. 
These are the Monsters. 
These are the Baregs. 
Test 4. 
Points quickly to the Kelaph and laughs. 
A deer. 
A butterfly. 
A table upside down (for the spider). 
Test 5. 
E: Can you now draw me a Kelaph? 
S: "The sign, or the actual? " he asks. 
E: Just whatever you prefer. 
S: Draws the sign. 
Test 6. 
E: What do you think a Kelaph is? 
S: A flower, or a kind of herb. 
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E: Why do you think so? 
S: Because it said in the story that they crushed them and that's what you do with 
herbs to heal and also because that's the shape, he says, and points to the Kelaph 











A kerlof, Astam, dandelion, thistle, daffodil, buttercup, heather, nettles. 
Many children noticed the skin of the desert deer used for clothing in Section I and 
reported on that spontaneously. There were children who noticed something about a cactus 
as early as Section 1; for example, Regina (age 10.6) spoke of. - "A cactus that the Pimas 
grew and ate the inside of it. " And there were children who spontaneously recalled pieces 
of contextual information and reported on it without being asked. Anthoni (age 9.10) for 
instance,, said: "The thick skin of the Kelaph" and "Carve stuff on. " Thus, contextual 
information and memory for instances grew stronger with age and so did the ability the 
children had to make the right connections of these clues. 
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Discussion. 
The following is a discussion of the main trends in the developmental data of Experiment 
2. Children's understanding of an utterance in relation to a wider linguistic context is 
influenced both by their current linguistic knowledge and by inferences and hypotheses 
that they make based upon evaluation of the present context. When the development of the 
unfamiliar word, Kelaph, was traced in the responses of the children, hypotheses that they 
were making when questioned in the Encoding Phase on the meaning of the new term often 
resulted in faulty lexical entries or completely wrong ones. However, older children were 
better able to recover from such erroneous entries. Individual variation also played a 
crucial role in performance within each condition and age group. There was a noted 
willingness in the children to participate in the whole procedure, together with their habit 
of sticking to the required pragmatics of the experimental situation; they did not play 
around or deviate from the instructions that they were given and appeared to try their best. 
The natural heuristics that Joos (1972) has spoken of as underlying the incidental 
deciphering of a word meaning from text, clearly were suppressed by early questioning in 
the experiment and pressure for intentional learning; thus, the experimental data gives 
valuable insights into the growth of word meaning in the maturing child when deciphering 
words from text. 
Age and Condition. 
The children employed much self-regulatory activity through the use of various 
resources; this technique counterbalanced some of the ambiguity of the experimental 
situation for the experimental children. Recovery from error was possible, but total 
recovery was difficult. The experimental children were able to learn from the stimuli 
materials without relating holistic information from the story to the meaning of the new 
word. This probably accounted for many of their correct responses in the tests and why 
they seemed in some cases to do better at first than the Control children did. The 
experimental children of all conditions and of all ages were certainly influenced in their 
responses by the manipulations of intentional leaming they had been subjected to, even 
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though many scored well on the tests. This influence is reflected, however, in their 
drawings and definitions of Kelaph; they could draw the Kelaph symbol, and could even 
say that it is a flower, but they did not relate that to a connotation of the new term as often 
as the Control children, who had been subjected to an incidental learning procedure. Even 
when they showed a drawing of a plant, they were not always able to state what a Kelaph 
was. The Controls in all age groups produced many good drawings of plants or flowers 
rather than drawing the test symbols as the majority of the children in the experimental 
conditions did. The Controls were more likely to interpret a Kelaph correctly. 
Age proved to be an important variable in Experiment 2. The effect of Age was 
reflected in all conditions in the Encoding Phase, with older children exhibiting in all 
conditions in the Test Phase better recall of the story, better word definitions, better 
recoveries from error, and more correct responding. However, the results indicated that 
Age was not as strong a variable as it was in Experiment 1. Mechanisms for the 
deciphering of words are developed early and changes in the skills of older children were 
based on factors such as older children having greater knowledge in a better- structured 
knowledge domain for plants, better auditory and memory skills, and a better-developed 
metalinguistic awareness. Providing fewer sentential contexts for the new term in 
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, gave greater control over the contribution of the 
linguistic encounter that the children had with the new term, "Kelaph. " 
Accompanied by very good linguistic abilities, as reflected by good recall and 
vocabularies in both the Encoding Phase and in the Test Phase, many children in all age 
groups seemed to overcome the ambiguity of the experimental setting, and the difficulty of 
the experiment as a whole, whatever their experimental condition, and gave correct 
answers in most, if not all, tests. The younger children were generally more imaginative 
and spontaneous, but still direct in their responses. The natural heuristics in the responses 
of the younger children may have been counterbalanced by the older children's growing 
skills of memory and rationality and greater knowledge about the world; these factors 
again often seemed to work against the natural heuristics of the older children. When they 
started to think consciously about the meaning of the new term, these 
factors, which they 
had not yet mastered, suppressed the natural heuristics with resulting erroneous entries. 
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Generally, if blessed with a good linguistic ability. even the young children were able to 
decipher the new term properly. These natural heuristics didn't seem to be easilý- 
suppressed in the older children with good recall, good vocabulary, or correct mappings of 
the test stimuli. 
For many children in the Metalinguistic Condition, too much pressure for 
definitions resulted in faulty entries of the new term and a lack of concept attainment-, 
whereas a delayed response time, as in the case of the Controls, resulted in clearer 
connotations and conceptual knowledge. 
Revelations of the Tests. 
In Experiment 2 there were 32 children of the total sample of 192 children who had 
all the 6 tests of the Test Phase correct, and 63 children had all the remaining 5 tests correct 
when the Test of Production (Test 3) had been omitted. Thus, there were fewer correct 
responses from children in this experiment than in Experiment 1. The children now heard 
the new word in fewer sentential contexts and had two sets of stimuli materials to adapt to 
instead of one set in the former experiment. These differences in the experimental design-- 
a lack of exposure and practise--may account for the poorer performance. 
Two-Way Anova showed main effects of Age, F(3.180) = 4.39, p =. 005 and of 
Condition, E(2.180) = 3.25, p <. 05. for the combined score Full Meaning from all subtests 
in the Test Phase. Age group 10.6 performed best overall and subjects in the Control 
condition gave better performance than did subjects in any other age group. 
A strong correlation exists among some of the tests: the strongest correlation 
among Test 5 (Depiction) and Test 6 (Interpretation) (. 67**) and among Test 4 
(Discrimination) and Test 5 (Depiction) (. 55* *). These tests clearly tap the interrelated 
functions of various psychological processes necessary for proper performance. Children 
who score highly overall score well in all these tests; on one hand, the tests of Symbol 
Comprehension and Object Comprehension may be highly related by their nature: they 
cover similar domains; on the other hand, little contamination may exist between some of 
the tests such as the tests of Discrimination and Depiction or between tests of Depiction 
and Interpretation as they cover different domains, the correlation may indicate 
high scores 
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for other tests and the requirement of a similar ability in discerning elements however in 
two different domains--the one of linguistic competence, the other of graphic competence-- 
similar to having a good logical reasoning ability, that helps. for example. in tests of some 
mathematical ability (but not necessarily in other mathematical fields), and in tests of 
linguistic ability. 
In all the conditions and with the youngest children of 4, errors were repeated from 
the beginning; there were children who were wrong on all tests. Other children were 
correct on two out of four referents and "Bareg" for "Kelaph" was a common mistake. 
There were children who had the first tests correct and the later tests incorrect or vice 
versa, mismatching the Bareg for the Kelaph in three out of six tests. Quite a few drew the 
Kelaph symbol and among the Controls there were more productions of pictures looking 
like flowers than there were pictures of symbols for Controls in all age groups. Many of the 
young children referred to appearances when they interpreted, for example, Kelaph by 
basing their definitions on the look of the symbol saying: "Cause them bits, them lines. " A 
few could relate to the story: "It looks like flowers and the Indians use them for flower, " 
but quite many did not recall having heard the word. It was quite clear in the experiment 
that the whole procedure was too difficult for the youngest children and the story was too 
complex for them. 
A similar pattern was found in the next age group of 6, but here there were more 
recoveries from error. Even if the mismatch of Baregs for Kelaphs was common in all ages 
and conditions, there were Control subjects that mismatched the Gila and the Bareg; but 
many older Controls recovered from that error later in the tests, or even as early as Test 2. 
The children who stuck to their errors had often made an error as early as the Encoding 
Phase, such as the child who constantly thought of Kelaph as an animal. When asked to 
give reasons for that, he responded: "It's just an animal like the deer that they killed 
for its 
skins. " There were other erroneous interpretations of Kelaph near the end of the experiment 
such as: "Like a hut"; "like a letter, " "like a signal, " "like fruit, " "like pot with 
bulb in. " 
Then there were children who did better and could draw the symbol, but could only say: 
"It's a flower or plant, " because of appearances, or a few who made use of information in 
both the story and in the test materials and said: "The Kelaph is a flower, I think. " 
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Still there were children in Test 5 (Depiction) who had done all their tests correct 
but could not define Kelaph in Test 6 (Interpretation) and this happened most often for 
children in the young Indirect groups. Those who were correct in all tests or almost all tests 
were more likely to make recollections from the story such as: "It was used for bandage, " 
or to recall Kelaph in connection with the desert deer and skins used for clothing, or to say 
something like: "They took the hard skins off them. " 
There was an increase in correct responses to all tests in the children of age group 8 
and a higher rise in the children of age group 10. But still there were children in both these 
older age groups who had three referents out of four wrong every time. There were children 
who had partial entries for Kelaph; usually they had picked up information on it from the 
story, such as "Kelaph is used to mend or bum something"; "They put it into their shells 
and use it to decorate things"; or "It was paint or powder. " But then there were subjects 
who recalled valuable contextual information from the story and could connect it properly 
and got Kelaph right throughout: "It was in the desert; it would have spiky leaves and the 
flowers, red or blue would give out the dye; there could have been juice in the stem, 
ancestors had taught them how to cure wounds... " 
In many studies of the acquisition of the meaning of new words, the range of 
possible properties that were referred to was highly constrained. When a number of 
properties are available for reference, the question is whether lexical contrast would still be 
informative to children for the meaning of a new term. The use of the term "strategy" 
indicates that there are certain regularities in the children's decision making. Provided that 
reference is established, children will use the first referent as the basis for subsequent 
attempts at mapping the meaning of the new word. Reference is not a property of words, 
per se, but of words containing expressions in concrete utterances. In grasping the sense of 
a word, one is not certainly assured of a reference. 
There were common responses from subjects in all conditions and age groups in 
some of the tests--for example , in 
Test 3, Production, various pronunciations of Kelaph: 
Kelagh, Kerlaph, Kerl, Kalaph, Kelogh, Kella, Kela, Kerlegh, and Kivalh. Kela was the 
most popular pronunciation apart from the proper one, Kelaph. For the Bareg there were 
pronunciations such as Bar, Barog, Bamag, Barleg, and Gareg. The ability to produce the 
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word "Kelaph" grew with age and properly pronouncing the term was better in the 
experimental conditions, probably because those children had heard the word more often. It 
was common for the children to give all items familiar names, such as: "This is the flower" 
(or "daffodil" as many children said) for Kelaph, and "This is the duck, " or "This is the 
crocodile" for Bareg. There were children who could say that Kelaph was a flower but 
when asked for its specific name said: "I just call it a yellow flower. " Many said "Swan" 
for Bareg. However, there were always some who could not produce Kelaph and said that 
they didn't know any name for it. 
In cases of lexical capture of the new term by another formerly existing term, there 
were examples such as "plant, " "flower, " "tree, " "cactus, " "a flowering cactus, " 
"buttercup, " "daisy" (both younger and older children), or "tulip, " "lily, " "waterlily" 
(mostly older children), or even "plantmonster" and "snailrose. " "Loveheart" (which may 
have been directly related to the look of the Kelaph symbol) said one who had gone off the 
track. Bareg was much more often captured lexically than was the Kelaph by other bird 
names such as "hen, " "goose, " "duck, " "swan" (said by younger children), "magpie, " and 
"osprey" (said by older children, mostly). And one young child named it "a bad duck 
named Popo. " It was quite common in all ages and conditions that the Bareg was named 
for the Kelaph and vice verse, but not necessarily because the child had mismatched these 
two in other tests, even if that happened also. The Control children who could produce 
Kelaph did not all say Bareg for the bird and even gave no name for Bareg. Few of the 
younger ones tried to name the monster (Gila). 
The same developmental trend in difference between comprehension and 
production was found in the experiment as in Experiment 1: producing the new term was 
harder for the children than for them to show signs of comprehension. 
In Test 4, Discrimination, the children had not seen the three symbols of the deer, 
butterfly, and spider; only the Kelaph symbol on the layout was familiar from the earlier 
tests. This may be a reason for high scores in Test 4; i. e. the children chose the familiar 
symbol, not necessarily because they had mapped the underlying concept properly, but 
because they had gained familiarity with that symbol before. The children saw the layout 
with four symbols and were asked to show or point to the Kelaph symbol; therefore they 
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might have linked the word they had heard earlier in the tests with the familiar symbol. 
Both younger and older children were presented with the same number of symbols. one of 
each on the layout. Many young children did as well as they had done already in the 
Encoding Phase and in Test 1. One reason why children in the two youngest age groups did 
well in Test 4 is possibly related to the fact that they had been presented, in Test I. with 
one or two symbols of each group instead of four symbols in each group, as was the case 
with the older children. Fewer symbols might have made them more confident. 
Pilot Testing had shown that for young children to work with four symbols of each 
group and to sort them was confusing; therefore, it was decided to present them with only 
one or two symbols of each group. In order to estimate whether the younger children's 
responses in Test 4 were biased because they had fewer symbols to work with earlier, I 
estimated their total performance. As many of the younger children did well in the other 
tests, which were not based on symbols, I conclude that their results were not biased 
because of fewer symbols. Besides, among the 8- and I 0-year-olds there were not as many 
confusions when they sorted the symbols. Children of 8 and 10 years have learned proper 
skills for this simple sorting. 
Holistic skills based on resemblance mechanisms are established early. Children are 
at the peak of their language acquisition from ages I to 4. Resemblance mechanisms are 
needed for the processing of symbolic representations as the ones in the figurative 
drawings of the Pima symbols. I would argue that resemblance mechanisms account for the 
instantaneous mappings observed in the children's first encounter with the new term and 
symbol. This holistic mode of resemblance was suppressed when the children tried to 
figure out logically or think consciously about the meaning of the symbols. Then remarks 
of criterial features of, for example, the Kelaph symbol were given such as: 
"This one 
looks like an arrowhead" or "This one looks like fire. " In order for the child to make proper 
use of criterial features, s/he must grow in age and skill for proper 
decontextualisation to 
take place. However, as Donaldson has argued (1978,1992), children make use of a variety 
of coding schemes in the mapping process. They use a 
blend of acquisition strategies or 
modes of knowledge. And above all, they are adaptive. 
It can be stated on basis of the 
results in Test 4 that it was 
difficult to pin down the mapping that each child used to one 
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mode. Nevertheless, for the children to use a logical, analytical mode which they had not 
mastered interfered with their correct mappings. 
The experiment demonstrated that the use of drawings in Test 5 were valuable tools 
in a language development study. By the same token, Test 5 gave valuable insights into the 
development of drawing in the growing child. 
The younger children often produced more abstract- looking pictures than did the 
older children (Bruner, 1966; Thomas & Silk, 1990). 1 am not claiming that they were 
abstract in their thinking, but according to Krampen (199 1 ), the young children are at the 
stage of caricatures, the symbolic stage in their drawing development. Even the youngest 
age group of 4-year-olds had already started learning to write in school. Berk (1986) has 
stressed the interrelation of the developments of language and writing. As stated in 
Krampen (199 1), Lurcat pointed out in the late fifties that the main aspects of grapheme 
development in children in her study of a large collection of writing and drawing in young 
children. The symbols in the experiment are somewhat graphemic, and the children--even 
young children--drew them with ease. Krampen (199 1) holds that: 
It is from the environment that the internal models on which the drawings 
are based are derived. Because these internal models are iconic codings of 
the environment,, children's drawings are equally based on iconic codings of 
that environment, albeit one step removed. The function circle that leads to 
the production of children's drawings starts with the perceptual exploration 
of the environment and then leads, via the interpretant - that is, via the 
imitation of this exploratory activity in the internal model - to an internal 
disposition to make traces on paper controlled by that model (p. 44-45). 
On the following pages examples of drawings from the children in all age groups 
and conditions are presented (Fig. 3.7., 3.8., p. 203-204). 
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Restructuring. 
Anglin (1977) has argued that developmental studies of word association have 
suggested that an important event occurs between 5 and 10 years of age. This shift has 
been termed the syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift. It refers to the fact that responses of young 
children in free association tests are predominantly of a different part of speech than are the 
stimuli words (syntagmatic). The responses of older children are predominantly of the 
same part-of-speech (paradigmatic). As cited in Anglin (1977) Woodworth (193 8) 
presented examples for syntagmatic responses from young children. For example, they 
associate the word "eat" with the word "table"; whereas adults are more likely to say 
"chair" in response to "table. " The most common response to the word "dark" for children 
is "night, " whereas for adults it is "light. " This shift has much to do with the understanding 
of relations among words so that for older children and adults, words are not unrelated 
entities, but rather cohere in a system, or in a lexical network that is determined by features 
shared by groups of words. This network takes time to grow but the extent to which it is a 
quantitative or a qualitative change that takes place is still an open question. 
For both the 8-year-olds and the I 0-year-olds in Experiments I and 2, a drop in 
performance is seen as compared to the performance of the younger two age groups and as 
compared to the performance of the oldest children. It is likely that a shift is taking place. 
This syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift takes time. Children between the ages of 8 and 10, 
who are in the process of shifting, have not yet mastered the newly acquired skills of 
lexical reorganisation, and a resulting confusion is reflected in their performance. 
Von Slagle (1974) refers to Joos when speaking of linguistic patterning at the level 
of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic distributional patterns of the elements of any given 
lexicon. Von Slagle maintains that such linguistic patterning ultimately rests on 
extralinguistic patterning. Thus, in order for children to establish the reference of a new 
term, they are required to draw on their knowledge, not only of the lexicon, but also of 
extralinguistic patterning. 
One factor affecting the responses of children in the experimental conditions may 
stem from the lack of affirmative feedback that they received from the experimenter in the 
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Encoding Phase; they might have thought that they must be constantly wrong in their 
responses, since they did not get affinnative feedback from them, and that they must tr)', 
something else. Also, earlier studies have shown that it is difficult for young children to 
define words directly (Dockrell, 1981; Campbell & Dockrell, 1986). 
It should be emphasised that the Control children had only heard the target word 
three times before being tested on it, whereas the Metalinguistic children had already, at 
the start of the Test Phase heard the word three times in the story and been questioned on 
it. Furthermore, the Indirect children had already gained familiarity with the test sample of 
symbols in the Encoding. And it should be noted that the scores of Controls in all age 
groups for the first test in the Test Phase were usually better than a combined score for the 
performance of the experimental children when their three interval scores of the Encoding 
Phase have been added. 
Notably, the children were often stressing their point, perhaps the same one through 
all sections and tests, and often spoke aloud to themselves or murmured, or moved their 
lips silently, so as to provide an understandable, or, more importantly, a manageable 
framework for themselves. They seemed to require a sense of familiarity, a self-motivated 
task orientation. I feel this characteristic is what Vygotsky (1962) touched upon as he 
spoke of the relationship between language and thought and of the importance of private 
speech. Private speech being speech to oneself having the ftiriction of relating the child to 
his/her social world and his or her inner world of self. The behaviour of the children 
indicated that they were using private speech to monitor their thinking and acting and was 
a factor in their lexical reorganisation of the meaning of the new term. 
The children were hearing many unfamiliar words in the complex text such as 
Pimas, Gila, Bareg, and Kelaph at the same time that they were processing information on 
the story's theme, structure, main characters, and events. 
When the child encounters a new term that is not captured lexically, s/he can map it 
directly if the intended denotatum in the experimental situation is picked up. Children learn 
synonyms at some stage in their vocabulary growth. Pre-emption or lexical capture may 
place added strain on the mapping process but it does not preclude the acquisition of the 
new lexical term as having the same or similar denotation to a previously 
known term 
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(Gathercole, 1987,1989). It still needs to be established at what age and for what word 
classes lexical capture is important. Pre-emption occurred more often with young children 
than with older children in the experiment. Dockrell (198 1) has argued that children's 
solutions, when pre-emption and lexical contrast conflict. may depend on a number of 
factors, including their ability to accept synonyms; the relative importance placed on 
linguistic information; the degree of ambiguity within the frame of reference; and the 
salience of the attributes--and other similar variables 
If children are learning many new names such as "Kelaph, " "Bareg, " and "Gila. " it 
makes sense to assume that once they have learnt a particular name and natural kind 
pairing that this natural kind such as Kelaph will not be referred to by another name. The 
problems children encounter with class inclusion and the understanding of subordinate and 
superordinates categories may well reflect this difficulty. A basic linguistic competence 
may be necessary before children realise that there is no incongruity in referring to the 
same plant, for example, by two distinct names. The fact that these types of responses are 
only given for nouns suggests that a clear indication of the intended referent exacerbates 
the problem. The tasks in the experiment may not be testing the children's competence with 
respect to how they learn the meanings of new terms. Rather, the tasks may have assessed 
the children's ability to learning something new about plants for which they felt that they 
already had a name, such as "daffodil. " Dockrell (198 1) has argued that there are two 
methodological implications of this. On the one hand, if one is looking at children's ability 
to develop a referential relationship, one should confine one's presentation to a single 
example of the unknown item. If, on the other hand, one wishes to look at children's ability 
to co-ordinate a number of different pieces of information, the experiment is clearly 
adequate. However, there was a lack of co-ordination on the children's part, which suggests 
that the study was in fact examining tasks that investigate general knowledge acquisition 
rather than semantic acquisition. Still, "full meaning" for several children emerged and 
grew with age, no matter which condition, and this performance is reminiscent of semantic 
acquisition in natural circumstance, which entails the co-ordination of information gained 
over a number of exposures. There was a strong relationship between performances in the 
Test Phase and the Posttesting. Children who already mapped the new word properly in 
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Test Phase, kept doing so in the Posttesting; whereas few of the children who kept giving 
erroneous responses in the Test Phase recovered from their errors in the Posttesting, but 
stuck to the same error pattern or fluctuated between various error patterns. 
Merriman et. al. have maintained (199 1) that children may use encapsulated 
procedural knowledge that is not accessible to conscious reflection when they solve 
nonverbal problems. Thus, children are not able to tap into this procedural knowledge in 
developing the corresponding word meanings. For concepts to become word meanings, 
Merriman has argued, the concepts may have to be reinvented, or at least rediscovered. 
However, linguistic experiences may influence the initial acquisition of the nonverbal 
concept even when acquisition of some word meaning is contingent on possession of some 
non-verbal concept. The children in the experiment may have mapped the new term, 
Kelaph, onto their pre-existing categories of plants. However, I cannot see from their 
responses how the precise manner in which they represented these categories was 
established; whether it was based on holistic encodings or on the working out of the 
criterial features (Brooks, 1978; Kemler-Nelson, 1984; Carey, 1985). 
208 
Conclusions. 
In the mapping for each child, one must discriminate between the development of the 
meaning of the word "Kelaph, " or "plant, " and the development of the concept of a Kelaph. 
or a plant. The meaning of the word "Kelaph" differed among the age groups, whereas the 
underlying concept seemed to rely upon the acquisition and reorganisation of the children's 
knowledge of plants. This growth of knowledge by age is well established in the 
production lists for plant terms in the Posttesting. It is suggested that the children in all the 
age groups based their knowledge of plants on observation and experiment that has 
adaptive and heuristic value for them. They may first reason from their own basic 
experiences of plants to the specific plants in question. Children with well-structured plant 
vocabularies should map the new plant term, "Kelaph, " instantaneously. Memory plays a 
part--a crucial step in the acquisition of deductive competence involves the ability to search 
for counter examples--this ability is constrained by the processing capacity of working 
memory which develops with age (cf, Johnson-Laird, 1990 as cited in Light & 
Butterworth,, 1992, p. 153). 
"Daffodil" is. 
) 
for younger children, the prototypical plant with the properties or 
features that are. ) 
for the children, perceptually salient aspects of the new plant. Carey 
(1985) maintains that "Four- and 6-year-old children rely on computations of similarity 
where I 0-year-olds and adults rely on deductive inferences from category membership" (p. 
192). It can be concluded that the knowledge that the children bring with them to the 
experiment about different properties of plants plays a strong role in their mapping process 
and frees them from the embeddedness of their thinking. Decontextualisation in the process 
of mapping is thought to arise through the construction of mental models that enables 
generalisation across various contexts. The child reasons by analogy with aspects of the 
situation where s/he first encountered the problem (Johnson-Laird, 1977; Light & 
Butterworth, 1992). 
In Experiment 2, the Metalinguistic children fared worst. Indirects showed 
confusion and Controls did sometimes rather well. There were fewer correct mappings for 
the new term noted than there had been in Experiment 1. Age was not as strong a factor in 
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Experiment 2, either. Working with fewer sentential contexts for the new term and 
incorporating a control word. Bareg, provided better control of the contribution of the 
linguistic information that the children heard. However, it is difficult to tease out the 
benefits of these two factors. 
The Experiment 2 sample was similar in terms of background and living standard to 
the sample used in Experiment 1. Half of the sample were children who had already 
participated in Experiment 1. The children in Experiment I ranged in age from 5 to 12, 
whereas children in Experiment 2 were younger--4-to- I 0-years-old. These age differences 
must account for differences in the results from the two experiments. 
It still needs to be established if there are differences, per se, in the two natural kind 
terms that were employed in Experiment I and 2. The nature of the mineral term, "Mikas" 
and the nature of the plant term, "Kelaph, " can account for differences in results from the 
two experiments. 
It can be concluded from the present experiment that: a) children's knowledge of 
plants is a strong factor affecting mapping; b) children adhered to what has been called 
"everyday reasoning" in their deciphering of the unknown term, the base of which is 
procedural knowledge; and c) children must have a well-structured vocabulary for 
declarative understanding: 
The point is that everyday reasoning is generally based on two types of 
culturally specific knowledge, whose representation is evoked by the 
appropriate context. On this view the context and content of thought are 
inseparable from the reasoning process (Light & Butterworth, 1992, p. 7). 
It can be concluded that the Control condition provided a base for holistic 
processing (incidental learning) needed for the construction of a mental model, whereas the 
analytic processing (intentional learning) provided by the Indirect condition and the 
Metalinguistic condition resulted in stimuli-bound decodings of the meaning of the new 
term. There were, however, children in all conditions who brought with them background 
knowledge and skills to overcome the ambiguities of their situation. These children had a 
strong sense of what James (1890) has called "Thingumbob"; they made 
favourable use of 
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A NOVEL ANIMAL TERM 
Introduction. 
Donaldson (1978) has spoken of a child's need for familiar contexts. In Experiments I and 
2, children in the experimental conditions encountered interferences with their encodings 
of the new term. These interferences may have interfered with the recognisability of the 
contexts that each condition provided; the perceptual processing of linguistic information 
could thus have been blurred and could have led them astray in their guessing of the proper 
meaning of the new word. Joos (1972) has argued that the guess is best that maximises the 
redundancy of word and environment together. However, many children recovered from 
their errors. There were even children in these conditions who mapped the word correctly 
after one trial. Dealing with language as perceptual information means, in a daily natural 
circumstance, having to deal with various other variables at the same time. Children may 
be quite well equipped from an early age to deal with ambiguities in their situation when it 
comes to language. This adaptive skill to deal with many variables at one time was well 
reflected in their performance in the two first experiments. Thus, I would argue, on basis of 
the earlier results, that the child is quite adaptive. 
In the present experiment, I wanted to see if 4- to 5-year-old children could cope 
with a design similar to those in the two former experiments, but with a story that I thought 
would appeal more to young children. An animal term, "Mimbo, " was chosen as the 
unknown word. It is known that children learn animal names early (cf. Dockrell., 198 1). 
The children in Experiment 3 heard the new term, Mimbo, six times in the story or as often 
as children in Experiment I had heard the new mineral term, Mikas; children in 
Experiment 2 heard the new plant term, Kelaph, only three times. I also decided to adopt 
the technique from Experiment I of having the reading of the story videotaped; in 
Experiment 2 the child heard the story read from an audio tape. On the other hand, I 
adopted the technique employed in Experiment 2 for the Indirects--that of using 
different 
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stimulus materials in the Encoding Phase than in some of the tests in the Test Phase. This 
was done in order to give both Indirects and Controls an equal opportunity to work NA-ith 
new test materials, in the Test Phase and thus to avoid the bias of familiarity with the test 
materials which might result in a better performance for the Indirects. 
The story theme I chose was one of nature, featuring animals, birds, flowers, pixies. 
and fairies. I thought that such a story would be familiar and interesting to 4-to-5-year-old 
children, who should have knowledge of what can be expected in such circumstances. 
Thus, the children's sensitivity for the communicative context and their sensitivity for the 
task demands were brought forth by the condition in which they participated and by the 
story context. Those children who had knowledge of the situational context were predicted 
to know what to expect in a forest--for example, that plants can become mouldy, what 
birds eat, and what lives in the soil. The purpose of the experiment was to see how children 
would map the meaning of the new term and to observe if they succeeded in drawing the 
new referent, the new animal, an unfamiliar worm-like creature. 
Donaldson (1978,1992) has argued that the manner in which children are 
questioned is important in research of this type and that if they are asked questions in terms 
they understand, they can demonstrate much more knowledge and skills than has often 
been thought. She speaks of the "embeddedness" of children's thinking and maintains that 
children can perform complex mental tasks when the tasks are embedded in a familiar 
context. Children learn words when they are accompanied by gestures, familiar faces, and 
favourite toys. To begin with, children's thinking is entirely dependent on such contexts: 
i. e. it is procedural. Donaldson maintains that children's thought, gradually and at a later 
age, becomes "freed" to the point where abstract, impersonal reasoning becomes possible. 
She has recently (1992) stressed the role of the development of children's emotions and 
their relation to the development of children's intellectual modes, or phases 
in the course of 
the decontextualisation of thought. 
Werrier (1948,1950,1954) has argued for conative or affective needs together with 
cognitive needs in language acquisition. Joos 
(1958) has pointed out that: "meaning is the 
result of subtractions principally, 
but also of additions by way of connotation, and that 
sentences mean what they 
do. so to say, BY DEFAULT, the competing meanings having 
been eliminated in one way or another" (p. 69). Correspondence meaning has to do with 
the correspondence a language makes between a "real noise and a real thing or the likell 
(between an utterance and its referents). This defines language as symbolic. Joos has 
argued. He has further maintained that overt acts of speech alter reality in that changes in 
the listener's behaviour correspond to them and that this defines human speech as 
communication. 
There are several studies suggesting that there are not to be expected many 
differences in performance between 4-and-5-year old children. According to Reynell 
(1977,1983), 1 -to-4-year-old children are at the height of their sensitivity for acquiring 
language. There are few differences reported, according to her language developmental 
scales. ) 
in the language abilities of 4- and 5-year-olds. There are reported differences in 
terms of simple vocabulary items from daily life, but when it comes to the question of 
knowledge of the deeper structure and relations of language and a declarative skill in the 
use of these, there are very small differences in her sample between the two ages. 
Carey (1985), in her work on conceptual change in children and the understanding 
of the concept "alive, " for example, reports very few differences for 4- and 5-year-old 
children, younger children sometimes doing better. Furthermore, in drawing development, 
4-year-old children are, according to Krampen (199 1), at the symbolic stage, or the stage of 
caricatures, a stage at which their drawings often resemble more "abstract" looking icons 
than later emerge: 
Generally, children's drawings can be classified into five stages, starting 
with the scribbling stage at about eighteen months to two years. Gradually, 
designs emerge at about two to three years that cannot quite be called 
representational until the child is about three to four years old, when figures 
based on the tadpole schema emerge. These drawings become more 
coherent as the children become older. During the stage of intellectual 
realism children often make X-ray drawings. It is not until the child is about 
eight years old that visually realistic drawings start to appear (Thomas & 
Silk, 1990, p. 41). 
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Object of Study. 
Experiment 3 was undertaken to find out If. a) young children, of 4 to 5 years, could 
decipher, from a narrative read to them on video, the meaning of an unfamiliar word. 
"Mimbo, " that denoted an unknown animal, a worm-like creature that appeared in six 
different sentential contexts within the story; b) to determine if or how children as young as 
4 and 5 would succeed in drawing the intended referent; and c) to observe how young 
children would cope in this type of experimental situation. 
As in the two earlier experiments, it was predicted that the analytic/intentional 
learning procedure imposed by the Experimental condition, the Indirect condition, and the 
ambiguity inherent in the structure of the condition would be likely to lead to children 
making incomplete "fast mappings. " This would be likely to happen in the Indirect 
condition and was predicted to result in a more incomplete lexical entry for the new ten-n 
than in the Control condition. Results were predicted to vary as a function of Age. 
However, it was predicted that Age would not show as strong a trend as in the earlier two 
experiments, because a) the children in the present experiment were so close in age (4.4 to 
5.6 years); b) because the older children were predicted to be just at the onset of a 
representational shift (Piaget, 1923; Bruner, 1964; Mandler, 1983); and c) because of their 
small school experience and educational training having yet had few benefits on the skills 
required. The spontaneity and natural heuristics of the younger children were expected to 
counterbalance the growing intellectual skills of older children. 
it was hypothesised that, in the Indirect condition, the natural heuristics of lexical 
acquisition when deciphering from text would be suppressed, resulting in erroneous lexical 
entries for the new term. Control children, who were questioned about theme and plot, 
were not expected to be affected in this way. The same trends of recovery from error were 
predicted as in the two earlier experiments. 
The initial aim of Experiment 3 was to build upon the results obtained in the two 
earlier experiments on the deciphering of words. I was interested in seeing if the artificial 
words, their acoustic image per se, "Mikas, " "Kelaph, " and a new one, "Mimbo, " would be 
equally difficult for children. If they were not, then some of the earlier results could be 
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explained by means of such differences. I also thought it very likely that in spite of the 
complexity of the task, the use of an unknown animal term would help to motivate the 
children,, since they tend to learn such words early. As Dockrell (198 1) puts it: 
By choosing an animal term I am presenting the children with a distinct 
perceptual entity. There is evidence (Nelson, 1973) that small concept 
domains such as animal terms are differentiated from the beginning of the 
acquisition period. By the age of two or three, children have fairly firrn 
ideas of what constitutes animalness, though this need not necessarily be in 
accordance with adult ideas (p. 13 8). 
There were three different-sounding words employed in the experiment that all 
denoted the same referent. These words were randomised within three groups of equal size 
within each age level and each subject got only one of them in his/her story and in the Test 
Phase. The words were "Mikas, " "Mimbo., " and "Kelaph, " and all denoted an unfamiliar 
worm-like creature. 
One Control condition was employed during the Encoding Phase in which children 
encountered the unknown word in different linguistic contexts. The children were asked 
questions on the story's theme in the intervals between the three sections of the story. In 
one experimental condition, the Indirect condition, children were asked questions on a test 
sample of objects in the intervals between the story sections. The Metalinguistic Condition 
of Experiment I and 2 was not included, since both these experiments showed that 
metalinguistic questioning was too difficult and put too much strain on the youngest 
children. 
Method. 
Experiment 3 was designed with the aim of appealing to young children. As in the 
two earlier experiments, a story was read to the children. The story theme chosen was the 
one of a fairy tale. The sensitivity of the children for the demands of the situation and for 
the nature of the story context was thought to be awakened by the theme in which animals, 
flowers, and things living in a forest were discussed. Because of their experience with 
previous storytelling activities, cartoon films, and television shows on nature, picture 
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books, and animal toys, I expected that children of this age would be able to expect certain 
things in a circumstance such as that of the story. The children who had a knowledge of the 
situational context, were expected to know what to expect in a forest--for example. that 
plants can become mouldy, what birds eat, and what lives in the soil. 
The theme, which was thought to appeal to young children, was also chosen with 
their conative or affective needs in mind (cf, Werner & Kaplan, 1950,1952), in the hope 
that it would give them scope to express themselves. 
As in Experiment 2,1 decided to use different materials in the Encoding Phase than 
in some of the tests in the Test Phase that took place after the children had listened to the 
story. This was done in order to control the bias that arose in the first experiment, in which 
the Indirect children had worked with the test materials in both the Encoding Phase and in 
the Test Phase. Thus, they had gained greater familiarity with the materials than had the 
Control and the Metalinguistic children. Therefore, blue plastic plates were employed in 
the Encoding Phase, but a different set of materials was used together with these in the Test 
Phase. There were four plastic plates, the shapes of which resembled a mouse; a bird; an 
unfamiliar berry, "Gombe; " and the unfamiliar worm-like creature, "Mimbo; " all of which 
were mentioned in the story. In the later Test Phase, the children were shown pictures 
bearing closer resemblances to the worm-like creature, the mouse, the bird and the berry. 
As these pictures had many colours and a variety of perceptual features and details, they 
may have looked even more complicated to some children than did the simple blue plates. 
However, I expected individual differences in preferences over these two sets of stimuli 
materials; some children to do better with the plates and others to do better with the 
pictures. This assumption was based on the children's performance in Experiment 2, in 
which there were individual preferences in performing with symbols and clay models. 
Dockrell (1981) has postulated that children with no previous experience of an 
unknown lexical item will choose a previously unnamed stimulus as its referent almost 
immediately. In the present experiment, this was not as straightforward as she described, 
since a control referent, the unfamiliar berry, "Gombe, " was also employed. 
Children in 
this experiment were required to deal with two new names and two concepts. The contrast 
217 
provided was much more ambiguous and the children had to lean on to their lIngulstIC 
knowledge of the text in order to map the new target word properly. 
The children's responses were tape recorded and observational notes were taken 
incidentally as the study progressed. This was done in order to estimate each child's total 
performance and to tap general trends in responding and attitude towards the experimental 
situation. 
The scoring procedure employed was the same as the one used in Experiment I and 
Experiment 2. (See Experiment 1, p. 47-48 and p. 64-65 for a description of the scoring 
procedure). The child scored I for a correct answer and 0 for a wrong one. 
Reynell (1977) has stressed the importance of continuing to present test materials 
for young children even if the questions on these materials seem meaningless to them, and 
that to discontinue the testing too soon was to risk misscoring the child. I had learned from 
Experiment I and Experiment 2 that working with the youngest children required more 
time and made greater demands on the experimenter's discretion, and that, when in doubt, 
it was better to continue with the testing than to stop entirely and to risk an inappropriate 
score of "0" for a child who could have scored " 1. " 
Subjects and Experimental Design. 
Seventy-two subjects wereemployed in this study, ranging in age from 4.4 to 5.6 
and were divided into two age groups, referred to below as the 4-and-5-year-old group. 
There was an equal number of boys and girls in each age group and in each condition. 
At each age level the children were randomly assigned to an Experimental 
condition, an Indirect condition and a Control condition. Subjects were obtained from a) 
two Primary Schools in Central Scotland--a morning and an afternoon group from 
Dunblane Primary and Dunblane Nursery; b) Balquhidder Primary; and c) two play-groups 
-- the Psychology Department Playgroup at Stirling University and Killin Playgroup. These 
children did not come from similar areas as regards living standards and social 
environment. There are differences between the social environments of middle class 
standards in Dunblane and Stirling as compared to the rural fanning environments of 
Balquhidder and Killin. Some of the same children took part in Experiment 3 as had 
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1 and afternoon Nursery participated in Experiment 2, i. e. young children from the morning 
in Dunblane and children from Primary One in Dunblane. Some of the nursery children 
had already scored very high in Experiment 2. All these children knew the experimenter 
very well and were already familiar with this type of a situation, even though it differed 
somewhat from that of earlier studies. The initial sample was supposed to be 96, but was 
reduced to 72 because of many inconveniences such as the experimenter's absence from 
Scotland, difficult testing circumstances in Killin, and the complexity of the experiment. 
Thus, in the sample of 72 there were data included from 12 children who, due to 
difficulties in testing and testing circumstance, were not deemed to be accurate. 
Materials and Procedure. 
The overall experimental setting was the one of a story presented in four sections 
about a small pixie, "Nandi, " and his life in a forest. (See Table 4.3., p. 222). The children 
were invited to learn about the pixie and his life in the forest and to examine some pictures 
and objects from his surroundings. The main story theme was the one of the pixie's life and 
his worries about being different from the other pixies; the story told about his attempts to 
find happiness. In the course of the story, the children heard one of three new terms: 
"Mimbo, " "Kelaph, " or "Mikas, " (according to the group for the new word to which they 
belonged). The story was presented in four sections and the children heard the word 
"Mimbo" in six different sentential contexts. (See Table 4. L, p. 221 and Table 4.2., p. 
22 1). Mimbo denoted an unfamiliar worm-like creature. The children also heard a control 
word, "Gombe, " that denoted an unfamiliar berry, twice in the second and 
fourth sections. 
Some of the objects used in the Encoding and the Test Phase were also mentioned in the 
story: yellow irises, a bird, and a mouse that shared some properties with the 
Mimbo. All 
the natural kinds employed in the study shared some functions, and some semantic, 
perceptual, and conceptual features with Mimbo, the unfamiliar worm-like creature. 
They 
were all alive; the iris and the Gombe both grow, can 
be picked, can go mouldy, cannot 
move on. their own volition, and could be edible. 
The Mimbo, the mouse, and the bird do 
not grow, but breathe and reproduce, can move on their own volition, and are edible 
by 
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humans or other animals. The Mimbo and the mouse can both live under the ground. 
whereas the bird lives on the ground, or in trees and bushes. According to Carey (1985). 
the Mimbo, the mouse, and the bird, being animals, are closer to the concept of "alive" for 
young children than are the Gombe or the iris. 
The story was presented to the children in a room close to the playgroup or the 
classroom. During the two weeks before the experiment started, the experimenter had 
visited the children daily, so as to evoke trust and familiarity. She told them that she was 
soon going to invite them to watch a story on video, and asked if they were willing to help 
her with questions about it. The story sections were purposely made rather long, in order to 
be comparable to the length of the story sections in Experiment I and Experiment 2. 
Pilot Testing. 
The pilot testing for the experiment was done with eight children from the 
Psychology Department Playgroup at Stirling University and from Balquhidder Primary. 
Initially, the experimental design included the use of clay for the Control children to play 
with in the interval sections during the Encoding Phase while they were asked questions 
about the theme of the story. However, pilot testing revealed that playing with the clay was 
too much of a distraction for the Control children and this practice was therefore not 
adhered to in the real testing. Instead, the children were allowed to look at a picture of 
Nandi in the intervals. Because pilot testing also showed that the younger Control children 
had difficulties in answering the questions about the theme of the story and often paused, 
these questions were therefore simplified. 
Encoding Phase. 
The method of indirect questioning was used to probe word knowledge during the 
Encoding phase in one experimental condition, the Indirect condition. 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. on the following page (22 1) show the sentential contexts 




The Six-Sentence Exposures of the Unknown Word Mimbo (Kelaph, Mikas, the 
Target Word) in Experiment 3. 
Section 1: "Some Mimbos have been in these mushrooms already, " he cries out somewhat 
annoyed. Well, the Mimbos can only move slowly while I can run. 
Section 2: Then he steps on something soft and long which nearly gets squashed. "Oh, it 
is a Mimbo. So sorry, " he says softly. 
Section 3: A lone bird sits there and digs for blue Mimbos. His favourites. As Nandi turns 
from the door, he sees that lone bird again but this time with a blue Mimbo in 
his beak. 
Section 4: Well, on the bank of the silvery stream where the Mimbos live in the damp, 
dark soil, there are the yellow irises, the flowers that grow by the stream. 
Table 4.2. 
The Two-Sentence ExPosures of the Unfamiliar Word Gombe (the Control Word) in 
Experiment 3. 
Section 2: A new day has broken and in the cool morning breeze some gleaming Gombes 
dingle dangle merrily on their hedge. 
Section4: He picks a few juicy Gombes from his hedge to eat. 
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Table 4.3. 
Example of Text from the Story used in Experiment 3: 
Section 1. 
Across the magic meadow by the silvery stream, Wild Wood opens onto a 
chain of lofty mountains. The trees of Wild Wood are very, very tall. Up and up 
they tower. But down on the ground among the evergreen bushes and multicoloured 
flowers, the bright-eyed pixie, Nandi, makes his swift ways. Swifter than a mouse 
even. 
Nandi is a busy fellow. In Spring and Summer, for example, he has the job 
of polishing gently the petal coats of Wild Wood's flowers so that they may twinkle 
like stars when the sun comes out to play. 
Autumn has now fallen, however, and many of the flowers droop their 
pretty heads silently. Nandi has been given a new job. This time it is picking tasty 
mushrooms for the Fairy Queen's Autumn Party. Some of the mushrooms have 
gone mouldy. Nandi takes care not to pick those. "Some Mimbos have been in these 
mushrooms already, " he cries out somewhat annoyed. Well, the Mimbos can only 
move slowly while I can run. I should be able to get to more mushrooms than they 
can, " he then adds and brightens up at the thought. 
(The whole story can be seen in Appendix C, p. CI -C 3). 
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The Indirect Condition. 
Following each of the four story sections, the children were given a test sample of 
four blue plastic plates, one of a blue won-n-like creature, Mimbo, one of an unfamiliar- 
looking berry, Gombe, one of a mouse, and one of a bird. The blue plastic Mimbo was 12 7 
mm. (w) x 135 mm. (h). The blue plastic berry was 75 mm. (h) x 105 mm. (w). The blue 
plastic mouse was 102 mm. (h) x 83 mm. (w). The blue plastic bird was 186 mm. (h) x 140 
mm. (w) (see Photo 4.1., p. 228). After having looked at these, the children were asked to 
give them to the experimenter as she asked for them by name, such as: "Can you now hand 
me the Mimbo plate; the mouse plate. " The plates were always asked for in a random order 
in each section. 
The Control Condition. 
Following story sections, the children were asked three or four questions about the 
theme of the section and its main events: Section 1: "Where did Nandi live? " "Was he 
picking something in the wood? " "For whom was Nandi working? " In Section 2: "Was 
there something strange with Nandi's eyes? " "Did Nandi use his own magic wand to 
change his eyes? " "Did his blue eye stay blue or turn brown? " In Section 3: "Did he go to 
see wise elf? " "Could wise elf change Nandi's blue eye? " "Did he say something about 
Nandi's irises? " In Section 4: "Did the fairy queen come to see Nandi in his sleep? " "Did 
the fairy queen say something about his irises? " "What are the irises? " 
Test Phase. 
The Test Phase was conducted shortly after the children had listened to the whole 
story and had been through the four sections. Five tests were 
designed to test 
Comprehension and Production of the new term, "Mimbo. " The same rationale behind the 
construction of these tests is the one that was underlying the tests 
in Experiment I (see Ch. 
2, p. 62-68 for description). The same scoring procedure as 
in Experiment I --I for correct 
answers and 0 for wrong or no answers--was employed 
(see Ch. 2, p. 46-47 and p. 64-65). 
2233 
The child's performance was to be used as a criterion for his or her lexical entry for the 
novel term. 
Test 1. Sign Comprehension. 
The children were presented with the same test sample of plastic symbols used in 
the Encoding Phase and were asked to hand them over as named, such as: "Can you now 
hand me the Mimbo plate? " (see Photo 4.1, p. 228). The children were always asked for 
these objects in the same order: Mimbo, mouse, Gombe, bird. Pilot testing had shown that 
it was too confusing for the children and the experimenter to use randomisation of both 
plates and pictures for each child. Therefore the sarne order was used with all children in 
the first two tests. In Test I the children were required to comprehend which referent in the 
real world the novel term denotes. 
Test 2. Object Comprehension. 
The children were presented with a test sample of pictures that they had not seen 
before, but that were all mentioned in the story: the worm-like creature, Mimbo; the control 
referent, - Gombe; yellow irises; the mouse; and the bird. In addition, they were shown a 
picture of a fly, which had not been mentioned in the story. 
There was a blue Mimbo with blue and white eyes, size 127 mm. (w) x 135 mm. 
(h). There was a twig with three berries for Gombe in blue, red, and yellow, size 75 mm. 
(w) x 105 mm. (h). There was a brown mouse, size 102 mm. (h) x 83 mm. (w). There was a 
white, red, blue and yellow bird, size 186 mm. (h) x 140 mm. (w). There was a yellow iris 
with some red in it, size 186 mm. (h) x 132 mm. (w), and a black, grey and blue 
fly with 
green and blue eyes, size 75 mm. (w) x 105 mm. (h) (see Photos 4.2,4.3, p. 
229-230). This 
test of comprehension and denotation was similar to Test 1. 
I had hoped to be able to conduct the Test Phase identically for all children and to 
present the five tests singly to each child. However, as the experiment proceeded, 
I reallsed 
that I had to follow the flow of the children's needs. The whole story and 
design was 
clearly very complex for many children. 
Therefore, I had to incorporate prompts and 
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encouragements in the Encoding and Test Phase and allow scope for communication to 
take place between the experimenter and the child. 
Pilot testing had revealed that to spend too much time on a test with which the child 
had difficulties or felt threatened would distract his or her attention. The children's 
behaviour towards the test materials in Test I and Test 2 often indicated, for both young 
Indirects and Controls, that in order to gain the co-operation of the child and to keep on 
with the study the materials in Test 2, pictures had to be presented first. The blue plastic 
plates used in the Encoding Phase and Test I were lying on the table at the same time. All 
tests in the Test Phase were arranged in the same order for all children, except that there 
was the above-described flexibility in administrating the first two tests. Therefore, these 
first two tests should be regarded as pretests to the actual testing. Besides, this testing was 
not always consistent. The three later tests were administered the same for children of both 
conditions and both age groups. Thus, they provide less biased criteria of the children's 
understanding of the new term. Since the test sample of the blue plastic plates that was 
presented to the Indirects in the Encoding Phase was also presented in the first test of the 
Test Phase, half of the children in the total sample of 72 children, or 36 of them, were 
already familiar with these when it came to the Test Phase. 
Test 3. Production. 
The children were shown a layout of pictures of the same objects as in Test 2, 
together with a picture of the pixie, the elf, and the fairy queen mentioned in the story. The 
children were asked about each item by the experimenter: "Can you tell me the name of 
this one? " or I simply asked: "This is a" "this is a" leaving a silence 
for the children to 
fill with the proper word, as I showed each item. The pictures on the layout were the 
following: A Mimbo, a rainbow, a sunshine, a hen, a tree, a fly, an elf, a mouse, a pixie, a 
fairy queen, three Gombes, a yellow iris, and two mushrooms (see Photo 4.4, p. 
23 1). This 
test gives scope to tap the ability of the children to produce the new term,, to recall its 
name, and to compare their performance with their recognition 
in Tests I and 2. 
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Test 4. Depiction. 
The children were asked to draw a Mimbo. The experimenter asked: "Can you noxv 
draw me a picture of a Mimbo"I" Thus, the children were required to draw from memory 
and were only given the plates or the pictures to copy if they spontaneously asked for them. 
The test gives scope for children's procedural understanding of the new concept to 
manifest, and taps a different declarative, or expressive skill than the following test of 
Category. 
Test 5. Category. 
The children were asked what a Mimbo was, what they had drawn, and why they 
thought a Mimbo was that which they said. They had their drawing in front of them when 
they were asked: "Can you now tell me what a Mimbo is? " They were given a choice of 
sentences if they paused and could not answer directly and asked: "Do you think a Mimbo 
is an animal, a flower, a bird, or a stone? " Finally, if they could not answer directly or 
make use of the choices, they were asked what it looked like. And if they could not answer 
that, they were given the test sample of pictures that had been presented in Test 2 and 
asked to show the Mimbo, and then asked what it looked like. 
This test called for a declarative understanding of the sense of the new term. A brief 
questioning about the story followed. The children were asked if they recalled having heard 
about Mimbos in the story and in which context. Then they were asked about the irises, 
what they were, and if the colour of Nandi's eyes changed. Care was taken to watch for the 
children's spontaneous recalls of the new term. Finally, the children were told that in two 
weeks the experimenter would come back to show them more pictures from the story. The 
whole Encoding Phase and the Test Phase of Experiment 3 took normally about an hour. 
Posttest 
The Posttesting took place two weeks after the initial experiment. The children 
were presented with four tests. First the experimenter read a short story to them in which 
Mimbo, Gombe, and the pixie were spoken of (see Appendix C, p. C1 -0). The same 
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experimental materials that were presented In the Test Phase were presented again in the 
Posttesting. 
Test 1. Sign Comprehension 2. 
In Test 1, the children were presented with the plastic figures that had been 
presented in Test I in the Test Phase and were asked to hand them to the experimenter as 
requested (see Photo 4.1, p. 228). 
Test 2. Object Comprehension 2. 
The children were again shown the pictures that had been presented in Test 2 in the 
Test Phase and were asked to hand them over as the experimenter requested (see Photo 4.2, 
4.3., p. 229-230). 
Test 3. Production 2. 
The children were presented with the layout that had been presented to them in the 
production test in The Test Phase and were asked to name the pictures (see Photo 4.4, p. 
231). 
Test 4. Category 2. 
The children were asked what a Mimbo was and why they thought so. The 
experimenter asked, for example: "What do you think a Mimbo is? " Care was taken to 
watch out for spontaneous productions of the word in the children's recalls from the story. 
If the child hesitated and paused and could not answer directly, s/he was given the test 
sample of pictures from Test 2 in the Test Phase and asked to show which one was the 
Mimbo and was asked again: "What do you think a Mimbo is? " If s/he could not answer 
s/he was asked what a Mimbo looked like. 
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Photo 4.2. SaIllple Set of Pictures (Gombe. iris, Fly, MI mbo) 
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Photo 4.3. Sample Set of pictures (Mouse, Bird) 
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Photo 4.4. Sample Set of Picture-Layout (Butterfly, Deer, Kelaph, Spider) 
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In this section, I will discuss the data analysis for this experiment, first quantitatively and 
then qualitative ly/de scriptive ly. 
First, I must clarify important issues in the behaviour of the children in the 
Encoding Phase and in the Test Phase, on basis of which, adjustments in the coding of their 
responses had to be made. As the experimenter continued with the testing, children who 
were not eager to respond at first made some responses later. This was in line with 
Reynell's (1977,1983) expectancies. She had stressed the importance of continuing the 
presentation of test materials and the testing in order not to underscore the ability of young, 
unresponsive, or shy children. 
The testing required a great deal from the experimenter and the children. I spent 
time getting acquainted with the children before starting the experiment. In the sample 
there were children from the morning and afternoon nursery in Dunblane who had 
participated in Experiment 2 and had performed well. They also did well in the present 
experiment. However, there were children from other places with whom I had faulty testing 
sessions. Examples of these were children from the Killin Playgroup, where the testing 
circumstances were not good. I presented the experiment and tested the children in a 
narrow kitchen with noise from the main playroom next door or I tested them in a storage 
room with very little space. Sometimes mothers were in the room with their children, and 
that may have affected the children's performance. 
As expected, individual children showed qualitative variations towards the tests. 
For example, highly distractable and restless children appeared to find the drawing test, in 
which they were required to produce something themselves, easier than listening to the 
story and answering questions on the theme of the story, or to looking at the 
blue plastic 
plates and pictures. This was part of the hoped-for diagnostic values of the tests and was 
very likely a reflection of what happens normally in a standard test situation. 
Therefore, it 
was not possible to make a general rule about when to stop testing in cases 
in which the 
children- could not complete a whole test. I 
had to make adaptations of the experiment to 
the level of the understanding of each child. Had I carried on with the strict testing 
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procedure of always administering Test I first and separately, such a procedure would ha\'C 
been too complicated and confusing. It would have given a false picture of the true 
capabilities of young word-learriers and would clearly have led to the underscoring of their 
abilities. The 4-year-old Indirects and the 4-year-old Controls were hesitant to co-operate 
and to continue without the modifications of the design. The 5-year-old children had Test I 
and Test 2 administered in the correct order, and separately. They worked with the same 
number of test items as did the younger children; this was expected to counterbalance for 
the older age group the bias created by the flexibility in the administration of the first two 
tests for the younger age group. However, if the older children got completely stuck with 
the plates in Test 1, they were given the pictures from Test 2 and later asked about the 
plates. But there were fewer older children who needed this procedure--roughly 30% of the 
total sample. When the contamination of the two first tests for both ages and both 
conditions is estimated, to work with the pictures first did not necessarily indicate that the 
child had mapped the new term properly, by selecting the appropriate referent or picture. 
Rather, working with the pictures mainly served to relieve the child's anxiety. Even if 
many children showed interest in the plates, they were quite passive when they were asked 
about them, but responded quickly, although not necessarily correctly, when presented with 
the pictures. 
Use of pictures for young Indirect children in the Encoding Phase in Characteristics 
of Responses (see Table 4.4., p. 238) was reflected after the story section in which the 
"blue" Mimbo was mentioned. There was an increase in correct responses; the children 
may have made the instant connection between that which they 
heard and the blue picture 
of Mimbo with which they were presented in the Interval. The 
importance of auditory 
skills was also a clear factor. 
The Indirect children's use of pictures in the Encoding Phase was counterbalanced 
by allowing the Controls in Test I to see both the pictures and the plates and 
to choose 
with which ones to start. Also, the younger 
Controls had only four pictures In the Test 
Phase with which to work, the same four as some of the Indirects 
had had in the Encoding 
Phase: Mimbo, mouse, bird, and Gombe. When the Indirects worked with the pictures 
in 
Test 2, they had two pictures added to these four: the fly and the iris. 
This procedure 
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should have counterbalanced some of the bias stemming from having only four pictures for 
the young Indirects to work with in the four Intervals of the storý,. Also, to counterbalance 
the Indirects' acquaintance with the pictures, the Controls, who hesitated to answer. were 
asked. when they worked with the pictures and the plates: "Are you sure? " and were given 
second trials. 
My mistake in the initial design for the experiment was to standardise it in the Pilot 
Testing with very adept children from the Psychology Department Playgroup and from 
Balquhidder Primary, who did not experience the same problems as did some of the 
subjects. The need for the adjustments did not emerge at the Pilot stage. Another mistake 
was to regard the plates as similar to the signs used in Experiment 2. But the signs were 
picturesque outlines, caricatures of natural kind things with some features such as eyes, and 
with some details emphasised because of a white background coming through; whereas the 
blue plates were only solid shapes with outlines and with no contrasts between the outlines 
and the interior and could be taken to represent unspecified natural kinds in each 
conceptual domain. Thus, the plates showed a lack of features--features that may be needed 
for young children to make proper discriminations and conceptual mappings. Had there 
been eyes or other facial features on the animal plates, these features might have elicited a 
different reaction in the children. Besides, complex patterns or forms may be more 
interesting to young children than are simple, basic ones (cf Bryant, 1974). 
The scoring for the first two tests in the experiment is, therefore, grounded on more 
subjectively based circumstance than is the scoring in Experiment I and 
2. In Experiment 
3, the needs of each individual child were taken into account. The design was modified 
according to his or her behaviour towards test items, whether s/he was passive 
(pausing, 
and showing no co-operation, as often happened with the plates), or was active, 
enthusiastic, and motivated. The scoring in Test 1, 
Sign Comprehension, and Test 2, 
Object Comprehension is not based on a strict, objective criterion. I regard the two 
first 
tests, therefore, as Pretests to the actual testing that took place 
in Test 33, Production, Test 4, 
Depiction, Test 5, Category. 
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A Quantitative Analysis of the Data. 
The quantitative analysis of the data is based on calculations of the raw scores of I 
for correct answers and 0 for wrong or no answers. Various statistical tests have been run 
in order to arrive at the final analysis of the two main variables under study, Age and 
Intervention: Chi Squares, t-tests, mean tables, Anovas, and the Duncan Multiple Ranges 
Test. 
The tests of the experiment were designed so as to test for sense, denotation, and 
reference of the new term. The tests revealed that in Experiment 3 neither Age nor 
Condition reached significance levels. Some children reached full mapping of the new 
term--children in both age groups and in both conditions. The results from the Indirects and 
Controls were nearly homogenous in terms of quantitative products in Test 1, Sign 
Comprehension, and in Test 2, Object Comprehension. Both these tests were pretests to the 
real testing; there were 60 to 75% correct scores for all possible total scores for both ages. 
As mentioned earlier, children in both the conditions had access to pictures if they 
showed uncertainty towards the plates. Control children also were allowed second trials if 
they were hesitant and unsure. However, there were both young Indirect and Control 
children--roughly 30% of the sample--who went through the standard procedure of 
working first, and separately, with the plates and then with the pictures and did very well. 
Thus, I have included in this result section only the results from the three later tests of the 
Test Phase: Test -3,4, and 5. These tests were administered in the same manner to all 
children. Results from the first two tests can be seen in Appendix C, p. C 10 - 
The result section starts with tables showing characteristics of responses during the 
Encoding Phase, then patterns of within-children/between-children responses in the Test 
Phase are shown, followed by individual between-groups comparisons for the different 
tests together with a correlation matrix for the tests, and, finally, effects of age and 
condition on performance are presented. 
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Characteristics of Responses during Encoding 
In Table 4.4. (p. 238), the correct responses to the new term during the Encoding 
Phase are presented. It should be noted, however, that there were children in both age 
groups who did not try to give a symbol/object from the sample set over when asked for it 
by the name "Mimbo. " The labels "S I" to "S4" are category labels for the four sections of 
the story and "TI " labels the first test in the Test Phase. 
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Table 4.4. - Experiment 3 
Indirects - Correct Responses during Encoding. 
Age SI S2 S3 S4 Ti 
4 5 6 10 9 10 
5 8 9 9 7 8 
N=36 
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Patterns of Within-Children/Between-Children responses. 
In order that the patterns of within-children/between-children responses could be 
estimated, the raw scores were calculated as percentages of the possible total scores for 
each group, in which N= 18. Results from T3 (Production) and T4 (Depiction) are 
presented in the following bar graphs (p. 240-241). Results from T3 to T5 in the Test Phase 
can be seen in Table C. I.,, Appendix C, p. C5. As stated earlier, the first two tests in the 
Test Phase were treated as pretests to the actual testing. In these two tests, the correct 
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Individual Between-Groups Comparisons for the Tests in the Test Phase. 
The different tests reveal interesting age-related developmental ,,, ariations and the 
effects of different encoding procedures in the sample; by using individual between-groups 
comparisons') employing the Duncan Multiple Ranges Test, the significance in performance 
is confirmed between the conditions and between the ages for the various tests in the Test 
Phase. 
Test 3- Production. 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms no significant difference between the 
conditions, Control condition (M . 42) and Indirect condition (M .3 1) at the . 50 
level and no 
significant difference between age 5 (M . 44) and age 4 (M . 28) at the . 050 
level. 
Test 4- Depiction 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confinns no significant difference between the 
conditions, Indirect condition (M . 64), and the Control condition 
(M . 58) at the . 50 
level 
and no significant difference between age 5 (M. 69) and age 4 (M. 53) at the . 050 level. 
Test 5- Category. 
The Duncan Multiple Range Test confirms no significant difference between the 
conditions, Indirect condition (M . 53), and 
Control condition (M . 67) at the . 050 
level and 
no significant difference between age 5 (M . 64) and age 
4 (M .5 5) at the . 50 
level. 
(See Appendix C, Table C. 2., p. C7, for the means and STD for condition and age 
for TI -T5 with the Duncan Multiple Ranges 
Test). 
The following correlation matrix (See Table 4.5., P. 243) shows strong 
correlation among some of the tests: the strongest correlation among 
Test 4 (Depiction) 
and Test 5 (Category) (. 56**); then, among Test I (Sign 
Comprehension) and Test 2 
(Object Comprehension) (. 53**), and, finally, among Test 3 (Production) to Testl (Object 
Comprehension) (. 32*), and a similar correlation to Test 5 (Category) (. 32*) and Test 4 
(Depiction) (. 3o*). (See more in Discussion on the revelations of the tests, p. 275). 
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Table 4.5 
Correlation Matrix for the Tests in the Test Phase in Experiment 3. 
sm: xm 1.0000 . 5272** . 1252 . 1234 . 2743 
CEM'd . 5272** 1.0000 . 3244* . 2307 . 2080 
PJM . 1252 . 3244* 1.0000 . 3032* . 3226* 
. 1234 . 2307 . 3032* 1.0000 . 5648** 
cpfm; . Z743 . 2080 . 3226* . 5648** 1.0000 
N cf cesm: 72 2-tailed Sigaif: *- . 01 ** - . 001 
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Effects of Age and Condition on Performance. 
The following is Two-way Analysis of Variance (Two-way Anova) showing effects 
of Age and Condition on performance in the different tests in the Test Phase. Ano'va tables 
and mean tables for these tests are presented in Appendix C, Table C. 4., C. 5., p. C l_"-C 19. 
Test 3 (Production). 
Two-way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 5.6 performed better overall. In both age groups, subjects in the Control condition 
performed best. 
Test 4 (Depiction). 
Two-way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 5.6 performed better overall. In both age groups, the Indirect condition perfonned 
better. 
Test 5 (Category). 
Two-way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 5.6 performed better overall. In both age groups, the Control condition performed 
better. 
Combined Tests. 
The following are combined tests, the results of which have been calculated from 
the means of each of a given subtest (TI: Sign Comprehension, T2: Object 
Comprehension, T3: Production, T4: Depiction, and T5: Category) in the Test Phase (see 
p. 223-226 for a full description of the tests). The results of three such combined tests are 
presented here. These tests have been named Full Meaning, Comprehension, and Verbal 
Concept. It should be noted that the names of these combined tests indicate that in Full 
Meaning, a child who has all the subtests correct has worked out the full meaning of the 
new term as s/he has mastered both the comprehension and production of the new term; 
whereas a child who has one or more of the subtests wrong has only a partial meaning 
for 
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the new term. In Comprehension, the test of Production (T3) has been omitted. and as the 
remaining four tests are testing for comprehension and a blend of linguistic and 
nonlinguistic knowledge, a child who has all four of them correct can be granted with a 
general understanding of the new term and with some linguistic understanding --but not a 
full meaning yet--as s/he has difficulties in recalling it. ) a procedure that may 
be of a more 
semantic content than the one of understanding. Finally, the combined test of Verbal 
Concept is based on the results from the tests of Sign Comprehension (TI), Object 
Comprehension (T2) and Category (T5), all of which test for verbal comprehension. 
Full Meaning (Test 1- Test 5). 
Two-way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 5.6 performed better overall. In both age groups, the Control condition performed 
better. 
Comprehension (Test 1, Test 2, Test 4 and Test 5). 
Two-way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 5-. 6 performed better overall. In both tests, the Control condition performed better. 
Verbal Concept (Test 1, Test 2 and Test 5). 
Two-way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 4.4 performed better overall. In both age groups, the Control condition performed 
better. 
The following graphs (Fig. 4.3., 4.4,1 4.5., p. 246-248) present effects of age and 
condition on performance in Full Meaning (T I -T5), Comprehension (T I +T2+T4+T5) and 
Verbal Concept (T I +T2+T5). 
Results from the other tests and posttests, mean tables, Anovas and Duncan 
Multiple Ranges are in Appendix C Table C. 4., C. 5., p. CI 2-C 19. 
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Figure 4.3. Effects of Age and Condition on performance in Full Meaning 
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Figure 4.5. Effects of Age and Condition on performance in Verbal Concept 













A Qualitative Analysis of the Data. 
The sign/object relationship occurs in the course of mental development in children. 
It is thought to evolve in three stages: perception , imagination, and conception. Bruner 
(1964) has argued for the sequence of stages in the development of intelligence. He termed 
the stages enactive, iconic, and symbolic phases. In the enactive phase, the child knows the 
world through habitual actions that presuppose an active and direct contact with the world. 
in the iconic phase, a new form of representation is developed in the form of "Imagery": 
and in the symbolic phase, actions and images are translated into language. All these 
phases leave traces and have a dynamic interplay in the various phases of development 
through life. 
Krampen (199 1) maintains that perception is involved in the earlier phase of the 
sign/object relationship. Imagination and conception he labels together as "representation, " 
implying two later stages of that development. Krampen further maintains that at the level 
of perception, the sign (signifier) consists of sense data that are constituted by different 
views of, or contacts with, the same object. The object or the signified is the "constant 
object" seen from its various perspectives. At the level of imagination... the signifier is the 
symbolic representation of the mental image of an object, the signified is the interrialised 
imitation of the perceptual activity necessary for grasping an object in its complexity. At 
the level of conception, Krampen holds that the signifier is the sign, the verbal 
representation of objects or processes, and that the signified is the internal operation on 
symbolic objects constituted in classes or as spatial systems. He maintains that the final 
stage of development--conception-- and the two previous stages--perception and 
imagination--imply a high degree of abstraction. Donaldson (1978,1992) has argued that 
for children to grow from context embeddedness to decontextualisation in their thinking is 
a developmental process that takes time. 
I will now give descriptions of the main trends in the children's responses in the two 
conditions: the Indirect condition and the Control condition that were employed in 
Experiment I The idiosyncrasy of the children's responses was an outstanding feature in 
their data and so was the variety of coding schemas that they used in their mappings of the 
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meaning of the new word. As in the two earlier experiments. their natural heuristics for 
mapping new words seemed to involve two main processes: a) the tacit. instantaneous 
conceptual mappings of the underlying category of the new word and b) the subconscious 
connotations for the word in which comparisons to similar kinds seem to be based on 
memory for instances used as contextual determinants, such as saying: "It's all blue, " "It 
looks like a slug, " and "The bird ate it. " As the response patterns showed, there were 
children who adhered to a trial-and-error strategy when they dealt with the interferences of 
their conditions. Other children made use of learning opportunities provided by these same 
interferences and still other children relied on their linguistic skills and intuitions and 
overcame the difficulties of their situation. 
The Indirect condition. 
The Indirect children used a strategy of pre-emption if they knew three out of four 
referents and mapped the unknown word, "Mimbo, " to the unknown referent in the sample. 
Usually they knew only two referents and a strategy of pre-emption did not work for them. 
However, there were Indirect children who clearly learned from the opportunities provided 
by repeated encounters with the stimuli materials. There were strong individual differences 
in whether the opportunities were learning opportunities or sources of greater confusions, 
in which the children continued with their trial-and-error testing. The Indirect children 
were helped to set up a semantic frame when they were asked: "Can you now give me the 
Mimbo? " The children's own non-linguistic biases and predispositions that they brought 
with them to the task may have led them to pay little attention to explicit linguistic 
contrasts provided in the input. If the children felt, for example, that "Gombe" was an 
unfamiliar token of a type for which they had a name, they might have applied "Mimbo" to 
it. Thus, they would have ignored the information in the input for forming hypotheses 
about the meanings of the new word, "Mimbo. " The. worm-like creature may thus have 
been a familiar token of a type for which the children still had no name but their biases led 
them astray when they decided instead on "Gombe. " 
The context of a given study in which children hear a word, clearly makes a 
difference in their first hypotheses about the word. In the Indirect condition in Experiment 
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3, the children received practice In working out the extension of the new concept by 
providing the children with contacts with the stimuli materials throughout the experiment. 
The children's predispositions and preferences may have been a variable that interfered 
with their more idiosyncratic responses being eliminated in the course of their processing 
of the linguistic information of the story. 
The problem that the Indirects had may have been more of a semantic problem than 
a conceptual problem. More unknown names, such as "Mimbo" and "Gombe, )" may 
have 
created greater confusion than did the underlying conceptual categories for these two 
names. There were children who opted for Gombe over Mimbo if they failed to identify the 
unknown target referent by use of the linguistic information available and thereby made a 
semantic mistake. Thus the Indirects were trapped by compounding their real-world 
knowledge with their semantic knowledge. I think that the plates proved difficult for both 
conditions because they were not differentiated enough with identifiable features such as 
eyes. Furthermore, they did not look unfamiliar enough, so that the problem with Mimbo 
was a problem of dealing with synonyms. If the children felt that they already had a name 
for all the animals in the sample, including Mimbo, they were easily confused. Therefore, 
they may have adhered to a trial-and-error strategy with mismappings. The pictures 
possibly showed more unfamiliar-looking referents; therefore the children did not already 
have names for all the animals and were motivated to work with the pictures, even if they 
did not map the new name properly. 
Quite a few children in the 4-year age group got Mimbo right during the Encoding 
Phase. However, the stimulus material of the plastic plates was, as mentioned earlier, rather 
puzzling to many children. The most common mistake was to hand the experimenter 
Gombe when she asked for Mimbo and vice verse. There were also children who took the 
bird for Mimbo. The following is an example of Indirect testing from the experiment with 
Mark (age 3-9), who was tested with the word "Kelaph": 
Section 1. 
Points to the Kelaph 
Points to Gombe 
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Points to the mouse 
Points to the bird. 
Section 2. 
Points to the mouse 
Points to the Kelaph for the Gombe 
Points to the gombes for the Kelaph 
Points to the bird correctly. 
Section 3. 
Points straight to Gombe for the Kelaph. 
Points to the bird correctly 
Points to the mouse correctly 
Points to the Kelaphs for the Gombe. 
Section 4. 
Points to Gombe 
Points to bird 
Points to mouse 
Points to Kelaph, and says Kelaph at the same time. 
All correct. 
Test 1. 
E: One of these is a Kelaph, can you show me which one ? 
S: Shows it. 
Shows all others correctly. 
Test 2. 
Does them all correctly 
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Test 3. 
Says toadstool pairs for the gombes 
E: What can you do with them ? 
S: You just sit on the top and then it falls off, and if they fall off. old man grumble 
comes 
Names all items except the Kelaph, does not know, he says. 
Says now apples for the gombes. 
Test 4. 
E: Can you now draw me a Kelaph ? 
S: I could. Well, not really, he says after some thought. 
E: It doesn't have to be perfect. 
S: Yeah. Starts to draw and says as he draws: But they have heads and tails and now 
he hesitates. 
E: Can you try 
S: They have very big heads like that, he shows the E what he is drawing, then they 
have very big eyes. 
I could draw something else here, he says when he has finished. 
This one is a bit grabby and- dirty, he says when he has finished the picture and 
shows it to E. 
Test 5. 
E: Can you tell me what a Kelaph is? 
S: It looks like a worm. 
Posttest. 
Test 1. 
Points to the bird for the Gombe 
Points to the Kelaph correctly 
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Points to the mouse correctly 
When asked if he remembers where the Kelaphs lived, he says Kelaph in the sand. 
Test 2. 
All correctly except he mixes Kelaph and Gombe. 
Test 3. 
When first asked about the Kelaph, he is hesitant and he is shown the figures, but 
he looks over to the pictures, and takes the Kelaph one. Cannot say Kelaph and Gombe. 
Test 4. 
E: Can you tell me what a Kelaph is? 
S: It's a worm. 
Those children who never corrected themselves in the Encoding Phase tended to 
repeat their error through all the tests and posttests. There were children who were always 
mixing bird, Mimbo, and Gombe. They clearly went through a good deal of trial-and-error 
sorting. Some of these 4-year-old children were quite passive. However, they seemed to 
enjoy the story itself 
The 5-year-old children often thought aloud and used facial expressions when 
answering. They looked at the experimenter for approval or reassurance. The following is 
an example of Indirect testing with Catherine (5.2), who was tested on the word "Kelaph": 
Section 1. 
When asked about the Kelaph, she takes good time to look at all over and over 
again, that one, she then says, and shows Gombe. 
Bird 




She listens very attentively. 
Gives mouse correctly. 
Gombe, that one and gives Kelaph 
Kelaph, that one and gives Gombe 
Bird. 
Section 3. 
S: Kelaph, that one, she is now very quick as if she has made a sudden realisation and 
gives it correctly. 
Gives Bird correctly. 
Gives Gombe correctly. 
Gives Mouse correctly. 
Section 4. 
Mouse 
Kelaph for Gombe 
Bird 
Gombe for Kelaph. 
She listens very attentively to the story all the time. 
Test 1. 
Gives the Kelaph correctly, but is esitant. 
Gives mouse correctly. 
Gives Gombe correctly. 
Gives bird correctly. 
Test 2. 










A fly for Kelaph 
A tree 
Long pause for the fly, no response 




Long pause for the Gombe, no response 
Fairy 
Pause for Nandi 
Test 4. 
E: Can you now draw me a Kelaph ? 
S: Draws something red that could pass for the Gombe. A very well drawn picture. 
Test 5. 
E: What is a Kelaph ? 




That one, she says and shows the Kelaph immediately. 
Shows other items correctly. 
Test 2. 
Shows the flower all of a sudden for Kelaph. 
Bird 
Mouse 
Kelaph for Gombe 
Gombe for flower. 
Hesitates when it comes to the fly, was going to give it, looks at experimenter, but 
stops giving it. 
Test 3. 
Names all except Gombe and Kelaph. 
Test 4. 
E: What is a Kelaph ? 
Pause. 
E: Is it an animal, a bird, or a flower ? 
S: Flower, she then says. 
Like the younger children they usually make mismatches between either Mimbo 
and Gombe or Mimbo and bird and some confused all three. This was an error pattern that 
they tended to repeat in the tests later. There were children who realised their error and it 
became clear that if there had been recovery already in the Encoding Phase these children 
did well in the tests later. 
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The Control condition. 
In the Control condition, the new term was embedded in a continuous text and the 
infon-nation to the denotation of the term was indirect. If children in the Control condition 
knew very little of the topic of the story that gave the context for Mimbo, they faced 
difficulties in making the "bridging" inferences necessary to understand sentences 
assuming that knowledge. Pre-emption may have been a problem in this condition, since 
the children may have known what was occurring in the story without the need to make 
any inferences about the target word. They could make a global sense of the story situation 
without doing so. Then the problem of pre-emption might not arise at all, since the children 
could listen to the whole story without the need to objectify their thinking, so as to 
consider word-object pairing. Their responses reflected information that they had chosen 
and regarded as salient. By allowing a passage of time between the children's first 
encounter with the target word and their subsequent encounters, there was the likelihood 
that the time allowed resulted in the children's considerable modification of the retained 
information, with their more idiosyncratic responses being eliminated. Thus, the Control 
condition allowed continuity and a final global assessment after a unified presentation, 
with interfering questions only on the theme of the story. The Control children had more 
time to learn about subject matter, but not as much practice as did the Indirects in 
establishing reference. This deficit was reflected in the hesitations that the Controls had 
with the test materials when they saw them first. They had difficulties co-ordinating their 
information with the sample of referents with which they were presented in the Test Phase. 
In case of the youngest children, I felt that it was necessary to make adaptations in the 
testing to meet their level of understanding. Therefore, I gave some prompts to children in 
both age groups and conditions. I gave Controls encouragements such as: "Are you not 
sure? ", "Do you want to try again? " if they were hesitant when they were presented with 
the test materials in Test I and 2 and I related the questions to the story when I asked the 
children to hand over the Mimbo, by saying things like: "Mimbo, like the one in the story. " 
In the youngest age group in this condition there was much individual variation in 
listening abilities and attention. However, even with children who had to talk to the 
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experimenter or remark on something that they saw on the screen while the woman was 
reading the story, they seldom showed restlessness or started other activities. The 
following is an example of Control testing with Steven (age 3.10), who was tested on the 
word "Mikas": 
Section 1. 
When he comes over to the test room he remarks: Hey, that's Maureen and screams 
and points to the tape. (Maureen was the woman reading the story). 
E: Where did the little pixie, Nandi, in the story, live ? 
S: Pause. 
E: In a big forest ? 
S: Yes. 
E: Whom was he working for ? 
S: Pause. 
E: A fairy queen ? 
S: Yes. 
E: Did he pick berries, flowers, or mushrooms ? 
S: Flowers. 
Section 2. 
E: Did you hear what Nandi was worried about ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Was he worried about his eyes? 
S: Yeah. 
E: Do you remember what was wrong with his eyes ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Was one eye blue..? 
S: And one eye was brown, he adds and fills in the sentence. 
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Section 3. 
E: Did Wise Elf have a magic wand ? 
S: Yes. 
E: Did wise elf use his magic wand or say something strange ? 
S: Yeah. 
E: How did Nandi feel about that ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Bad ? 
S: Yeah. 
E: Did wise elf slam the door ? 
S: Yeah. 
Section 4. 
E: Did the fairy queen come to see Nandi in his sleep ? 
S: Yeah. 
E: What did she tell him ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Not to worry ? 
S: Yeah. 
E: Did Nandi sing ? 
S: Yeah. 
E: Did the fairy queen say something about his irises ? 
S: Yeah. 
E: What are the irises ? 
S: It's the eye. 
Test 1. 
He points to the Mimbo immediately. 
Other items correct. 
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Test 2. 
Which one is the Mimbo? 
That one, he says and points to bird. 
Mouse for Gombe 
Gombe for mouse 
Fly correctly. 
Mimbo for bird. 
Test 3. 
He recognises Mimbo but can't say the name 
A hen 
A man for the elf 
An apple for the flower 
Fairies for Gombe 
Don't know for fairy queen 
The boy that slams the door, points to the queen 
Grapes for the mushroom 
All other ones correct. 
He is asked again for the name of the Mimbo and he says now: a fairy. 
Test 4. 
E: Can you now draw me a Mimbo? 
S: I can't really. 
E: It does not have to look perfect. 
S: Now he starts to draw it. Draws a blue Mimbo. 
E: What is this? 
Pause. 
S: That's it, one eye blue, and one eye brown, he says. 
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Test 5. 
E: Can you now tell me what a Mimbo is? 
S: A worm. 
Posttesting. 
Test 1. 
E: Where is the Mimbo now ? 
S: My Mimbo is going to be a caterpillar, this one, points to it now correctly. 




Points to Fly correctly. 
Points to iris correctly. 
Points over to bird for the Mimbo. 
Points to Gombe correctly. 
I have never seen these, he remarks about the Gombe 
Mouse correct 
Mimbo is left, he realises something is wrong but does not correct it. 
Test 3. 
Says caterpillar for the Mimbo 
Says fly 
Says rat for mouse 
Don't know what it is, he says for the flower. It looks like a hen, he says for the 
flower 
cocadoodledoo for the bird 
Looks like a fly for the Gombe. 
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Other items correct. 
Test 4. 
What is a Mimbo? 
Pause. 
A worm. It looks like a caterpillar, he remarks when he sees the pictures. 
There were children who gained some global sense of the story but could not be 
very specific about events or the story line. Other children only answered with "Yes" or 
"No" and the experimenter sometimes had to simplify her questions to give these children a 
feeling of confidence. There were also children who did not report on anything in the story 
and paused every time they were asked a question. 
Some of the 5-year-old children could give a decent report on the story; others 
compensated with their own imagination when their memory failed; but most of the time 
their guesses were within the global sense of the story. The following is an example of 
Control testing with Patricia (age 5.9), who was tested with the word "Mimbo": 
Section 1. 
E: Where did Nandi live ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Did he live in a big field or a big wood? 
S: Wood. 
E: Was he picking something in the wood? 
S: Yes. 
E: Can you tell me what he was picking? 
S: Mushrooms. 
E: For whom was Nandi working? 
S: Pause. Can't remember. 
Section 2. 
E: Was there something strange with Nandi's eyes ? 
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S: Yeah. 
E: Can you tell me ? 
S: One was brown and one was blue. 
E: Did Nandi use his own magic wand to change his eyes ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Did he try to use it ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Did his blue eye stay blue or turn brown ? 
S: Stayed blue. 
Section 3. 
E: Did Nandi go somewhere for help ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Did he go to see wise elf ? 
S: Pause. 
E: Could wise elf change Nandi's blue eye? 
S: No. 
E: Did he say something about Nandi's irises? 
S: Yes. 
Section 4. 
She listens extremely attentive to the story all the time. 











Fly for Gombe 
Flower 
Gombe for fly 
Test 3. 
Almost all items correct except elf 
An old--? ( for elf ) 
An old man for elf. 
Mi- for Mimbo. 
Berries for Gombe 
E: Do you know the name of these berries ? 
S: No. 
Boy in the story for Nandi. 
E: Do you remember his name ? 
S: Yes. I can't remember. 
Test 4. 
E: Can you now draw me a Mimbo ? 
S: She starts to draw it immediately. 
She starts with the head and takes good care at drawing well. 
E: What is a Mimbo ? 
S: Pause. 
E: What does it look like? 
S: Like a caterpillar, she replies. 
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Test 5. 
E: Did you hear about the Mimbos in the story ? 
S: Yeah. 
E: Where did the Mimbos live ? 
S: A hedge, she says. 
E: Do you remember the colour of the Mimbos in the story ? 
S: Blue 
E: What did the Mimbos eat for example ? 
S: Leaves. 
E: What do the Mimbos look like? 
S: Look like a snail. 
E: Have you heard about Mimbos before ? 
S: Yeah, nods. 
E: Did you hear about Nandi's irises ? 
S: Yes. 
E: What are they used for ? 
S: Seeing. 




Shows the Mimbo immediately 
Other items correct. 
Test 2. 
Shows the Mimbo correctly and all other items. 
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Test 3. 
Says Mimbo clearly 
Mouse 
Bird 
Pause for Gombe. 
Test 4. 
E: What is a Mimbo ? 
S: A worm. 
E: Did Nandi's eye stay blue or turn brown? 
S: It stayed. 
The older Control children remembered more about main characters and events 
than did the younger Controls. These older children used much body language and often 
seemed to speak to themselves silently. 
Children in both the 4- and 5-year groups appeared to look to the experimenter for 
support and affirmative answers. They said, for example, "Don't you think? " "Isn't it? " and 
"What was he doing? " The last section of the story proved difficult for both these age 
groups; they tended to slip back and pause and did not all follow what was happening in 
the section. There were cases in which the experimenter had to stop the tape in the midst of 
the section and start the prologue to the Test Phase. This required allowing the children to 
handle the plates and pictures if necessary. 
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The Representational Ability of Young Children as Expressed in Drawings. 
I will finish this descriptive analysis with a short section on the drawings of the 
children in the experiment. There were drawings produced in the experiment, which I have 
included here (see Fig. 4.6., 4.7., 4.8., p. 271-273) that I find to be outstanding examples of 
the ability of young children to express their procedural knowledge in more detail than I 
would have thought them to be capable. The drawings were more symbolic than I had 
expected. However, I had predicted that even for such young children, to look initially at 
the plates and pictures and handling them would influence their motor copy of the referent. 
As stated in Thomas and Silk (1990, p. 34-39) Luquet (1927) has argued that 
behind the development of the drawings of children, was a tendency towards realism. He 
advanced a theory on the sequence of five phases in drawing development: scribbling (age 
2 to 3), fortuitous realism denoting the discovery of certain features of scribbles and 
objects in reality (age 3 to 4), failed realism entailing synthetic incapacity (age 4 to 5), 
intellectual realism., a stage in which children draw what they "know" about reality such as 
when they draw that which is inside a car as well as its outward looks (ages 5 to 8), and 
visual realism., a stage in which children draw that which is visible only from a certain 
point of view in reality, with a certain perspective (ages 8 to 12). 
Krampen (199 1) maintains that children's drawings issue from a mental image. He 
further maintains that this image is a particular form of signal coding and that it constitutes 
an assimilation rather than a copy, by being the result of a translation into a code that 
preserves the structure of the spatiotemporal pattern present in the stimulus object. Thus, 
Krampen argues that the process of signal transformation during perception is not at all 
conceived of as passive. He regards it as 'perceptive action, ' also involving effect or 
movements, such as hand movements while touching an object or eye movements 
following the outline of a figure. 
Krampen (199 1) maintains that the French psychologist Liliane Lurgat together 
with her coworker already in the late fifties had spoken of a "visual geometry, " including 
reading, writing, and geometry, in her hypothesis on the development of graphic activity. 
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Lurqat argued for the common origin of images in drawing and signs in writing, which 
would separate in the course of development (see Krampen, 1991, p. 47-48). 
Drawings, for Lurqat, in the sense of iconic representations of objects and scenes. 
are seen as being part of a more general graphic activity. This general graphic activitN,, 
comprises scribbling, early foreshadowings of writing, and the first attempts at drawing 
letters or writing. Graphic activity, even if a unitary activity at first, begins to split into two 
functions between the age of 4 and 5: symbolic (or iconic) representation and writing with 
conventional signs. According to her suggestions, the children in Experiment 3 should be 
at these stages (see Krampen, 199 1, p. 61-62 and p. 121-122). 
The same general effects of encoding on the drawings were noted in Experiment 3 
as in Experiment I and 2. There were more Indirects who were stimulus-bound in their 
drawings, or asked for the plates or pictures to copy, and there were individual differences 
in whether they asked for a plate or a picture to copy. The drawings of the Controls were 
not as stimulus-bound. There was a trend of less stimulus-bound drawings in their group as 
in the two earlier experiments. The Control children drew from memory more often than 
did the other subjects, and I think the reason they produced somewhat fewer drawings than 
did the Indirect children was because of the difficulty for children as young as four to draw 
from memory. 
The drawings were scored by the experimenter on the basis of how they looked and 
on the basis of what the child said about his or her drawing when they were producing it. 
Many children in the younger age group chatted aloud as they were making their picture. It 
is important to note that when the child was asked later what a Mimbo was, s/he was given 
choices if s/he could not answer such a direct question. If the children were still not able to 
answer, they were asked how Mimbo looked. There were children who had drawn a worm- 
like creature but who said something other than "worm" for Mimbo when asked to 
categorise it. There were also children who had drawn something other than a worm-like 
creature but could define or describe Mimbo properly. This shows that there was little 
contamination between the tests of Depiction (Test 4) and Category (Test 5). Therefore, it 
can be concluded that these two tests were tapping different underlying processes for 
understanding and different mechanisms in expression and declarative skill. 
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Overextension was another important variable in the children's depiction and 
category, as can be seen when they drew a worm-like creature with bird's legs. It is as if the 
children overextended the new term, Mimbo, to other animals such as the bird in their test 
sample. In other instances of overextension, children drew a won-n with wings and thus 
seemed to have been confused between Mimbo and the fly or the bird in their procedural 
knowledge of these referents. 
Conflicts between verbal and nonverbal levels may be revealed in Test 4 and Test 
5. Children who had worked out proper decontextualisation earlier in the Encoding Phase 
and earlier in the Test Phase for the meaning of the new term seldom showed this pattern in 
the two last tests. 
What I found interesting in the drawings of the younger age group was how much 
more content their drawings had than what is usually considered to be within the abilities 
of young children to draw in detail. Their drawings were symbolic and were not accurate 
icons of the real referent, as were the drawings of the older children. According to these 
productions, the younger children were clearly at the stage of caricatures or at a symbolic 
stage in their drawing representations (Kellogg, 1969; Lowenfeld & Brittain, 1975; 
Krampen, 1991). Performance styles in both age groups were highly idiosyncratic. 
However, a strong trend was seen in the drawings of the older children towards replicas of 
the test materials. 
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Figure 4.6. Examples of Drawings (Controls and Indirects - age 4, proper referents) 
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Age, the developmental variable in Experiment 3, was not predicted to have a strong effect 
on performance with the 4- and 5-year-old children who participated in the experiment. 
since general shifts in representational abilities were not expected until an older age. Also, 
children at these ages, have had little school experience and training in various knowledge 
domains. 
Subjects in a Control condition and the Indirect condition were expected to show 
similar trends in responding as they had in Experiment I and 2. Thus, Control children, 
who underwent a holistic encoding procedure, were expected to perform much better than 
the Indirect children, who had more encounters with the new referent, Mimbo, through 
indirect interventions in the Encoding Phase. Both these expectations were confinned in 
the experiment; the younger children performed even better than the older children in some 
cases. However, as I have explained earlier (see p. 232-235), the encoding and the testing 
for the younger age group was somewhat biased. This may have provided them with 
learning opportunities that raised their scores. Nevertheless, among the younger children 
there were extremely adept children who showed correct mappings for the meaning of the 
new term after their first encounter with it. These children kept that mapping. 
No significant differences existed between the three artificial words "Mimbo, " 
"Kelaph, " and "Mikas, " all standing for the same unknown, animal creature, and used as a 
variable in the story. Children performed slightly better with "Mimbo. " 
Revelations of the Tests. 
In Experiment 3 there were II children of the total sample of 72 children who had 
all the 5 tests of the Test Phase correct, and 20 children who had all the remaining 4 tests 
correct when the Test of Production (Test 3) had been omitted. As compared to the results 
of Experiment I for the youngest children these results are relatively good 
for the 4- and 5- 
year-old children who participated. The experiment shows a similar trend in responding to 
the comprehension and production tests as the two earlier experiments. 
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Two-Way Anova showed no significant main effects of Age and Condition for the 
combined score Full Meaning for all subtests in the Test Phase. Age group 5.6 performed 
better overall and subjects in both age groups perfon-ned better in the Control condition. As 
none of the two-way interactions between conditions and ages in all tests in the 
experiment were significant that may suggest a similarity of functioning at both age levels. 
One reason for not getting significant differences between the age groups may have been 
that in the younger age group there were extremely adept children from the playgroup of 
the Psychology Department of Stirling University. There were also very adept children 
from the morning and afternoon nursery in Dunblane who had participated in Experiment 2 
and were therefore familiar with the experimenter and this type of experimental design. 
The children from these two places raised the mean score for the younger age group. 
A strong correlation was found among some of the tests: the strongest correlation 
among Test 4 (Depiction) and Test 5 (Category) (. 56**) and among Test I (Sign 
Comprehension) and Test 2 (Obj ect Comprehension) (. 53* *). These tests clearly tap the 
interrelated functions of various psychological processes that are necessary for proper 
performance. Children who score highly overall score well in all these tests; the tests of 
Sign and Object Comprehension may be contaminated in the sense that they tap similar 
domains; however, little contamination may exist between the tests of Depiction and 
Category as they cover different domains, their correlation may indicate a similar ability in 
discerning elements however in two different domains--the one of linguistic competence, 
the other of graphic competence--similar to having a good logical reasoning ability, that 
helps, for example, in tests of some mathematical ability (but not necessarily in others), 
and in tests of linguistic ability. 
The story was somewhat complicated for the youngest children. However, all 
children showed much interest in the plates and pictures presented 
in the Encoding Phase 
to the Indirects and to children of both conditions in the Test Phase and in the Posttesting. 
The Control children in both age groups gave slightly better responses in producing the 
new word, which may have been related to their slightly 
higher scores in comprehension. 
There were Indirect children in both age groups who showed confusion on two or more 
names in the Production Test (Test 
31). 
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The unknown word stood for an unknown animal. Even if there were instances in 
which children confused the new word with a word that they already knew to represent a 
creature of a similar kind, there were many instances in which the children in both 
conditions and age groups treated the new word as standing for an unknown creature and 
thus showed correct mappings. 
Much individual variation was found among the responses of the children within 
the two age groups. These differences were more significant than were the differences 
between the age groups. Performance styles were highly idiosyncratic, as was reflected in 
the children's drawings of the worm-like creature. 
The drawings of the children were quite remarkable and showed more content and 
detail than could have been expected. The drawing test (Test 5) may have appealed to the 
emotive needs of the children by serving an expressive purpose and by giving the pleasure 
of creating a symbol world in which they could exercise more control than they had in the 
other tests. The drawings were clearly representations. As Thomas and Silk (1990) have 
said: "As a representation, we may try to understand it both as something related to natural 
perception, but also as a symbol which is interpreted as part of a symbol system" (p. 58). 
Whether one regards the drawings of the subjects as schema, as pictorial invariants 
of structure, or as visual concepts, is not important. The real issue is that their sets of marks 
on a flat surface elicited a perceptual response that is related to, but not identical with, 
perception of the real world (cf. Thomas & Silk, 1990). This perception was clearly related 
to the stimulus materials for some children, but for others it was related to imagery based 
on earlier perceptual experiences and memory. 
Restructuring. 
Children in the experiment were aware of the demand characteristics of their 
situation, which was reflected in the way they treated the Mimbo, the Gombe, the bird and 
the mouse. They took them to be nouns that denoted physical objects that satisfied some 
set of perceptual criteria. There were children who realised that Mimbo 
designated an 
animal and were able to incorporate it into the proper semantic domain. 
However, since 
there were two new words, "Mimbo, " and "Gombe, " the children's confusion about these 
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words could stem from: a) the children not identifying these words as proper members of 
semantic classes, and/or b) the conceptual organisation of the appropriate reference 
domains not being adequate. As Dockrell (198 1) maintained: "New words which are 
members of semantic classes that have not been firmly defined or that are themselves 111- 
defined are open not only to the ambiguity of the referential situation but also the 
ambiguity or possibly complete lack of conceptual organisation of the appropriate 
reference domain" (p. 178). 
According to Joos (1958), the meaning of a single term within text is restricted, "so 
that it means LESS IN EXTENSION, as philosophers say, and means MORE IN 
INTENSION" (p. 67). Thus, the connotations of words are vague in processing. When they 
listened to the story, the children may easily have gained the general sense that Mimbo 
looked like some won-n-creature, but the interferences may have hindered them from 
specifying this any further, and the needed restructuring did not take place. On the other 
hand, after having worked with the test materials a few times, the children could learn that 
they were always being asked about Mimbo, the mouse, Gombe, and the bird. Since they 
were more likely to be familiar with both the mouse and the bird, they were left to choose 
between Mimbo and Gombe. If this were the case and they chose Gombe over Mimbo, it 
could have been a semantic mistake,, rather than a conceptual one; they may have confused 
the words rather than the concepts. 
Certain non-linguistic intellectual capacities are necessary before any word learning 
takes place. In order to identify the intended referent of a word from nonverbal cues and to 
construct retainable representation of it via interferences, the word, and the association 
between the interferences and the word, the child must have enough attention, memory, 
social, and auditory skills. Undifferentiated procedural patterns of the young children may 
be a factor in their underattribution of features and properties attributed to the new referent. 
Inadequate knowledge about animals in general may account for some error 
responses, but as the children's conceptualisation of animals became more 
differentiated 
with gains in knowledge, there was the possibility of better-structured 
domains for each of 
the test referents and greater declarative skill. Although the animal properties were not 
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completely undifferentiated from each other in the responses of some children, increasing 
differentiation could be seen as a function of age and/or knowledge. 
One reason for improper mappings was that the children may have taken the task to 
be a task of dealing with synonyms. They may have felt that they had a name for both 
Mimbo and Gombe and for the bird and the mouse. The Mimbo and Gombe materials 
probably did not look strange enough to the children in order for them to require a new 
name. With more strange-looking materials than the ones employed, the problem of 
synonyms could be better circumvented in new designs. 
There was some strain placed on these children by the procedure of asking them 
direct metalinguistic questions, such as those in Test 5 (Category): "Can you now tell me 
what a Mimbo is? " When they were asked what the Mimbo looked like, many fared better. 
Both Experiment I and Experiment 2 had shown that children had difficulties answering 
such direct questions, even those that referred to words that they already knew. 
As had been the case in the two earlier experiments, there was a noted difference 
between comprehension and production, which does suggest different channelling modes. 
However, in the drawing test there were children who produced the new word 
spontaneously when the experimenter was not asking about it. These young ones were 
often difficult to test and often the experimenter had to simplify the questions. 
Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) have spoken of concepts as being the "coinage of 
thought". It has been argued that biological categories such as animal and plants are 
intrinsically well-defined. On the other hand, categories of objects created by humans 
(individual concepts) may be intrinsically fuzzy. Knowledge clearly plays a role in 
affecting which type of fuzzy representation is employed. Children may represent their 
knowledge about a set of items in terms of a fuzzy concept, whereas adults may employ 
well-structured feature lists. Conceptual categories such as "animal" or "car" are mentally 
represented in terms of the features that characterise these categories according to 
traditional feature analysis. Now, new important evidence seems to demonstrate that the 
specification of concepts by hard-and-fast rules is questionable; 
instead they could be 
specified by rules of thumb. by some sort of heuristics. 
The way people represent 
conceptual categories is affected 
by what they know (cf. Carey, 1985) in a given 
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knowledge domain. As concerns the development of biological concepts in children. their 
conception is likely to be much fuzzier than is the clear-cut, well-defined representation of 
an expert's list for the same concepts. 
Children are known to learn animal names early (Dockrell, 1981). Some full 
mappings were noticed and in other cases even if not having worked out the proper 
denotata, children's test responses indicated that they were working out the denotational 
boundaries for the new term, well on their way to completion. Whether pre-emption was at 
work influencing the child's ensuing mappings was questionable. These children tended to 
say: "Like a snail Like a worm, " "Like a caterpillar, " for Mimbo, but that may not be 
evidence for pre-emption; rather, the child may have chosen a familiar name because of the 
security it gave. Hearing the word six times in different sentential contexts clearly was a 
factor in proper mappings, as compared, for example, to scores for young children in 
Experiment 2, in which they had heard the new word in only three different sentential 
contexts. 
There were children who were trapped by compounding real-world knowledge with 
semantic knowledge and there were children who appeared to be constructing a store of 
knowledge relevant to Mimbo. They had explicitly and implicitly been told that the key 
items were things in nature and they seemed to be sensitive to these cues. 
Children in the study, especially the younger ones, adopted the strategy of saying 
that Mimbo looked like: "A worm, " "a caterpillar, " or "a slug, " rather than answering 
directly: "It's an animal. " By doing so, they seemed to prefer to categorise the new term at 
the same level as worms and slugs, instead of in terms of a superordinate "animal. " Thus, 
they avoided shifting between levels in a taxonomy. Even when they were given choices, 
there were many children who paused. Then there were others who said: "Mimbo is a 
worm, " and when asked what a worm was, they just said: "Worm. " 
There were children 
who said: "Mimbo is Mimbo" which was similar to concrete, unanalysed 
definitions for 
young children in Experiment I when they said: "Mika 
is Mika, " or for young children in 
Experiment 2 when they said: "Keila is Keila" and were not willing to specify any 
further. 
Those children who had mapped Mimbo early in the whole procedure were more 
likely to define it with the superordinate "animal, " and this was in line with results 
from 
279 
standard vocabulary tests such as those of Reynell (1976). Children who score high on 
vocabulary items tend to score high on conceptual superordinates. 
In the two earlier experiments for a similar test. Category, the children were 
required to demonstrate knowledge of the superordinate term in order to attain a correct 
score, by saying, for example, "Kelaph is a plant, " or "Mikas is metal. " If they said: "It 
looks like a daffodil, )" or "It looks like silver, " they were also required to say that a daffodil 
is a plant or that silver is a metal and to say that Kelaph and Mikas were the same as plants 
and metals, respectively. 
In the present experiment, the scoring for Test 5, Category, was not strict, as it was 
based on three types of response patterns: a) direct definitions (the children stated that 
"Mimbo is an animal, ") b) choices given by the experimenter: "Is a Mimbo an animal, a 
plant, a bird, or a stone? " or c) what the child said Mimbo looked like: "Looks like a 
worml" "Is a worm. " 
Although the same child might say: "slug, " "worm, )" "caterpillar, " when asked about 
Mimbo in the Test Phase and in the Posttesting but never say: "animal, " I am sure, 
nevertheless. ) that children of 4- to 5-years would have the word "animal" in their 
vocabularies. 
A different picture might have emerged if I had asked about the concept of 
"animal., " or the concept "alive" as Carey did (1985). But I was observing how the meaning 
of the word "Mimbo" evolved and how the underlying concept was related to the child's 
concepts of other animals that s/he knew. In a natural situation, if a child is exposed to a 
sample of all known animals except one and spontaneously asks about the one, s/he doesn't 
know, s/he will likely ask: "What sort of animal is this? " or "What animal is this? " rather 
than "What is this? " 
I tested this notion with a boy of 4.9 years who was playing with clay animals. In 
the sample there was a hen, a fox, a crocodile, a sheep, a donkey, a dog, and a llama (see 
Photo 415., p. 283, for a photo of the animals). He knew all the names except the one of the 
llama and asked: "What animal is this? " and was told that it was a llama. Shortly 
afterwards, when playing with the animals, he said: "This is a 
llama" spontaneously, as he 
showed me the llama. 
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It is possible that the children in Experiment _3' compared Mimbo to their prototype 
of worms and therefore defined it at the same level. In a natural circumstance. theY might 
ask: "What sort of worm is this? " for Mimbo rather than: "What sort of animal is this? " In 
the case of the llama, a different picture emerged, because there the child had many very 
different animals in the sample and the llama was not like any of them, the contrast 
between the animals was strong. The llama was different enough from the others to require 
a new category; whereas, in the experiment, the worm-like creature was not strange- 
looking enough for the children even to require a new name. The children could keep their 
"worm" or "slug" name without having problems in their processing of the meaning of the 
story or the setup of the tests. The new term may have been preempted, and, if so, the 
children may have had difficulty in accepting synonyms. 
Even if the worm-like creature looked somewhat exaggerated, it did not require a 
special name; the name was therefore redundant for the children. The children may have 
known, from earlier experiences with stories of this type, that the story figures tend to be 
exaggerated and take that exaggeration for granted. Therefore, a blue worm is not strange 
in such a story context. 
Carey (1985) has argued that even a young child may have deductive abilities to 
categorise new referents but not know how to use these consciously, or when. I agree with 
her analysis, on basis of the performance of the children when they were asked to define 
Mimbo. 
I think that the responses of the children when they said "like a slug" or "like a 
worm, " indicate that they based those definitions or descriptions on memory for instances 
of the new term and on their memories of other similar referents. They were not aware of 
working out the general rule for an animal concept. This happened in both Experiment 1, 
when the young children said: "It looks like silver, " "It is silver, " or "Mika is Mika, " or in 
Experiment 2, when they said, "Kelaph looks like a daffodil. " They based these 
descriptions on particular instances that seemed to be natural for them and they did not 
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give much thought to the process. They relied, in their attempts when asked to give 
definitions, on inductive abilities rather than deductive categorisations. 
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Photo 4.5. Sample Set of Clay Animals (Sheep, Dog, Fox, Donkey, Hen, Uama, Crocodile) 
: 7- 
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The Need for Interaction. 
Many of the young children in the experiment showed great enthusiasm, but were 
often difficult to test because their attention wandered somewhat. They often had to tell the 
experimenter about themselves, their families, and other matters of interest. It was clear in 
their data that a variety of coding schemes or strategies in focusing their attention on the 
target word in the Test Phase was used. Thus, a communicative need was a strong variable 
in their performance. 
Factors such as auditory skills, general IQ, and linguistic abilities were being 
incidentally tested in the study. The adaptive abilities of the children were required when 
they realised that they had to rely on themselves, that they were not going to get help from 
the experimenter. This lack of feedback may have inhibited their true capabilities as young 
word learners. Therefore the results should be looked at in the light of all these demands. 
When children are confronted with demanding academic tasks as they were in the 
experiment, their private speech has been found to increase (Berk, 1986; Bivens & Berk, 
1990). Their need for scaffolding is also known to increase in such situations. Vygotsky 
(1962) had maintained that private speech helps children to integrate language and thought. 
He had argued that what begins as personal speech gradually becomes, as the children 
grow older, internal thought. The type of personal speech that children most often use is 
"self-guiding, " taking on a guiding function in the form of self-answered questions. When 
young children are working on complex tasks, they are known to comment, for example, as 
follows: "Because this is where the spots are supposed to be, " or to use self-guiding 
comments such as: "Don't put this red colour there on the head. " 
The behaviour of the young children in Experiment 3 showed the need for 
expressive circumstances for such young children. The type of experimental setup was 
inhibiting since it did not provide any "scaffolding" between child and adult. (There was a 
lack of paraphrase of what the child said, which runs counter to the usual pattern of 
conversation between adults and young children). When children are told stories, they are 
often used to scaffolding; an adult or an older child "scaffolds" their retelling of the story, 
in order to help them achieve declarative understanding, which, although almost entirely 
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dependent on their prior knowledge, they might not otherwise have achieved (Bruner. 
1966; Light & Butterworth, 1992). This lack of scaffolding and retelling in the present 
study possibly decreased the confidence of the children and their fluency in demonstrating 
their knowledge. Thus, the conative or affective needs of the children. needs that Wemer 
(1948,1950,1954) has argued are important for language acquisition, are suppressed in 
this type of study, together with their cognitive needs. 
The children relied on guidance and direction from the experimenter before they 
could function independently. In a natural circumstance, when an adult provides assistance 
necessary to carry out a new task, children can structure their efforts in the same way as the 
adult, and thereby create a framework within which to guide their efforts, at times with the 
assistance of private speech. 
It was natural for the 4- to 5-year-old children under study to be verbally active 
while solving problems and completing tasks. By being attentive to the private speech of 
the children, the experimenter could have asked them the same kinds of questions that they 
were asking in their private speech, in order to help them solve their problem. However, 
according to the experimental paradigm, such interference was not allowed. It is known 
that this type of help is needed in ordinary circumstances when the children receive 
guidance on tasks that are at the edge of their abilities and experience and are co-ordinated 
with their current level of development. Griffiths (1986) has argued for an interactional 
theory of language acquisition, and contends that the child is not engaged in "... a lonely 
task of acquiring a stock of meaningful adult expressions. Rather, the child and adult are 




What I am arguing is that speec , which Joos (1952.1958) has defined as communication, 
is a variable entering language acquisition. The lack of emphasis on the speech of the 
children in Experiment 3, and the lack of an affective tie with an adult communicator was a 
lamentable factor for many children. Therefore, the type of setup employed, together with 
the faults of the design and the biases of the administration of Test I and 2 may not have 
given a proper reflection of a young word learner's ability to decipher language. 
Nevertheless, Experiment 3 provided support for the basic implications of 
Experiment I and 2--namely that even with younger children, rich and complex knowledge 
of linguistic material can be obtained in the Control condition independently of overt, 
conscious strategies for acquisition. These children, even if not having the learning 
opportunities of the Indirect children, still processed information from the linguistic 
material that helped them encode the meaning of the new term. 
The shortcomings of the experimental setting that was employed with the two age 
groups showed that there is a need to create situations in which children feel free to express 
themselves. The experiment also showed the need to use a shorter story. Generally 
speaking, there is a need to create a less strenuous practice for the children. The results 
showed that interferences provided learning opportunities for many children, so that they 
could map the word properly when they were provided with the test sample of referents. I 
would argue that in a natural circurnstance, a repetition of the story would have provided 
enough support for proper mappings of the new term without the use of any test materials, 
or objects. It would be interesting, in a new experimental design, to run a somewhat shorter 
story twice with a Control group, without any interfering questions on the theme of the 
story, then to compare the learning products of the Controls with the learning products of 
an Indirect group that had interfering questions on test materials. 
In a new design, a different methodology, such as that of Experiment 1, in which I 
worked with more unknown materials and names for young children, would, perhaps, 
provide greater control over the linguistic and non-linguistic attribution towards the 
meaning of the new term, and from which Control children might benefit more than 
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Indirects would. However, I would expect children in both these conditions to come up 
with similar learning products, quantitatively speaking, because of their self-regulatory 
adaptations, taking place within the children, no matter which of the two conditions as it is 
clear that many children realised the nature of the task and that realisation is, perhaps, the 
important factor in proper deciphering (cf. Light & Butterworth, 1992, p. 16-18). Indeed, it 
was difficult to provide thorough incidental/intentional dichotomies in the two conditions 
that were employed. I strongly argue that a demand on explicitness in the Metalinguistic 
condition in the two earlier studies would be beyond the capacities of these young children 
and would mislead them and interfere with the needed restructuring. 
In natural circumstance, I would recommend "rich language" in order for verbal 
creativity and verbal intelligence to develop in the growing child. I argue that the growth of 
the creative skill behind language depends on the growth of imagination and the mental 
image. Pretence play in which words rather than objects are used, is a source of vocabulary 
growth in children. The depth of the understanding that children have and the intension of 
their underlying concepts or connotations is dependent upon a highly desirable skill for 
literacy and the growth of vocabulary. Bivens and Berk (1990) have contended that the 
language environment of children should be provided with elaborate and complex 
sentences as well as simple ones. By hearing text that is somewhat complex, the children 
get a chance to practice their linguistic skills when deciphering. They need to receive many 
and varied meaningful experiences in order to have a background from which to express 
themselves. This experience also gives them encouragement and support, which is 
necessary for their use of language. 
Bivens and Berk (1990) have argued for the functional significance of private 
speech. Accordingly, the early social speech of the child is global and multifunctional and 
gradually separates into two functionally specific types: speech used to communicate with 
others and speech directed at communicating with the self, as private speech 
branches off 
social speech it becomes thought that is spoken out loud--an externalised self-monitoring 
system that plans, directs, and controls behaviour. When the child successfully 
brings 
action under the control of her/his self-directed verbalisations, overt private speech 
diminishes and turns into inner speech or verbal thought: 
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... cross-sectional studies of the private speech of preschool and early 
elementary school children indicate that it follows an orderly developmental 
path, proceeding from task-irrelevant self-stimulating forms (e. g., word play 
and affect expression) to task-relevant externalised speech, and finally to the 
more internalised forms of muttering and lip tongue movement 0 990, p. 
444). 
In concluding, it can be stated that the context embeddedness of children's thinking 
(Donaldson, 1978,1992), as reflected in their drawings and in their attempts to categonse, 
was an established factor for children of both age groups and conditions. They clearly 
adhered to the practice of describing what the new referent looked like, compared to other 
animals they knew, instead of declaring directly what the new word meant. Such 
declarative practice seemed to be unnatural to them. But failure to demonstrate the skill 
does not necessarily confirm the fact that the children were incapable of such a skill. They 
may have had to be taught the skill or it may have been necessary to point out to them that 
that was the requirement. 
Many children overextended the target word to other animals such as the bird or the 
fly, indicating that their denotation of the term was not properly limited. The study did not 
give scope to estimate the precise criteria upon which each child settled for his or her 
mapping. Even if denotation had been mastered in some full mappings of the new term, as 
reflected in the test responses and in the restructuring between the Test Phase and the 
Posttesting, the extent to which it had been mastered can only be established in the context 





In this final chapter I discuss the results of the present experiments and the consequences 
of the probing techniques and what these tell about word use as compared to word 
meaning; also, I speak of the importance of the social dimension within which the child is 
functioning, and, lastly, of the applications of the results. 
Since many factors are operating concurrently the child when acquiring or 
understanding a word is required to synthesise meanings derived simultaneously from 
many sources (Crystal, 1971,1987). But the child seems to carry out this "vastly complex 
task" with great ease. John Lyons (1977a) has argued that a great deal of language is 
learned initially in an intuitive manner. He speculates on the topic of language acquisition 
as follows: 
The child learns the applicability of words, expressions and utterances in all 
sorts of situations of language use and his initial assumptions about the 
sense and denotation of the words he hears in utterances may be guided by 
more or less specific innate principles of categorization (p. 228). 
Similarly, Johnson-Laird (1985) has argued that "Indeed, you can never be 
completely conscious of how you exercise any mental skill" (p. 465). The division between 
conscious and unconscious processes is, he contends, the best available cue to the structure 
of the mind. In the work presented in this thesis, I have not attempted to define 
operationally the variables "conscious" "unconscious, " but feel sure, on basis of the 
general results, that reflecting back on language in a logical focused awareness is not the 
natural way for children to gain understanding of the meaning of new words, and that both 
"conscious and unaware knowledge" interlock in the deciphering of word meaning (cf. 
Joos, 1972). 
An important part of the studies is the noted tendency by the children to work 
eagerly on the tasks, and it leaves me to wonder if solving these tasks is motivated by their 
goals to learn new words or as Bruner has stressed "we come to love words. " 
Bruner 
(1964), for example. spoke of general regulatory mechanisms and self-regulatory abilities 
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in children and argued for a "principal creative ability, " relating it to the adjustment of 
needs and the function of the behaving child. Certainly, passion and emotive needs are 
some of the strong factors that account for the rapid learning that was seen to take place in 
the three experiments with children of 4 to 12 years. I am not, however, by stressing 
passion and needs, arguing for a conscious voluntary and purposive activity--the dilemma 
of consciousness is not solved here--but pointing out that consciousness is an issue entering 
language acquisition in children, and that the regulation and the restructuring that takes 
place in the growth of word meaning can be, on the one hand, based on "self-regulating of 
activity or systems, mechanisms which processing is not conscious, and, on the other hand, 
on processing that depends on the growth of personal awareness, the perception of the self 
in the world, and on self-regulating metarepresentations. 
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5.1. Results. 
The children in the studies were bombarded with many types of input and were required to 
synthesise information from various sources. According to Campbell (1979). we need to 
know much more about the structure of children's message representations and the rational 
processes available to them. He thinks that a dual representation might account for this 
synthesis; every structure might be presented differently at different levels. Causal criterion 
is, perhaps, represented phenically, but the heuristic identification procedure may be 
cr tic. YP 
In the three experiments, the children's "developing theories of the world" (cf. 
Carey, 1985) and their growing knowledge structure had much to do with the growth of the 
new natural kind term, the development of their rational processes as Campbell (above) 
suggests. The children were seen to make use of various information from both linguistic 
and non-linguistic contexts. 
Miller and Gildea (1987), in their experiment with American schoolchildren, in 
which they were estimating how the children learrit new names from sentential contexts, 
have argued that the word process becomes more complex over the school years, as 
children learn to read and write. Children, they argued, are quick to notice new words and 
to assign them to broad semantic categories, to the proper semantic field; thus, as 
suggested by Campbell (above) their heuristic identification takes place rapidly. They are 
able to keep such fields separate even before they know what the individual words mean. 
Asked the colour of something, they may respond with any colour they know, at random, 
but they never answer with the words "round" or "five" or "lunch. " However, a slower 
stage follows, one that entails working out the distinctions among words within a semantic 
category. A child who has correctly assigned red, green, yellow, and blue to the semantic 
field of colour terms still has to learn the differences between and the relations among 
those words. This stage takes much longer than the first and rapid stage and may never be 
completely finished; some adults correctly assign delphinium and calceolaria to the 
semantic field of flowering plant names but have not learned what plants the words denote 
and cannot identify the flowers on sight: "At any time many words will 
be in this 
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intermediate state in which they are known and categorised but still not distinguished from 
one another, " (p. 87). 
The tests in the three experiments were designed as assessment tools of the growth 
of word meaning in children. The tests were not intended to be "intelligence tests, " rather 
they were concerned with a range of functions. The total testing profile of each experiment 
included: a) language ability assessment, both comprehension and expression, b) verbal 
and imaginal coding, and c) general knowledge and IQ. The different tests reveal 
interesting individual variations in the sample and different testing profiles. The tests show 
much correlation among them, especially tests that were designed to test for verbal coding, 
comprehension, and general knowledge, and verbal tests correlate with tests of imaginal 
coding--high scores on verbal tests usually relate to good performance in the depicting 
tests--and tests that were designed for the production of the new tenn correlate with tests of 
comprehension and highly with tests that only test for categorisation, conceptual 
understanding and declarative skill based on the understanding of logical relationships 
between words in a taxonomy. These test results may indicate that the tests of production 
and of linguistic definitions better reflect true linguistic abilities than tests of 
comprehension, general knowledge, and imaginal coding which may be broader and cover 
a wider range of both linguistic and non-linguistic functions (see Ch. 2, p. 79-80 and p. 119- 
1203 Ch. 3, p. 166-167 and p. 197-198, and ChA, p. 242-243 and p. 274-275 on the 
correlation among the tests). Thus, tests of production and of definition may be better 
screening tests for linguistic abilities. In concluding with the value of the tests, I can state 
that the criteria of sense, reference, and denotation proved to be useful to tease apart each 
aspect of the word's meaning by working these out in different tests in the test batteries. 
Basically, it can be stated that the tests in Experiment I and the experimental setup 
resulted in the highest scores for the 3 experiments: in Experiment I there were 76 children 
of the total sample of 160 children who had all the 5 tests of the Test Phase correct, and 
123 children had all the remaining 4 tests correct when the Test of Production 
(Test 4) that 
proved the hardest had been omitted; in Experiment 2 there were 
32 children of the total 
sample of 192 children who had all the 6 tests of the Test 
Phase correct, and 63 children 
had all the remaining 5 tests correct when the Test of Production 
(Test -3 )) had 
been omitted, 
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and, finally, in Experiment 3 there were II children of the total sample of 72 children who 
had all the 5 tests of the Test Phase correct, and 20 children who had all the remaininu 4 
tests correct when the Test of Production (Test 3) had been omitted. Thus, the testing in the 
three experiments shows a striking difference between word meaning and word use in all 
age groups, that, again, may be a result of the probing techniques as the experimental 
designs gave more scope for the child's exposure to contexts including the new term and 
for his/her practise of the comprehension of the new term than for the practise of its 
production: in the Test Phase there were several more tests of Comprehension--both verbal 
and nonverbal--in each experiment than there were of Production, and, besides, the 
Encoding Phase mainly focused on Comprehension. 
Statistically, the results can be presented as follows: 
In Experiment 1, a Two-Way Anova showed significant main effects of Condition, 
E(3,144) = 3,43, p <. 05 and of Age, F(3.144) = 48.06,12 <. 001 for the combined score Full 
Meaning from all subtests in the Test Phase. Age group 11.6 performed best overall, 
particularly in the Metalinguistic and Indirect Conditions. However, age group 9.6 in the 
Indirect Condition performed better than did subjects in any other age group or condition. 
In Experiment 2, Two-Way Anova showed main effects of Age, F(3.180) 4.39, P 
=. 005 and of Condition, E(2.180) = 3.25, V <. 05 for the combined score Full Meaning from 
all subtests in the Test Phase. Age group 10.6 performed best overall and subjects in the 
Control condition gave better performance than did subjects in any other age group. 
In Experiment 3, Two-Way Anova showed no significant main effects of Age and 
Condition for the combined score Full Meaning for all subtests in the Test Phase. Age 
group 5.6 performed better overall and subjects in both age groups performed better in the 
Control condition. 
On basis of above, I would argue that the experiments have been so designed that 
they tested the competence that one wished to investigate in the Control condition. They all 
showed a similar trend: the Controls performed well and not worse than children in the 
Intervening Conditions and even better at times; the differences were seldom, however, 
statistically significant. This result is in line with earlier experiments with adults on the 
effects of encoding on performance, such as the experiments of Aveling (1911,1912), and 
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of Brooks (1978) in which there was not a significant statistical difference between the 
different conditions but a difference in the quality of the learning products. 
By using large samples, I have, if the rationale is correct, gained a proper 
distribution of what could be expected in the wider population. It should be pointed out, 
however, that the children in the three studies came from areas in mid-Scotland with high 
living standards and parental education. 
Children in the oldest age groups in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 were known to 
score above average on a standard vocabulary test of English that is administered yearly in 
Scotland to Primary 7 children before they enter high school. Also, the areas from which 
the children came have a high socio-economic status. Therefore, the type of sample that I 
employed may account for the high scores that subjects in the experiments attained. 
However, I would expect that the general testing profile would be similar but that the 
scores would be lower with a sample of children of lower socio-economic backgrounds 
related to a difference in ability associated with the different populations, patterns and rate 
of development of verbal skills may be different between the sample employed in this 
study and children in other parts of Scotland. These tests work well with gifted or highly 
talented children but may not work as well with a different sample. Also, because some of 
the same children participated in Experiment I and Experiment 2, and because a few 
children participated in all the three experiments, there were children who were quite 
experienced with the experimental design. 
Furthermore, many of these children have parents with high socio-economic status 
and education and have very likely gained superior skills through their family interactions, 
picking up invariants of the structured linguistic context. Thus, I argue for an interaction 
between ability and social variables; however, the results of the " high- scorers" in the 
studies may have to be looked at independently of their social background and the type of 
encoding that they underwent. Improved experimental designs that are more 
developmentally age-sensitive than the ones employed in the studies--the results show 
much individual variation--are needed in future experiments. 
It is clear from the Miller and Gildea (1987) experiment that children need time to 
learn to distinguish nuances, and should not be asked to use the new words in sentences 
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until this distinguishing has taken place. Miller and Gildea also stress the importance of 
motivating children to learn about the subject matter and of exposing them to new words 
within that context, reading to them over time in several sentential contexts, then testing 
them for recognition. As with the Control children in my own experiments, these 
researchers were aware of the difficulty that children may have in giving direct definitions 
when they are being tested for recognition or when they are making the needed bridging 
inferences between the information they already have and the exposures of the objects to 
which these new terms refer. 
Children are always coping with interferences and complex stimuli when 
processing language in real life, and, must, therefore, need flexible contextual abilities and 
creative insight thinking for the processing (see Ch. 1, p. 3 -8 and Ch. 5, p. 3 06-3 07 on Joos). 
The results of my experiments could be looked at in the light of the flexiblity of such 
contextual abilities and of insight thinking, no matter which type of interference was 
employed. An important finding was that the children did not stick to their error as much as 
predicted; instead they tried options. Rarely did a child score "0" throughout the studies. 
Rather than always repeating the same mistake, most children fluctuated between guesses, 
so that they attained some correct scores on some tests and some suddenly came to the 
proper solution that stayed with them. What emerged in the studies was the need of the 
younger children for more expressive circumstances in which the cursive act of thinking 
was brought forth: as in pretence play, in private speech, speech to oneself, in the form of 
self-cueing and self-guiding comments (Berk 1986; Bivens & Berk 1990). 
There was greater variation in knowledge among older children, but they were 
similar in thinking. If there were no differences among the groups one might ask if 
linguistic abilities create the variation. As stated above, the results of the different 
conditions often showed homogeneity of scores and learning but thequality of the learning 
from condition to condition was different. The differences between the conditions in many 
learning products were small. Rather, there were differences in emphasis such as the 
drawings of other things than the sample materials among Controls. There were more 
stimuli-bound drawings among Indirects. In the Control condition, there the questions 
asked by the experiment always made inferences about the theme of the story. It is not, 
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therefore, known whether the scores for Controls would have been higher if the children 
had processed the story with no such interferences and had then only been asked about the 
meaning of the new word after the whole story was finished. I would suggest such a 
procedure for further experimentation with Control children. 
With the results, one can ask if there were differences between the three natural 
kind terms. For example, was the animal name easier to learn than the metal or the plant 
name? The children were apt to guess that an unknown word such as "Mikas" referred to 
an unknown material, so that successful reference was established. Some children in all 
groups progressed from knowledge of reference to knowledge of denotation of the word, 
such as knowing the denotation of other similar metal names. The hierarchical network of 
the lexicon seemed to have evolved, even in the youngest children, to the stage that they 
were sensitive of the syntactic categorisation of the unknown term, that it was a natural 
kind concept. This hierarchical arrangement furnishes the mind with a multitude of 
associations or retrieval cues. If the children had gained sensitivity for the internal 
hierarchical structure of language relations to other words in the same semantic field, this 
retrieval probably started at a high level of abstraction and worked down to a more 
specialised level; if the initial reference was wrong, the children had difficulties recovering 
from blurred information. 
The children had repeated encounters with the new word in the different linguistic 
contexts. Their developing memory skills were well reflected in their gain in performance 
with age. The older children clearly demonstrated effects of schooling on memory skills. 
All the age groups showed a considerable power of recognition. Recall came later, it 
seems, as was reflected in the production of the new word and may have accounted for 
some of the differences between comprehension and production. The younger children 
used more reasoning of a primitive scientific sort, whereas the older children used 
considerably more sophisticated reasoning; they could alter or reconstruct their designs. 
However, what went against this ability was often their own self-caution and attempts at 
"logical" thinking. 
Thus, it is clear from these data, generally, that the development of the new term 
increased as afunction ofAge. The youngest children could not always deal With the 
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structure of the whole experimental set up and that biased their results relative to the results 
of the older children. Donaldson (1978) has warned that such an artificlal setup might go 
against the natural skills that young children have for processing language. 
Finally, these results provide support for Joos's idea (1948,1959,1962) that earlý' 
interference with the meaning of a new word when deciphering from a verbal context 
results in errors. However, recovery was possible for many children, if not guaranteed. 
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5.2. Consequences of the Probing Techniques. 
In the Experimental conditions, the manner of the input clearly affected the children's 
decoding of the new concept. However, children with very well-str-uctured conceptual 
knowledge and good vocabulary seemed to overcome the ambigultles of the Experlmental 
conditions and Age was not an important variable in their performances. 
The cognitive needs that children have when they must structure their newly 
acquired information and experience, together with an emotive need that motivates them to 
learn the meaning of an unknown word, were well expressed in the behaviours of all the 
age groups and within all conditions. This was in line with Wemer's (1948,1950,1954) 
arguments. He had argued that the primitive concept is not a specific and a stable one, but 
relative and shifting and shows a lack of proper polarity between the child's self and the 
world. He further argued that abstract concepts result from the sharpening of the polarity 
between the child's self and the world. These abstract concepts tend toward high stability 
and specificity and are expressed in a mature understanding and more sharply determined 
relations and logical deductions. 
When processing the new information, the children often seemed to rely upon a 
principle of cognitive relevance in the input. They picked up what was relevant in order to 
make a sensible whole rather than looking for pragmatic relevance in communication with 
the experimenter, who gave no feedback or support for their newly acquired notions. 
Therefore, many children learned early in the experimental process that they could not rely 
on information from the experimenter. Strategies in their decision making were clearly 
affected by the setup of the experiment and their use of conceptual knowledge. 
The Indirect Condition. 
The experimental setups in Experiment I and 2 appeared to be more appropriate for 
the older children, but beyond the competence of the youngest children. Presence of non- 
linguistic context was a significant variable in the performance of children in the Indirect 
conditions. The simultaneous processing of all the different aspects of the new word's 
meaning was, however, too much for many children, regardless of condition. 
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The experiments gave much insight into the designing of different stimuli materials. 
and how they adjusted to the requirements for unfamiliarity. It became clear in Experiment 
3, for example, that none of the materials was as strange looking as they should have been. 
There were not enough features on the blue plates that were employed, there was a lack of 
contrast. The pictures in the experiment had more features and more contrasts and there 
were contrasts in the colours in the pictures. Similar to Experiment 2, because of the nature 
of the linguistic contrasts provided in the story and the perceptual contrasts, many children 
may have interpreted the new terms as synonyms. In Experiment 3, the importance of 
features was well reflected in the drawings; the children tended to draw big eyes on the 
worm-like creature. The concept of flowerness, or animalness clearly played a part. In 
Experiment 2, since there were four different variations of each symbol type, these 
symbols provided more perspectives than did the blue, plastic plates in Experiment 3. It is 
possible also that the children did find complex patterns more interesting than the simple 
ones and were thus more motivated by the more complex materials in these two 
experiments. With linguistic and perceptual contrasts lacking in the two later experiments, 
some children may have taken the new words for synonyms for known words, so that with 
some children the problem of deductions did not arise. Children are known to be able to 
use superordinate names in other instances, such as in the Ilarna experiment in which the 
contrasts were sharply circumscribed in the sample. According to Carey (1985), worms do 
not come as close to animalness, or to the prototype animal, as do many of the other 
animals such as dogs or tigers that she employed in her study. 
When met with contrastive information in a restricted referential situation, such as 
in the Indirect condition, the children's knowledge of the referents in the test sample clearly 
helped them to create the denotational. boundaries for the new word. If their knowledge of 
two or more other referents was inadequate and if they were not leaning on the available 
linguistic information, this lack of clear structure in their situation created conflict for 
them. Taken as a whole, however, these data show strong evidence for the ability of the 
young word learner to map the new word to the proper semantic 
domain by using cues 
from: a) the linguistic information in the story, and b) the set frame of the stimuli sample. 
When the children were asked to hand over this or that object from the sample they were 
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sensitive that they were being asked about substances, plants, or animals, about natural 
kind objects. The protocols showed sensitivity for some sort of natural kind nominals. 
Sensitivity towards syntax proved to be strong from early in the experiments, 
sustaining the claim raised by Werrier and Kaplan (1950,1952) for a strong 
interdependence between grammar and meaning. The new terms, Mikas, Kelaph, and 
Mimbo clearly related to the children's general concepts of natural kind terms. The children 
spoke of features such as: "hard, " "shiny, " "gets dots, " "heavy/light, " and they attached 
colour to these natural kinds. Fast mappings, or short-lived alternative idiosyncratic 
hypotheses were common. A stronger feature, however, was the striving of the children 
towards the full mapping of the new term and their recovery of error. But recovery from 
error in the experimental conditions may have been a function of the children's general 
cognitive knowledge rather than a semantic acquisition. 
The Metalinguistic Condition. 
It was clear from the children's protocols, that their ability in the Metalinguistic 
conditions to integrate information from sentences about the meaning of the new word 
increased as a function of Age. There were gross individual differences noted in the 
inferential abilities of the children and different cognitive styles. However, even for the 
oldest Metalinguistic children, the co-ordination of information in an additive/subtractive 
manner was not natural to them--as when comparing their various definitions of the new 
word in order to estimate similarities in their definitions. The children used poorer access 
to that feasibility than could have been expected, even when they were given the choice. 
This lack of reasoning on the processed linguistic information supported Joos's idea (1972) 
that the meanings of words are processed instantaneously at a conceptual level and 
processed at tacit levels of understanding. And it also supported Denny's argument about 
the habits of our everyday thinking. Further, I would argue that evidence for the principle 
of lexical contrast or pre-emption--no two forms can mean the same thing--was established 
in the experiments. As their metalinguistic awareness grew with age, the children realised 
that two word forms could rarely mean the same thing. Thus, pre-emption was more 
300 
apparent in the younger children and was reflected in their production rather th III an in their 
comprehension of the new word. 
It was not possible to learn how the Metalinguistic children processed their 
information by simply asking them. If Joos's thesis is right, inferential skills for processing 
information from text do not result from autornatisation through conscious experience. 
There was difficulty in articulating children's knowledge of these processes and even when 
given the option, difficulties cropped up; the children found it strange to connect 
information through conscious reasoning. Thus, it seems that processing semantic 
infori-nation involves something more than (or something qualitatively different from) 
systematic relations between events and features, something more than associations, a 
holistic sensation the Gestalt nature of which is not easily tapped by questions aimed at 
specifying the process of the structuring and restructuring of the perceived whole. 
The demand on the children, even the older children, to be aware of the process of 
connecting semantic information from various sources of the linguistic context seemed 
often to run counter to their needed semantic reorganisation of coded information and their 
proper use of data bases, in order for the new concept to emerge. 
The Metalinguistic children gained familiarity with the interval testing and started 
creating expectancies; thus, they were not filling in the inferences as encoding proceeded 
but were figuring out the correct answer when the questions were asked. Thus, the process 
of making crucial inferences during their original auditory processing of the text and 
storing them in memory was blurred. When the Metalinguistic children were asked 
explicitly to give definitions of the word being processed, an element of stress or anxiety 
was clearly evoked in some of the younger children. However, in other children of that 
same age group, a sense of motivation appeared to be evoked. For the children in the oldest 
two groups, conscious strategies were evoked, such as their metalinguistic and 
metacognitive awareness. Nevertheless, these manipulations may have engaged the explicit 
system and elicited anxiety that was related to the poor performance of many children in 
combining information. The children were required to co-ordinate the new linguistic 
information with the previous responses in order to infer the appropriate denotation of the 
term. Thus, they may have been either helped or handicapped by having to make a series of 
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explicit responses. Their task appeared to be more a matter of problem solving than of 
mapping meaning onto words. Since I argue that, for example, the term "Mikas" in 
Experiment I was not preempted in the lexicon of the children, they were presented with 
information that could count as elaborative linkages or semantic extensions for them in 
learning the new word. If the new term was preempted, as may have been the case with 
Kelaph in Experim ent 2 and with Mimbo in Experiment 3, the children were translating 
or solving a problem. Thus, if the children already had a lexical entry for the natural kinds 
referred to, pre-emption was a variable. This hindered them in identifying the referent of 
the new term, similar to Clark's (1987) argument that children reject multiple labels for the 
same object. 
The Control Condition. 
Useful diagnostic pointers can be found in the pattern of scoring and the way in 
which the tests were conducted. For the Control condition, for example, it is important to 
state whether the children asked for second trials, or were offered second trials by the 
experimenter when they paused or were in doubt. Furthermore, the experiments reveal that 
bridging inferences are needed for the Control children. However, it is difficult to see how 
to solve that problem without violating, at the same time, the conceptual distinctions that 
are, according to Joos, made at tacit levels of understanding. 
In the present studies, relevant responses from Indirect children were predicted to 
be traceable to the physical characteristics of the target materials. Their protocols were 
expected to be more data-driven than were those of the Control children, as was well 
established in the data. Relevant responses from the Control children in the Test Phase 
were predicted to reflect some relevant information or contextual determinants that were 
not traced to the physical characteristics of the target material or object. These were 
responses based on experience and memory, and, as such, were based more on intensional 
criteria than on extensional criteria and were more conceptually driven. The memories may 
not have been the ones to which the Control children had conscious access. If these 
memories were available to consciousness, the Control children may not have realised it or 
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they may have been unable to see the importance of making the metacognitive assumption 
that the information was relevant to the lexical decisions required in the testing. 
The Control group was not as "ostensively bound" or as affected by the stimuli 
materials as were the experimental groups. Therefore, their responses had more semantic 
content. Also, when many processes were occurring simultaneously, the motivation of the 
children may have been in the direction of acquiring a new word rather than solving a 
particular task. 
It is clear that the Control children were able to acquire the abstract structure of the 
new term presented in the text under conditions in which the acquisition was unintentional. 
This knowledge can therefore be seen as having been obtained in the absence of conscious 
strategies used to acquire that specific knowledge. The lack of manipulation of the target 
word in the Control condition was shown to be maximally beneficial when it was 
representationally co-ordinated with the tacit knowledge derived from experience. The 
children's own store of knowledge actively contributed to the mapping of the meaning of 
the new word in the experiments. When decoding the story, the children brought their own 
experience to bear on what they heard, by filling gaps, by interpretation, and by 
deciphering from what was given in the text. 
The Control situation allowed continuity and a final global assessment after a 
unified presentation. The children were presented with a general picture allowing implicit 
connection of the word and its referent. There are strong grounds to suggest, on the basis of 
the Control data, under which conditions the acquisition of the new term was unintentional, 
that the "Control learner" can be described as an implicit learner who emerged from the 
training session with a tacit, valid knowledge base co-ordinate with the structure of the 
stimulus environment. 
Contextual information is sometimes described as top-down information and strong 
stimulus information as bottom-up information. What I would like to argue is that the 
children clearly made use of both bottom-up and top-down strategies in the special 
conditions with which each child was confronted, and that these strategies did co-ordinate, 
no matter which condition. Children must rely more on bottom-up processing than on top- 
down processing for most kinds of discourse to build an overall representation of the 
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meaning of what is being said. Repeated experience with structural representations such as 
the common format of a story allows generalisations about their structure to be formed. 
These structural representations enable children to engage in a good deal of toP-down 
processing in which their comprehension is guided by and partially controlled by their 
expectations of what is to come. What is retained is the underlying gist of the story, many 
details of the surface structure are lost. 
I argue that the Control learner depends more on top down processing than on 
bottom up processing, and, that, in order for the top down processing in his/her condition 
to take place repetition of subject matter that gives a sense of familiarity or acquaintance is 
needed. There was lack of repetition in the experiments of the subject matter and that lack 
may have been a factor affecting performance. 
There is the suggestion in my data that the bridging of inferential processes needed 
for the children were to some extent metarepresentative processes. Then there were 
variations among the children in the forming of these processes and their use. By 
metarepresentation, several factors are meant, such as: a) knowledge of one's other 
representations, b) knowledge of what other people know, and c) the ability to make 
inferences from these two former issues on statements in the world, or to reason 
counterfactually. 
I have argued for the incorporation of pretence play into new designs of language 
research, because pretence relates to the real world in a very strict sense; there is a form of 
early pretending related to the verbal mastery of language that may be due to the 
availability of a cursive way of thinking needed for children to shift from the procedural 
nature of their thinking to include major declarative components. Metarepresentations at a 
cursive level are expressed in pretence. 
Children are neither active nor static in the word-leaming process; they seem to act 
upon themselves and to change. As they grow in their awareness of own thoughts, that 
ing those thoughts by monitoring, guidi awareness is, in itself, a force capable of alteri 11 ing, 
and correcting them. Flavell (1972,1979,1986; cf Flavell & Wellman, 1977) had spoken 
of metaknowledge as gradually appearing in the course of the child's mental development 
and as one of the most distinctive features of the human intellect. Examples of this 
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awareness in children are when they realise that a fact should be checked before taken to be 
true, or the feeling that it would be well to make note of something that they might forget. 
Flavell has defined reflective access as thinking about one's own thinking. This does not 
mean that one is aware of one's processing, but rather to have access to the products of 
some of that processing and be able to represent these processes for oneself and others. 
In concluding on the consequences of the probing techniques, I must state, 
however, that another type of self-regulation affecting performance may have taken place 
in all the conditions for the children other than the self-regulating aspect of their growing 
metarepresentations, and that this other is some autonomic, self-regulating mechanism at 
tacit levels of their understanding--especially affective for automatic control in case of the 
Control condition: the child modifies his/her learning without being aware of the 
modification or even of the fact that h/she is learning a new word. 
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5.3. The Growth of Verbal Reasoning. 
Variables such as accessibility of knowledge, effects of age, and intervention are all 
affected by the child's experience in a particular domain. Where experience was less, 
bottom-up processing of information of an inductive nature was expected. Where 
experience was greater, top-down processing of a deductive nature was expected, drawing 
on the children's store of memory, abstraction, and imagination. Bottom-up processing is 
data-driven, so that the child is depending on the input to a much greater extent and it is 
presumed can týlerate less interferences. 
It was clear from these data that children used a variety of coding schemes or 
strategies in focusing their attention on the target in the testing. But as long as these 
strategies did not entail an inappropriate ruleformation, their impact was superficial. 
The children's tacit representation of rules was clearly idiosyncratic in various 
characteristics. This personalised aspect of induction routines was well established in the 
sample as a whole. 
Joos (1972) has spoken of the deciphering of unknown words as an "Aha" 
experience. The "Aha" experience has been equated with Insight thinking or creative 
thinking, and is described as follows: 
"The "aha" phenomenon is experienced when we are able to transcend the 
properties of the individual components that enter into and constitute a 
problem, and are suddenly able to organise the solution" (Notten-nan & 
Drewry, 1993, p. 107). 
It should be noted, however, that Joos also stressed that before that type of experience 
takes place, various struggles and confusions occur. He has demonstrated this struggle for 
the "Aha" with his own pain over deciphering the Middle High German word "Gelaetet. " 
Actually, this procedure is reminiscent of the theme of the Parzival story, from which the 
word is taken. The story tells of the pains that the hero suffers over himself and his 
circumstance in finding truth. At the time Parzival himself decides to surrender to the 
course of things and to truly have faith, the truth emerges unscheduled and in a natural 
0 
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The Parzival story surveys the relationship between the self and the world, for 
understanding to be revealed the hero must deal with himself in his total context and 
understand that relationship. That understanding is only brought forth when he surrenders 
to the whole and lets the pattern take the incidental course of action further--the least 
meaning is revealed. 
When the children in the present studies were learning tacitly, it was necessary for 
them to raise their knowledge to awareness by having to answer questions about the 
stimulus materials or when there were demands on expression of their meanings of the 
target words. Hence, in order for the children to increase their knowledge of the new terrn 
from context embeddedness to declarative understanding and expression, bridging 
inferences were needed, and the experimental designs that I employed may not have given 
proper scope for that. Therefore, I argue, that designs in which the cursive act of thinking 
is brought forth are needed in future research into language development in order to 
estimate children's declarative abilities. 
Einar Haugen (195 1) who has evaluated Joos's (1950) theory of language as a 
design, has pointed out that even if deduction is an important factor in all language designs, 
the ordinary language user must have another constant on which to base his or her 
linguistic intuitions and that this is the non-linguistic experience of things, events taking 
place in the wider context. Knowledge of extralinguistic patterning is thus thought to 
provide a base for the understanding of linguistic patterning. Pointing to objects and 
naming them and/or teaching children the definitions of words and pointing out the logical 
relationships between words in hierarchies, using ostensive definitions, may therefore be 
necessary as a stage in language development in young children. Besides, experience and 
exercise with a given word and familiarity with the context of its use are needed by the 
child in order to decipher the least meaning. 
Young children are often dominated and easily misled by perceptual appearance, 
whereas older children seem less bound by surface structure. This happened in my 
experiments with the Indirect children and also with children in the other conditions when 
working with the test sample materials. Older children had greater facility 
for solving 
problems, perhaps because of their ability to make use of symbolic transformation. 
During 
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Preschool and school-age years, integration of information increases from visual and verbal 
channels and can account for the superior performance of older children in the three 
studies. With growing age, the ideational content goes well beyond the concrete evidence. 
language gradually becomes the vehicle for thought, and verbal comprehension merges 
into higher intellectual processes, such as verbal reasoning. The evidence from the studies 
suggests that there is a close parallel between the age of the children and their ways of 
thinking and interpreting new words; also, the large sample should be representative of a 
group of children from the social backgrounds from which the subjects were selected; and 
the studies provide an evidence of the characteristic ways of interpretation and defining 
new words by children from age 4 to 12. 
The context sensitivity of reasoning gives way to a more generallsed understanding. 
Specific deductive explanations can be subsumed under more general, abstract, inclusive, 
or basic explanations. Deductive explanations are relatively independent of specific content 
or context and one can speculate if the inborn constraints Jackendoff (1983,1984) and 
McShane (199 1) argue for as part of the cognitive architecture are of a deductive nature; 
how else could a child realise that, when, for example, a new animal is named patas by an 
adult who points to it, the adult is speaking of the animal as a whole but not of a part of it 
such as its nose or its tail? Or how can the child, without deductions, know that some 
words denote substances and objects, i. e. nouns, whereas other words denote descriptive 
attributes, i. e. as adjectives do? There is, of course, no claim in these speculations for 
deliberate use of deductions in young children. 
Verbal reasoning grows as the child's concepts develop gradually and are 
continuously being modified by experience, and, when relations that, at first, were raw, 
procedurally-based relations, become progressively more informed and more sharply 
determined. The general characteristics of a proper definition of a word are that it should 
state the class to which an object belongs and the features that distinguish it from other 
objects in the class-, clearly, the definitions of many children failed to satisfý these criteria. 
The results from the tests in the studies suggest that children can show referential 
knowledge earlier (such as they show in the tests of comprehension, i. e. Object 
Comprehension and Sign Comprehension) than they can show conceptual understanding 
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(such as they show in the tests of Category and Interpretation, in direct metalinguistic 
questioning, and in Production). This may happen, not because their knowledge is so 
limited, but because their concepts are immature and/or because they don't understand what 
is required of them, as the task is not presented in terms that are meaningftil to them or this 
type of experimental approach is outside their experience so that they show less linguistic 
ability than they are endowed with. Also, as the perception of the child's self in the world 
relates to his/her function and adaptation for which concrete experience and the context of 
the immediacy of the task is necessary, the child, lacking the availability to relate to 
concrete experience and to a natural dialogue in the tests of Category, Interpretation, and 
Production, is unsure of his/her function and that again affects performance. 
The " high- scorers" in the studies were children who, regardless of condition, 
showed great sensitivity for syntax, had good working memories, and had the ability to 
find original solutions for the linguistic problems. These children appeared to have a strong 
intuitive sense and a trust in their own abilities, and were not easily misled. They had a 
strong sense of "thingumbob, " as James (1890) once said. 
Joos (1950) has argued for a distributional definition of word meaning. Haugen 
(195 1), who has evaluated Joos's thesis, has stressed the fact that the native speaker has 
learned to use the meaning of a word in substantially the same distribution as have other 
speakers of his or her language and that what s/he gives as the meaning is the replacement, 
a synonym or a ci rcurnlocation, which has approximately the same distribution in the 
language. According to Haugen, the point is that the speakers can do so only because they 
have a constant to which they may refer the question, namely their non-linguistic 
experience. Thus, an understanding of the rules of correspondence between linguistic and 
extralinguistic patterning is important. 
To sum up, then, in order for children to learn the meaning of a new word, they 
need to work out both the extension and the intension of the word. In the studies described 
here, there were several children who had worked out some aspects of the new word's 
meaning from contextual information, as was the case with the Controls or from stimulus 
infon-nation, as was the case with the Indirects. Some of these children failed to integrate 
their knowledge, but could still make do, and established only a vague understanding. They 
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were sensitive to syntax and to the word class in which the new word belonged. Jackendoff 
(1984) has developed the idea that once a language leamer has learned the meaning of the 
construction in question, the observed syntactic distribution will follow automaticaliv. He 
has argued for the importance of innate aspects of meaning in the very early stages of 
language acquisition that help shape the development of syntax. Lexical and grammatical 
generalisations are reflections, he maintains, of deeper generalisations rooted in the 
structure of cognition. He maintains that the language learner "Cannot acquire syntax 
without use of the correspondence rules: (s)/he must be independently guessing the 
meaning of utterances from context and putting it to use in determining syntax" (p. 5 1). 
Thus, the context-determined semantic interpretation of forms is not necessarily restricted 
to syntax. The etymology of many words shows that context-determined semantic 
interpretation of forms constitutes a basic mechanism for semantic change at the lexical 
level and is a basic factor in lexical reconstruction. It is clear, on basis of my results, that 
more work is needed within the field of both psychology and linguistics to clarify the 
relationship between linguistic and extralinguistic patteming-correspondence meaning- in 
order to learn about factors influencing the lexical reconstruction of children's 
vocabularies, and, that, designing approaches to tap the holistic nature of such 
reconstruction depends on an improved understanding of correspondence meaning. 
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5.4. Word Use as compared to Word Meaning. 
Striking differences between comprehension and production (see p. 29-3 )-294) were clearly 
established in all the age groups and between the conditions-Contol children usually 
performed worse in the tests of Production than did children in the intervening conditions. 
Even if children in the Control condition did not hear the word as often as did children in 
the other conditions, all children heard it the same number of times in the Test Phase. 
Children who had all tests of word meaning correct except for the production tests must 
have understood the meaning of the new term. Therefore, it cannot be said that what they 
were lacking was meaning in Production. Also, the test sample of objects employed in 
Production was a sample of the same objects employed in Comprehension and should 
therefore have been more familiar to the children. Thus, the differences could not either be 
related to the test sample of objects employed. 
In conclusion, it can be stated, that the differences in performance on tests of 
comprehension and production could be: a) related to recognition for comprehending the 
meaning of the new word, which came earlier in all the age groups than the needed recall 
for production of the new word, and b) to the influence of the probing techniques--the 
experimental designs gave more scope in both the Encoding Phase and in the Test phase 
for the practise of the new term's comprehension than for its production as there were 
several more questions and tests for comprehension--verbal and nonverbal--than there were 
for production. 
Dockrell (198 1) had argued that the relationship between comprehension and 
production is not always systematic--it will depend on the conditions in which children 
encounter the new word and on their semantic competence--and--on the extent to which 
alternative labels are present in their vocabulary. She further argues that this contention is 
different from stating that comprehension and production are inherently not related. 
Dockrell has argued that the production and comprehension of terms of reference 
would Imply an underlying organisational process capable of guiding the application of a 
given word to an assortment of objects and actions. It is this categorisation process. which 
objectively manifests itself in children's actual choice of denotata 
for a given word. that 
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constitutes the basis of a theory of the development of word meaning. Thus we must ask 
what criteria children use for restricting and extending the denotation of a new term. In 
turn, what relationship eventually holds between the various denotata such that they form a 
coherent whole, a concept? Researchers have usually ascertained the relationship between 
errors in production and in comprehension, rather than attempting to describe the 
intensional bases for these errors (Anglin, 1977,1978). When children use familiar words 
such as "animal" or "cat" properly in many contexts, they still may have an immature 
understanding of these words. For instance, a child might call a cow "cat" or say "Rufus is 
not an animal; he is a cat. " (See Ch. 2, p. 27-28 on Comprehension and Production). 
Overextensions in production were noted in the studies. They have been explained 
in many ways (Rescorla, 1980). The overextension of words during production can be seen 
as a communicative strategy. Bloom (1973) has maintained that productive overextensions 
arise because of limitations in vocabulary. If children do not know the proper term 
required, they may use some word related to it in meaning. Thus they may rely on relation 
in meaning that is possibly based on perceptual or functional criteria or on degree of 
similarity to a prototype. They might, for instance, say "silver" for "Mikas, " "daffodil" for 
"Kelaph, " or "caterpillar" for "Mimbo. " 
It should be noted that these mappings may not be cases of pre-emption. Gentner 
(1978) has proposed that children prefer to use a word they know well, because it places 
them on surer ground. Perhaps a different set of strategies is implemented for production, 
as when children use general-purpose words where a lexical gap exists or extend words the 
denotational boundaries of which are vague. 
Huttenlocher (1974; Huttenlocher & Smiley, 1987) has argued that retrieval errors 
occur in labelling a referent. Whether an asymmetry really exists between the children's 
comprehension and production abilities is a much-disputed issue. Furthermore, evidence of 
comprehension may not be evidence of semantic knowledge. Children may have other 
strategies for understanding available to them so that what might at first be seen as 
comprehension of a lexical item, may, in reality, not involve semantic knowledge at all, i. e. 
children who are interpreting what is said to them are probably relying on pragmatic 
factors. intonation, and various nonverbal cues (Clark, Hutcheson & Van Buren 1974). 
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Studies involving comprehension are easier to design than are studies of production 
(Hoogenraad et al., 1978). Thus, experimental designs that have been made to elicit 
production have no guarantee of presenting the wanted data (cf. Thompson & Chapman's 
experiment, 1977). However, given that such an experimental design is successful, one 
must ensure that the equivalent knowledge is being tested in the comprehension task. 
During this task, the children must not have any alternative non-linguistic strategies with 
which to cope, that, however, was the case in the experimental designs of the present 
studies--the children were asked to name the materials or objects in the test sample. 
To surnmarise, then, children's understanding of the basic aspects of syntax is 
developed by 4 or 5 years of age. However, their pragmatic understanding is based largely 
upon context and upon the reading of clues about the speaker and the physical environment 
(Donaldson, 1978). When they seem to understand what is said to them, it is misleading to 
assume that they have acquired a specific level of language skill per s. They may be 
relying more heavily upon cues of other kinds than upon the intension that the speaker has 
for the words that have been spoken. The results of the 3 experiments indicate that the 
children had more correct responses to tests of comprehension than to tests of production, 
which may indicate the general difference established in other studies between 
comprehension and production, but may, also, indicate that the tests in the experiments that 
were of a semantic nature and really screened the linguistic ability of the children were the 
ones of production. 
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5.5. The Value of using Drawings in the Experiments. 
In the studies , information could 
be activated in memory that could be used to help retrieve 
the target word, but the children often did not have the metamemorial sophistication to use 
the information. The initial representational system of the child is procedural in nature and 
gradually shifts over the course of the preoperational period to one that includes major 
declarative components. Perceptual processing, of which I argue that language processing 
is one type, is largely procedural. Gradually, the child acquires the ability to access 
knowledge beyond the demands of the immediate procedural context. Mandler (1983, 
1984) pointed out that the simplest form of this increased accessibility is the ability to 
recall absent things, to locate an item in memory without any current perceptual support. 
Bruner (1964) has spoken of multiple access as the ability to move around freely in a 
representational system. However, as Vygotsky (1962) has pointed out, little is known 
about the course of freeing parts of procedures into generally accessible pieces of 
knowledge. Vygotsky has stressed the referential nature of language--how, as a symbol 
system, it is used to refer to other knowledge, and how concepts undergo the change from 
being natural concepts of daily life experience to the scientific concepts of taxonomic 
hierarchies based on logical deductions. Preoperational thinking depends on images--static 
imagery more than kinetic, presumably--but later becomes subordinate to and influenced 
by operational thought. The drawings used in the studies may be important in this regard 
for young children. Bruner has argued that a change occurs, around six to eight years of 
age in the child's representational system, as the child begins, spontaneously, to use more 
symbolically and linguistically based kinetic imagery. 
The use of drawings to tap understanding in the experiments proved to be extremely 
valuable. The drawing process involves planning, positioning, and alignment problems and 
is a complex task for the child. Freeman (1972) had criticised the lack of consideration 
for 
the children's performance factors involved when translating conceptual 
knowledge or a 
mental image into a recognisable representation or drawing, and 
has argued that this lack 
has led to the underestimation of children's knowledge. Freeman concluded that onlý' When 
one understands how children draw can one interpret what conceptions and 
feelings 
314 
drawings hide. Care must be taken when inferring knowledge and concepts from children's 
pictures; there are still many gaps in our understanding of their graphic intentions. Thomas 
and Silk (1990) have put it thus: 
Children in their drawings present different kinds of information. Earlý, 
drawings may be no more than symbolic representations of the genus to 
which the drawing topic belongs. Later drawings often display object- 
centred information about the structure of the object depicted and (where 
appropriate) about the structure of the array of objects in the scene. Viewer- 
centred depictions are typically produced more frequently by children older 
than seven years. Performance factors often play a crucial role in 
determining the information apparently presented and must be recognized in 
any adequate attempt to draw inferences about children's knowledge and the 
kinds of information that they consider it important to present in their 
drawing (p. 109). 
Thomas and Silk hold that art is characterised by three properties: repleteness, expression 
and composition. They have argued that even infants are sensitive to composition and that 
drawings made by young children are often more artistically appealing than drawings made 
by older children. The drawing artistry of young children was well reflected in the present 
experiments. 
Kellogg (1969) has suggested that all art can be understood as an independent 
visual order and that children, in their developmental process, proceed slowly from stage to 
stage and incorporate various sketches from earlier drawings, combining them in new ones. 
She further maintained that this developmental process is one of a logical, visual system 
and that the artistic action of children is based on visual thinking: they create different 
known gestalts, which in turn call into mind new gestalts. Kellogg has argued that children 
begin by receiving their ideas about structure from looking at their own scribbles. Her 
argument was that, for example, the first sun that children draw is not a symbol for the red 
sun in the natural world but that it stems from many types of line shapes that they have 
seen in their earlier scratch. 
Lowenfeld and Brittain (1975) have spoken of children's active knowledge that 
shows their understanding of the world and their interests. 
They have argued that this 
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knowledge is expressed in their drawings. They always draw what they know and what 
matters to them. Artistic expression is seen as an indivisible part of the overall 
development of children. Art in young children is seen as an unconscious self expression 
but within the span of development, older children learn to create art as an act without 
conscious forethought. Lowenfeld and Brittain have argued that children use material from 
their experiential background and that by interpreting and recreating it, they create "a ne\, N. 
and meaningful whole" in which they manifest how they think and feel and see. 
In the experiments, there were different developmental pathways of different 
individuals as well as the strategies shared by many. This is in line with the arguments put 
forth by Thomas and Silk. They pointed out that according to Gesell (1925), individual 
differences were related to a physiologicalibiological growth principle of each person 
within the limits of which much individual difference existed. I feel that Gesell's notions 
could be examined when evaluating the fact of individual differences and developmental 
diversity in the data from my three experiments. 
In their review of the literature on drawing development, Thomas and Silk 
maintained that there were three factors presented in children's pictures: a) their knowledge 
of the topic, b) their interpretation of what is important in the picture, and c) their capacity 
to draw what they know. They argued that pictures present information having enough in 
common with that provided by the perception of the real world for the children's immediate 
identification of the object depicted. Freeman (1987) maintained that the abilities of 
younger children to present information has heretofore been grossly underestimated. The 
drawings of the youngest children in my studies confirm his notion. 
There is still too little research probing the capabilities of children under the age of 
four to permit one to fill the gaps in the study of drawing development. There is some 
evidence now that even three-year-old children can create much more complex pictures 
than was previously thought (Thomas & Silk, 1990). This complexity was well established 
in my experiments with the drawings of the young children. Little has been done to 
investigate the drawings of children from their point of view and their thoughts about them. 
Asking them about their drawings could be a valuable tool in the study of language. 
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When children create a drawing, it may require considerable cognitive work--a 
complex achievement not merely requiring the projection of conceptual knowledge onto a 
sheet of paper. Arnheim (1969) believed thinking to be perceptual and argued that much 
thinking involved images and that pictures might facilitate thinking. Children's drawings. 
Arnheim argued, would have a helpful effect on their general cognitive development and 
help them solve particular problems. His notion is well supported by the data of the present 
experiments; the enjoyment with which the children experienced themselves in the drawing 
tests eased their communication and helped them reflect on their own thinking and doing. 
Paivio (197 1; Paivio & Csapo, 1973) has suggested that two forms of 
representations were employed for thinking: a verbal form and an imaginal code. 
Information, when coded, is either verbal or imaginal. The general conclusion is that 
drawing can facilitate thinking about ideas coded in images. Similarly, as was established 
by Vygotsky (1962), writing may facilitate thinking about ideas and information coded 
verbally, which often is the case with adults. Younger children may have more of their 
information coded imaginally; this is perhaps why the drawings were a better way for 
them to express themselves. Recently, Vygotsky's ideas on the value of drawings for 
development have been expressed thus: 
"Drawing marks the child's great discovery about symbols (both linguistic 
and non-linguistic ones)-about their potential to stand for the things as well 
as being things in their own right. This discovery leads to further 
development of abstract thinking, imagination and logical reasoning, since it 
allows children to perform a much wider range of operations within a 
system of symbols" (Lange-Kiittner & Thomas, 1995, p. 15 5). 
Vygotsky's ideas of the value of drawing were incorporated in the experimental designs of 
the present studies, and, as the data shows, the tests of drawing proved very valuable. 
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The Clinical Value of Drawings. 
The results of the developmental studies in this thesis can have implications for 
work, not only in the field of education, but also in the field of clinical disorders that are 
known to produce serious deficits in conscious, overt processes--what Campbell (1979) 
would terrn phenic processes. The fact of disjunct representations for a new word's 
meaning was well-established in these studies, especially in differences between tests of 
metalinguistic ability and direct definitions, as compared to tests of indirect measures such 
as those of drawings. Children's responses with these tests often showed disjunct 
representations; they might draw the referent properly but then categorise wrongly, or vice 
verse. 
Dora Black (cf. Black et al., 1993) has recently argued for the therapeutic value of 
drawings as channels through which repressive memories can be expressed. She speaks of 
the photographic memory of children and argues that their minds have the ability to absorb 
the details of a given situation without their awareness being focused on these aspects of 
their situation. Implicit learning seems to be a factor here, in a way similar to the leaming 
of the Control children in my Control conditions. In therapeutic work, as she has shown, 
drawings are of much value when working with children who have undergone repressed 
trauma. Black argues that children's conscious thinking and talk, what, according to 
Campbell (1979), can be termed the phenic aspect of mind, sometimes seems not to 
incorporate any disturbing memories of past traumatic events in the lives of these children. 
However, their drawings often reveal things that are very different from what they say or 
feel when they are confronted with direct questions. Thus, their drawings have revealed 
extremely traumatic scenes from their past. 
Drawings in this regard can be useful in personality assessment or in order to 
diagnose a psychological problem. Besides, expressive skills are fostered in such drawings 
as a means of emotional expression of a clinical, therapeutic value. 
The enjoyment with which many children in my studies produced their drawings 
was suggestive of the importance of their aesthetic needs, together with the importance and 
value that the young children had for visual thinking. On the other hand, since I 
did not 
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attempt an analysis of their construction processes in making their drawings, I can saY verY 
little about their strategies of representation. Also, I am careful in interpreting their 
presentation of information in the drawings. Instead, I would like to point out that this 
aspect could be elaborated and worked out in new designs. Bruner (1964,1966) stressed 
the effects of drawings and other forms of play in the development of early intelligence. In 
line with his argument, the success of the drawing tests may have been related to the ease 
of the situation that the children experienced. This scope for emotive ease and expression is 
of value when considering new designs for word learning in children, as it is clear from my 
data that several factors combine in the meaning of a new word for a child, also, giving 
direct definitions of word meanings in terms of logical relationships between words is not 
natural to the child, s/he may have much knowledge of the referent and drawing it may be 
the proper way to declare something about that knowledge. 
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5-6. The Social Dimension. 
Several authors have emphasised the communicative interaction between child and adult 
and the child's need for the adult to paraphrase that which s/he is trying to express in order 
for their language to grow. In the following a light is shed on some of these notions and the 
bearings they have for the data of the present experiments. 
Werrier and Kaplan (1950,1952) spoke of the difficulties that many of their 
subjects had had in their experiments in seeing the word as highly lexicalised and stable. 
Instead, the children perceived the lexical situation globally in which subjective and 
ob ective factors were not clearly differentiated. Donaldson (1992) argues that an objective j 
attitude is needed in order for children to grow beyond the context embeddedness of their 
thinking. This phenomenon was quite strongly reflected in many protocols in my 
experiments. There were children who did not make the needed metacognitive assumptions 
in order to raise the unaware familiarity that they had of the meanings of the new terms and 
thus to raise their knowledge to the level of declarative expression. I suggest that one of the 
following factors was needed for declarative understanding: a) scaffolding, or the retelling 
of that which the children thought about the story or the new words, b) second trials for the 
children to rethink the information they had; or c) designs that incorporated the opportunity 
for their private speech or their self-expression, such as, for example, pretence play 
situations. Thus, the children could use their natural resources in order to reflect on their 
own thinking or doing. 
Gordon Wells (I 986a) has stressed the needs of children and a respect for these 
needs in language interactions with them. Thus, in order to be a good language model for a 
child, the adult should be sensitive to the child's level of understanding, his or her needs 
and interests and show empathy and interest; if the adult interferes with the natural needs 
of the child to create language and to work with it in a personal way, the adult may hinder 
the needed restructuring of the child's knowledge and vocabulary. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1979,1986) has argued that it is never sufficient to ask when a 
particular linguistic category is mastered behaviourally by the child. She has argued that 
focus must be placed on the representation of the function that a category has initialINT and 
320 
the ways in which its functions evolve and change with time. She spoke of fundamental 
changes in children's underlying representations at eight years and beyond, when children 
start to cope abstractively with language. Then they reorganise the components of the 
"utterance grammar" they have mastered earlier, by age five, and acquire procedures for 
operating on spans of cohesively related utterances, thereby changing the functions of their 
earlier-mastered categories. She has argued that children treat the language they are hearing 
as a formal problem space. The results of the present studies showed a general growth in 
comprehension with age. 
Carey (198 5) has contended that concepts undergo change in the mind of the 
incumbent. However, the extension of a concept may not be subject to radical change, even 
if children initially seem to understand many concepts, but the knowledge structure of the 
concept is continually enriched and refined. How conceptual change takes place may, 
according to Carey, be determined by the beliefs that children hold about the process of 
other conceptual change as determined by the knowledge structure of their other concepts; 
the growth of knowledge having not only to do with the personal world of self but also 
with the interactions of the child with his/her social world.. 
A crucial factor in the studies was the asymmetry in status between the children and 
the experimenter. The children used certain words in a different sense than adults use them. 
The way in which the questions were presented may have influenced their answers in a 
special way. There were limitations to the children's technique and the intentional aspects 
may have been a problem of communication between the child interviewee and the adult 
interviewer (cf. Pikas, 1966); a lack of proper interaction and a lack of paraphrase of the 
child's language may have suppressed their natural heuristics in a way similar to what a 
formal instruction might do. Also, tiredness may have been a factor, given that children 
were faced with so many questions. However, it was clear that most children were not 
distracted by the experimental set up and were adaptive; more striving for the "Aha" was 
seen than had been expected. 
Bruner (1964) spoke of self-regulatory abilities in children and of their "principal 
activi ing systems. 
He 
creati ity" over and beyond the construction of abstracted cod, 
argued for the "principal creative activity" as the combination of 
the resultant of learning to 
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deal with needs in the establishment in behaviour of general regulatory systems. The needs 
of the children in my three experiments may have been underestimated. so that this natural 
self-regulatory ability became suppressed. Thus, a monitoring ability may exist in language 
acquisition that detects and corrects errors. The needs of the children may be important 
factors in their restructuring of the meaning of the new terms even if the restructuring 
happens initially at tacit levels. 
In a similar line of reasoning, Bruner (1983) has emphasised the social base of 
language learning in children, the importance of communicative interactions with adults 
and older children in social exchanges, such as in primitive forms of give and take play of 
objects during the first year. This type of conununication he has called the "language 
acquisition support system" (Lass). Chomsky (1973,1980,1986) spoke of the language 
acquisition device, the Lad that he took to be innate, an inborn tendency to learn the rules 
of language and to create and modify them). By the Lass, children learn various language 
formats that help them understand many aspects of language use long before they 
themselves can use language; to learn to exchange objects may later become a base for 
learning to take turns in conversations. Bruner argues for an interdependency of the Lad 
and the Lass, by which the child is enabled to participate in the language community and in 
the culture to which the language is a key. 
Werrier (1950) has stressed the importance of the cognitive and conative needs of 
children in their language acquisition. He distinguished between literal 12erce]2tiO , in 
which objects are perceived according to their objective geometrical -technical qualities, 
and physiognomic perception, in which objects are perceived through the motor and 
affective attitudes of the subject. He argued that affect may be a necessary prerequisite for 
accurate and rational cognition and that factors are effective in semantic change that are not 
rooted in the logical operations of thought. Thus, regulation of motive expression through 
concept formation should not be underestimated. The developmental aspects of phenomena 
such as expressive, symbolic processes underlying change of word meanings, and 
underlying melodies produced by 2.6-to-5-year-old children were studied 
by Werrier. who 
concluded that aesthetical aspects are very important 
for children. I think these aesthetical 
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needs of children should be studied further, in new designs that better tap the issue of 
language acquisition. 
Much regulatory activity takes place within the children themselves and among 
them in interaction with others in the course of language development. The communication 
interaction between parent and child happens In a variety of ways. Expressions used by the 
mother to refer to entities in the environment are understood by the child as references to 
just these entities and not to other, irrelevant entities. Input to the child is simplified, the 
parent talks slowly, uses shorter utterances, repeats key words, and uses a higher pitch 
(Trevarthen, 1977). The child identifies the units that make up the utterance, selectively 
attends to the stressed elements of the adult utterance, extracts the major content words, 
and largely ignores the rest. 
Catherine Snow (1987; Snow & Ferguson, 1977) has proposed that mothers of 
young infants speak to them about what is happening and what can be expected to happen 
long before the infants start to speak. She argues that this behaviour helps the infants to 
structure their world, to discriminate between events and different actions and to anticipate 
future events. She demonstrated that mothers of young infants believe their infants to be 
valid communicative partners, and that this belief has much to do with the growth of 
communicative skill and strengthening of language in their children. 
Other important interactive patterns of behavioural reference occur in the 
achievement of visual coorientation when the child follows another person's gaze-, those 
patterns also support linguistic reference. Both these regulatory activities emphasise the 
environmental support of non-linguistic patterning and the value of direct, ostensive 
definitions. The cognitive system of the child seems to be constrained to treat ostensive 
definitions as names for whole objects, otherwise the child might, for example refer to 
stripes on an animal's back, as a part of the whole animal. Thus, the child does not have to 




In sum, the results of the present studies should be looked at in the light of the lack 
of interaction and lack of paraphrase that the experimental setups gave rise to; these 
restrictions were necessary in order to run the studies as controlled experiments. 
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5-7. Applications of the Results. 
The application of the results of the studies is now described. I consider the main issues in 
this realm to be: a) the design and subsequent new designs b) the need for psychological 
insight when estimating the word definitions of children, and c) the applications of the tests 
and their implications for work in the educational and the clinical field. 
The Design and New Designs. 
One of the basic aims of the experimental designs was to develop understanding of 
how rich and complex knowledge would be obtained in the Control condition, independent 
of overt, conscious strategies for acquisition. With the Controls. ) it was clear that verbal 
context without non-linguistic support could be informative to the children, provided that 
the linguistic information was sufficient to specify the denotation of the term. At the same 
time, one must bear in mind that part-of-speech (here a natural-kind nominal) was a 
variable that must be considered in its own right when investigating the word-learning 
abilities of young children and when designing new approaches. 
For an understanding of the partial knowledge that the children gained in the 
different conditions employed in the three studies, understanding of both structural and 
metamemorial influences are important. Thus, the ability of the children to perform in 
these experiments is due to memories of prior experiences with the word, contextual 
determiners, and to information supplied by the language system. Durso (Durso & Shore, 
1991) has argued similarly. He maintains that: "savings of unrecognised words and 
semantic decisions about unknown words both appear to suggest that general constraint 
information is present in the memory trace" (p. 193). 
Dockrell (198 1) has stressed the point that children learn language and the meaning 
of new words often without direct instructions, through tacit restructurings taking place 
over time, which, she argues, the young word learner needs favourably without 
interferences. The experiments presented in this thesis are based on this hypothesis. A 
basic implication of the present experimental data is the question of bridging inferences, of 
the manner in which children raise to awareness the knowledge that they have of the 
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meanings of new words after enough time. Further, the data is suggestive of the 
contribution of such factors as repetition, auditory skills, private speech, cursive thinking. 
memory, personal will, and a notion of incidentally learning from interactions with the 
environment. These factors are the ones I would like to stress as being important when the 
children make the needed bridging inferences between their knowledge and the demands of 
the situation when probed for recognition of words and declarative skill, bearing in mind, 
that, private speech, according to Vygotsky (1962), both helps to relate the children to the 
social world by monitoring their activities and to relate them to their inner world of se4f 
and thus helps thought and language to fuse and become an integrated whole (cf. the 
experiment of Wykes & Johnson-Laird, 1977 and a description of it in Ch. 1, p. 12-14). 
Therefore, I regard it as important, with new designs in the line of research 
presented in this thesis, to create situations for children in which bridging inferences are 
made possible, together with controlled procedures for estimating these. This procedure 
would involve greater repetition of subject matter for Control subjects than was required in 
my studies and more availability of the cursive act of thinking and speech and self-cueing 
for young children than my designs allowed for. A procedure is needed that structures the 
child's situation to the extent that sufficient interaction with the adult and with the private 
world of the child is provided. This is the procedure that, I suggest, should be followed in 
future designs with my Control condition: repeated readings without any interferences. 
Until this is done, we will not have a fair comparison between the performance of Control 
children and Experimental children who often learnt from the interferences of their 
condition. 
The general implication from my studies is that, in the case of learning the 
meanings of new words from sentential contexts, children should be given enough time to 
learn about the subject matter. Words are best learned in their natural context, implying 
that they are acquired as a by-product of learning about subject matter. This subject matter 
must be introduced so as to evoke the interest of children and to help them correlate new 
knowledge with old knowledge. What has emerged from my experiments is that , in order 
to learn the intension of new words, children should be exposed to new words over a 
n several contexts without with the period of time, encountering them 
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processes of semantic reorganisation. Verbal intelligence based on accumulated knowledge 
is thus fostered. However, I do suggest that,: a) how children encode the meaning of the 
new word depends on whether they hear the story in which the word is embedded only 
once or two or three times, before being tested on it, and b) how they are tested on the 
meaning of the new word is important--whether, for example, they are tested once or twice 
or given second trials. Mandler (1983,1984) maintained that the more an individual 
knows about the subject matter being read, the more s/he can use his or her previously 
acquired knowledge in a top-down fashion to interpret new knowledge. For the children to 
know subject matter well may enable them in future designs to become "good guessers. " 
The children generally showed enthusiasm for the tasks in the experiments. They 
were involved in their tasks, so that the experimental manipulation was a natural part of the 
interaction. Of course the structured tests were not representative of natural word-leaming 
situations. Nevertheless, different types of encoding clearly affected the performance of the 
children. It may not have resulted in differences in learning scores but in differences in 
decoding and in the qualitative aspects of leaming. An example was the Control children's 
sensitivity for the intensions of the new words, as compared to the Experimental children's 
sensitivity for the extensions of the new words. 
Assessment and Psychological Insight. 
The children in the studies used many different forms of definition to explain the 
meaning of the new term, depending apparently on their knowledge of the word, their 
encodings, and their understanding of what was required of them. It is difficult to classify 
all these forms of definition; however, three broad classes can be discerned: a) definition 
based on emotional-tone or conational attitude--i. e. physiognomic--denoting ru imentary 
classifications that express commands or desires ("mum has a gold bracelet"; "bad bird 
named Popo"; "little creatures that grow"; "the bird ate it") b) definition based on a specific 
context and specific instances that associates meaning with a specific situation ("Its hard 
and the sun gets it hot"; "they used it to decorate with"), and c) definition that is generic in 
type and reveals a mature concept (per genus et differential) definition based on the 
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superordinate concept, the genus of the word ("its metal and metal is a mineral"; "it is a 
plant"). 
As Denny has argued, a habitual semantic use of words influences our lack of 
reflecting upon their conceptual meanings. Bums (195 8) has stressed the need to assess the 
word definitions of children, not only by a logical criterion, but also by a psychological 
criterion that is based on insight into the ways children think and adjust in the world. Bums 
(p. 38) takes as examples to illustrate his contention the following remarks from his 
vocabulary studies, the experimenter asks: "the accusation is unjust, " the child answers: 
"you accuse somebody when you say-you've done it; " experimenter: "the city corporation, " 
and the child says: "people to whom we pay rates and in return, they clean the streets; " and, 
experimenter: "he showed great friendliness, " and the child answers: "kindness to help. " 
Bums described this need for a psychological insight when assessing children's 
definitions in the following: 
Definitions at this level are, perhaps, evidence of a habitual use of the words 
in these situations rather than of any inability to deal with abstract concepts 
as such; and the apparent inability of older children to give adequate 
definitions of more complex concepts can be similarly explained. Often their 
acquaintance with a word is limited to two or three contexts, which is a very 
small basis for determining genus and species. In such cases, any definition 
that states or implies the generic relationship and exemplifies it in a 
particular way, would seem to be satisfactory, despite its logical limitations 
(p. 37-38)ý 
To sum up, children in all the age groups clearly found that using descriptions of 
the meanings of new words--by adhering to the contexts in which the words were learned 
and used--much more convenient than attempting to give special definitions--by declaring 
the logical relationships between concepts at different levels of hierarchical structure, such 
as saying: "Mikas is metal and metal is a mineral. " This was such a strong feature of the 
research that I would argue it is one of the basic results of the studies, and gives much 
support to Joos's ideas of connotations of words when deciphering text. Connotations are 
vague. 
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As I have stressed throughout the thesis, a balance is needed between the conscious 
overt and the unconscious covert that exists in a real situation. How that balance is 
achieved may be linked to the development of consciousness. in which the development of 
emotion may be as important as the development of intellectual modes. Donaldson (1992) 
has argued similarly and adds that if more concern was given to emotions and their role in 
development was respected, children could live a better life, and society, into which the 
child is initiated through language, would work better. 
Applications of the Tests and their Implications for Educational and Clinical Work. 
I believe that I now have strong grounds on which to argue that the tests designed 
for my experiments could be used in future practice as screening tests for linguistic skill, 
as they both tap verbal comprehension and visual imagery, assuming that language is not 
only based on logical relationships but on intuitive analogies as well. The tests could be 
used together with intelligence scales and tests of performance abilities. The results of each 
test in the three experiments could be used as a base to find which tests tap linguistic 
abilities best. I discovered the value of these designs as diagnostic and educational tools 
when I worked with children in the experiments who were known to have low linguistic 
abilities but better nonverbal abilities (according to standard IQ measures). In the sample, 
for example, there was a young boy of seven whom I knew. He had been diagnosed with 
speech and language-expression difficulties. He was confused on the tests that required 
direct metalinguistic answers but was always confident about his drawings and thus 
showing disjunct representations of the new term. If the drawing test had been omitted 
altogether his results had shown his hampered expressive ability, and, also a lack of 
comprehension, and therefore a biased testing profile of his comprehensive abilities. 
I consider the test of drawing an important tool to include in standard psychological 
testing procedures of cognitive and/or linguistic abilities; a tool that both facilitates 
communication with the child and gives a fairer estimate of his/her range of abilities and of 
the interrelatedness of their functions. (I have used such a testing procedure for some years 
now in educational psychology with Icelandic schoolchildren). 
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The functional separation of conscious and unconscious cognitive processing has 
recently emerged from the study of various patient populations. In cases such as amnesia. 
blindness, prospagnosia, and alexia there is now evidence for effective performance in the 
absence of awareness (Reber, 1989a). However, very few studies have as yet been 
conducted into the effects of implicit versus explicit leaming in the face of serious 
psychological and neurological disorders. Reber (I 989a) has maintained that older 
primitive systems in evolutionary biology are more resistant to physical insult than are 
newer, more complex systems and that these primitive systems should show greater 
resistance via implicit cognitive processes than should the explicit processes of the younger 
system. In a recent study, he and his co-worker have suggested (Abrams & Reber, 1989) 
that even the acquisition of knowledge is undiminished as long as the task is a 
nonreflective, nonconscious task. They worked with a mixed population of institutionalised 
depressives, schizophrenics, and alcoholics with organic brain damage in an implicit 
grammar learning task and an explicit short-term memory task. On the explicit memory 
task, the patients performed worse than a normal control group (similar to what can be said 
to have happened to the Metalinguistic children in the present studies); whereas the 
performances of the two groups were statistically indistinguishable on the implicit learning 
task. Actually, the results of the Indirect children in the present studies can be taken to 
indicate the resistance of the older evolutionary systems. As there were several children 
who overcame the interference effects of their condition and incidentally learned the 
meanings of the target words, there is the question if they were learning from the type of 
encoding that they underwent, or, more importantly, if their old and primitive systems (via 
which implicit cognitive processing took place) resisted change and survived the blur. 
I take the general good performance of the children in all conditions and in all age 
groups to indicate the existence of these older systems. I cannot relate that good 
performance only to learning opportunities and/or shortcomings of the experimental 
designs. 
I consider this work to have significance in the clinical field, both as a manner of 
studying consciousness in children and adults, and to give patients renewed faith in 
themselves and as a way to open for them the possibility of learning new adaptive 
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strategies and possibilities. To this, one can add Joos' (1972) remark that: "we never know 
how much we know after all" (P. 260). Whorf (1956) has pointed out the phenic and 
cryptic division of consciousness and how trapped people can become by phenic, habitual 
thought processes. He stated this as follows: 
In the understanding of a large linguistic pattern there is involved a. partial 
shift of focus away from the versatile psychic activity. Such understandings 
have even a therapeutic value. Many neuroses are simply the compulsive 
working over and over of word systems, from which the patient can be freed 
by showing him the process and pattern (p. 269). 
Whorf s example shows well the importance of raising to awareness erroneous thinking 
and, by doing so, opening up for new ways of leaming. 
Furthermore, new designs and tests based on them could be based also on other 
measures, such as reaction time and physiological measures. It would be interesting to run 
such tests on all the age groups studied in this thesis. 
The results of the studies may have implications in education in the field of reading. 
As the young children in the studies were not good at synthesising incidents and analytical, 
logical definitions were not natural to them, the question as to how subject matter is 
presented in text is important. Studies of children's narrative abilities (Berman & Slobin, 
1986; Peterson & McCabe, 1991) show a marked growth in such abilities between ages of 
five and nine, as measured by the length of their stories, their reference to major plotline 
components and by an increase in linking of events and experiences, in terms of temporal 
sequence and of causal relationships, and in the number and diversity of subordinate 
clauses. The stories of the youngest children are picture-dependent and do not have a 
global episodic structure whereas narratives by the older children have an overarching 
episodic structure and observable actions and events are explained in tenns of goals, 
motives, thoughts and emotions of the central story characters. 
On basis of the present experiments, I suggest that perceptual, artistic presentation 
based on sensory images rather than a logical, analytical presentation is likely to meet the 
level of the younger child's understanding and interest better (cf. Wells, 1986a). Phrases 
and expressions that convey visual images, experience and information, stories with a 
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series of actions, drama and poetry are more likely to help regulate the needs of children 
and to help structure their concepts and enhance the growth of their vocabulary. 




This thesis addressed the process of semantic development in children of 4 to 12 years. In 
particular, there were two emphases: a) the observation of developmental differences in 
children's acquisition of the meanings of unfamiliar words from linguistic contexts and b) 
the examination of the effects of experimental interventions on the lexical entries for these 
new words during continuous assessment. 
The present work has left me with an awareness for the contribution that the overall 
development of the children and their function in the areas of cognitive, emotional, and 
communicative achievements has for their developing word meanings. The functional role 
of the children's intrapersonal and interpersonal interactions is well reflected in their 
growing awareness of the subject/object relationship and the strife towards full meaning. 
Thus, one main conclusion is the light the studies shed on the processes of context 
embeddedness and decontextualization in the growing children and what these tell about 
the function of their minds in the various psychological and social aspects of the 
experiments. 
In order for the children to construe meaningful discourse in the experimental 
circumstances, they must participate in communication with the adult experimenter in a 
very constrained setting. Vygotsky (1962) had argued for the dynamic unity of many 
psychological processes and for a functional , interrelatedness 
between such processes as 
language development, writing, and drawing in a socio-cultural context. He had maintained 
that for the child to develop the ability to represent the world symbolically in 
decontextualised ways drawings make great contributions towards such development. The 
results confirm Vygotsky's notions and indicate the validity of the drawing tests for the 
children to master these demands and to perform at the level of their ability. These results 
have, therefore, great implications for new experimental designs, for standard 
psychological testing, and for educational practices as the), show that children can be 
supported to learn language, to comprehend and to express it by having at the same time 
access to their growing writing and drawing skills, and, that,: "these processes, each in its 
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own way, enhance the child's mastery of discursive communicative skills" (Lange-KUttner 
& Thomas, 1995, p. 153). 
Mastery of discursive communicative skills is linked to the sharpening of the 
polarity between the child's self and the world and to the process of decontextualization. As 
there was a lack of expressive settings--for speech, dialogue, cursive thinking and 
meaningful context--in the present experiments, the results may, however, show less abilm, 
than children of normal IQ have for learning language. 
Markova (199 1) has stressed the individual and societal development of knowledge 
and has pointed out that whatever stand one takes towards the evolution of concepts, they 
always develop in the enviromnent and/ or in the person's interaction in the social world: 
If universals are considered to be the basis for concepts rather than concepts 
themselves, then the question that needs attention is how this genetic 
endowment is actualized - i. e. how does the basis for a concept become a 
concept? In other words, what is the role of the individual's environment in 
this process? If, on the other hand, universals are considered to be concepts, 
it is their relationship with the knower's active involvement with the world 
that must be the subject of concern (p. 97). 
In agreement with Markova's argument, and, in concluding, defining words may be a 
process of learning about the social implications of a word; that, again, may be a result of 
the child's linguistic abilities, his/her experience and social being in the world. Function is 
a core issue here. 
At first, the young child tends to apprehend the word as dynamically related to and 
dependent on himself and embedded in the particular instances of the context. There is a 
noted lack of sharpening of the polarity between the young children and the world in the 
present studies--their word meanings are partial--but, more importantly, such performance 
of the children indicates that in natural settings these partial meanings would have adaptive 
value for the function of the children and convey enough clues to the proper word meaning 
to be understood by their communicative partners, the ability to make logical deductions, 
and mature significations based on the general, the universal, emerge at a later stage (cf 
Wemer, 1948). 
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The observed modes of thinking, conceptual i sing, feeling. and perceiving in the 
data represent phases in the children's developments of the meanings of the newwords, 
developments that may be linked to their consciousness and social growth as selves in the 
world. With such complex material as language (cf Brooks, 1978) children may early--and 
incidentally -- learn to rely on intuitive analogies and tacit self-regulatory mechanisms. 
Their personal linguistic intuitions about the meanings of words and their reading of 
contextual clues in the studies show that they are mostly within the proper semantic field in 
their guesses. The proper word meaning and the abiltiy to declare a full meaning definiton 
certainly take time to grow. However, the underlying and rapid heuristic identification of 
the new word meaning survives more blur and the children show more adaptation than I 
initially hypothesised. In order to function in the midst of competing stimuli such 
adaptation in language for the growing child is tenable. 
On basis of the results, the main notions of this thesis are confirmed, namely, that 
different phases are involved in the composition of a word within text, and in the 
deciphering of that composition from contextual to acontextual meaning. 
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Final Comments. 
It is clear to me, after working with so many children of different ages, that various phases 
of knowledge interact in lexical acquisition. 
What I would like to stress in conclusion is the fact that researchers are often not 
stating whether the skills they think children use in their deciphering of unknown words 
are cognitive skills or some other skills. Might they not just as well be skills of intuition, of 
intuitive analogies; of imagination? The matrices Joos (1972) spoke of, on which we must 
rely for inverse probabilities to reveal the least meaning of a word consistent with the 
context,, need not be deductive logical matrices--they might be intuitive matrices of the 
imagination (and of a cryptic nature, whether inductive or deductive: a mystery). The 
language (including text) that we hear is not only of a cognitive character--it is also audial, 
even musical, symbolic and of an implicate order-holographic. 
Besides, the concept of cognition, as it is often used, is far too complex and badly 
stated most of the time, whereas in older accounts consciousness was seen as the function 
of discernment, giving rise to the components of perception, conception, and volition. 
It is clear to me, after having completed the work presented in the thesis, that more 
work is needed in order to learn more about implicit learning on basis of what ever new 
theories may emerge. 
Therefore, I conclude this thesis in the hope that some of the information gained in 
these developmental studies can be suggestive of further developmental work and have 
some implications for the progression of the concepts we use in research, such as 
cognition, insight thinking, intuition, and imagination. The work has left me with an 
awareness of the complications of these notions and how seldom in the present-day 
literature they are related to the notion of human consciousness. 
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APPENDIX A 
(PILOT STUDY AND EXPERIMENT 1) 
The Story Used in the Pilot Study of More and Less. 
(Examples of Testing with Fiona, age 3.11, are shown, along with the relevant scores. ) 
Donald Duck and his nephews' shopping day 
One fine day Donald Duck and his nephews Huey, Louie and Dewy decided to go 
downtown to buy new bikes for the boys as their old ones were getting too small for them. 
They got up early and dressed, and as they are quite noteworthy ducks, they always like to 
wear their caps when shopping. Now, they had to decide which caps to wear this special 
day. 
Which shelf has caps? (example: more) I 
Which shelf has caps? (example: less) 
Which shelf has caps? (example: red) 0 
They decided to wear the blue caps and now they all three went out of their house 
and to the car park to find their car. There were two car parks in their street which had 
many cars in them. 
Which car park has cars? (example: less) I 
Which car park has cars? (example: green) 0 
Which car park has cars? (example: more) I 
They got into their small red car and off they went for the shopping centre 
downtown. But as it was early morning and they hadn't had their breakfast yet, they 
decided to go first to Auntie Daisy for breakfast. Auntie Daisy was certainly glad to see 
them and offered them two plates full of biscuits she had just baked. 
Which plate has biscuits on it? (example: more) 0 
Which plate has biscuits on it? (example: brown) 0 
Which plate has biscuits on it? (example: tiv) 0 
Al 
They all liked the biscuits very much and after having eaten well of them they 
thanked Auntie Daisy and went back to their car. Now they drive carefully towards the 
town-centre. Just before coming there, there was a big and beautiful park along the road. 
There they parked their car and went for a walk in the park. And what a sight it was, all the 
beautiful flowers in the flowerbeds, and the many trees with their sprinkling green leaves 
and some with fruit already. 
Which flowerbed has flowers in it? (example: more) 0 
Which flowerbed has flowers in it? (example: tiv) 0 
Which flowerbed has flowers in it? (example: orange) I 
In one comer of the park there were some apple trees, some with red apples and 
some with green. Huey, Louie and Dewy very much wanted to pick some, but they knew it 
was forbidden, so instead they counted all the apples. 
Which apple tree has 
Which apple tree has 
Which apple tree has 
After wandering around in the park for a while, Donald Duck and his nephews 
walked to the shopping centre and looked in the shop windows for some bikes. They 
passed many shops before finding any selling bikes. Of all the shops there, they liked the 
top shop best. In its window they saw balloons, blue and yellow and red in small boxes. 
apples on it? (example: less) I 
apples on it? (example: more) I 
apples on it? (example: red) 0 
They decided to go in and buy some. 
Which box has balloons in it? (example: tiv) I 
Which box has 
Which box has 
balloons in it? 
balloons in it? 
(example: blue) 0 
(example: more) I 
Later when they came home they would blow up their balloons and tie them with 
string to the handlebars of their bikes. It would certainly be nice to cycle around with their 
balloons blowing in the wind. But then they would need to buy good string as well. And 
they asked if they could see the trays with the strings. 
Which tray has strings in it? (example: more) 
Which tray has strings in it? (example: less) 
Which tray has strings in it? (example: blue) 0 
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Off they went now with their balloons and strings to find their ne", bikes to buy. On 
the very next comer they found a shop with many bikes, big and small. In they rushed to 
take a good look around. Finally they decided on very fine orange bikes which stood in one 
of the shop windows. 
Which window has bikes? (example: tiv) 0 
Which window has bikes? (example: more) 0 
Which window has bikes? (example: red) 0 
They asked to have their new bikes immediately sent home and then they hurried 
back to their car and set off for home. And in the afternoon that very same fine day, you 
could see Huey, Louie and Dewy happily cycling around in their home streets with their 
blue caps on their heads and their balloons tied with a beautiful string to the handlebars of 
their bikes; the balloons softly blowing in the wind. 
The pictures accompanying the story are presented on the following pages. (Fig. 

















Figure A-2. SamPle Set Of Stimulus Materials in Pilot Study 
. . 10 
The Story Used in the Encoding phase of Experiment 1. 
The Secret Fate of Planet OC. 
Section 1. 
The starship Skyfax is heading for its destiny in a distant galaxy. The captain of the 
ship, Wilfred Cook and his crew have been sent on a special mission to look for the 
remains of an ancient civilisation on planet OC. The OC race was quite famous in the 
Ancient World for its love of peace and sound lifestyle. A good supply of Mikas supported 
the OC's culture. One day some external danger seems to have threatened the OC's happy 
existence and completely destroyed them. Many centuries have passed since then, in the 
the course of which men have made attempts to get to planet OC, but always in vain, due to 
the fact that their starships have been too weak in power. Finally now, men on planet Earth 
have managed to build a starship with quite powerful engines which according to their 
calculations are strong enough to reach OC where they hope to find some cues to the secret 
fate of the OC civilisation. 
Section 2 
Skyfax is now out of our known galaxy and is soon entering a galaxy in the Milky 
Way noone from planet Earth has been to before. Soon captain Cook gets planet OC on the 
radar screen and starts to prepare for the landing. Everything seems to work out well. They 
land at the entrance to a big valley. As they leave the starship they take their helpful robot 
C- IB with them. When they start to look around, they see in the middle of the valley the 
ruins of what seems to have been an old city. The only building which is still in a 
reasonable state is a huge temple near some rocky hills above. Everything is deathly quiet. 
No animals, plants or life forms of any kind can be seen anywhere. Huge layers of sand lie 
all around. There is something glittering in the sand; it is Mikas which does not wear off 
easily. Suddenly their robot C- IB gets very excited and unfortunately stumbles over some 
ruins and falls forwards. He lies like this for a while complaining, but then gathers himself 
together and hurries towards the temple. What is his excitement all about? 
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Section 3 
Captain Cook and his men now decided to follow C- IB up to the temple. As they 
approached, they began to hear a soft sound coming from it, as if some things were being 
banged together, like bells or shields. When they came closer, they saw a big bell hanging 
outside the entrance to the temple. The beautiful sound came from that bell. C- IB nodded 
continuously and looked quite pleased. As they stood silently beneath the bell and 
contemplated on its sound and elegant shape, the temple doors started to open up for them 
and they entered a big and beautiful hall. Their voices echoed strangely in there because of 
all the Mikas in the hall. What now caught their attention was an altar standing in the 
middle of the hall. On it there lay an old manuscript with some ftinny sort of an inscription. 
Clearly, these are picture signs, they thought. They might provide cues to the secret fate of 
the OCs. As soon as they had the idea the bell started tolling again as if it was commenting 
on their thoughts. 
Section 4 
Fortunately, C- IB had been programmed for the decipherment of unknown 
languages. He might perhaps accomplish the task of translating the picture signs in the altar 
manuscript. At last, after much puffing, C- IB had the answer decoded. Much to their 
surprise, they now realised that this OC code was very similar to the picture signs code 
once used on Earth in ancient Egypt thousand of years ago and there known as 
hieroglyphics. The message C- IB translated ran as follows: 
"If you have come as men of peace and benevolence, the entrance bell will 
greet you and open up the huge temple doors with the help of our secret 
formulas. You have made the sincere effort of seeking knowledge of our 
fate. Go to the bottom of the valley for more information. " 
This message sounded rather puzzling, but Cook and his men decided to follow the 
advice given. When they came out of the temple, the bell started tolling again and the 
temple doors closed slowly. As they headed towards the city ruins again, they had the 
funny feeling that the bells' beautiful sound would always remain in their hearts like a 
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guiding star and a gift of the secret wisdom of the OCs. Once out of the ruined city, they 
came to a countryside of many farm ruins circled by fences made of Mikas. At the valley's 
bottom they saw a small loch. What information would they find there? 
Section 5 
It was already twilight when they reached the loch. The loch was very clear and 
quiet. There was no sign of life to be seen anywhere. The men stared curiously at the loch. 
This mission was very special to them all. But they would all have felt quite lost here on 
OC if they had not found the message in the temple. The bell over there had sureIN, been a 
great help and so had their C- I B. Yes. They had to admit they would never have got so far 
without advanced technology. But what was so special about this loch here? What was the 
information that the altar manuscript had spoken of? Suddenly their brainracking was 
disturbed by C- I B. He stood there on the shore nodding eagerly and pointing at something 
glittering in the middle of the loch. What could this be out there? Captain Cook decided to 
try swimming over to find out. When he came closer he saw this was a tiny satellite. Now 
he got really curious. He managed to lift the tiny satellite out of the water and swam 
carefully with it to the shore where the others awaited him in a state of excitement. When 
out of the water Cooks clothes were soaking wet whereas the Mikas he had kept in them 
from the temple was wet, but of course not soaking as it does not get soaked by water. 
Cook happily handed the tiny satellite over to his friends. They all felt a great relief at this 
new discovery. 
Section 6 
Cook, C- IB and the other of the Skyfax team took the tiny satellite over to the 
starship. They decided to have some rest now as it was getting very late. They had a long 
and good sleep and when they woke up the next morning the sun was shining burning hot. 
They managed to open up the tiny satellite by the use of an electric current from C- I B. 
Inside it they found a picture sign message which once translated ran as follows: 
"OC. Year 4020. January 15th. An alien force from planet x- 12 has 
succeeded in getting through our defences. Now our civilisation and all life 
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forms on the planet have been destroyed by their powerful fire weapons. 
Most of the race has been taken into slavery. Others have died. We have 
never exploited our scientific knowledge to produce weapons. Instead it has 
been used for the good and benefit of all. As we don't want our scientific 
knowledge to fall into the hands of such a savage people who would use it to 
serve their urge for power and dominance in the Universe, a few of us have 
attempted at escaping with it in one of our rockets. Much of our secret 
knowledge is also hidden within this tiny satellite which we shot down and 
is self directed to the loch after everything is over. When the right time 
comes for your race , our secret knowledge hidden within the satellite will 
reveal itself Keep it well. May you live in peace. " 
Captain Curdin. 
The Skyfax team was now ready to depart from planet OC. They now hold the 
answer to the secret fate of the OC. Before leaving they paid their last farewell to the 
temple and the city ruins. Captain Cook's hand brushed against something in the city ruins 
made of Mikas which the sun's rays had made terribly hot, and burnt himself. When on his 
way back to Skyfax, Cook thought of all the happy OC people living here once. And as he 
entered his starship and turned to have a last look at planet OC, he wondered if the OC's 
beautiful dream of peace would ever come true. 
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The Story Used in the Posttest. 
One Sunday morning in May a few years ago the following news was read in the 
Icelandic radio: 
"A team of geologists who have been working in the Highlands the past 
weeks at measuring the thickening of our largest glacier, Vatnajokull, found 
earlier this morning a wee satellite near a cave Southeast of the glacier. " 
It is now known that the following message which the university's computers have 
been working on was found in the satellite: 
"We are a team of geologists coming from a distant galaxy. Our leader is the 
ruler of an old kingdom on one of its planets. Our ancient culture is 
supported by a plentiful supply of Mikas which we have on the planet. As 
we were not sure whether our spacecraft was strong enough to enter Earth's 
atmosphere we decided to send down to your country this satellite. If you 
can decode this message it is clear that your science is far enough advanced 
to make you capable of contacting our galaxy within a few years time and 
answer our request. We undertook this mission to look for cobalt on other 
planets which we now need to improve our technology. Do you have cobalt 
in your country which you would like to exchange for some Mikas? " 
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Quantitative Data. 
In the following pages quantitative data from Experiment I are presented that are 
complimentary to the data already presented in the Results section of Chapter 2 (p. 80-95). 
Patterns of Within -C h ild ren/Between-Ch ild ren Responses. 
In the 5-year-old group, no child in the Indirect, Metalinguistic, or Control 
conditions received perfect scores on all five tests--not even on all tests 1,2!, 3, and 5 with 
the Production test (T4) omitted. However, two children in the Metalinguistic Plus Indirect 
condition scored perfectly on four correct tests--on all but Production. 
In the 7-year-old group, two children in the Indirect group received perfect scores 
on all tests and a third received perfect scores in all but T4. Five subjects in the 
Metalinguistic group received perfect scores on all five tests, as did five in the Control 
group and six in the Metalinguistic Plus Indirect group; two others received perfect scores 
in all but T4. 
In the 9-year-old group, nine subjects in the Indirect group received perfect scores 
on all tests, as did four in the Metalinguistic group. Three others received perfect scores on 
all but T4. In the Control group, five subjects received perfect scores on all tests and three 
received perfect scores on all but T4. In the Metalinguistic Plus Indirect group, eight 
subjects received perfect scores on all tests. 
In the II -year-old group, eight subjects in the Indirect group received perfect scores 
on all tests--nine not counting T4. Six subjects in the Metalinguistic group received perfect 
scores on all tests--seven not counting T4. Six children in the Control group received 
perfect scores on all tests--seven not counting T4. Eight subjects in the Metalinguistic Plus 
Indirect group received perfect scores on all tests; nine received perfect scores on all but 
T4. 
All 
Table A. 1. 
Percentages of Correct Responses to the Tests in the Test Phase in Experiment 1. 
Age Condition T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
5 Indirect 30% 0% 10% 10% 50% 
5 Metalinguistic 30% 0% 10% 0% 50% 
5 Metaling. + Indirect 60% 20% 30% 30% 50% 
5 Control 30% 20% 40% 0% 70% 
7 Indirect 70% 50% 50% 50% 60% 
7 Metalinguistic 60% 70% 60% 70% 90% 
7 metaling. + Indirect 90% 80% 90% 60% 100% 
7 Control 90% 80% 70% 50% 100% 
9 Indirect 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
9 Metalinguistic 70% 70% 60% 50% 90% 
9 Metaling. + Indirect 100% 80% 100% 90% 100% 
9 Control 80% 80% 90% 50% 80% 
11 Indirect 100% 90% 80% 100% 100% 
11 metalinguistic 80% 90% 90% 70% 90% 
11 Metaling. + Indirect 100% 90% 100% 90% 100% 
11 Control 80% 80% 80% 70% 100% 
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Figure A. 3. 














Age 5 Age 7 Age 9 Age 11 
Figure A. 4. 
Percentages of Correct Responses for Age and Condition. 
Test 3 
Word Sentence 
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Table A. 2. 
Duncan Multiple Ranges Test for Age and Condition in Experiment I 
THE SUBSETS 
TkB& 1- Cbject C-; t mi -a1 mi cn ( ticn) 
a1 
Grap Grp 2 Grp 1 Grp 3 
MsEn . 6000 . 7179 . 7500 
------------------------ 
.92 
Grap Grp 1 Grp 3 Grp 4 
MeEn . 7179 . 7500 . 
8780 
------------------------ 
Test 1- Cbject n- cn 
.91 
GrCLP Grp I 
MeEn . 3750 
---------- 
.92 
Grap Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4 
MaEn . 7805 . 
6750 . 9231 
------------------------ 
Test 2- Cbte_qm7 Defini ti m (- - 1,3 Ltim) 
.91 







Test 2- Ckitegary Definitim (Ap) 
. gz*3; m 
I 





GrOLP Gtp 2 (I: p 3 




76& 3- Wmd SeMenas 
a1 
Grap Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp I 
MEEn . 5500 . 6000 . 7179 
------------------------ 
a2 
Grap Grp 3 Grp 1 Grp 4 
MsEn . 6000 . 7179 . 8049 
------------------------ 
7WIt- 3- W=d-Switeince Oas) 
.91 
Grap Grp 1 
MEEn . 2250 
---------- 
.92 
Grap Grp 2 
YbEn . 6829 
---------- 
.93 






ýl 7bg; t 4- P=d]Ctiim ( 
.91 







Gýap Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4 
MsEn . 4750 . 





ýkEn . 1000 
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.92 
GCOLP Qýp 2 Grp 3 
14san . 5854 . 7250 
----------------- 
.93 
Grap Grp 3 Grp 4 
MSEn . 7250 . 8462 
----------------- 
Teist 5- DecActicm (Ctmditicn) 
R1 
Grap Grp 3 Grp 2 Grp 1 Grp 4 
MsEn . 7750 . 8000 . 8718 . 6780 
------------------------------- 
.93 
Group Grp 3 Grp 4 
man . 8000 . 8974 
7kmt 5- Depiction (Age) 
S= 1 
Grap GqD 1 
MsEn . 5500 
---------- 
a2 
Gn)LP Grp 2 Grp 3 Grp 4 
MEen . 8780 . 
9250 . 9744 
------------------------ 
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Table A. 3. 
Correlation Matrix with STD for the Tests in the Test Phase in Experiment 1 
veaýOhle mBan Bbc1 DERr 
CEMA 160 . 7375 . 4414 
CP= 160 . 6250 . 4856 
W39M 160 . 6688 . 4721 
pim 160 . 5625 . 
4976 
U= 160 . 8313 . 3757 
CB034 1.0000 . 5942** . 4553** . 5619** . 
5277** 
OnEw . 5942** 1.0000 . 
6343** . 6441** . 
5T72** 
WOSEN . 4553** . 
6343** 1.0000 . 5839** . 
4629** 
EEM . 5619** . 
6441** . 5839** 1.0000 . 
4773** 
I3E= . 5277** . -5472** . 
4629** . 4773** 
1.0000 
N cf Cý: 160 2-tmiled Signif: *- . 01 ** - . 001 
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Effects of Age and Condition on Performance in the Posttesting. 
Posttest 1. Comprehension Mikas. 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3,144) = 44.18, p<. 001. 
and a significant interaction effect of condition and Age F (9,144) = 2.68, p<. O I. Age 
group 11.5 perfonned best overall, with the Metalinguistic and Indirect condition giving 
the best results, except in age group 5.5, where the Control condition did. 
Posttest 2. Production Mikas. 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3,144) = 41,3 2, p<. 00 1. 
Age group 11.5 perfonned best overall, with the Control condition giving the best results 
in all agegroups, except age group 9.5, where the Metalinguistic and Indirect and the 
Indirect conditions did. 
Posttest 3. Comprehension Cobalt. 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3,144) = 11.59, p<. 001. 
Age group 7.5 performed best overall, with the Control condition suiting age group 5.5 
best, the Metalinguistic and Indirect condition suiting age group 7.5, the Metalinguistic, 
Indirect and Control conditions Age group 11.5 suiting age group 9.5, and the Control 
condition suiting age group 11.5 best. 
Posttest 4 Production Cobalt. 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3,144) = 6.01, p= 001. 
Age group perfonned best overall, with the Control condition giving the highest results for 
the younger age groups and the Metalinguistic condition for the older age groups. 
Combined Posttests: 
Post Comprehension - Combined for PT1+PT2 
1 p<. 
001 Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3,144) = 54.13, 
and a significant interaction effect between condition and age F (9.144) = 2.3 1, p<. 05. 
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Age group 11.5 performed best overall. The Control condition gives the best results 
in age groups 5.5 and 11.5 (and 7.5, along with the MetalingulstIc and Indirect condition) 
and the Metalinguistic condition and the Indirect condition in age group 9.5. 
Combined Tests. 
Age group 11.5 did best overall in both Test 4 and Comprehension, with the 
Metalinguistic and Indirect condition giving the best results in both cases also, except for 
in Test 4, age group 5.5, where the Control condition did. 
Posttest 2 (Production Mikas) and Posttest I (Comprehension Mikas). In both 
posttests, the 11.5 year age group perfonned best overall, with the Metalinguistic and 
Indirect condition giving the best results in both posttests except in age group 5.5 in 
Posttest 1, where the Control condition did. 
In Test 4 (Production) and Test I (Object Comprehension) combined, agegroup 
11.5 performed best overall. The Metalinguistic and Indirect condition had the best effects 
on all age groups in Test I and the younger two age groups in Test 4, where the Indirect 
condition had the best effects on the older age groups. 
A20 
Table A. 4. 









































































































































































































































Sm Of MEEn Siglif 
Scurae of Variatim S4jares EF Sqkare F of F 
Main Effects 4.732 6 
. 789 6.967 . 000 Cr-ND 
. 327 3 . 109 . 964 . 412 PGFCUP 4.412 3 1.471 12.992 
. 000 2-vzry Interactims 1.412 9 
. 157 1.386 . 1-99 CF-ND PGFCUP 1.412 9 
. 157 1.386 . 199 Dplained 6.144 15 
. 410 3.618 . 000 
Pesidial 16.300 144 M 
Tbtal 22.444 159 
. 141 
Full Mmning (Cmbý tests TI T5) 
BY Cau CCNCT= 
Pacup Pýý 
SM Of MBEn Siglif 
ScurcxEý of Variatim a4uares EF sqlare F of F 
Main Effects 263.974 6 43.996 25.764 . 000 
CCND 17.579 3 5.860 3.431 . 01-9 
PGRajp 246.190 3 82.063 48.056 . 000 
2-oRy Irteractims 19.222 9 2.136 1.251 . 269 
CCND PGRap 19.222 9 2.136 1.251 . 269 
Explain3d 283.196 15 18-880 1-1.0-56 - 000 
Pr=sicbal 245.904 144 1.708 
Tbtal 529.100 159 3.328 
OaTprE h (cadDinEd tests TI+T2+74+T5) 
BY CCND CCI=CNS 
PGFCUP Pýý 
an of MBEIn S ignif 
Cc! uroe of Variatim S40rc-S EF s4ore F of F 
Main Effects 159.419 6 26.570 24-178 . 000 
Cau 12.130 3 4.043 3-679 . 014 
ATCUP 147.355 3 49.118 44.697 - 000 
2-ýAay Irteractims 11.310 9 1.257 1.144 . 336 
CCND AMCUP 11.310 9 1.257 1.144 . 336 
Dplained 170.730 15 11.382 10.357 . 000 
PEsidlal 158.245 144 1.099 
Thtal 328.975 159 2.069 
Ca4,4I C3MPREiRZICN MMS 
BY CCND CCN=CNS 
PGRap 
qn of MaEn S ig-lif 
san-m- of variatim SqLares EF S: 4jare F of F 
Main Effects 14.379 6 2.397 22.993 . 000 
CCND . 566 
3 . 189 
1.809 . 148 
PGRap 13.814 3 4.605 44-179 -000 
2--my IrtEractials 2.512 9 . 279 
2.678 . 007 
CCm MUP 2.512 9 . 279 
2.678 . 007 
DpLained 16.891 15 1.126 10.804 -000 
Resicbal 15-009 144 . 104 









Sum Of M3En Siglif 
San-ce of Výriation SCI EF Square F of F 
Main Effects 17.788 6 2.965 21.050 
. 000 
caz . 328 3 . 109 . 776 . 509 
PGRap 17.458 3 5.819 41.318 
. 000 2-. -zy Irteracticrr. 1.874 9 . 208 1.478 . 161 
CCND PGRap 1.674 9 . 208 1.478 . 161 
aplaired 19.662 15 1.311 9.307 . 000 
Pasidual 20.282 144 . 141 
Tbtal 39.944 159 
. 251 




JGF UP Pýý 
Sum Of MaEn Signif 
l2burce of Variation Squarp-cl, EF Square F of F 
Main Effects 8.191 6 1.365 6.597 . 000 
CCMD 1.019 3 . 340 1.642 . 182 
zGRap 7.191 3 2.397 11-583 . 000 
2-mEy Irteoctions 1.986 9 . 221 1.066 . 391 
CCND PGUP 1.986 9 . 221 1.066 . 391 
aplained 10.177 15 . 678 3.279 . 000 
P-Esi d lal 29.798 144 . 207 






an of btEn S ignif 
Source of Variation Squares EF Square F of F 
Ntdn Effects 2.357 6 . 393 3.106 . 007 
CCND . 085 3 . 028 . 225 . 679 
PGRap 2.279 3 . 760 6.007 . 001 
2-vay Irtemcticns . 528 9 . 059 . 464 . 897 
CCND AGRap . 528 9 . 059 . 464 . 897 
Dplained 2.885 15 . 192 1.521 . 105 
Resicbal 18.209 144 . 126 
Tbtal 21.094 159 . 133 
(OaTbined pcsttests C CM4I -F =) 
BY CCND CCNCTI= 
PGFCUP Pýý 
San of MaEn S ignif 
Scurae of Variation S40res EF Square F of F 
Main Effects 117.839 6 19.640 18.61-9 . 000 
CIM 5.643 3 1.881 1.783 . 153 
MUP 112.453 3 37.484 35.537 . 000 
2-wiy Iriteractia-s 15.769 9 1.752 1.661 . 104 
MID PGFCUP 15.769 9 1.752 1.661 . 104 
Dplaimd 133.608 15 8.907 8.444 . 000 
Pesicbal 151.892 144 1.055 
Thtal 285-500 159 1.796 
FCM (airbined pcsttests CCMMI+FR=) 
BY Cau CCNCT= 
Pýý PoRap 
an of MEEn S ignif 
Samc3-_ of Variation SqBres EF Square F of F 
Main Effects 57.385 6 9.564 27.746 . 000 
CCND 1.460 3 . 487 1.412 . 
242 
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PGRaip 55.975 3 18.658 54.130 . 000 
2-vzry Irteractia-s 7.173 9 . 797 2.312 . 0-19 
CEND PGFCUP 7.173 9 . 797 2.312 . 019 
Eýplained 64.557 1-5 4.304 12.486 . 000 
REsidial 49.636 144 . 345 
Total 114.194 159 . 718 
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Table A. 5. 
Summary Table for Means in all Tests in Experiment I 
- -------------- -- ----------------- - -- Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Condition Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 
Cases Cases Cases Cases 
- ------------------------ -- ------------------ - ------------------- 
Summaries of Object Comprehension by levels of Conditions and Agegroups 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs 11,5 yrs 
0,3000 0,9000 0,8000 0,8889 
Control 0,4830 0,3162 0,4216 0,3333 
10 10 10 9 
0,3000 0,6000 0,7000 0,8000 
Metalinguistic 0,4830 0,5164 0,4830 0,4216 
10 10 10 10 
0,3000 0,7000 1,0000 1,0000 
Indirect 0,4830 0,4830 0,0000 0,0000 
10 10 10 10 
0,6000 0,9000 1,0000 1,0000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,5164 0,3015 0,0000 0,0000 
10 11 10 10 
Summaries of Category Definition by levels of Conditions and Agegroups 
---- ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs 11,5 yrs 
0,2000 0,8000 0,8000 0,8889 
Control 0,4216 0,4216 0,4216 0,3333 
10 10 10 9 
0,0000 0,7000 0,7000 0,9000 
Metalinguistic 0,0000 0,4830 0,4830 0,3162 
10 10 10 10 
0,0000 0,5000 0,9000 0,9000 
Indirect 0,0000 0,5270 0,3162 0,3162 
10 10 10 10 
0,2000 0,8182 0,8000 0,9000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,4216 0,4045 0,4216 0,3162 
10 11 10 10 
--- -- ---- -- ------------- - -- - ----------- 
Summaries of Word Sentence by levels of Conditions and Agegroups 
5,5 7,5 9,5 11,5 
0,4000 0,7000 0,9000 0,8889 
Control 0,5164 0,4830 0,3162 0,3333 
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10 10 10 9 
0,1000 0,6000 0,6000 
'9000 Metalinguistic 0,3162 0,5164 0,5164 0,3162 
10 10 10 10 
0,1000 0,5000 1,0000 0,8000 
Indirect 0,3162 0,5270 0,0000 0,4216 
10 10 10 10 
0,3000 0,9091 1,0000 1,0000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,4830 0,3015 0,0000 0,0000 
---------- ------ - 
10 
-- 
11 10 10 
- ------------------------------------------------ 
Summaries of Production by levels of Conditions and Agegroups 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs 11,5yrs 
0,0000 0,5000 0,5000 0,7778 
Control 0,0000 0,5270 0,5270 0,4410 
10 10 10 9 
0,0000 0,7000 0,5000 0,7000 
Metalinguistic 0,0000 0,4830 0,5270 0,4830 
10 10 10 10 
0,1000 0,5000 1,0000 1,0000 
Indirect 0,3162 0,5270 0,0000 0,0000 
10 10 10 10 
0,3000 0,6364 0,9000 0,9000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,4830 0,5045 0,3162 0,3162 
10 11 10 10 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Summaries of Depiction by levels of Conditions and Agegroups, 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs H, 5 yrs 
0,7000 1,0000 0,8000 1,0000 
Control 0,4830 0,0000 0,4216 0,0000 
10 10 10 9 
0,5000 0,9000 0,9000 0,9000 
Metalinguistic 0,5270 0,3162 0,3162 0,3162 
10 10 10 10 
0,5000 0,6000 1,0000 1,0000 
Indirect 0,5270 0,5164 0,0000 0,0000 
10 10 10 10 
0,5000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,5270 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
10 11 10 10 
Summaries of Full Meaning 
- -------- - ------------------------ 
(Combined tests TI - T5) by 
-------- 
levels of Condi tion and 
Agegroups. 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs 11,5yrs 
A26 
1,6000 3,9000 3,8000 4.4444 
Control 1,0750 1,2867 1,8135 LO 1 '38 
10 10 10 9 
0,9000 3,5000 3,4000 4,2000 
Metalinguistic 1,1005 2,0138 1,7764 1,3166 
10 10 10 . 10 
1,0000 2,8000 4,9000 4,7000 
Indirect 0,8165 1,9322 0,3162 0,6749 
10 10 10 10 
1,9000 4,2720 4,7000 4,8000 
Metaling. and Indirect 1,7288 1,1909 0,6749 0,4216 
10 11 10 10 
---------- ---------------------------------------------- 
Summaries of Comprehension (Combined tests TI+T2+T3+T5) by levels of 
Conditions and Agegroups, 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs 11,5yrs 
1,6000 3,4000 3,3000 3,6667 
Control 1,0750 0,8433 1,4944 0,7071 
10 10 10 9 
0,9000 2,8000 2,9000 3,5000 
Metalinguistic 1,1005 1,5492 1,3703 . 0,9718 
10 10 10 10 
0,9000 2,3000 3,9000 3,7000 
Indirect 0,7379 1,5670 0,3162 0,6749 
10 10 10 10 
1,6000 3,6364 3,8000 3,9000 
Metaling. and Indirect 1,4298 0,8090 0,4216 0,3162 
10 1 10 10 
Summaries of Comprehension Mikas (Posttest 1) by levels of Conditions 
---- ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
and Ageg roups. 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs 11,5 yrs 
0,3000 1,0000 0,7000 1,0000 
Control 0,4830 0,0000 0,4830 0,0000 
10 10 10 9 
0,2000 0,9000 1,0000 0,9000 
Metalinguistic 0,4216 0,3162 0,0000 0,3162 
10 10 10 10 
0,2000 0,4000 1,0000 0,9000 
Indirect 0,4216 0,5164 0,0000 0,3162 
10 10 10 10 
0,2000 0,9091 1,0000 1,0000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,4216 0,3015 0,0000 0,0000 
10 1 10 10 
---- - -- - ------------- ----- -- - --------- -- -- -- -- 
Summaries of Production Mikas (Posttest 2) by levels of Conditions and 
A27 
Agegroup. 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9, j yrs 11,5 Yrs 
0,2000 0,3000 0,5000 1,0000 
Control 0,4216 0,4830 0,5270 0,0000 
10 10 10 9 
, 2000 0,2000 0,9000 0,9000 
Metalinguistic 0,4216 0,4216 0,3162 0,3162 
10 10 10 10 
0,0000 0,1000 0,9000 0,7000 
Indirect 0,0000 0,3162 0,3612 0,4830 
10 10 10 10 
0,0000 0,2727 0,7000 0,9000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,0000 0,4671 0,4830 0,3162 
10 11 10 10 
- --------------- 
Summaries of Comprehension Cobalt (Posttest 3) by Conditions and 
Agegroups. 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs H, 5 yrs 
0,3000 0,7000 0,6000 0,8889 
Control 0,4830 0,4830 0,5164 0,3333 
10 10 10 9 
0,2000 0,9000 0,6000 0,5000 
Metalinguistic 0,4216 0,3162 0,5164 0,5270 
10 10 10 10 
0,1000 0,5000 0,6000 0,4000 
Indirect 0,3162 0,5270 0,5164 0,5164 
10 10 10 10 
0,1000 0,9091 0,5000 0,4000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,3162 0,3015 0,5270 0,5164 
10 11 10 10 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Summaries of Production Cobalt (Posttest 4) by levels of Conditions and 
Agegroups. 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs N, 5 yrs 
0,1000 0,2000 0,1000 0,3333 
Control 0,3162 0,4216 0,3162 0,5000 
10 10 10 9 
0,0000 0,0000 0,3000 0,4000 
Metalinguistic 0,0000 0,0000 0,4830 0,5164 
10 10 10 10 
0,0000 0,0000 0,2000 0,3000 
Indirect 0,0000 0,0000 0,4216 0,4830 
10 10 10 10 
0,0000 0,0909 0,2000 0,3000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,0000 0,3015 0,4216 
0,4830 
A28 
10 11 10 10 
--------- ------ --- -- --- ------------------------------ 
Summaries of Post Comprehension (Combined posttests COMMI+PRODMI) by 
levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
5,5 yrs 7,5 yrs 9,5 yrs 11,5 yrs 
0,5000 1,3000 1,2000 2,0000 
Control 0,8498 0,4830 0,9189 0,0000 
10 10 10 9 
0,4000 1,1000 1,9000 1,8000 
Metalinguistic 0,5433 0,5676 0,3162 0,6325 
10 10 10 10 
0,2000 0,5000 1,9000 1,6000 
Indirect 0,4216 0,7071 0,3162 0,6992 
10 10 10 10 
0,2000 1,1818 1,7000 1,9000 
Metaling. and Indirect 0,4216 0,6030 0,4830 0,3162 
10 11 10 10 
- ------------------- - ------- - --------------------------- 







The Story Used in the Encoding phase. 
The Thunderbird Clan of Pima. 
Section 1. 
The Pimas were a Red-Indian clan who lived in the Arizona deserts of North 
America. Their land was a yellow desert of salt brush, scarce water and rare rivers. 
Peculiarly shaped sandstone rocks were scattered around in the landscape. Against all odds, 
the Pimas had endured in this lonely land as naturally as the mountains themselves. They 
were the descendants of an ancient clan who had lived in the same desert surroundings for 
at least nine thousand years. The Pimas called their ancestors "Those who have gone" and 
held them in great respect. In spite of their desert land, the Pimas were farmers and 
grinders of meal. They had learned from their ancestors how to dig canals throughout their 
land to bring water to the vegetation. They planted corn and pumpkin and hunted the little 
desert deer whose skin they used for clothing. They collected the Kelaphs in the desert and 
used them to dye their soft deer skins red. 
Section 2. 
The Pimas believed in the Great Spirit in the sky. Occasionally, or so they believed, 
The Great Spirit manifested himself in the disguise of a bird of an enormous size. They 
held the bird in great awe and called it the Thunderbird. By the work of the Thunderbird 
the Earth was watered and vegetation grew. He carried a lake of fresh water on his back 
which caused a great downpour when he flew through the air. Also the Pimas believed that 
lightning flashed from his beak and that the beating of his wings was the rolling of thunder. 
The Pimas saw the Thunderbird as a guardian of their old clan. Incidents of warfare with 
other clans were few, and the Pimas never fought a war except to defend their territory. 
Their worst enemies were the Apaches. The medical knowledge of the Pimas' ancestors 
BI 
had taught them how to heal their warriors' wounds by using a bandage of some crushed 
Kelaphs. Another dangerous enemy of the Pimas was Gila, the desert monster which they 
feared more than anything else. However, the question remains whether the Gila was an 
actual monster or a tall dust monster that arose every noon because of the whirling xNinds 
that then swept the desert. 
Section 3. 
The Pimas were singers of songs and they loved to dance. They performed their 
dances at special full moon festivals to honour the Great Spirit in the disguise of the 
Thunderbird. Usually, if the Thunderbird was seen he was accompanied by a flock of other 
birds, mostly magpies and Baregs. The Pima girls always came to the Thunderbird festivals 
with little jingling copper dance bells around their ankles whereas the Pima boys took 
along their small deer spears decorated for the occasion with feathers and wrapped 
beadwork. The grown up Pimas all wore engraved seashells as ornaments on their clothing. 
These shells had been traded from clans who lived near the Pacific Ocean. The Pimas had 
learned to use the acid juice of the tough skinned Kelaphs to engrave designs on the shells. 
At the Thunderbird festivals everyone gathered in front of the high priests lodge. 
This was no ordinary lodge. Although it was a simple house of poles and thatch, like all 
other Pima lodges, the Pimas saw it as a house enveloped in white winds and white clouds, 
full of noble spirits, some of whom were the spirits of their ancestors, and to whom they 
turned for guidance. 
B2 
The Story Used in the Posttest. 
For the American Indians, land was endless as the sky and belonged to no man. 
They saw it as the Great Spirit himself whom they should foster and worship. Still the 
Pima Indians of Arizona gather at special festivals to honour the Great Spirit. They all then 
put on their soft deer skin clothing that they have dyed yellow by using kelaphs they have 




In the following pages quantitative data that compliment the data presented in the 
Results section of Ch. 3 (see p. 165-180) are shown. 
Patterns of With in-Ch ild ren/Between-C h ild ren Responses. 
In the 4-year-old group for Indirects, only two children had all tests correct; and 
with T3 omitted, no one had all other tests correct. In the same age group for 
Metalinguistics, only one child had all tests correct; and with Test 3 omitted, no one had all 
other tests correct. In the sarne age group for Controls, only one child had all tests correct; 
and with Test 3 omitted, no one had all other tests correct. 
In the 6-year-old group for Indirects, only one child had all tests correct; and with 
T3 omitted, one child had all other tests correct. In the same age group for Metalinguistics, 
only one child had all tests correct; and with T3 omitted, two children had all other tests 
correct. In the same age group for Controls, only two children had all tests correct; and 
with T3 omitted, three children had all other tests correct. 
In the 8-year-old group for Indirects, only two children had all tests correct; and 
with T3 omitted,, four children had all other tests correct. In the same age group for 
Metalinguistics, three children had all tests correct and with T3 omitted no one had all 
other tests correct. In the same age group for Controls, one child had all tests correct, and 
with T3 omitted, three children had all other tests correct. 
In the I 0-year-old group for Indirects, five children had all tests correct; and with 
T3 omitted, one child had all other tests correct. In the same age group for Metalinguistics, 
six children had all tests correct; and with T3 omitted, no one had all other tests correct. In 
the same age group for Controls, seven children had all tests correct; and with T3 omitted. 
three children had all other tests correct. 
B4 
Table B. 1. 



























TI T2 T3 
50% 50% 31% 
38% 56% 31% 
44% 69% 13% 
50% 75% 31% 
38% 56% 19% 
63% 81% 19% 
50% 63% 19% 
44% 56% 44% 
50% 75% 25% 
88% 75% 63% 
75% 69% 50% 
81% 100% 50% 
T4 T5 T6 
44% 50% 44% 
63% 44% 31% 
75% 63% 38% 
56% 56% 25% 
44% 69% 81% 
75% 88% 75% 
69% 63% 56% 
44% 56% 50% 
69% 75% 75% 
63% 69% 56% 
69% 81% 56% 
81% 75% 75% 
B5 
Figure B. I. 
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Figure B. 2. 
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Figure B. 3. 












Age 4 Age 6 Age 8 Age 10 
Table B. 2. 
Duncan Multiple Range Test for Age and Condition in Experiment 2 
ME SUBSETS 
1,, b t&o groLU-s are --i cnif icantly dif f erEnt at tiie- . 050 le)el 
Test 1- Sign ng1 rim (i ta. M) 
.91 
Grap Grp 2 Grp 1 Grp 3 
MaEn . 4219 . 5938 . 5938 
------------------------ 
Test 1- Sign f, I; ,,, - md cn (Am) 
.91 
Grap GIP 1 Grp 3 Grp 2 
MEM . 4375 . 4792 . 5000 
------------------------ 
.92 
Grap Gxp 4 
MsEn . 7292 
---------- 
Test 2- Cbject ngi mi m-. ticn) 
S 
Gnxp Grp 2 Gip 3 
MSEn . 5938 . 6563 
----------------- 
a2 
Grap Grp 3 Grp I 
A)EM . 6563 . 8125 
----------------- 
Test 2- abject CU gi Mm, (kp) 
R1 
Grap Gtp 1 Grp 3 Grp 2 
MsEn . 5833 . 
6458 . 7083 
------------------------ 
7w& 3- Ictim 
1 
Grap Grp 1 Grp 3 Grp 2 
B9 
MEEn . 2656 . 3281 . 3438 
------------------------ 
Test 3- Pzcdicti - fin (ftp) 
.91 








Grap Grp 4 
YBM . 5417 
---------- 
MBst 4- Pxcc-kxticn, 
.91 
Grcxp Grp 2 Grp 3 
Ils-En . 5469 . 5"781 
----------------- 
.92 
GrOLP ap 1 
MBen . 7500 
---------- 
Test 4- DJ 'i ! Lti Cn (? OB) 
a1 
Q: up Gtp 2 ap 1 Grp 3 Grp 4 
MBEn . 5833 . 6042 . 6042 . 7083 
------------------------------- 
Test 5- Dwdr-ticn 
.91 
Grap Grp 3 Grp 2 ap I 
MEEn . 5938 . 
62ý . 7500 
------------------------ 
Ust 5- DalActim (Age) 
.91 
Grap citp 1 Ckp 3 Grp 2 
bbm . 5208 . 




a-ap Grp 3 Grp 2 Grp 4 
MaEn . 6458 . 7083 . 7500 
------------------------ 
Test 6- axpolatim (- *ticn) 
.91 
GrOLP Grp 3 Grp 2 
MBEn . 4219 . 4844 
----------------- 
.92 
GroLp Grp 2 Grp 1 
mem . 4844 . 6563 
----------------- 
R2 
Grap Grp 3 Gtp 2 Grp 4 
m3En . 6458 . 7083 . 8125 
------------------------ 
Test 6-, IM ati m (W 
a1 
Grap Grp 1 Grp 2 Grp 4 
MsEn . 3750 . 5208 . 5833 
------------------------ 
.92 
GrOLP Q-, p 2 Gxp 4 Grp 3 
MBM . 5208 . 5833 . 6042 
------------------------ 
Bll 
Table B. 3. 
Correlation Matrix with STD for the Tests in the Test Phase in Experiment 2 
Iftr-Lable cbaw bim Sbd Law 
SM=d 192 
. 5365 . 5000 CEM4 192 
. 6875 -4647 FRE 192 
. 3125 -4647 IM3C 192 
. 6250 -4854 1 11P7 192 
. 6563 . 4762 INM 192 
. 5208 . 5009 
a=miats., .: SMZ .M CEKM am imm IEFM INIM 
SM3cm 1.0000 
-4324** . 4014** . 3371** -3388** . 2374** cemd 
. 4324** l. OOX . 2848** . 2437** -3874** . 2306* FRD 
. 4014** . 2848** 1.0000 -2205* . 3223** -2868** imsc 
. 3371** . 2437** . 2205* 1.0000 . 5493** -3338** EEPM 
. 3388** . 3874** . 3223** -5493** 1.000() . 6668** INMM 
. 2374** . 2306* . 2868** . 3338** . 6668** 1.0000 
N CIE cmes: 1.92 2-12d-Ud s imd :* . (), ** 
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Effects of Age and Condition on Performance in Posttesting. 
Posttest I (Symbol Comprehension 2) 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3,180) = 4.97, p<. 005. 
Age group 10.5 performed best overall. The Control condition gave the best results in all 
agegroups except age group 8.5, where the Indirect condition did. 
Posttest 2 (Picture Comprehension) 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Condition F (2,180) = 3.89, 
p<. 05. Age group 10.5 performed best overall. The Control condition gave the best results 
in all age groups except age group 10.5, where the Indirect condition did. 
Posttest 3 (Production Post) 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3,180) = 3.78, p<. 05. 
Age group 10.5 performed best overall. The Control condition gave the best results in age 
groups 6.5 and 8.5, the Indirect condition in age group 4.5 and the Metalinguistic condition 
in age group 10-5. 
Posttest 4 (Production List) 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3,180) = 3.71, p<. 05. 
Age group 10.5 performed best overall. The Control condition gave the best results in age 
groups 6.5 and 8.5, the Indirect condition in age group 4.5 and the Metalinguistic condition 
in age group 10.5. 
Posttest 5 (Generalisation) 
Two way Anova shows significant main effects of Age F (3.180) = 4.02, p<. O I and 
of Condition F (2,180) = 3.44, p=. 05. 
B13 
Table BA 













SYMEM CCMFFEIE! \= 
AFE G; = 
CCN=N 
Sxn of MBEn Signif 
SqLk-zes EF Sq-are F of F 
3.734 5 . 747 3.104 . 010 2.474 3 . 825 3.427 . 018 1.260 2 . 630 2.619 . 076 
. 698 6 . 116 . 483 . 820 
. 698 6 . 1-16 . 483 . 820 4.432 11 . 403 1.675 . 082 43.312 180 . 241 















arn of MSEn S ignif 
Sqames EF 94mre F of F 
3.000 5 . 600 2.851 . 017 
1.375 3 . 458 2.178 . 092 
1.625 2 . 812 3.861 . 023 
. 375 6 . 063 . 297 . 938 
. 375 6 . 063 . 297 . 938 
3.375 11 . 307 1.458 . 151 
37.875 180 . 210 




















































































































By Pilcup AFE GF= 
CaD CCNCT= 
an of M33n Signif 
Scurce of Variatim q-, 1-: 4 EF Square F of F 
Mý6n Effects 2.313 5 
. 463 2.062 . 072 PGFCUP 1.438 3 
. 479 2.136 . 097 Cau . 875 2 . 438 1.950 . 145 2-Auy Ir±eracticns . 625 6 . 104 . 464 . 834 PGUP CCND . 625 6 . 104 . 464 . 834 Eýýplairý 2.938 11- 
. 267 1.191 . 296 
PEsid)lal 40.375 180 
. 224 
Total 43.313 191 
. 227 
INIER 
W PGFCUP AE GR= 
CCm CCND= 
SLrn of MSEn S iglif 
Sarce of Variatim Sqzres EF Sq-0re F of F 
Main Effects 3.427 5 . 685 2.878 . 016 
PGR: Iup 1.542 3 . 514 2.157 . 095 
CCND 1.885 2 . 943 3.958 . 021 
2-way Irteractims 1.615 6 . 269 1.130 . 347 
PGFCUP CCND 1.615 6 . 269 1.130 . 347 
Eqplained 5.042 11 . 458 1.924 . 039 
RESiAlal 42.875 180 . 238 
Total 47.917 191 . 251 
FUU Maming (O mbined tEEt: s Ti - T16) 
BY X= AE GUUFS 
CCDU Ca\rT= 
an Of MBEn Si glif 
Scurm of Variatim S4k-m-es EF Sc4iare F of F 
Main Effects 72.057 5 14.411 3.934 . 002 
ACICUP 48.266 3 16.089 4.392 . 005 
CIM 23.792 2 1-1.896 3.247 . 041 
2-%uy 3.500 6 . 583 . 
159 . 987 
PGFaP CCND 3.500 6 . 583 . 159 . 
967 
Eqplain3d 75.557 11 6.869 1.875 . 045 
Pesidial 659.438 180 3.664 
Total 734.995 191 3.848 
CaTrd-E=Cn (cmbimd tests Ti+T2+T3+II5+T6) 
E3Y Pimcup AE GP= 
Cau CCNCT= 
an Of 14REn S ignif 
Sazm of Variation -c4Bres 
EF S4kire F of F 
Mqdn Effects 55.839 5 11.168 3.994 . 002 
PGFOJP 27.266 3 9.089 3.250 . 023 
Cr-ND 28.573 2 14.286 5.109 . 007 
2-wry Interactims 3.719 6 . 
620 . 222 . 
969 




&plained 59.557 11 5.414 1.936 . 
037 
Resi d ial 503.313 180 2.796 
Total 562.870 191 2.947 
E, n= (OaTbned tests T5+rl'6) 
By PGRaP AM GF= 
Cau =1= 
B15 
an of MaEn Siglif 
Scxmu-- of Variation Ch 1--F Rijare F of F 
Main Effects 10.677 5 2.135 2.785 
. 019 PGRap 5.354 3 1.785 2.328 
. 076 CEND 5.323 2 2.661 3.471 
. 033 2-, vEry Irteracticris 3.302 6 . 550 . 718 . 636 PGUP CEND 3.302 6 
. 550 . 718 . 636 E5plaired 13.979 1-1 1.271 1.658 . 086 Pasicbal 138-000 180 
. 767 Total 151.979 191 
. 796 
NIC F(BYIESF 1 (SMKL 0 214REýý 
EY PGFCLJP AE GR= 
(11\D CCND= 
am of MSEn Sig-lif 
Sazm of Variation S40res EF S4-iare F of F 
Mýdn Effects 4.172 5 . 834 3.539 . 004 PGFCUP 3.516 3 1.172 4.971 . 002 Cau . 656 2 . 328 1.392 . 251 2-way octi ans . 969 6 . 161 . 685 . 662 PGFOJP cau . 969 6 . 161 . 685 . 662 Dplained 5.141 11 . 467 1.982 . 032 Ptsicbal 42.438 180 . 236 
Total 47.578 191 . 249 
P= REMEM' 2 (P=E CCMFREHaZ3IC P 
BY XFCUP AM GF= 
CCND CCI\=CN 
an of MaEn S ig-, if 
Sa= of Variation 34m= EF S 4-are F of F 
Main Effects 2.776 5 . 555 2.456 . 035 
PGRap 1.016 3 . 339 1.498 . 217 
CCND 1.760 2 . 880 3.894 . 022 
2-vay Irterc-ictions 1.281 6 . 214 . 945 . 464 
AGPCLP C2U 1.281 6 . 214 . 945 . 464 
Exj2ained 4.057 11 . 369 1.632 . 093 
Pesirbal. 40.688 180 . 226 
Total 44.745 191 . 234 
FRM2 3 (FKEM= 2) 
BY PGCLP NE GR= 
CCND CCN=N 
an of MEEn S iglif 
c2u= of Variation S. -pares EF S qjare F of F 
Main Effects 2.802 5 . 560 2.346 . 
043 
PCFCUP 2.708 3 . 903 3.779 . 
012 
C2D . 094 2 . 
047 . 196 . 822 
2-Auy Irteractims 1.448 6 . 241 1.010 . 
420 
PGRajp cau 1.448 6 . 241 1.010 . 420 
Dplained 4.250 11 . 386 
1.617 . 097 
Fesidial 43.000 180 . 239 
Total 47.250 191 . 247 
PFC= FC)S= 4 (PFCELL= 
BY PGRaP AE G; CU: S 
Cau CI=CN 
arn of MaEn S ignif 
ccurm of V: ýiation s4mles EF -9 4ore 
F of F 
M3in Effects 3.010 5 . 602 
2.550 . 029 
PGFCUP 2.625 3 . 675 
3.706 . 013 
B16 
CCND . 385 2 . 193 . 2- ýý . 444 
2-%ay Interactims 2.156 6 . 359 1.522 . 17; --1 
PGRap CCI\D 2.156 6 . 359 1.522 . 173 
aplainrsd 5.167 11 . 470 1.989 . 032 
Resicbal 42.500 180 . 236 





Source of Tvbriaticri 



































































an of mem sigaif 
Source of Variation Sqmres EF Sq-are F of F 
Main Effects 63.422 5 12.684 4.492 
. 
001 
PGRap 48.599 3 16.200 5.737 
. 
001 
Cau 14.823 2 7.411 2.624 . 075 2-vey Int- 13.635 6 2.273 
. 805 . 567 POUP CCND 13.635 6 2.273 
. 805 . 567 Dýained 77.057 11 7.005 2.481 
. 
006 
Rsidjal 508.313 180 2.824 
Total 585.370 1-91 3.065 
Fasit (CtrdDinEd pcsttests SICM+PICEK 
BY CEND CCN=N 
AGRaP AE GR= 
am of M3an S ignif 
Source of Variation Szpares EF S4jare F of F 
Main Effects 11.729 5 2.346 3.530 . 005 
CCND 4.542 2 2.271 3.417 . 035 
Pf FC UP 7.188 3 2.396 3.605 . 015 2-Aay Ir±eracticns 2.625 6 . 438 . 658 . 683 
CCND XFCUP 2.625 6 . 438 . 658 . 683 
Eýýained 14.354 11 1.305 1.964 . 034 
Pesid)al 119.625 180 . 665 
Total 133.979 191 . 701 
Rl=3 (Cad)ined posttests SECU2+PlCavl+FR3D=4GENER) 
13Y CCND CCNC=N 
P19CUP NE G= 
an of MaEn Signif 
Sazoe of Variatim Stl ores EF S: pare F of F 
Main Effects 22.302 5 4.460 3.294 - W7 
Cr-ND 5.698 2 2.849 2.104 . 125 
AGRM 16.604 3 5.535 4.067 . 008 
2-wý, r Interactims 4.927 6 . 821 . 
606 . 725 
Cr-ND PGFOJP 4.927 6 . 821 . 
606 . 
725 
DplainEd 27.229 11 2.475 1.828 . 052 
Resid)al 243.750 180 1.354 
'Ibtal 270.979 191 1.419 
Total cases = 192 
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Table B. 5. 
Summary Table Showing Means for all Tests in Experiment 2 
------------ --- ---------- -- ------------------ Group I Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Condition Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 
Cases 
------- 
Cases Cases Cases 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Summaries of Symbol Comprehension by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5 yrs 
0,4375 0,6250 0,5000 0,8125 
Control 0,5123 0,5000 0,5164 0,4031 
16 16 16 16 
0,3750 0,3750 0,4375 0,5000 
Metalinguistic 0,5000 0,5000 0,5123 0,5164 





Summaries of Object Comprehension by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 










0,6875 0,8125 0,7500 1,0000 
Control 0,4787 0,4031 0,4472 0,0000 
16 16 16 16 
0,5625 0,5625 0,5625 0,6875 
Metalinguistic 0,5123 0,5123 0,5123 0,4787 
16 16 16 16 
0,5000 0,7500 0,6250 0,7500 
Indirect 0,5164 0,4472 0,5000 0,4472 




Summaries of Production by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5yrs 
0,1250 0,1875 0,2500 0,5000 
Control 0,3416 0,4031 0,4472 0,5164 
16 16 16 16 
0,3125 0,1875 0,3750 0,5000 
Metalinguistic 0,4787 0,4031 0,5000 0,5164 
16 16 16 16 
0,1875 0,3125 0,1875 0,6250 










Summaries of Discrimination by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 Yrs 10,5 Yrs 
0,7500 0,7500 0,6875 0,8125 
Control 0,4472 0,4472 0,4787 0,4 031 
16 16 16 16 
0,6250 0,4375 0,4375 0,6875 
Metalinguistic 0,5000 0,5123 0,5123 0,4787 
16 16 16 16 
0,4375 0,5625 0,6875 0,6250 
Indirect 0,5123 0,5123 0,4787 0,5000 
16 16 16 16 
- ------------ Summaries of Depiction by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5 Yrs 
0,6250 0,8750 0,7500 0,7500 
Control 0,5000 0,3416 0,4472 0,4472 
16 16 16 16 
0,4375 0,6875 0,5625 0,8125 
Metalinguistic 0,5123 0,4787 0,5123 0,4031 
16 16 16 16 
0,5000 0,5625 0,6250 0,6875 
Indirect 0,5164 0,5123 0,5000 0,4787 
16 16 16 16 
Summaries of Interpretation by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
-- -- --------------- - ------- - ---------------- - ------------------ 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5 Yrs 
0,3750 0,7500 0,7500 0,7500 
Control 0,5000 0,4472 0,4472 0,4472 
16 16 16 16 
0,3125 0,5625 0,5000 0,5625 
Metalinguistic 0,4787 0,5123 0,5164 0,5123 
16 16 16 16 
0,4375 0,2500 0,5625 0,4375 
Indirect 0,5123 0,4472 0,5123 0,5123 
16 16 16 16 
------------ - ------------ --- --- ------------------------------------ 
Summaries of Full Meaning (Combined tests TI-T6) by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10, .5 yrs 
3,0000 4,0000 3,6875 4,6250 
Control 1,8619 1,5055 1,6215 1,7842 















2,5625 2,933 75 3,1875 4.0000 
Indirect 1,8963 1,7689 2,0726 1.8974 
16 
- ------------------- 
16 16 16 
- ---------- -- -------------------- Summaries of Comprehension (Combined tests TI+T2+T4+T5+T6) by levels of 
Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 Yrs 10,5 
-1 rs 
2,8750 3,8125 3,4375 4,1250 
Control 1,7078 1,3276 1,5478 1,4549 
16 16 16 16 
2,3125 2,6250 2,5000 33,2500 
Metalinguistic 1,57 
, 
98 1,8212 2,0000 1,7701 
16 16 16 16 
2,3750 2,6250 3,0000 3,31750 
Indirect 1,6279 1,6683 1,8974 1,5438 
16 16 16 16 
----------- --------- - -------------------------------------- 
Summaries of Insight (Combined tests T5+T6) by levels of Conditions and 
Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5Yrs 
1,0000 1,6250 1,5000 1,5000 
Control 0,8944 0,7188 0,8165 0,8165 
16 16 16 16 
0,7500 1,2500 1,0625 1,3750 
Metalinguistic 0,9309 0,9309 0,9287 0,8062 
16 16 16 16 
0,9375 0,8125 1,1875 1,1250 
Indirect 0,9979 0,8342 0,9106 0,8851 
16 16 16 16 
Summaries of Symbol Comprehension Post (Posttest 1) by levels of 
- --------------------------- -- ------------------------------------ 
Conditions and Age groups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5 yrs 
0,5625 0,6875 0,4375 0,8125 
Control 0,5123 0,4787 0,5123 0,4031 
16 16 16 16 
0,4375 0,5625 0,1875 0,7500 
Metalinguistic 0,51233 0,5123 0,4031 0,4471 
Indirect 
16 16 16 16 
0,5000 0,4375 0,5000 0,6875 
0,5164 0,5123 0,5164 0,4787 
16 
-- ----- - -------- - -------- --- 
16 
-------- - ------- - 
16 
------ - ------- 
16 
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Summaries of Picture Comprehension (Posttest 2) by levels of Conditions 
and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5Yrs 8,5Yrs 10,5 Yrs 
0,7500 0,8125 0,7500 0.6 8 75 
Control 0,4472 0,4031 0,447- 0,4787 
16 16 16 16 
0,4375 0,4375 0,5000 0,6875 
Metalinguistic 0,5123 0,5123 0,5164 0,4787 
16 16 16 16 
0,5000 0,5000 0,6250 0,8750 
Indirect 0,5164 0,5164 0,5000 0,3416 
16 16 16 16 
-- - ---- - ----- 
Summaries of Production Post (Posttest 3) by levels of Conditions and 
Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5 vrs 
0,3125 0,6250 0,7500 0,6250 
Control 0,4787 0,5000 0,4472 0,5000 
16 16 16 16 
0,3750 0,4375 0,5000 0,8125 
Metalinguistic 0,5000 0,5123 0,5164 0,4031 
16 16 16 16 
0,5000 0,5625 0,5000 0,7500 
Indirect 0,5164 0,5123 0,5164 0,4472 
16 16 16 16 
--- ---- ---- ------ -- ------------ - -- - --- -- -------- - -- 
Summaries of Generalization (Posttest 4) by levels of Conditions and 
Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5 yrs 
0,3125 0,3125 0,4375 0,5000 
Control 0,4787 0,4787 0,5123 0,5164 
16 16 16 16 
0,0625 0,0625 0,3750 0,3 12 5 
Metalinguistic 0,2500 0,2500 0,5000 0,4787 
16 16 16 16 
0,1875 0,1250 0,1250 0,5000 
Indirect 0,4031 0,3416 0,3416 0,5164 
16 16 16 16 
Summaries of Production Post List (Posttest 5) b: 
and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 
0,3750 0,6250 
Control 0,5000 0,5000 
16 16 
y levels of Conditions 





0,3750 0,5000 0.4375 0,8750 
Metalinguistic 0,5000 0.5164 0,5 12 3, 0.3416 
16 16 16 16 
0,5000 0,3125 0,4375 0,6 875 
Indirect 0,5164 0,4787 0,5123 0,4787 
16 
- ----------- ------- 
16 16 16 
-- - ------------ - -------------------------------- 
Summaries of Post (Combined posttests 1+5) by levels of Conditio ns and 
Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5 vrs 
2,3125 33,0625 3,1250 33,2 500 
Control 1,6; 15 1,8062 1,7464 1,8439 
16 16 16 16 
1,6875 2,0000 2,0000 3,4375 
Metalinguistic 1,8154 1,7125 1,8619 1,1529 
16 16 16 16 
2,1875 1,9375 2,1875 3,5000 
Indirect 1,7595 1,5692 1,6008 1,5492 
16 16 16 16 
Summaries of Post Comprehension (Combined posttests 1+2) by levels of 
--- ----------- - -------- - --------------------------------- - --------- 
Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 8,5 yrs 10,5 Yrs 
1,3125 1,5000 1,1875 1,5000 
Control 0,7042 0,8165 0,8342 0,8165 
16 16 16 16 
0,8750 1,0000 0,6875 1,4375 
Metalinguistic 0,8062 0,8944 0,7932 0,8139 
16 16 16 16 
1,0000 0,9375 1,1250 1,5625 
Indirect 0,8944 0,8539 0,8851 0,6292 
16 16 16 16 
---------------- --- -- - ---------------------- -- -------------------- 
Summaries of Post Comprehension (Combined posttests 1+2+3) by levels of 
Conditions and Agegroups. 
. 4,5 yrs 6,5 yrs 
8,5 yrs 10,5 yrs 
1,6250 2,1250 1,9375 2,1250 
Control 1,0247 1,2583 1,1815 1,1475 
16 16 16 16 
1,2500 1,4375 1,1875 2,2500 
Metalinguistic 1,2383 1,2633 1,167-3) 1,0646 
16 16 16 16 
B23 
Indirect 
1,5000 1,5000 1,6250 
1,2649 1,2649 1,1475 
16 16 16 







The Story Used in the Encoding phase. 
Nandi of Wild Wood. 
Section 1. 
Across the magic meadow by the silvery stream, Wild Wood opens onto a chain of 
lofty mountains. The trees of Wild Wood are very, very tall. Up and up they tower. But 
down on the ground among the evergreen bushes and multicoloured flowers, the bright- 
eyed pixie, Nandi, makes his swift ways. Swifter than a mouse even. 
Nandi is a busy fellow. In Spring and Summer, for example, he has the job of 
polishing gently the petal coats of Wild Wood's flowers so that they may twinkle like stars 
when the sun comes out to play. 
Autumn has now fallen., however, and many of the flowers droop their pretty heads 
silently. Nandi has been given a new job. This time it is picking tasty mushrooms for the 
Fairy Queen's Autumn Party. Some of the mushrooms have gone mouldy. Nandi takes care 
not to pick those. "Some mimbos have been in these mushrooms already, "he cries out 
somewhat annoyed. Well, the mimbos can only move slowly while I can run. I should be 
able to get to more mushrooms than they can, " he then adds and brightens up at the 
thought. 
Section 2. 
Up, up, the trees of Wild Wood tower. A new day has broken and in the cool 
morning breeze some gleaming gombes dingle dangle merrily on their hedge. Nandi is not 
too merry, though. He has a secret worry, the poor soul. Here on the hedge top, the roof of 
his house, because, you see, he lives in that hedge, he now sits and washes his face from 
the morning dew. This is the day before the Fairy Queen's Autumn 
Party. All the pixies are 
going, but Nandi is still not sure if he will go. 
cl 
"Oh me, oh my, " he sighs as his eyes meet their own reflection in a big dew drop, 
"why was I made so different from all the other pixIes, oh dear, oh dear. one eye brown and 
one eye blue, oh the shame, at least I thought they would both have turned brown as I grew 
older, brown like the eyes of the other pixies, but, alas, no, here I am still with one eve 
brown and one eye blue, deary me. " And like he has done so often before when feeling so 
blue, he reaches out for his magic wand and waves it in front of his eyes and utters the 
pixies'magic words: Ixy, Wixy". He looks back into the dew drop. No, it didn't work this 
time either. 
"Oh. Nandi. Stop being so silly, " he says in a bleak tone of voice, and let's himself 
slip to the ground. Then he steps on something soft and long which nearly gets squashed. 
"Oh, it is a mimbo. So sorry, " he says softly. Then he rushes off for his day's work. 
Section 3. 
Up, up the trees of Wild Wood tower. The noblest of them is the mighty, old Oak, 
home of Wise Elf. 
Now, Wise Elf is said to be of a cross temper, but cross, or not, he knows all about 
magic, and a little magic, Nandi feels is badly needed to change the colour of his blue eye. 
After all, it is quite clear that Nandi's own magic wand won't do the job. Nandi, therefore, 
decides to pay Wise Elf a visit. 
Hidden behind a spray of ivy is a tiny door to the old Oak. A lone bird sits there and 
digs for blue mimbos. His favourites. Nandi knocks loudly on the door which creeks open. 
Two twinkling brown eyes look him up and down and a gruff voice says: "Speak up, pixie. 
Don't waste my time. " These sharp words startle Nandi, but he plucks up his courage and 
starnmers: "Well, uhm. , it's my eyes, 
I have got one brown and one blue, and it feels 
dreadfully odd, all other pixies I know of have got both theirs brown. 
I wondered if you ... 
?" 
"You young fool, " Wise Elf interrupts with a mischievous 
look on his face, " it's your Irises, 
and my magic can't change them, anyway. Just let it 
be and your Irises shall take you to the 
Source of Light. " Saying that, he roars with laughter, as 
if it is all a big joke, and slams the 
door. What cheek. 
C2 
As Nandi turns from the door. he sees that lone bird again, but this time with a blue 
mimbo in his beak. 
Section 4. 
"Oh me, oh my, " Nandi whispers helplessly. as he slips back home. I am afraid I 
don't understand at all what Wise Elf is talking about. " It feels as if his good heart is 
sinking. I mean to say, he has a really bad heart ache, as you can imagine. For manY hours 
he racks his brain over Wise Elf s words. -It is this word Iris that puzzles him most. Wise 
Elf had said he could not change "your Irises. " And he had also said something about the 
source of Light. 
Now, Nandi knows some things that bear the name Iris. Well, one is the rainbow. 
Everyone in Wild Wood calls her Iris. Her flight through the air is so rapid that she is 
seldom seen,, except for her multicoloured shiny trail. Even though Nandi has sometimes 
seen two such Irises in the sky, surely they are not the Irises Wise Elf meant. After all, they 
do not belong to him. "Your Irises, " must therefore be something different. Well, on the 
bank of the silvery stream where the mimbos live in the damp, dark soil, there are the 
Yellow Irises, the flowers that grow by the stream. But, another pixie takes care of these 
flowers, so it can not be them either. But then what can "my Inses" be 
Poor Nandi is hungry and completely exhausted. He picks a few juicy gombes from 
his hedge to eat. Then he falls asleep. He dreams that the Fairy Queen comes to him. She 
looks him in the eyes and whispers softly : "Remember Iris, the rainbow. She has got a 
visible part and an invisible part. Well, dear chap, that's how it is with the most important 
things. They are invisible to the eyes. But the source of Light where all things come from 
also shines in you. Why bother so much then over having a brown Iris in one eye and a 
blue Iris in the other? After all, it is your Irises that help the Light make some things visible 
to you. " Saying this she disappears and Nandi wakes. His worry has left him and he sings 
sweetly at the top of his tiny voice and happiness shines in his eyes. Now 
he knows what 




In the following pages quantitative data are presented that compliment the data 
presented in the Result section of Chapter 4 (p. 240-255). 
Patterns of Within -C hildren/Between-C h ild ren Responses. 
In the 4-year-old group for Indirects, two of the children got all five tests correct 
and three children had all tests correct when the scores from Test 3 (Production) were 
ornitted. In the same age group for Controls, two of the children got all five tests correct 
and two children had all tests correct when T3 was omitted. 
In the 5-year-old age group for Indirects, two of the children got all five tests 
correct and three children had all tests correct when the first test had been omitted,, and one 
child had all tests correct when T3 is omitted. In the same age group for Controls, seven of 
the children got all five tests correct and two children had all tests correct when T3 Is 
omitted. 
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Table C. 1. 
Percentages of Correct Responses in T3, T4 and T5 in the Test Phase in Exp. 3. 
Age Condition T3 T4 T5 
4 Indirect 22% 50% 50% 
4 Control 33% 50% 61% 
5 Indirect 39% 72% 56% 
5 Control 50% 67% 72% 
C5 
Figure C. l. 















Age 4 Age b 
Table C. 2. 
Duncan Multiple Ranges Test for Age and Condition in Experiment 3. 
(No subsets are presented here, as there were not significant enough differences in means: 
differences in means are presented in the following table). 
7b& 1- Sign n- r' im nxiliticn) 
GrCup Oa zit. Man Dsv iaticn Eý= 95 R, "-t 03if Int fcr NtEn 
Grp 1 36 . 5000 . 5071 . 0845 . 3284 Th . 6716 
Grp 2 36 . 4543 . 
-0757 
. 5685 Th . 6759 
Total 72 . 6111 . 4909 . 0579 . 4958 Th . 7265 
Tg& 1- Siga nr Lm (Am) 






D2= 95 Fct Ctnf Irl- fcr Mýn 
(ILP 1 36 . 6389 . 4K1 . 08U . 4741 TD . 8037 
Grp 2 36 . 5833 . 5000 . 0833 . 4142 Th . 7525 
Total 72 . 6LU . 4909 . 0579 . 4958 Th . 7265 
TeEk- 2- Cbjer-t 
GrCLP Cburit MEEn Deviation E= 95 Pct Ccnf Int for Mean 
ap 1 36 . 6111 . 4944 . 
0824 . 4438 'Ib . 7784 
GLp 2 36 . 6667 . 
4781 . 0797 . 
5049 To . 8284 
Total 72 . 6389 . 
4837 . 0570 . 
5252 ib . 7526 
Test 2- Cbject Caqxid-frsicn (Age) 




E= 95 Ft--t ax± Irt for Mýn 
c3rp 1 36 . 
6944 . 4672 . 
0779 . 5364 rib . 
8525 
Ckp 2 36 . 5833 . 
5000 . 0833 . 
4142 To . 7525 
Total 72 . 6389 . 
4837 . 0570 . 
5252 rib . 7526 
Test 3- Prcdactiarl (0=3iticn) 
Gru-P Oarit MEEn Deviation E= 95 Fct 
Omf Int for MaEn 
Grp 1 36 . 3056 . 
4672 . 
0779 . 1475 
'Ib . 4636 
Gtp 2 36 . 4167 . 
5000 . 




Tbtal 72 . 3611 . 4837 . 0570 . 2474 Th . 4748 
Ttst 3- Prcclcticn (Age) 
Stmbid Starx3ard 
GrcLp CcLrt Mam Deviatim E= 95 Fdt- Ctff Int fOr MEEM 
Grp 1 36 . 2778 . 4543 . 0757 . 1241 Th . 4315 
Grp 2 36 . 4444 . 5040 . 0840 . 2739 Th . 6150 
Total 72 . 3611 . 4837 . 0570 . 2474 Th . 4748 
Test 4- Dqaicticn (0m: 3iticn) 




a= 95 Pct Ctnf Int fcr MsEn 
Grp 1 36 . 6389 . 4871 . 0812 . 4741 'Ib . 8037 
Ckp 2 36 . 5833 . 5000 . 0833 . 4142 Th . 7525 
Tbtal 72 . 6111 . 4909 . 0579 . 4958 'Ib . 7265 
Test 4- Dspiction (kje) 
GL-CLP 
Starr-Jard Sta-dard 
a)unt Mýn Dýviaticn D= 95 Pct Omf Int fcr Mýn 
Grp 1 36 . 5278 . 5063 . 
0844 . 3565 Th . 
6991 
Grp 2 36 . 6944 . 
4672 . 0779 . 
5364 Th . 8525 
Total 72 . 6111 . 4909 . 
0579 . 4958 Th . 
7265 
Ttst 5- Qategmy (Ctr iditicn) 




Err= 95 Fct Oaif Int fcr MsEn 
Grp 1 36 . 5278 . 
5063 . 0844 . 
3565 'Ib . 6991 
Grp 2 36 . 6667 . 
4781 . 0797 . 
5049 Th . 8284 
Total 72 . 5972 . 
4939 . 0582 . 
4812 Th . 7133 
Test 5-Q itagury (Ale) 
d S d d 




E= 95 Ft7t- OJIf Irt fCr MýEn 
Grp 1 36 . 5556 . 
5040 . 
0840 . 3850 Th . 
7261 
Grp 2 36 . 6389 . 
4871 . 0812 . 
4741 Tb . 8037 
Total 72 . 5972 . 
4939 . 
0582 . 




Correlation Matrix with STD for the Tests in the Test Phase in Experiment 3. 
lbriabas m9m Sbd Dew 
S= 72 . 6111 . 4909 
CEC(M 72 . 6389 . 4837 
PJRM 72 . 3611 . 4837 
72 . 61-U . 4909 
CRM; 72 . 5972 . 4939 
1.0000 . 5272** . 1252 . 
1234 Z743 
CEMA . 5272** 1.0000 . 
3244* . 2307 . 
2080 
PJRM . 1252 . 3244* 
1.0000 . 3032* . 
3226* 
ilmm . 1234 . 
2307 . 3032* 
1.0000 . 5648** 
cKm; . 2743 . 
2080 . 3226* . 
5648** 1.0000 
N cf casm: 72 2-t&LUd Simi :*- . 01 '- -001 
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Effects of Age and Condition on Performance in the first two Tests of the Test Phase 
and of all the Tests in Posttesting. 
Test 1 (Sign Comprehension). 
Two way Anova shows that Condition is close to being significant F(1,68) =3 . 
75 
almost at p=. 05. Age group 4.4 performed better overall, with the Control condition giving 
better results for both age groups. 
Test 2 (Object Comprehension). 
Two way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 4.4 performed better overall. The Control condition gave better results with age 
group 4.4, the Indirect condition with age group 
Posttests: 
Posttest 1 (Sign Comprehension Post). 
Two way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 4.4 performed better overall. The Control condition gives better results in age group 
4.4, the Indirect condition in age group 5.6. 
Posttest 2 (Object Comprehension Post).. 
Two way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 5.6 perfonned better overall. The Control condition gives better results in 
both 
agegroups. 
Posttest 3 (Production Post). 
Two way Anova shows no significant main effects of 
Age and Condition. Age 
group 5.6 performed better overall. The Control condition gives 
better results in both age 
groups. 
CIO 
Posttest 4 (Category Post). 
Two way Anova shows no significant main effects of Age and Condition. Age 
group 5.6 performed better overall. The Control condition gives better results in age group 




















cLrn of botan Signif 
S41ares EF -1341are F of F 
. 944 2 . 472 1.993 . 144 
. 056 1 . 056 . 234 . 630 
. 889 1 . 889 3.752 . 057 
. 056 1 . 056 . 234 . 630 
. 056 1 . 056 . 234 . 630 1.000 3 . 333 1.407 . 248 16.111 68 
. 237 




C azce Of Vea: iaticr, 











an of 1,, hr: n Signif 
Squares EF 94Bre F of F 
. 278 2 . 139 . 586 . 559 
. 222 1 . 222 . 938 . 336 
. 056 1 . 056 . 234 . 630 
. 222 1 . 222 . 938 . 336 
. 222 1 . 222 . 938 . 336 
. 500 3 . 167 . 703 . 553 
16.111 68 . 237 
















an Of ME-Ein Siglif 
S. -Ijares EF Sq)are F of F 
. 722 2 . 361 1.545 . 
221 
. 500 1 . 500 
2.140 . 148 
. 222 1 . 
222 . 951 . 333 
. 000 1 . 
000 . 000 1.000 
. 000 1 . 
000 . 000 1.000 
. 722 3 . 
241 1.030 . 385 
15.889 68 . 234 


















Sqxwes EF Sq-iare F of F 
. 556 




1 . 500 
2.054 . 156 
. 056 
1 . 056 . 
228 . 634 
. 000 
1 . 000 . 
000 1.000 
. 000 
1 . 000 . 
000 1.000 
. 556 
3 . 185 . 
761 . 520 
16.556 68 . 243 








an Of MBEn Sigriýf Scurce of Variatim SIzres EF S 
Main Effects 






. 390 PGRCUP 
. 125 1 . 125 . 505 . 480 Cau 
. 347 1 . 347 1.403 . 240 2-wEry Irteracticrr, 
. 014 1 . 014 . 056 . 813 POUP CCMD 
. 014 1 . 014 . 056 . 813 E5plained 
. 486 3 . 162 . 655 . 583 F-Esi d ial 16.833 68 
. 248 Tbtal 17.319 71 
. 244 
FuLl M3miirg (ambLmd tests M r15) 
By' PGRaJI D AE GRaJFS 
CEND CCNC= 
an of PtEn Signif 
Sburoe of Variatim S41ares EF -c4mre F of F Main Effects 5.139 2 2.569 
. 966 . 386 PGRap 1.125 1 1.125 . 423 . 518 CCND 4.014 1 4.014 1.509 . 223 2-vHy Interacticns 
. 681 1 . 681 . 256 . 615 PGFCJP COM 
. 681 1 . 681 . 256 . 611) Eqalained 5.819 3 1.940 . 729 . 538 Resi d ial 180.833 68 2.659 
Total 186.653 71 2.629 
OMP (0:: nbimd tests TJ-+'I2+T4+T5) 
W MUP AE (9UJPS 
CCND CCND= 
ain of Ntan S ignif 
Scume of Variatian S4ores EF S4iare F of F 
Main Effects 2.472 2 1.236 . 643 . 529 POCUP 
. 125 1 . 125 . 065 . 799 CUD 2.347 1 2.347 1. = . 273 2-%W Irteract: ý= . 681 1 . 681 . 354 . 554 
, PGRaip c2D . 681 1 . 681 . 354 . 554 
E5C)Iairjed 3.153 3 1.051 . 547 . 652 
Resicbal 1K. 722 68 1.922 
Thtal 133.875 71 1.886 
Vatal =: qpt (Ctffbined tests Ti+'12+T5) 
13Y AGCUP AE GR= 
CCND CCNCT= 
an Of MeEn S ignif 
Scumn of Variatim -SýtLares EF -Stpare F of F 
Main Effects 3.250 2 1.625 1.358 . 264 
PGRaip . 125 1 . 
125 . 104 . 748 
Cau 3.125 1 3.125 2.61-1 . 111 
2-vay Interactia-s . 681 1 . 
681 . 569 . 453 
PGRap Cau . 681 1 . 
681 . 569 . 453 
E5qD] ai ned 3.931 3 1.310 1.095 . 357 
RESi d 3al 81.389 68 1.197 
Total 85.319 71 1.202 
SM32ý2 = CCMMEMMCN = 
By PGRaP AE GRJJFS 
Cau MET= 
C13 
axn of MaEn Sig-Lf San-ce of 'ýbriatian S43ares EF S 4-Bre F of F Main Effects 
. 056 2 . 028 . 132 . Tn PGCUP 
. 056 1 . 056 . 264 . 609 CEND 
. 000 1 . 000 . 000 1.000 2-vzry Interacticns 
. 056 1 . 056 . 264 . 609 PGCUP Cau . 056 1 . 056 . 264 . 609 E5p] ai rr-*9 . L11 3 . 037 . 176 . 912 Resi d lal 14.333 68 
. 211 Total 14.444 71 
. 203 
CB= CEI= CCMpFaiaý=. 
BY AIUJP PM ýý 
Cr-ND CCNET= 
axt, of PtEn Signif Scuroe of 'vbriaticn S4m-es EF Sqiare F of F M3in Effects 
. 806 2 . 403 1.949 . 150 PoRap . 125 1 . 125 . 605 . 439 Cau 
. 681 1 . 681 3.292 . 074 2-my Irteracticns 
. 014 1 . 014 . 067 . 796 KRIP CCND 
. 014 1 . 014 . 067 . 796 
_ ained . 819 3 . 273 1.32-1 . 275 Rýsidial 14.056 68 
. 207 Total 14.875 71 
. 210 
FR2M FECCLL= R)ST 
w PGRap 
Cau 
'KE a; = 
CCNCT= 
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(ctntäred pcsttests Scu= - G=) 
13y bSR: lip Alý GFOLIPS 
ci: m cr-NIMmý 
an Of biBEn Signif 
San-ce of Vaa: iatian Sgaares IF 
Square F of F 
Main EEfezts 4.806 2 2.403 
1.234 . 298 




«: 3 D(DZU ý, 
(, F, Iý- 
CEND 3.125 1 3.125 1.605 . 210 2-v, ay Irferacticns 1.125 1 1.125 
. 578 . 45:, - AICUP 1.125 1 1.125 
. 578 . 45c- E>püairad 5.931 3 1.977 1--011) . 391 pasi ci la] 132.389 68 1.947 
Total 138.319 71 1.948 
Fcmb KlittLied pcsttests SI02Q-+CB=) 
BY' PORMP KE GFCJPS 
CEND CCN: l= 
Sm of MBEn S ignif 
Sazca of Variaticn Stimres EF -ckgýe F of F 
Main Effects 2.028 2 1.014 
. 855 . 430 
IGR= . 347 1 . 347 . 293 . 590 
can 1.681 
ýi 
1.681 1.418 . 238 
2--tjaýr Interactia-s . 681 1 . 681 . 574 . 451 
PGCUP ccm . 681 1 . 681 . 574 . 451 
E>plairied 2.708 3 . 903 . 762 . 520 
P, Esi ci ni 80.611 68 1.185 
Total 83.319 71 1.174 
C15 
Table C. 5. 
Summary tables showing means for all tests in Experiment 3 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 


















)n by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
0,7222 0,5000 
1ndirect 0,4609 0,5145 
18 18 
0,6667 0,6667 
Control 0,4851 0,4851 
18 18 
Summaries of Production by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
0,2222 0,3889 
Indirect 0,4278 0,5016 
18 18 
0,3333 0,5000 
Control 0,4851 0,5145 
18 18 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Summaries of Depiction by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
0,5556 0,7222 
Indirect 0,5113 0,4609 
18 18 
0,5000 0,6667 
Control 0,5145 0,4851 
18 18 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Summaries of Category by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 







Control 0,5016 0,4609 
18 18 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Summaries of Verbal Concept (Combined tests TI+T2+T5) bY levels of Conditions 
and Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
1,7778 1,5000 
Indirect 1,2154 1,0432 
18 18 
2,0000 2,1111 
Control 0,9701 1,1318 
18 18 
Summaries of Full Meaning (Combined tests TI-T5) by levels of Conditions and 
------- ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
2,5556 2,6111 
Indirect 1,6881 1,5770 
18 18 
2,8333 3,2778 
Control 1,3827 1,8409 
18 18 
Summaries of Comprehension (Combined tests TI+T2+T4+T5) by levels of 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
2,3333 2,2222 
1ndirect 1,4951 1,3086 
18 18 
2,5000 2,7778 
Control 1,2005 1,5168 
18 18 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Summaries of Post (Combined posttests PTI-PT4) by levels of Conditions 
and Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
2,1667 2,7222 
Indirect 1,5435 1,4061 
18 18 
2,8333 2,8889 
Control 1,2005 1,4096 
18 18 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




4,4 yrs 5,6 vrs 
0,7222 0,7222 
Indirect 0,4609 0,4609 
18 18 
0,7778 0,6667 
Control 0,4278 0A851 
18 18 
------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- 
Summaries of Object Comprehension Post by levels of Conditions and 
Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
0,5556 0,6667 
Indirect 0,5113 0,4851 
18 18 
0,7778 0,8333 
Control 0,4278 0,3835 
18 18 
-------- -------------------------------------------------------------- 
Summaries of Production Post by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
0,3333 0,5556 
Indirect 0,4851 0,5113 
18 18 
0,5000 0,6111 
Control 0,5145 0,5016 
18 18 
-------------------------------- 
Summaries of Category Post by levels of Conditions and Agegroups. 
4,4 yrs 5,6 yrs 
0,5556 0,7778 
Indirect 0,5113 0,4278 
18 18 
0,7778 0,7778 




Total cases = 72 
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